The white line : Rowan Williams on time and tragedy by Delport, Khegan Marcel
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE WHITE LINE: ROWAN WILLIAMS ON TIME AND 
TRAGEDY 
 
BY  
 
 
KHEGAN MARCEL DELPORT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master 
of Theology (MTh), Department Systematic Theology and Ecclesiology, Faculty of 
Theology, Stellenbosch University.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Professor R.R. Vosloo 
December 2014 
2 
 
Declaration  
By submitting this thesis, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original 
work, that I am the authorship owner thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that 
I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification. 
 
Date: 29/8/2014 
 
 
Signed: Khegan M. Delport 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright  2014 Stellenbosch University
All rights reserved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3 
 
Abstract 
 
In this study, I will be concerned with the viability of a tragic theology that is at the same time able 
to cohere with the standards of a classically orthodox Christian theology. My study will focus on a 
particular figure, namely Rowan Williams who, I will argue, exemplifies a blending together of these 
two concerns. However, as we shall see in this study, ‘tragic theology’ is by no means an 
uncontroversial affair since some argue that it implies heterodox conclusions in relation to God, 
creation, sin, etc. My aim is to counteract this claim that a classically orthodox theology cannot coexist 
with a tragic perspective. I will make the claim that tragic theology aims to emphasise the reality of 
contingency, conflict and suffering in relation to human life as seriously as possible, without effacing 
the difficulty it proposes to thought and the limits of human action, while at the same time holding onto 
the conviction that these beliefs can exist comfortably with an orthodox theological perspective. 
Through my study of Williams, which will largely follow a genealogical approach, I aim to show that 
Williams is able to emphasise this difficulty of tragedy, while at the same time believing in the 
fundamental goodness of creation, the possibility of transformation, hope and healing, as understood 
within a incarnationally-centred understanding of ‘the redemption of time’. Systematically speaking, I 
will attempt to arrange Williams’ understanding of tragedy according to four motifs which recur 
throughout his oeuvre, namely contingency, contemplation, compassion, and non-closure, all of which 
can be understood within the context of a classical Christian theology of God, salvation, and 
creaturely finitude. 
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Opsomming 
Ek sal in hierdie studie ondersoek instel na die lewensvatbaarheid van 'n tragiese teologie wat 
terselfdertyd met die kriteria vir ‘n klassieke, ortodokse Christelike teologie belyn is. My studie fokus 
op 'n bepaalde figuur, te wete Rowan Williams,  wat, – so argumenteer ek – hierdie twee aspekte op 
eksemplariese wyse aan die orde stel. Soos uit hierdie studies al blyk, is die begrip ‘tragiese 
teologie‘ geensins 'n onomstrede saak nie, aangesien sommige juis argumenteer dat dit afwykende 
beskouinge aangaande God, die skepping, die sonde, ensovoorts, impliseer. My doel in hierdie studie 
is om die standpunt uit te daag dat 'n klassieke, ortodokse teologie noodwendig teenoor `n tragiese 
perspektief gestel moet word.  Ek wil juis argumenteer dat 'n tragiese teologie daarna streef om die 
werklikheid van kontingensie, konflik en lyding ernstig te neem, sonder om in die proses die 
uitdagings wat dit vir die proses van nadenke en vir die grense van menslike handeling inhou, op te 
hef. Terselfdertyd word die oortuiging gehuldig dat `n tragiese teologie‘ gemaklik met `n klassieke, 
ortodoksie teologiese persektief saamval. In die bestudering van Williams se werk, wat grootliks 'n 
genealogiese benadering volg, wys ek uit hoe Williams hierdie komplekse aspek van tragedie 
verreken, terwyl hy terselfdertyd aan die fundamentele goedheid van die skepping, asook aan die 
moontlikheid van transformasie, hoop en heling, vashou. Hierdie oortuiginge word binne die kader 
van `n inkarnasie-gesentreerde verstaan van die ‘verlossing van die tyd‘ geplaas. Sistematies beskou, 
sal ek poog om Williams se verstaan van tragedie volgens vier motiewe wat deurlopend in sy werk 
voorkom, te bespreek. Hierdie vier motiewe is onderskeidelik die motiewe van kontingensie, 
kontemplasie, medelye en nie-sluiting (of voortdurende openheid). Daar word geargumenteer dat al 
hierdie begrippe binne die konteks van `n klassieke Christelike teologiese raamwerk aangaande  
God, redding en eindigheid geplaas kan word. 
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 The reference is to the song entitled ‘Going Home’, from Cohen’s album Old Ideas.  
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membrane of freedom.’ 
 
 
— Rowan Williams, ‘Augustine’ and ‘King Lear’ 
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1. Introduction: Tragic Theologies 
 
1.1. The Theme 
 
 
Our study shall be concerned with essentially one question: is a tragic theology a viable option for 
an authentically Christian theology? This is by no means a straightforward question (as we shall see) 
because our understanding of ‘the tragic’ is by no means uniform or seamless. Furthermore, 
rendering Christian belief and hope into a more tragic vein is by no means uncontroversial in itself. 
According to a respectable body of theologians and scholars, a tragic vision sits rather uneasily in 
relation to mainstream orthodox theology. Such scholars, while not denying the reality of tragedy 
itself, question whether tragedy can have any ultimacy in relation to our soteriological or 
eschatological reflections. Many of their concerns have some valid grounds: does not Christian 
theology teach a divine redemption which aims at the reconciliation of all things (Col. 2.20) in which 
every tear will be wiped away (Rev. 21.4)? How does such a happy end cohere with a tragic vision? 
Certainly the history of humankind is laced with human suffering, conflict, and disaster, but does not 
the Christian tradition, in which God’s reconciling act in Christ is confessed, point towards a comedia 
and not a collapse into the abyss, or the blindness of Oedipus?   
Tragedy has been understood in different ways throughout the history of human culture. As is well-
known, its origins, as far as can be discerned, lie in Greek culture (more specifically in Athens of the 
sixth century BCE)
1
. However, as our cultural history shows, tragedy and ‘the tragic’ generally 
speaking have been transformed and modified by the cultural and philosophical milieus it has 
interacted with, resulting in different themes and motifs being exercised.
2
 In the past, it was easier for 
people to reduce ‘tragedy’ to a basic idea or ‘essence’, whether it be the traditional Greek themes of 
ὕβρις, άτη or ἁμαρτία, or the Medieval concept of Fate and Fortune, as well as the idea of a 
disastrous conclusion to a narrative. Today it is a little more difficult to describe tragedy in accordance 
with a single theme or underlying conceptual unity. Certainly the themes of human suffering, 
contingency and conflict remain important, but the manner in which these themes are plotted is by no 
means uniform. This has not prevented scholars and theologians from articulating antagonistic 
schemas whereby the Judeo-Christian tradition is deemed to be anti-tragic, and to be ultimately in 
conflict with the conclusions of tragic inquiry and questioning. When this occurs, as will be argued in 
this thesis, tragedy is usually being interpreted through a rather Procrustean definition, which is 
unable to account for the pluriformity of tragic texts and phenomena.   
It is my aim in this study to question such a hasty conclusion; I aim to show that an orthodox 
Christian theology is compatible with a tragic vision. Certainly such a tragic theology would need to be 
carefully circumscribed and limited, but nonetheless I aim to show that such an enterprise is possible 
and even desirable. To justify such a conclusion, I will focus my attention on a modern exemplary of 
                                               
1
 ‘Whatever might have happened elsewhere in Greece, whatever analogues (none of them true ones for that matter) may 
appear in Egypt, Mexico, or Polynesia, tragedy has never come to birth anywhere in the world except in Athens in the sixth 
century B.C.’ The reference for this quote is Gerald F. Else, The Origin and Early Form of Greek Tragedy. Martin Classical 
Lectures XX (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 1.  
2
 We shall justify these statements later in this chapter.  
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such a circumscribed tragic theology, namely Rowan Williams, widely considered to be an orthodox 
and classically-orientated thinker.
1
 In my estimation (along with many others), Williams is one of the 
most discerning, learned and penetrating theological thinkers in the world today, one who is able to 
traverse the complex interrelations of theology, history, philosophy, literature, and poetry with a 
relative amount of ease. However, Williams is also a profoundly orthodox thinker
2
 who is able to 
commandeer the resources of the mainstream theological tradition in surprising and provocative 
ways. In relation to the theme of tragedy, as I will argue, Williams seems to be endorsing four main 
motifs that recur throughout his oeuvre. These themes will be unpacked throughout the development 
of this thesis, but I will give a brief summary here so that the reader may have a basic orientation of 
what is to come.  
                                               
1
 There are others who could have been studied, but for reasons to be given I have chosen Williams as the subject of this 
thesis. A survey of other thinkers will be given later in this chapter.  
2
 For some (especially for some conservative evangelical voices within the Anglican Communion), this is a disputed claim. Their 
suspicion of Williams is tied mainly to his own position on the divisive problem of homosexuality and gay ordination. It is not my 
intent in this study to enter into this debate (which is fraught with heated emotions on both sides); my contention that Williams is 
an orthodox thinker stems from the fact (one that is difficult to deny) that Williams’ theology remains securely placed within the 
mainstream of orthodox thinking, which can be seen in his endorsement of a robust Trinitarian theology, the divinity of Christ, 
the centrality of the cross and resurrection, the virgin birth, the importance of prayer and contemplation, negative theology, 
original sin, and even the empty tomb. It could be confidently said that (by and large) Williams remains within a conservative 
Augustinian tradition of thinking. However, this should not imply that Williams is unable to mine the depths of this tradition in 
new and innovative ways (as has been argued particularly by Jeffrey McCurry). Oliver O’ Donovan once described Rowan 
Williams as a thinker ‘who did not think it the business of theology to make Christian faith less offensive to modern man, but 
rather to expand modern man's imagination to the dimensions of Trinitarian faith’. For this quotation, see Oliver O’ Donovan, 
‘Archbishop Rowan Williams’. Pro Ecclesia 12.1 (2003), 5.  
 It should be mentioned here that for Williams ‘orthodoxy’ is not about settling with certain credenda, and then sticking with 
them, no matter what. Primarily, orthodoxy is concerned the category of holiness, a particular distinctiveness, in the sense that 
‘The idea of orthodoxy...is inextricably linked to the idea of holiness. Not (God knows) that right belief makes you holy...But the 
idea of an orthodox faith makes no sense unless it is about the conditions that make it possible to live a holy life and the criteria 
by which Christians recognize this or that life as holy’ (Williams, ‘The Seal of Orthodoxy: Mary and the Heart of Christian 
Doctrine’, in Martin Warner (ed.), Say Yes to God; Mary and the Revealing of the Word Made Flesh (London: Tufton, 1999), 
15). It is in this sense that doctrine and tradition provide a critical voice in the present, namely, that ‘the tradition that is 
important for theological method is the story of a church thinking and living in confrontation with the primary challenge of God 
and its classical testimony. This is why tradition can be a critical and renewing factor in theology…a creative recovery of the 
past in the context of an idle, banal, or corrupt present’ (in Williams (with James Atkinson), ‘On Doing Theology’, in Christina 
Baxter (ed.), Stepping Stones: Joint Essays on Anglican Catholic and Evangelical Unity (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1987), 
10). And furthermore, as he says elsewhere: ‘tradition makes thinking possible – an engagement, even a struggle, with what is 
given, rather than a passive and meaningless observation. Paradoxically, it is only ‘orthodoxies’ that make us critical, that 
enable us to ask questions’ (Williams, What is Catholic Orthodoxy?’, in Rowan Williams and Kenneth Leech (eds.), Essays 
Catholic and Radical (London: Bowerdean, 1983), 12). Regarding the language of creeds and specific doctrines, Williams does 
not seem to suggest that this way of speaking is non-revisable, but rather that what we are concerned with here is the least 
inadequate way of speaking about God that is available to us. For example, regarding the Nicene Creed, he argues that it 
provides us with the least ‘mythological’ way of speaking of God since in it we are not concerned with ‘cosmogonic fantasy’ or 
‘speculative dramas’ of heavenly individuals, because the incarnation has given as realistic way of speaking in which ‘the 
history and unsayable resource of the divine act are no longer to be pulled apart’ (For these statements, see Williams, ‘The 
Nicene Heritage’, in James M. Byrne (ed.), Christian Understanding of God Today (Dublin: Columbia, 1993), 45-48). Being 
patient with the language of traditional Christianity, refusing to give into another idiom too quickly, stems from the belief that 
‘scriptural and Christian language always says more than it initially seems to say. To believe that you have mastered that ‘more’ 
is to arrest a process in which God is actively causing you to grow…to be cautious about hermeneutical or dogmatic closure is 
not discard or relativise sanctioned words; you occupy the territory marked out by those words, but you will not know where the 
boundaries are, because the search for definite boundaries suggests that you might be ‘in possession’ of territory, not yourself 
included in (possessed by?) it’.(For this quotation, see Williams, ‘B.F. Wescott (1825-1901): The Fate of Liberal Anglicanism’, in 
Anglican Identities (London: Darton, Longman, & Todd, 2004), 80-81). This means that, for Williams, even though Christianity is 
entwined with certain ways of speaking, this does not mean that orthodoxy is a finished project: rather ‘orthodoxy’ should be 
considered as something ‘something still future (to become 'coeval' with the debate at some level); which means that a briskly 
undialectical rhetoric' today of ‘conserving' and 'defending' a clear deposit of faith may come less easily to us…Orthodoxy 
continues to be made’ (in Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition (rev. ed, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 24-25), because 
Christian doctrine and language contains within itself resources for ‘self-critique’ (cf. Williams, ‘Maurice Wiles and Doctrinal 
Criticism’ , in Wrestling with Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology, (ed.) Mike Higton (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 
275-299), and continues to be ‘open to judgement’ from its reception in history and in its engagements with non-Christian 
contexts (cf. ‘The Judgement of the World’, in On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 29-43). And when everything is 
said and done, the main purpose of dogma is not about formulas but to direct us joyously and in thanksgiving to the 
transcendent God revealed in Christ. On this, see Williams, ‘Creed and Eucharist’, in Gratiarum Actio (CMZ-Verlag Winrich: 
Rheinbach, 2004), 34-49 (this was an oratio given on his reception of an honorary doctorate at the Rheinische Friedrich-
Wilhelsm-Universität Bonn). For an excellent discussion of this theme generally in Williams’ work, see Benjamin Myers, 
‘Disruptive History: Rowan Williams on Heresy and Orthodoxy’, in Matheson Russell (ed.), On Rowan Williams: Critical Essays 
(Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2009), 47-67.  
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Firstly, Williams believes that tragedy and human suffering are entwined with our habitation of 
materiality and temporality. Tragedy, for Williams, is not a part of some absolute or ontological 
necessity but is rather a part of the contingent necessity of living within creaturely time.
1
 To live as 
created beings is to live within the finite plane that is granted us by our dwelling within time and the 
material order. For Williams, createdness and temporality are good things that should be embraced, 
that should be seen as part and parcel of God’s primordial gifting action (creatio ex nihilo), which 
thereby grounds the goodness of what is created. However, to live as creatures also means to be 
subject to things that are beyond our control, to forces and dynamics that hinder our action, to suffer 
the conflict of differing rights and goods that often characterise our social interactions. And it is this 
experience of contingency that is the root of tragedy. By grounding tragedy in contingency and 
created finitude, Williams thereby avoids the problem of an ultimate ontological conflict, as critiqued 
by figures such as David Bentley Hart and John Milbank.   
Secondly, in relation to tragedy, Williams adopts a contemplative stance in the sense that he 
refuses to efface the recalcitrant difficulty of the tragic, but rather seeks to allow tragedy to stand out 
in all its requisite ‘objectivity’. Rather than seeking a soothing explanation or resolution to the problem 
of the tragic phenomena, it will be argued that Williams seeks to emphasise that tragedy cannot be 
reduced in such a way. Following his teacher Donald MacKinnon, Williams holds to the 
‘transcendence’ of the tragic itself, in the sense that tragedy provides an exemplary case of the reality 
of the world in its ‘over-against-ness’ apropos the human ego. Furthermore, Williams (as can be seen 
in his interaction with T.S. Eliot) aims to expound an understanding of the divine redemption of history 
that does not move beyond the tragic in some uncomplicated manner. This is because Christian hope 
for redemption cannot absolve itself from the problem of time and human suffering, without 
surpassing the temporality of human personhood.  
Thirdly, as a result of his attempt to pay resolute attention to the contours of tragedy, Williams’ 
adopts a ‘contemplative’ or ‘poetic’ stance in relation to human suffering that leads him to endorse an 
ethic of compassion rather than sheer despair or helplessness in the face of tragedy. He does not 
ascribe meaning or significance to evil or suffering itself (he strongly resists such a position), but he 
does not exclude the possibility that suffering may provide an opportunity for personal transformation 
and resistance against the disorderedness of the world, wrenching meaning from the apparent abyss. 
Fourthly, Williams refuses to resolve the problem of suffering, whether it be through theodicy or 
some kind of eschatological harmonisation. As such, he asserts the tragedy resists closure and that it 
provides us with a continuing difficulty for ethical, theoretical, theological, and existential reflection. Of 
course Williams is a discerning thinker, and so he does not claim that all suffering or tragedy is 
irredeemable or that healing cannot be found in particular circumstances. Nonetheless, the reality of 
human suffering on the grand scale on which it has occurred is simply staggering, and the post-
Auschwitz experience has made us acutely aware of this fact. Williams refuses to resolve such 
problems or assert an ultimate closure concerning the immensity of human disaster.
2
 Because of this 
                                               
1
 I borrow the language of absolute or contingent necessity from David Tracy. On this, see Tracy, ‘On Tragic Wisdom’ in 
Hendrik M. Vroom (ed.), Wrestling with God and Evil: Philosophical Reflections (Amsterdam – New York: Rodopi, 2007), 13-24.  
2
 It should be said here that by saying that Williams refuses to completely solve the problem of tragedy or evil, I am not 
suggesting that Williams endorses an ‘obscurantist’ or ‘magically realist’ position whereby the historical reasons for human 
suffering are left unexplained. Such a position has been critiqued by James Wood who has said, apropos magic realism and 
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lack of ultimate resolution, it seems to follow that the application of the term ‘tragic theology’ to 
Williams’ oeuvre is not misplaced or a misinterpretation.
1
 In Williams’ opinion, when we encounter the 
scale of human suffering, we encounter something like ‘a finality of non-resolution’ (quoting Paul 
Janz) which cannot be placed within ‘any broader system of explanation.’
2
 As such, tragedy places 
before us the difficulty of any ultimate resolutions to the problem of time – redemption is possible, but 
the woundedness potentially remains.   
In the following section, I will layout my methodology and the broad argument that will be 
encompassed therein. 
 
1.2. Research Methodology and Argument  
 
By and large, my thesis is a genealogical and chronological study in which I will trace the 
outworking of Williams’ own appropriation of the tragic awareness which he deems important for any 
realist understanding of history and God’s working within such a history. As such, the problem of time 
and history play an important part in this inquiry, and will be recurring themes throughout the following 
chapters. The manner I have decided to compose this text is one centred upon different periods of 
                                                                                                                                                  
the fairy-tale, that ‘the terrible is always wrapped in the continuing consolation that the terrible cannot be explained, and that it 
thus has no connection to our lived world’. For this quote, see James Wood, The Broken Estate: Essays on Literature and 
Belief (London: Jonathan Cape, 1999), 240. Such a position cannot be equated Williams’ own perspective: for example, in 
relation to September 11, Williams was able to discern the context in which such an event occurred, without justifying it or 
drawing any specific ‘meaning’ from the tragedy itself. For this, see Williams, Writing in the Dust: Reflections on 11
th
 September 
and its Aftermath (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2002), 65-81.  
1
 It should also be mentioned that by seeking to categorise, and (to a certain extent) to systematize Williams’ thought in this 
area, I am engaging in something Williams himself has not, as of yet, attempted to do. There are several possible reasons for 
this. However, the one possible reason is that – generally speaking – Williams tends to a little bit suspicious of ‘systematic’ 
thinking. This might be a particular ‘Anglican’ habit of mind (there are no significant Anglican systematic theologies, comparable 
with the likes of Aquinas, Calvin, Barth, Pannenberg, etc.), which might have something to do with self-conscious attempts of 
Anglican thinkers to engage matters in a particularist fashion (no doubt stemming from its ‘incarnationalist’ sensibilities) rather 
than engaging in the construction of broad ‘systems’ of thought. But in Williams’ case, he himself has explicitly said (in his 
‘Prologue’ On Christian Theology) that ‘when you try to tidy up an unsystematized speech, you are likely to lose a great deal. 
What the early church condemned as heresy was commonly a tidy version of its language, in which the losses were judged to 
severe for comfort’ (p. xii-xiii). As can be seen, these sentiments are a result of Williams’ investigations of early Christian 
thought. While Williams does not deny an incipient orthodoxy in early Christian thinking (cf. Williams, ‘Does it Make Sense to 
Speak of a Pre-Nicene Orthodoxy?’, in Rowan Williams (ed.), The Making of Orthodoxy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), 1-23), he is more pluralist in his understanding of Christian origins in sense that he does not want to unify early 
Christianity in a systematic way since such a ‘reduction’ might result in ‘a diminution of imaginative and affective resource, and 
a step away from the dense and unavoidable plurality of perception generated by an authentically new moment of insight’ (in 
Williams, ‘Baptism and the Arian Controversy’, in Michel Barnes and Daniel Williams (eds.) Arianism after Arius: Essays on the 
Development of the Fourth-Century Trinitarian Conflict (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993), 177).  Elsewhere, he has said that ‘the 
history of doctrine has the paradoxical character of a repeated effort of definition designed to counter the ill effects of definition 
itself – rather like the way in which a good poet will struggle to find a fixed form of words that will decisively avoid narrowing and 
lifeless fixtures and closures of meaning’ (in Williams, ‘Newman’s Arians and the Question of Method in Doctrinal History’ in I.T. 
Ker and Alan G. Hill (eds.), Newman After a Hundred Years (New York – Oxford: Claredon Press; Oxford University Press, 
1990), 285). However, one could take this further, and say that, fundamentally’, this tendency stems from Williams’ resolute 
commitment to the tradition of negative theology, which resists any tidy or stable description of the divine reality, resulting in a 
continual, patient attention to the difficult ‘dialectic’ of speaking about God. In relation to Pseudo-Dionysius (regarding the 
metaphor of light and darkness in his thought), Williams has said ‘Christian speech is incurably dialectical. No attempt to 
resolve it even by supposing that there is a communicable and incommunicable ‘part’ of God will do. The illumination is itself a 
revelation of the dimensions of inconclusiveness, challenge, and questioning in all talking about what we refer to as God’ (in 
‘Dark Night, Darkness’, in Gordon Wakefield (ed.), A Dictionary of Christian Spirituality (London: SCM 1983), 104). Taking all 
this into account however, does not deter us from the possibility drawing out a rational and coherent understanding of reality 
(as can be seen, for example in Williams’ studies of Origen). For some of the insights discussed here, I am indebted here to 
discussions with Christoph Schwöbel, who encouraged me further to ‘systematise’ Williams own thinking in this regard, to 
articulate some ‘clarity’ within the fragmentation of his dispersed and often contextual writings.  
2
 Paul D. Janz, God, the Mind’s Desire: Reference, Reason and Christian Thinking (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 170-174. The context of these quotations is an exposition of Donald MacKinnon’s reflections on tragedy. Overall, Janz’s 
provides an excellent study of the philosophical theme of ‘reference’ in this book, in the sense of the question of what our 
language and theological reflections ‘refer’ to, the ‘object’ of speaking. He seeks to rehabilitate Kant’s philosophy in this regard 
(against other theologians like John Milbank), and argues that tragedy and human suffering, in an exemplary way, provide us 
with something that cannot be simply the result of interpretation and human construction (in the idealist sense of these terms), 
but rather place us before a ‘finality’ of some kind, which cannot be explained away.  
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Williams’ own theological development. Rather than developing each of the four motifs separately 
(contingency, contemplation, compassion and non-closure), I have decided to analyse texts in 
chronological sequence (moving from earlier texts to later texts as the chapters progress), focusing on 
those themes that are important for this study, showing thereby how the various themes are accented 
or developed in his maturing thought. The benefits for following such a method are tied to the nature 
of the texts and the related motifs themselves. Since these motifs are intertwined together (with some 
motifs being emphasised more in some periods in comparison with other texts), it seems to be 
artificial and unnecessarily atomistic to separate them from one another. Where these motifs are 
developed and emphasised together, I have expounded them together, rather than parsing them into 
individual chapters. As will be seen, a further advantage of this method is that it avoids unneeded 
repetition of texts; this means that by and large once I have completed an exposition of a particular 
text, I will not need to return to it again. I will not need to repeat quotations, or to re-contextualise each 
statement again and again. As a result, the flow of the argument will be easier to follow and the traces 
of development more apparent. Furthermore, it avoids the problem of equal treatment of each motif. 
As we progress in this study, it will become apparent Williams’ deals with some motifs in a more in-
depth manner than other themes. For example, the themes of compassion and non-closure are not 
given as much space as the other motifs of contingency and contemplation because they are not as 
prominent or as pronounced in Williams’ writings. This should not imply that their level of importance 
is degraded, only that in the available texts in which Williams deals with themes of suffering and 
tragedy, the motifs of contemplation and contingency are more apparent than the others.  
So it is for these reasons that I have I chosen this particular method of investigation and study, in 
the hope that it provides the reader with a more linear argument, one that is easier to follow, and in 
which chronological development and expository clarity remain intact. The only exceptions to this 
method are to be found in the first two chapters of this thesis, the first being an introductory chapter, 
and the second which provides a theological presupposition for the developing thesis, namely 
Williams’ understanding of creation, time and human sinfulness.   
The outline of my central arguments can be given here, even though clarity requires a more 
detailed exposition. It should be said that the chapters of my thesis, generally speaking, are not 
structured like a deductive argument (one proposition built upon another in part of a wider argument), 
but should be seen as a presentation of Williams developing thought on the theme of tragedy, with 
various potential criticisms and problems addressed along the way, rather than an argument building 
to a climax. However, it seems prudent to lay out the basic argument of this thesis here, so that that 
the reader may have a conceptual and theological orientation for this study. The argument roughly 
goes as follows:  
 
1. Theology in general (and systematic theology in particular) are concerned with relating Christian 
thought and rationality to reality as it presents itself. Since theology is determined to understand 
the world as something created and fundamentally rational (because it is patterned after the 
creative logos or ratio of the God who is confessed within the Judeo-Christian tradition), we 
attempt to understand the world as something that is not ontologically chaotic but rather 
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something that is rational and ordered, despite all the apparent confusion that presents itself to 
us, thereby relating the created world to its divine raison d’être.1 In the words of Thomas Aquinas: 
‘in sacred science, all things [my italics] are treated of under the aspect of God: either because 
they are God Himself [sic] or because they refer to God as their beginning and end.’
2
 But since 
theology is concerned with the world, as understood within the matrix of Christian belief, thought 
and praxis, the horizon of potential reflection is the ‘totality’ of the world as it presents itself. As 
such there is no part of reality that can be excluded a priori from the realm of Christian thought 
and reflection. It follows from this that it cannot be the task of Christian theology to cordon off 
legitimate areas of study from rational investigation. Rather than being the product of orthodox 
Christian thinking, it is a touchstone of heretical thought to divide the world up into such a dualistic 
manner (e.g. to separate God the Creator from God the Redeemer, as we find in early Gnostic 
and Marcionite thought), rather than finding an ontic rationale to the created world, as held by 
orthodox Christian thinking.
3
 In other words, Christian theology is concerned with the question of 
truth
4
 and is entwined with a permanent continuation of dialogue that is part of the hermeneutical 
process of coming-to-understand.
5
 As such, systematic theology is concerned with the dual 
purpose of retrieving its own identity in the historical-hermeneutical task of reflection on its own 
traditional texts in light of where it is now, and with the systematic-analytic task of relating it truth-
claims to the wider world of discourse and rival truth-claims.
6
 Or in another idiom, systematic 
theology is concerned with constructive task (interpretation) and a reconstructive task 
(communication).
7
 Such a constructive-reconstructive task, from a systematic perspective, is 
based on fundamental beliefs (e.g. Trinity, creation, atonement) which orientate and shape its 
‘world’ (Welt), and also thereby the ‘context’ (Umwelt) in which it articulates itself. There is no 
construction of a ‘world’ without a ‘context’ being articulated at the same time. As such, there is a 
sense in which systems of thought can be considered as ‘self-referential’, while at the same time 
not being deemed ‘auto-poetic’.
8
  
 
                                               
1
 John Webster, ‘Principles of Systematic Theology’.  International Journal of Systematic Theology 11.1 (2009), 56-71. It should 
be said here in passing that it could be argued, from these principles, that such a vision lies at the foundation of the our 
understanding of education in general, as well as the idea of the university itself. For this, see Williams, ‘Faith in the University’, 
in Simon Robinson and Clement Katulushi (eds.), Values in Higher Education (Glamorgan: Aureus Publishing / University of 
Leeds), 24-35.  
2
 Summa Theologiae I. Q. 1. Art. 7, ad. 1.  
3
 For more on this, cf. Rowan Williams, ‘Origen: Between Orthodoxy and Heresy’ in Walther Bienert and Uwe Kühneweg (eds.) 
Origenia Septima: Origenes in den Auseinandersetzungen des 4. Jahurhunderts (Louvain: Peeters, 1999), 3-14; Rowan 
Williams ‘Defining Heresy‘, in Alan Kreider (ed.), The Origins of Christendom in the West (Edinburgh-New York: T & T Clark, 
2001), 313-335.  
4
 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology I, trans. Geoffrey Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI, 1991), 1-61.  
5
 Ingolf U. Dalferth, ‘Beyond Understanding? Transcending Our Limits and the Limits of Our Understanding’, in (eds.) Arne 
Grøn, Iben Damgaard, Søren Overgaard, Subjectivity and Transcendence (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 37-54. 
6
 Christoph Schwöbel, God: Action and Revelation (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 1992),12-22. 
7
 Ingolf U. Dalferth, Theology and Philosophy (Oxford, Blackwell, 1988), chap. 12. In Rowan Williams’ own parlance, he would 
relate celebratory and critical aspects of theology with the hermeneutical task, and the communicative with the church’s 
interaction with the world. For more on this, see Williams, On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), ‘Prologue’, xii-xvi. It 
should be said obviously that there is not simple division between the constructive (what a text meant) and the reconstructive 
(what a text means), since they are involved in a dialogical process of mutual explication. For some great reflections on this, 
Nicholas Lash, Theology on the Way to Emmaus (London: SCM Press, 1986), especially the essays entitled ‘Performing the 
Scriptures’, ‘What Authority Has Our Past?’ and ‘What Might Martyrdom Mean?’ where he deals with these kinds of questions.   
8
 For some more discussion of this, drawing heavily on the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann, see Michael Murrmann-Kahl, 
“Mysterium Trinitatis“? Fallstudien zur Trinitätslehre in der evangelischten Dogamtik des 20. Jahrhunderts (Berlin-New York: 
Walter De Gruyter, 1997), 1-16.  
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2. As a result of this preceding consideration, it should be said that a perennial risk of such a 
systematic enterprise is that it can become absolutized or static, presuming to be immune from 
the contingency of all our human constructive and reconstructive practices. Such an attitude 
(whether it be apparent or inchoate, thematised or unthematized) is inherently ideological
1
, the 
result of the sinful desire to assert mastery and control over the world.
2
 It is precisely here that the 
problem of tragedy and human suffering asserts itself because it resists the desire for totalization 
and control which seems to bypass the reality of limitations in its drive for a systematization of ‘the 
whole’. The experience of human suffering and the tragic in the world provides an example of 
such a limitation. The tendency to absolutize is by no means the exclusive prerogative of the 
Christian church (in some of its manifestations throughout history) but also secularist society
3
 and 
neo-liberal forms of democracy in which control and violence remain a constant possibility.
4
  
Tragedy and human suffering, both in its literary and historical manifestations, provide for us in an 
exemplary manner the way that the world resists tidy or resolved description. It articulates a 
problem for thought and ethical reflection.
5
 And yet, since the project of systematic theology is (as 
argued above) thought to provide some order and truth-coherency to the world, as refracted 
through Christian reflection and theology, we cannot leave the reality of suffering or tragedy 
outside of our purview (without reducing ourselves to a dualistic viewpoint rejected by orthodox 
theology). As such, it remains a problem for thought.    
 
3. How is this problem solved? There is no general answer to this question since there are differing 
responses to this problem. However, one could classify the responses into three broad 
categories, while bearing in mind that any categorisation has the tendency to smooth over 
differences in order to establish a basic perspective. Nonetheless, three broad responses are 
possible; I have called them: the tragic response, the anti-tragic response, and the post-tragic 
response
6
. I shall discuss each briefly under the categories of theology as tragic or paradoxically 
tragic, theology as anti-tragic or non-tragic, and theology as partially tragic or post-tragic. 
  
(i) Theology as tragic or paradoxically tragic 
 
The first option does not seek to resolve the problem of the tragedy, but rather seeks to leave 
it as a problem for Christian thought and reflection. Central to this perspective is the idea that 
                                               
1
 For Williams’ reflections on theological ideology, see ‘Theological Integrity’, in On Christian Theology, 3-15.  
2
 On this, see Sarah Coakley, ‘Is there a Future for Gender and Theology? On Gender, Contemplation, and the Systematic 
Task’. Criterion 47.1 (2009), 2-11. For a more a detailed treatment, see Sarah Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self: An Essay 
‘On the Trinity’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 33-65.  
3
 This is the argument of John Milbank in Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (2nd  ed, Oxford: Blackwell, 
2006), but it has also been advanced by Rowan Williams. For this, see Williams, ‘Has Secularism Failed?’,  in Faith in the 
Public Square (London, Bloomsbury: 2012), 11-22 where he argues that the functionalism and managerialism of ‘programmatic’ 
secularism is unable to make sense of the tragic, with that which resists technological reduction or elimination.  
4
 Cf. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998). 
5
 Such a position will be argued further when we engage in a definition of tragedy, and when we survey the relation between 
theology and tragedy in this chapter and what is to follow. However, for a sample of such an argument by an important 
contributor on this theme, see Donald MacKinnon, The Problem of Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1974), 122-135.  
6
 I draw the language of ‘partially tragic’, ‘paradoxically tragic’ and ‘anti-tragic’ from the work of Graham Ward. For more on this, 
Ward, ‘Tragedy as Subclause: George Steiner’s Dialogue with Donald MacKinnon’. Heythrop Journal 34 (1993), 274-287. I 
have however adapted these designations slightly for my own purposes. 
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suffering cannot be completely explained, and that tragedy and human disaster should not be 
placed within a framework into which it is dissolved. As such, these theologians are opposed 
to the project of theoretical theodicy in its various manifestations. Of the theologians and 
thinkers who expound this perspective, there is a wide range of divergence, between those 
who are more radical in their emphasis and those who are a little more nuanced in their 
perspective. Bearing in mind these differences, some of those who expound this viewpoint 
include figures such as: Donald MacKinnon, Paul Tillich, Nicholas Lash, Dietrich Ritschl, Paul 
Janz, Kathleen Sands, Flora Keshgegian, Kenneth Surin, David Toole, Larry Bouchard, 
Wendy Farley, Jürgen Moltmann, Johann Baptist Metz, Graham Ward and Rowan Williams.  
 
(ii) Theology as anti-tragic or non-tragic 
 
Regarding the second option, here we have an espousal of an anti-tragic consciousness which 
refuses to give little place to tragedy within orthodox theological reflection. One could place the 
early George Steiner within this ‘anti-tragic’ interpretation of the Judeo-Christian faith on a 
prima facie reading (though things are not as simple when one examines him in detail). His 
basic intention, at least in The Death of Tragedy, is that the Judeo-Christian helped to bring 
about this death because its fundamental myths and themes were at odds with tragedy (e.g. 
its theology of redemption). Similar contentions were held by the literary critics Laurence 
Michel
1
 and D.D. Raphael
2
, as well as the philosopher Karl Jaspers (who said ‘Der glaubende 
Christ anerkennt keine eigentliche Tragik mehr’
3
). Another ‘anti-tragic perspective’ is 
propounded by David Bentley Hart, who emphasises quite strongly that tragedy is little place 
within Christian theological reflection. He rejects out of hand any kind of ‘tragic theology’.
4
 On 
this view, tragedy (especially in its Attic manifestations) is opposed to the Christian vision of 
redemption. The emphasis on tragic necessity, death, and scapegoating all imply a particular 
theological and socio-political perspective that is ultimately conservative and is unable to take 
account of the radical newness that is revealed in the resurrection. Against the background of 
Greek tragedy, tragic sacrifice is something that does not bring about change, but rather 
serves as a kind of release valve in which the splenetic and thymotic whims of society are 
given a place to vent (namely the scapegoat). However, such a mechanism is simply an antic 
of the current order, one that is used to maintain the status quo. Furthermore, Hart rejects 
‘tragic theology’ because he believes it involves the metaphysical necessity of evil, and as 
such comes into conflict with orthodox Christian teaching.  
 
 
 
                                               
1
 Laurence Michel, ‘Die Möglichkeit einer christlichen Tragödie‘, in Volkmar Sander (ed.), Tragik und  Tragödie. Wege der 
Forschung, Band 108 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971), 177-208. This is a German translation of an 
originally English essay.  
2
 D.D. Raphael, The Paradox of Tragedy (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1960), 37-69.  
3
 Karl Jaspers, Über das Tragische (München: R. Piper & Vo Verlag, 1952), 9-10, 48-49. The quotation is on p. 48.  
4
 Hart’s rejection of tragic theology will be sketched in more detail later. However, for a short précis of his arguments, see David 
Bentley Hart, ‘Response from David Bentley Hart to McGuckin and Murphy’. Scottish Journal of Theology 60.1 (2007), 95–101.  
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(iii) Theology as post-tragic or partially tragic 
 
The third perspective is a bit more difficult to categorise since it includes a much wider area of 
Christian thinkers. It concerns those are able or willing to give the tragic a place within 
theological reflection, but believe nonetheless that Christian hope moves beyond tragedy, to a 
more tragicomic vision whereby tragedy and human suffering are either justified or overcome 
eschatologically. The spectrum of those who hold this view is wide, and includes those who 
endorse some kind of theodicy, and those who do not. They include: Reinhold Niebuhr, Karl 
Barth, Hans Urs Von Balthasar, John Milbank, amongst many others.  
Taking into account these broad perspectives, there obviously are thinkers who are not so 
easy to classify, either because they do not ultimately decide for a tragic or post-tragic 
perspective, or because they make use of tragic and theological themes but are not concerned 
with other traditional themes of Christian theology (e.g. Terry Eagleton, Walter Benjamin). 
Nonetheless, I believe that the broad categories I have used here are a helpful heuristic for 
orientating ourselves as we continue in our study of this theme.  
 
4. Moving onto our next point, it is my purpose in this study to advocate a modest and circumscribed 
tragic theology, following the contours suggested by Rowan Williams’ theology. The reason I have 
opted for a more tragic theology (rather than post-tragic) is for the following reasons:  
 
(i) Tragic theology allows us to take the problem of suffering as seriously as possible, along with 
the various aporias it creates. Rather than dissolving or harmonizing the problem of human 
disaster and suffering
1
, tragic theology allows us to be more agnostic about the final outcome, 
while making allowance for redemption, exposing us to the truth of reality in all its resistance to 
tidy description, and emphasising the practice of empathy with those who suffer. It allows for 
loss and woundedness to remain, even though healing always remains a possibility. It has 
difficulties with the consolations and generalisations of various theodicies. Furthermore, tragic 
theology provides us with resources for doing systematic theology within a postmodern 
context, where absolutisation and resolution remain problematic prospects, since it present us 
with resolute difficulties that cannot be systematized. On the other hand, however, tragedy 
also provides us with something that resists being explained away as something simply that is 
the result of interpretation or construction (like some radical poststructuralist theory implies), 
because to do so would imply a moral failure of a particularly brutal kind, in which suffering 
would just be a matter of sheer ‘perspective’. As such, tragedy can be understood as an 
occurrence of ‘the real’
2
 precisely because provides an objective ‘referent’ for thought, thereby 
opening a path to reason and discernment.  
                                               
1
 In relation to the vision of tragedy, Richard Sewall writes that tragedy is ‘not for those who cannot live with unsolved questions 
or unresolved doubts, whose bent of mind would reduce the fact of evil into something else or resolve into some larger whole’. 
For this quote, see Richard W. Sewall, The Vision of Tragedy (new ed., New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1980), 5.  
2
 I am using the term ‘the real’ here in a different sense to the Lacanian sense of its use, though it finds comparison in the fact 
that both assert a resilient ‘thereness’ of the real (though the nature of that ‘thereness is by no means agreed upon). For 
example, Slavoj Žižek asserts that ‘The Real is thus the disavowed X on account of which our vision of reality is anamorphically 
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(ii)  Tragic theology is not opposed to an authentic Christian theology. As will be argued (against 
figures like David Bentley Hart), tragedy cannot be reduced to one homogenous dynamic, nor 
can it be easily essentialised (as Raymond Williams and Terry Eagleton have argued). 
Furthermore, I will argue that it is possible to endorse an orthodox Christian theology, while at 
the same time holding onto an incarnationally-centred perspective that is able to embrace a 
tragic consciousness simultaneously.  
(iii) By focusing on Rowan Williams, who holds a circumscribed and discerning theology of the 
tragic, we are able to navigate through some of criticisms lodged against tragic theology. By 
emphasizing the motif of contingency, and the tragic conflict implied by dwelling within the 
boundaries of time, we are able to avoid the problem of a tragic ontology (as advocated by 
figures like Kathleen Sands), whereby violence, diremption and conflict are given a 
fundamental status in the heart of being. For Williams, the heart of being is the Triune God, a 
being of infinite difference and otherness, of knowledge and love, of desire and deferral, which 
gives place for created being. However, being a created being involves entanglement in 
finitude and temporality, and it is this that is the source of tragic experience. Furthermore, by 
emphasising the motifs or contemplation and non-closure Williams is able to take the problem 
of history and particularity seriously, and does not aim to provide easy resolutions to the 
problem of suffering. And lastly, my emphasising compassion, Williams does not endorse 
hopelessness or resignation before the powers of Fate, but seeks to advance a contemplative 
and compassionate practice that opens the way for transformation, healing, and even a poetic 
creativity, which as such provide us with avenues for meaningful resistance and protest 
against the disorderedness of the world.  
 
5. The question still remains regarding how this particular study shall progress, and how it will be 
structured. Below, I will give a summary of how the chapters contained herein shall progress and 
develop: 
I will begin in this first chapter by seeking to briefly adumbrate a definition of tragedy, in 
conversation with some modern philosophical attempts to understand it as an art-form and as a 
historical experience. Thereafter, I will engage in a survey of how modern theology has 
appropriated the tragic, thereby creating a background and perspective into which I will place 
Williams as a thinker.  
 In the second chapter, I will place Williams’ discussion of tragedy within the context of his 
understanding of creation, time, and human sinfulness. I aim to show that Williams’ understands 
                                                                                                                                                  
distorted; it is simultaneously the Thing to which direct access is not possible and the obstacle which prevents this direct 
access, the Thing which eludes our grasp and the distorting screen which makes us miss the Thing’. For this quote, see Slavoj 
Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2006), 26. It can also be mentioned here that speculative realists like 
Quentin Meillassoux have also sought to return to a non-naïve account of ‘objectivism’ by asserting that it is ‘contingency, ‘the 
capacity to be otherwise’, or ‘chaos’ itself that provides a real referent for thought, thereby moving outside the paradigm of 
Kantian phenomenalism. For Meillassoux’s arguments, see Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of 
Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier (London-New York: Continuum, 2008). Exegetically, he has applied such a perspective to the 
poetry of Mallarmé in The Number and the Siren: A Decipherment of Mallarme's Coup de Dés, trans Robin Mackay (Falmouth-
New York: Sequence / Urbanomic, 2012) where he argues that Mallarmé attempted to articulate the infinitude of chance and 
‘the capacity to be otherwise’ through a code hidden in the text, revealed in hints in the poem, but not clear enough to be 
decisive either way. It should be said here that my use of the term ‘objectivity’ will follow the more theological use of the term as 
given to it by Paul Janz.  
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our tragic disorderedness to be based upon our existence as finite and bounded beings. In 
addition to this, however, I will also aim to emphasise the fact that matter and temporality are not 
things to be shunned, but rather that they are manifestations of something beautiful and 
something to be embraced. Such a perspective needs to be remembered as we encounter the 
rather stark theme of tragedy as it occurs in the remainder of this thesis. Further, I will argue that 
since Williams wholeheartedly embraces the traditional doctrine of privatio boni, his 
understanding of tragedy should not be predicated upon a theory of ‘radical evil’ or ontological 
violence.  
The third chapter will be centred around Williams’ lectures on T.S. Eliot’s Four Quartets. To 
contextualise these lectures, I will deal with the influence of Donald MacKinnon on Williams’ 
thought, as well as dealing with an early essay of Williams on the Spirit and eschatology that 
provides our first glimpse into Williams’ reflections on the theme of tragedy. My treatment of 
Williams’ lectures on Quartets is (to the best of my knowledge) the most in-depth treatment of 
these texts (which as of yet remain unpublished). I will argue that Williams’ encounter with the 
‘tragic realism’
1
 of Eliot’s vision (which Williams argues is founded upon a theology of the 
incarnation), reinforced within Williams’ mind the problem of the redemption of time, and all the 
tragic contingency it implies. Rather than seeking to move beyond the tragic contours of time, 
Williams argued that an authentic Christian doctrine of the incarnation gives us the resources for 
taking the reality of time and tragedy seriously. A Christian hope which aims to avoid ‘the world of 
speculation’ (Eliot) and fantasy has to take the problem of meaningless suffering seriously. 
Redemption can only be glimpsed when we see what is truly there, not seeking to explain it away. 
As such, hope and meaning are not something beyond possibility, but we need to remain vigilant 
against the tendency to resolve the difficulty that suffering and tragedy propose.  
The fourth chapter will seek to develop these themes a little further to show how the insights 
gained through Williams’ reading of the Quartets influenced his later theology. By examining 
some texts and sermons, we will show that Williams emphasis on taking the tragic seriously 
(without dissolving it or explaining it away) is tied to his growing emphasis on the problem of 
fantasy, mainly in its attempts to secure the ego within the flux of contingency and finitude. The 
reason for this growing emphasis (which is there earlier, but becomes more pronounced latter) 
seems to be the result of Williams’ engagement with the critique of religion we find in Freud. In 
this context, suffering, tragedy and the experience of the ‘dark night’ act as a bulwark against the 
ego’s attempts to create a tidy description of the world, one that ultimately mirrors the ego itself.  
The following chapter will deal with Williams’ most sustained engagement with the thought of his 
teacher Donald MacKinnon. This provides us with a very important text for understanding 
Williams’ thoughts on the relation between the doctrine of the Trinity, tragedy, and contingency. 
Also in this chapter, I will deal with Williams’ response to the question of theodicy. It will not be 
main aim to develop or study in detail this problem (a problem which is fraught with controversy 
and dissenting opinions). Rather I shall deal with Williams’ response to the theodicy proposed by 
                                               
1
 For a discussion of this term, see John Orr, Tragic Realism and Modern Society: Studies in the Sociology of the Modern Novel 
(London: The Macmillan Press, 1977). The origin of the term stems from Erich Auerbach; on this, see ibid., 3-15.  
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the analytic philosopher and theologian Marilynn McCord Adams. I aim to show that Williams 
rejects Adams’ ‘aesthetic’ approach to the problem of evil, and faults her for proposing a general 
solution to the problem of evil which does not allow for the particularity of human meaning-making 
within the context of suffering - even ‘horrendous’ suffering. After discussing this theme, I will deal 
with some miscellaneous texts in which the problem of time and tragedy are dealt with in some of 
Williams’ later texts. These later reflections will confirm what we have been arguing up to this 
point, namely that tragedy is entwined with the problem of time. This chapter will also contain a 
section in which I seek to respond to a possible interpretation of Williams’ theology of the Trinity. It 
is possible that Williams’ understanding of divine desire could acquire tragic overtones if taken too 
far. However, it will be shown that we cannot take Williams thought in this direction without 
creating serious problems with what he says elsewhere. I will show that as we examine the 
various texts in which Williams deals with the theme of the Trinity, we can see that his thoughts 
on this topic allows for an infinite deferral of desire and openness that grounds the ontological 
possibility of finite being. Such a perspective implies a non-closure and openness within the 
Triune being. But this should not be understood as an attempt to read ‘tragedy’ back into the 
divine life.  
I will end this thesis with a conclusion, summarising the findings of this study, while at the same 
time proposing some avenues for future study and reflections. I will also respond to some further 
objections that might be made against Williams’ theology on this matter.  
 
The points above more or less summarise the argument and structure of the following study. The 
following section will deal with the problem of defining tragedy (in relation to philosophy), thereafter 
followed by a survey of how various theologians and thinkers have related the tragedy to theological 
questions.  
 
1.3 Tragedy: In Search of a Definition  
 
When it comes to advocating a modest plea for a tragic theology (the kind I will expound in relation 
to Rowan Williams), a lot hangs on the definition of ‘tragedy’ and ‘the tragic’.
1
 As will be readily 
admitted, there are certain understandings of ‘tragedy’ and ‘the tragic’ which are difficult to reconcile 
with an authentic Christian theology. However, as modern scholarship regarding ‘tragedy’ tells us, a 
simple definition of tragedy is difficult to come by. It is harder today to reduce ‘tragedy’ in its myriad 
manifestations to a single dynamic or to one over-arching mythological backdrop (whether this be 
pagan, religious or non-religious). Certainly there are several recurring ‘traditional’ themes within the 
genre of ‘tragedy’ but these themes are by no means necessarily always present in particular tragic 
                                               
1
 It should be mentioned here that – generally speaking – discourse surrounding ‘the tragic’ is largely a modern affair. The 
Greeks did sometimes use ‘the tragic’ as a general term to describe certain forms of heightened speech or actions, but by and 
large the ‘universalizing’ use of the term ‘the tragic’ is one which we inherit from post-Kantian German Idealism (Schlegel, 
Schelling, Hegel, Hölderlin, etc.).  On this, see Simon Goldhill, Sophocles and the Language of Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 137-165. Also, cf. the comments of Peter Szondi when he says ‘Seit Aristoteles gibt es eine Poetik der 
Tragödie, sei Schelling erst eine Philosophie des Tragischen. Als Unterweisung im Dichten will die Schrift des Aristoteles die 
Elemente der Tragischen Kunst bestimmen; ihr Gegenstand is die Tragödie, nicht deren Idee.‘ For this quote, see Peter 
Szondi, Versuch über das Tragische (Frankfurt am Main: Im Insel-Verlag, 1961), 7. However, for a slightly different perspective, 
see Miriam Leonard, ‘Tragedy and the Seductions of Philosophy’. The Cambridge Classical Journal (2012) 58, 145–164.  
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narratives, nor do tragic narratives conform to one formulaic system of presentation (a tendency 
prominent since Aristotle’s Poetics).
1
  
It cannot be denied that tragedy, in its primary manifestation, is a phenomenon of Greek antiquity. 
Its exact origins remain mysterious, as can be seen when we examine the word ‘tragedy’ itself. The 
exact etymology of the word (τραγῳδία) is difficult to trace, but its exact meaning has been translated 
as ‘goat-song’ or ‘goat-singer’, which implies (as some have argued) that it most likely has its origins 
within a Dionysian cultic or ritual context of dithyrambic worship, though the exact relation between 
this and actual literary forms of ‘tragedy’ still is debated.
2
 Other suggestions include the idea that the 
dramatic form of tragedy stems from the Greek poet-actor Thespis (via Solon and eventually 
Aeschylus) who created it as a new art-form in the City of Dionysia during the civic festival, circa 534 
BCE, under the patronage of Peisistratus. The ‘goat’ might have been a prize for the winner of the 
dramatic competition which was held in the city.
3
 Others trace the connection the figure of ‘the goat’ to 
the tragic figure of the scapegoat who in Attic tragedy is sacrificed for the sake of socio-political 
catharsis.
4
 Nonetheless, despite its mysterious origins, tragedy is believed and interpreted by many to 
be primarily a Greek phenomenon, with other ‘tragedies’ being analogous to this primary experience. 
Paul Ricoeur writes that ‘Greek tragedy is not at all an example in the inductive sense, but the sudden 
and complete manifestation of the essence of the tragic; to understand the tragic is to relive in oneself 
the Greek experience of the tragic, not as a particular case of tragedy, but as the origin of tragedy…it 
is by grasping its essence in its Greek phenomenon that we can understand tragedy as analogous to 
Greek tragedy.’
5
 Ricoeur goes on to describe this essence of Greek tragedy by examining several of 
the recurring words and themes related to it, namely ὕβρις (pride), άτη (delusion or blindness), 
ἁμαρτία (fault), μοίρα (fate) , φθόνος (divine jealousy), φόβος (fear), and the κακός δαίμων (the 
wicked god).
6
 For Ricoeur, the central theme of tragedy is the conflict between ‘the wicked god’ and 
the tragic hero, who achieves greatness by resisting the evil powers that enforce themselves upon the 
heroic figure. As Ricoeur argues, we do not have tragedy until ‘the theme of predestination to 
evil…comes up against the theme of heroic greatness’.
7
 When we have the rebellious figure asserting 
their freedom against the powers of necessity, we encounter the essence of tragic experience. He 
goes on to argue later that deliverance from the tragic experience is to be found in the very 
experience of tragedy as spectacle, namely as the process whereby the representation of tragedy is 
                                               
1
 For Aristotle’s views, see particularly Poetics 1449b22ff, in Jonathan Barnes (ed.) The Complete Works of Aristotle: The 
Revised Oxford Translation (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984).  
2
 This is a widely accepted interpretation (but not uncontested); for a sample of this, see Adrian Poole, Tragedy: A Very Short 
Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3-19; Walter Sparn, Tragödie I’, in Gerhard Müller (ed.), Theologische 
Realenzyklopädie. Band 33 (Berlin-New York: Walter De Gruyter, 2002), 751.  
3
 Gerald F. Else, The Origin and Early Form of Greek Tragedy; Richard E. Sturm, ‘The Ancient Origin and Sense of Tragedy’, in 
Pink Dandelion, Douglas Gwyn, Rachel Muers, Brian Phillips, and Richard Sturm, Towards Tragedy / Reclaiming Hope: 
Literature, Theology and Sociology in Conversation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 1-9. The political dimension of ancient tragedy 
should not be overlooked since the productions of the various Greek tragedies were something funded precisely by the polis, 
and the generalizing use of ‘the tragic’ by German Idealists also betrays a particularly political motivation as well. On this, see 
Goldhill, Sophocles and the Language of Tragedy, 152-164.  
4
 For an example of this, see Terry Eagleton, Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). Eagleton traces 
this motif up to the contemporary understanding of ‘the tragic’, but he surprisingly seems to re-interpret the theme of ‘the 
scapegoat’ in a distinctly leftist, Marxist and even Pauline fashion whereby ‘the scapegoats’ are not a legitimation of the 
contemporary status quo (as we find David Bentley Hart’s interpretation of Attic tragedy), but rather ‘the excremental remainder’ 
(to quote Slavoj Žižek) thereby pointing to the limitations of the present order of things, rather than the legitimation of it. In this 
interpretation, society should be judged on what it excludes from its definition, rather than what it includes.  
5
 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 211.  
6
 Ibid., 213-226.  
7
 Ibid., 218.  
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aimed to invoke sympathy within its audience, namely through the ‘chorus’ in which the audience is 
enabled to experience the pain of the tragic hero through poetic lyricism of the spectacle.
1
 
Regarding this interpretation of Greek tragedy, one might quibble regarding details, but this 
nonetheless seems to be a relatively accurate portrayal of the Greek understanding of the tragic. 
What is questionable however in Ricoeur’s interpretation above is his assertion that every truly ‘tragic’ 
narrative is ‘analogous’ with Greek tragedy. Raymond Williams, regarding the history of interpretation 
of tragedy, argues that not only was the ancient Greek view not ‘systematised’ but also that it is worth 
asking the question whether the tradition of tragic interpretation ‘carries so clear and single a 
meaning?’
2
 Clearly there are similarities between Hellenistic tragedy and the tradition that developed 
after it (the theme of conflict between ‘freedom’ and ‘necessity’ remain important touchstones, for 
example); however, what Raymond Williams shows is that as the tradition develops, a tidy description 
becomes more and more complex.
3
 He writes that ‘Tragedy is then not a single and permanent kind 
of fact, but a series of experiences and conventions and institutions. It is not a case of interpreting this 
series by reference to a permanent and unchanging human nature. Rather, the varieties of tragic 
experience are to be interpreted by reference to the changing reference of institutions. The 
universalist character of most tragic theory is then the opposite pole from our necessary interest.’
4
 
Terry Eagleton continues within the tradition of Raymond Williams (whom he studied under) in his 
more recent study of the same theme, entitled Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic (2003). 
Eagleton’s book is a rigorous and rather dense response to the so-called ‘death of tragedy school’, 
most ably defended by the literary critic George Steiner in his book The Death of Tragedy (1961). 
Steiner’s central thesis (which is by no means straightforward)
5
 is that tragedy as a literary form is no 
longer possible within our modern context. For Steiner this is not necessarily a good thing, but is 
nonetheless tied to several factors, namely the legacy of Judeo-Christianity, Marxism, the rise of the 
prose novel, amongst other factors. One of Steiner’s central arguments in this book is that the Judeo-
Christian tradition is inimical to tragedy (‘Tragedy is alien to the Judaic sense of the world’
6
), and that 
therefore it has been one of the contributing factors to a decline in the tragic art-form.
7
 His main 
argument for regarding the Judeo-Christian tradition as being anti-tragic lies mainly in its 
                                               
1
 Ibid., 227-231.  
2
  Raymond Williams, Modern Tragedy (Stanford; California: Stanford University Press, 1966), 14.  
3
 Ibid., 17-45. It should be said here that some have criticised Raymond Williams himself for narrowing the tragic tradition so 
that it tends to take on a more secular and revolutionary meaning. On this, Walter Stein, ‘Humanism and Tragic Redemption’. 
New Blackfriars 48.561 (1967), 230-244.  
4
 Ibid., 45-46.  
5
 The contradictions and ambiguities of Steiner’s work in this regard are discussed by Graham Ward in ‘Tragedy as Subclause’. 
For an example of Steiner’s own development in relation to the theme of tragedy, see George Steiner, ‘Absolute Tragedy’, in 
No Passion Spent: Essays 1978-1996 (London: Faber & Faber, 1996), 129-141.  
6
 The Death of Tragedy (London: Faber & Faber, 1961), 4. It should be said here that Steiner’s sentiments are by no means 
isolated. Alain Badiou has echoed similar sentiments when he said (in 1990) that ‘For the moment, there exists no modern 
tragedy’ mainly due to the democratic climate of contemporary society. For Badiou, the tragic hero is one who chooses truth, at 
the expense of meaning and socially-consented lawfulness. For this, see Alain Badiou, Rhapsody for the Theatre, trans. Bruno 
Bosteels (London-New York: Verso, 2013), 86. This opinion that there is no such thing as ‘modern tragedy’ goes back to Hegel 
who spoke of the death of real art in the modern period. Such sentiments were later echoed by Heidegger. For more on this, 
see Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy: From Plato to Žižek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 207-234.  
7
 Steiner’s argument lacks a significant amount of clarity here because while, on the one hand, he argues that the death of 
tragedy in the modern period is in some sense dependent upon the legacy of the Judeo-Christian tradition (because he 
believes such a tradition to be by and large ‘anti-tragic’), he also argues that the death of tragedy has resulted in a loss of an 
important contribution made by the Judeo-Christian tradition itself, namely tragedy as an art-form. The ambiguities in 
argumentation here are clear, as Graham Ward has shown. For a similar ‘ambiguous’ argument regarding the relation of 
Christianity to tragedy, see Sewall, The Vision of Tragedy, 50-56, a book that is roughly contemporary with Steiner’s book 
(1959), republished with new content in 1980.  
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understanding of salvation and its eschatology, which are compensatory and just, whereas the tragic 
art-form must ‘start from the fact of catastrophe. Tragedies end badly…Job
1
 gets back double the 
number of she-asses; so he should, for God has enacted upon him the parable of justice. Oedipus 
does not get back his eyes or his sceptre over Thebes.’ For Steiner, ‘Tragedy is irreparable. It cannot 
lead to just and material compensation for past suffering.’ He goes on to say that ‘Tragic drama tells 
us that the spheres of reason, order and justice are terribly limited and that no progress in our science 
or technical resources will enlarge their relevance. Outside and within man is l’autre, the ‘otherness’ of 
the world. Call it what you will: hidden or malevolent God, blind fate, the solicitations of hell, or the 
brute fury of our animal blood. It waits for us in ambush at the crossroads. It mocks us and destroys 
us. In certain rare instances, it leads us after destruction to some incomprehensible repose.’
2
 
Whatever the validity of some of Steiner’s insights, Eagleton seeks to problematize Steiner’s 
reductive approach to tragedy as well as Marxism and Judeo-Christianity.
3
 Eagleton’s book as a 
whole (but particularly the first chapter) aims to debunk any reductive account regarding tragedy as a 
literary form or an existential event.
4
 He even wonders whether ‘tragedy’ might not be exchangeable 
with something like ‘very sad’ without being more descriptive than that. He writes ‘The truth is that no 
definition of tragedy more elaborate than ‘very sad’ has ever worked.’
5
 He critiques Paul Ricoeur for 
what he regards as ‘essentialism’, especially in regard to his privileging of Greek tragic themes. 
Referring to Steiner’s work in particular he says, ‘It is…a mistake to believe with George Steiner that 
Christianity is inherently anti-tragic. Steiner makes the same mistake about Marxism, for much the 
same reasons. Because these are both ultimately hopeful world-views they can have no truck with the 
tragic, which for Steiner is all about ill-starred endings.’
6
 Speaking in relation to the death of Christ, 
Eagleton says that ‘Jesus’s crucifixion is genuinely tragic’ and further that ‘If his death was a mere 
device for rising again in glory, a kind of reculer pour mieux sauter, then it was no more than a cheap 
conjuring trick. It was because his death seemed to him a cul-de-sac, as his despairing scriptural 
quotation on the cross would suggest, that it could be fruitful…The truth is that Jesus was a miserable 
failure, and his probable expectation that he would return to earth in the lifetime of his followers 
seems to have been a little too optimistic.’ However Eagleton goes onto say that ‘only by accepting 
the worst for what it is, not as a convenient springboard for leaping beyond it, can one hope to 
surpass it. Only by accepting this as the last word about the human condition can it cease to be the 
last word. Jesus was left only with a forlorn faith in what he called his Father, despite the fact that this 
power seemed now to have abandoned him…The destitute condition of humanity, if it was to be fully 
restored, had to be lived all the way through, pressed to the extreme limit of a descent into the hell of 
meaninglessness and desolation, rather than disavowed, patched up or short-circuited. Only by being 
                                               
1
 It can be mentioned here in passing that Richard Sewall’s puts the book of Job at the beginning of his literary study of the 
tragic vision, even before the Greek tragedians. For this, see Sewall, The Vision of Tragedy, 9-24.  
2
 The Death of Tragedy, 8-9.   
3
 For more on Eagleton, Steiner and ‘the tragic’ in relation to Christian theology, see Graham Ward, ‘Steiner and Eagleton: The 
Practice of Hope and the Idea of the Tragic’. Literature & Theology 19.2 (2005), 100-111.  
4
 Sweet Violence, 1-22.  
5
 Ibid., 3.  
6
 Ibid., 38.  
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‘made sin’ in the Pauline phrase, turned into some monstrous, outcast symbol of inhumanity, can the 
scapegoat go all the way through that condition to emerge somewhere on the other side.’
1
 
Regarding tragedy itself, he writes elsewhere, again referencing the work of Steiner that ‘Tragedy 
is not just about things ending badly. There are not many tragedies, whatever George Steiner 
cavalierly asserts in The Death of Tragedy, in which destruction is literally the last word. Tragedy can 
also mean that one must be hauled through hell to have any chance of freedom or fulfilment.’ Going 
further, he says that ‘Tragedy can be an index of the outrageous price we have sometimes to pay for 
them, not of their illusoriness. To claim that this is tragic is to insist that it would be far better were it 
not so. It is the antithesis of the barracks-room view that suffering makes a man of you. It is a 
measure of how catastrophic things are with us that change must be bought at so steep a cost. Only 
by some bruising encounter with the Real…a confrontation which we cannot survive undamaged, and 
which will leave its lethal scars silently imprinted on our existence – can we hope for genuine 
emancipation.’
2
 
As can be seen from this quote (of which many others could be adduced throughout this book), 
Eagleton does not believe that tragedy can be easily circumscribed into a simple essence or 
emplotment. Rather there is a diversity of presentation and examples, with some tragic themes 
appearing, and others not. The ‘death of tragedy’ makes the mistake of assuming that tragedy comes 
in a single form, and when it does not conform to this schema, it cannot be considered as truly ‘tragic’. 
In a neo-Marxist vein, Eagleton opines that that the belief in ‘the death of tragedy’ is often entwined 
with a suspicion of any kind of ideological conviction, in the sense that in our postmodern era it is 
difficult to advocate adherence and commitment to big ideas and values, since they are often viewed 
as a part of the totalizing tendency within Western metaphysics and philosophy.
3
 In such context a 
commitment to strong religious or political beliefs are viewed with suspicion. However, Eagleton 
argues that such a denial of ‘ideology’ is really a kind of ‘false consciousness’ which allows the truly 
‘ideological’ dynamics of capitalism to continue unchecked. In contrast, Eagleton argues that a tragic 
view of the world (inflected by Judeo-Christian, literary, Marxist sources) provides a critique and 
delimitation of any simplistic belief in endless technological advancement or progress. Furthermore, it 
does not seem that Eagleton holds to the viewpoint that holding onto the tragic in our experience 
necessarily implies a political conservatism or resignation to fate, as can be seen in the last chapter 
where he reflects on the figure of the scapegoat, who represents the limits of the present order, rather 
than the legitimation of it.
4
 Following Walter Benjamin, Eagleton would argue that belief in ‘the tragic’ 
provides resources for revolutionary action against an ‘ideological’ belief in progress, in the sense that 
human suffering and disaster point towards the limitation of the contemporary ancien régime.
5
 
                                               
1
 Ibid., 37.  
2
 Ibid., 58-59.  
3
 ‘For some death-of-tragedy theorists, we are now ‘post-tragic’ exactly because we are post-ideological, bereft of all synoptic 
vision. Tragic art, on this theory, presupposes a tragic vision – a bleak view of the world, an absolute faith for which you are 
prepared to die, or at least a dominant ideology to be heroically resisted. Like almost every other general view of tragedy, this 
one identifies the entire mode with one kind of action, and then proceeds to write off whatever fails to conform to it.’ (Ibid., 9). 
4
 Ibid., 274-297.  
5
 Walter Benjamin’s ‘On the Concept of History’ is well-known for explicating this viewpoint. For more, see Walter Benjamin, ‘On 
the Concept of History’, in Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (eds.), Selected Writings IV 1938-1940 (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press, 2003), 398-400. Benjamin is also well-known for his image of revolution as ‘the emergency brake’ which is 
applied to ‘the locomotive of world history’. For this quote, see Benjamin, ‘Paralipomena to ‘On the Concept of History’’, in 
Selected Writings IV 1938-1940, 402.  
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Our brief examination of Eagleton’s work in this regard is simply to show that our understanding of 
‘tragedy’ and ‘the tragic’ as we move forward cannot be equated with simplistic schemas or one mode 
of presentation. ‘Tragedy’ rather than dying has simply changed its form. As such, it cannot be 
equated with any one particular cultural presentation (whether it be in an Attic, Elizabethan, or modern 
permutation). Certainly there are common themes that can be seen as we examine tragic narratives 
generally speaking (necessity versus freedom, human suffering, etc.), but as can be seen (when 
particular tragic instantiations are examined), the presentation of these themes is not consistent, nor 
does every ‘tragedy’ contain all of these characteristics (e.g. catharsis
1
, the defiant hero, the tragic 
flaw, disastrous ending, etc.).  
In giving my own broad definition of ‘tragedy’ or ‘the tragic’, obviously one has to be very careful 
here since I have been arguing against any ‘essentialised’ view of tragedy. However (following 
Eagleton
2
): if we are to escape a kind ‘nominalism’ we have to advocate some kind of ‘family 
resemblance’ (Wittgenstein) between different tragic narratives. On this score, one also has to take 
into account here the perspective of Walter Benjamin, especially in the so-called ‘Epistemo-Critical 
Prologue’
3
 to his book on the Trauerspiel. Benjamin argues that an ‘inductive’ and ‘deductive’ method 
of categorizing fails to take into account the specific contours that ‘tragedy’ can take. However, at the 
same time, pure ‘nominalism’ makes a philosophy of art pretty much meaningless (‘philosophy’ 
understood here as essentially dealing with ‘the representation of ideas’). For Benjamin, philosophical 
concepts or ‘ideas’ have to be able to account for the extremes of their instantiations, so that the idea 
of ‘the tragic’ has to be situated within the history of being’s becoming, in which its determinate 
‘essence’ and ‘origin’ has to be thoroughly historical, open to continuing ‘discovery’ and therefore is – 
even though Benjamin does not use this exact language, but rather intimates it - eschatological. A 
philosophy of art cannot dispense with the idea of ‘the tragic’, even though such a formulation can 
only be born through the continuing labour of relating such an ‘idea’ against its possible extremes and 
marginalized instances. Taking into account these qualifications, I think the definition of Richard 
Sturm, who is aware of the critique of Eagleton, is helpful:  
 
‘Tragedy, originally a particular artform in ancient Greece but today a more comprehensive 
term going beyond specific artistic expressions, is an event, expression or experience of 
suffering that arouses sympathy and fear, evokes reflections on humanity’s deepest values 
                                               
1
 It should be mentioned here that many of these characteristics of tragedy owe their definition to Aristotle, namely from his 
Poetics. However, the exact meaning of these terms is not always so straightforward, as we can see in the debate related to 
the precise meaning of Aristotle intention behind using the term ‘catharsis’ in his famous definition of tragedy (which he rarely 
uses elsewhere in relation to tragedy). For more on this, see Julian Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy: From Plato to Žižek, 
26-34.  
2
 Sweet Violence, 3ff.  
3
 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London-New York: Verso, 1998), 27-56. The 
obvious Socratic-Platonic tendencies of Benjamin’s method here are apparent. For an excellent study that shows the Socratic 
method of elenchus, namely the question ‘What is x?’, is concerned with just this problematic, see Sean D. Kirkland, The 
Ontology of Socratic Questioning in Plato’s Early Dialogues (New York: SUNY Press, 2012), 119-151. More particularly, see his 
statement on p. 243, in which he says that in the Socratic mode of questioning, regarding ‘What is x?,’ the point of seeking a 
definition does not concern ‘a presumably grasped whole, but a distant horizon that gathers all the discrete contexts of 
everyday life and demands that we consider them together, whereby the various appearances of ‘what [x] is’ in those contexts 
conflict with one another and open us up to the being of [x] as distressingly excessive’.    
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and concerns, and ultimately affirms providence in the discovery of hope, justice, truth or 
wisdom gleaned in and through that suffering.’
1
 
 
I would like to expand on this definition with a few more points. Firstly, tragedy is any story where 
human beings are subject to suffering that is in some sense unavoidable because of their involvement 
in contingency and human interaction. Ben Quash writes that ‘the tragic may be summarized as the 
woundingly ‘embroiled’ character of human action’.
2
 Tragedy acknowledges that there is a kind 
suffering, pain and limitation that is simply a part of being human, living within finite strictures; such 
pain or suffering as such is not necessarily ‘tragic’ but it can (in specific contexts) reach certain 
proportions and immensity which cannot be denied a tragic status. 
Secondly (following the tradition bequeathed to us by German Idealism)
3
, I hold that tragedy is 
concerned with the reality of human conflict and contingency whereby the goods for all are not 
achievable for everyone within the confines of human limitation and time, whereby human freedom 
strains against the ‘necessity’ of living within a contingent and finite world.
4
 The reasons for these 
goods and freedoms not being achieved are as complex as human culture and history are complex 
entities, which mean that we cannot resign ourselves to fatalism assuming that unjust circumstances 
are simply a fact of life to be accepted. Such a tragic resignation can become one more example of 
an ‘ideological’ positioning of the have’s versus the have not’s, or simply a legitimation of the status 
quo. However, we cannot avoid the fact that human development (culture, history, technology, 
science, art, etc.), the struggle for justice and freedom, and our interactions with other human beings 
are not always going to be harmonious or happy. A cursory look at human history will disprove this 
point. On the face of it, history could be viewed as ‘one single catastrophe’, a ‘pile of debris’ growing 
toward the sky
5
, where (in the words of Macbeth): ‘Life’s but a walking shadow; a poor player, / That 
struts and frets his hour upon the stage, / And then is heard no more: it is a tale / Told by an idiot, full 
of sound and fury, / Signifying nothing’.
6
 These are realities we have to take account of. Nonetheless, 
in this thesis, our purpose will be to advocate a more hopeful vision that at the same time is able to 
take account of the tragic quality of human existence.  
Thirdly, in light of these historical experiences, one can argue tragedy is concerned with a kind of 
suffering that provides a persistent difficulty for thought and easy resolution. Tragedy in its resilient 
questioning and probing of the limitations of rational explanation shows that there is a kind of suffering 
that exceeds every taxis or purposeful reason, and continues to remain a challenge to our thinking 
and reflections on human life. Concerning the tragic, Jennifer Geddes writes that ‘that there is 
something about it which ruptures our very ability to see clearly, state concisely, think neatly, know 
                                               
1
 Sturm, ‘The Ancient Origin and Sense of Tragedy’, 32.  
2
 Ben Quash, ‘Four Biblical Characters: In Search of a Tragedy’, in Kevin Taylor and Giles Waller, Christian Theology and 
Tragedy: Theologians, Tragic Literature and Tragic Theory (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2011), 15.  
3
 Poole remarks (Tragedy: A Very Short Introduction, 61), it was Hegel who turned ‘tragedy into Tragedy’, thereby becoming the 
first tragic theorist. However, one could argue (as Peter Szondi, Simon Goldhill, and Julian Young have) that already with 
Schelling and Hölderlin we have some sophisticated reflections on the nature of the tragic. For more on German Idealism and 
its relation to tragedy, see Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy: From Plato to Žižek, 68-138.  
4
 For more on this, see Poole, Tragedy: A Very Short Introduction, 44-68; Eagleton, Sweet Violence, 101-152.  
5
 This language is taken from Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History’, 392.  
6
 Macbeth 5.5.24-28.  
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completely.’
1
 There are perspectives and suffering that imply a loss, entropy that cannot be easily 
regained, or cannot be re-attained all.
2
 The Jewish Sonderkommando Salman Lewenthal, who was in 
charge of burning bodies in the crematoria in Auschwitz-Birkenau, wrote (in a document discovered 
under one of the crematoriums): ‘the truth was always more atrocious, more tragic than what will be 
said about it’.
3
 As the experience of the so-called Muselmänner
4
 show, there is a kind of suffering 
which goes beyond any simplistic attempts of human description or knowledge. In spite of these 
realities, a tragic view of history is not necessarily tied to hopelessness, resignation or fatalism since it 
can awaken within us the possibilities for compassion (as Ricoeur and others have argued), an 
awareness of the limitation of the present state of things (as Eagleton has pointed out), and it can (as 
an art-form) strive against the apparent meaninglessness of human existence through an attempt to 
give dignity and beauty to those who experience tragedy (as Rowan Williams and David Toole 
argue).
5
 History may have a significant tragic quality, but this does not prevent it from ‘providing a 
small gateway in time through which the Messiah might enter’.
6
 In the words of Shakespeare’s 
Coriolanus we can posit that ‘There is a world elsewhere’
7
, but at the same our social imagination 
needs to be confronted with the intransigent fact of the tragic, which resists overly optimistic or 
utopian ideals regarding social reconciliation. There are limitations to what can be achieved in the 
here and the now.  
Regarding the use of the term ‘tragedy’ and ‘the tragic’ two things are assumed throughout this 
study: (1) Tragedy exists as a form of discourse (within analogical predication, theatre, philosophy, 
film, art, etc.) and as a human experience of an empirical history.
8
 It follows from this that (2) tragedy-
as-discourse, as an analogical and artistic predication is based on the concrete experience of 
‘tragedy’ and ‘the tragic’
9
 as it is experienced within the realm of poetic creation and historical 
                                               
1
 Jennifer L. Geddes, ‘Religion and the Tragic’. Literature & Theology 19.2 (2005), 98.  
2
 Cf. here John Orr:  ‘The tragic lies in the irreparable loss occasioned by the experience the hero has undergone’, in Tragic 
Realism and Modern Society, 14.  
3
 Quoted in Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of Disaster, trans. Ann Smock (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 82.  
4
 The term ‘Muselmann’ (literally ‘Muslim) was used by prisoners of the concentration camps (mainly Auschwitz-Birkenau) to 
describe those reached a point of ‘inhumanity’ in which they were described as ‘staggering corpses’ or the ‘living-dead’. For 
more on this, see Giorgio Agamben, The Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(New York: Zone Books, 2002), 41-86. I should mention here that I am aware of some criticism that has been directed at 
Agamben’s minimalist understanding of Holocaust testimony, namely that the extermination of the Jews was an event ‘without 
witnesses’. It would take us to far afield to go into Agamben’s justification for this rather stark conclusion. However, for some 
friendly criticism of Agamben in this regard, you can read Sibylle Schmidt, ‘Für den Zeugen zuegen: Versuch über Agambens 
,,Was von Auschwitz bleibt’’ in Janine Böckelmann and Frank Meier (eds.), Die governementale Maschine: Zur politischen 
Philosophie Giorgio Agambens (Münster: UNRAST – Verlag, 2007), 90-106. You can also read the criticisms of Oliver 
Marchart, Die Politische Differenz: Zom Denken des Politischen be Nancy, Lefort, Badiou, Laclau und Agamben (Berlin: 
Suhrkamp, 2010), 227-231; Thomas Trezise in Witnessing Witnessing: On the Reception of Holocaust Survivor Testimony 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 122-158.  
5
 This is a point argued by David Toole in his book Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo: Theological Reflections on Nihilism, Tragedy, 
and Apocalypse (Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), 89-128.  We will discuss Rowan Williams views on this topic when we 
come to his essays ‘The Spirit of the Age to Come’ and “Poetic and Religious Imagination’.  
6
 Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History’, 397.  
7
 Coriolanus 3.3.135 
8
 I take this distinction from Paul Janz, in relation to his discussion of Donald MacKinnon in God, the Mind’s Desire, 171-173. 
For a definition of tragedy as a ‘negative event’ (‘Widerfahrnis’) and for what constitutes real tragedy, against a more bland use 
of the concept, see Reinhold Bernhardt, ‘Die Erfahrung des Tragischen als Herausforderung für Theologie. Versuch zur 
Theodizee’. Theologische Zeitschrift 59 (2003), 258-259.  
9
 In this study, I will not assume a hard distinction between the terms ‘tragedy’ and ‘the tragic’ (the former referring to tragedy-
as-discourse and the later to tragedy-as-empirical history). The reason for this is that as a heuristic device it is not useful for 
interpreting Rowan Williams’ theology who does not seem to use the distinction in this way; further, Williams himself has not 
engaged in any extensive engagement with tragedy within its literary form, focusing more on tragedy as an experience within 
history. Instead, Williams’ reflections on tragedy are to be found in a more scattered fashion throughout his oeuvre, in essays 
and articles dealing with subjects in which the idea of ‘the tragic’ or ‘tragedy’ is important, but not the central focus. As  a result 
of these facts, I have used ‘tragedy’ and ‘the tragic’ interchangeably throughout this study, without clearly distinguishing the 
difference between them in a rigorous or scientific fashion, because Williams does not seem to use such a distinction. 
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experience.
1
 Our definitions of ‘the tragic’ are bound to the particularity of ‘tragic’ instantiations, while 
acknowledging the ‘family resemblance’ between different tragic examples, thereby escaping both 
essentialism and nominalism.
2
 Here, we are following Ricoeur when he said that tragedy as 
‘spectacle’ triumphs over tragedy as ‘speculation’.
3
 And finally (3), since our articulation of ‘the tragic’ 
always has to keep close to specific instantiations of tragedy, our speech concerning ‘tragic theology’ 
has to always been done with the awareness of potentially different ‘tragic theologies’ that may be 
enunciated. My choice of Rowan Williams entails that my proposal for a ‘tragic theology’ will take on 
specific forms and contours different than other ‘tragic theologies’. This by no means excludes other 
possibilities (as I will enunciate in the following section of this chapter); other alternatives are 
available. However, the question that needs to be kept in mind is whether such a ‘tragic theology’ can 
be conceived within an authentically Christian orthodox theology.
4
 
With these distinctions in mind, we can move onto our survey of the relation between theology and 
tragedy, particularly focusing on its reception in modern theology, thereafter seeking to place Williams 
within this trajectory.  
 
1.4. Theology and Tragedy: A Survey  
 
Some regard tragedy and the Judeo-Christian perspective as not compatible. However, if one 
accepts a theory of the tragic that is less systematised, more polyform in its presentation, and a 
Christian theology that is less optimistic or triumphalist, then the mutual compossibility of these 
                                               
1
 By saying this, I am distancing myself a bit from the position found in Reinhold Bernhardt, ‘Die Erfahrung des Tragischen als 
Herausforderung für Theologie, 252-255. Bernhardt argues that theology should focus on tragedy as a phenomenological 
experience, rather than a literary one. I would argue that such a hard distinction is problematic since tragedy-as-discourse and 
tragedy-as-empirical continue to play off one another. For example, literary tragedy can expose us to a laboratory of genuine 
experimentation whereby our horizons and definitions of ‘the tragic’ are expanded, However, tragedy in the experienced world 
can serve as a realistic point of reference for determining the value of the art produced (This is what George Steiner argues in 
his later essay entitled ‘Absolute Tragedy’ (in No Passion Spent): the reason ‘absolute tragedy’ fails is because it does not 
correspond to lived experience, which rarely provides examples of such paramount tragedy). Therefore, I would argue, that the 
distinction between the historical-phenomenological and the literary-fictional needs to be complicated, as has been by scholars 
such as Michel De Certeau and others. For a sample of this, Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History, trans. Tom Conley 
(New York: Columba University Press, 1980). 
2
 Cf. Larry D. Bouchard, Tragic Method and Tragic Theology: Evil in Cotemporary Drama and Religious Thought (Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989), where he writes that ‘tragedy is a method of inquiry into the tragic (p. 1)’.  
However,, it should be said here that while ‘tragedy-as-discourse might come first, historically speaking, it was not very long 
before tragedy-as-empirical history was used to describe historical events, without explicit reference to tragedy as a literary 
form. Therefore, we should not make a hardened distinction between historical tragedy and empirical tragedy, since they feed 
reciprocally into one another. On this, see Poole, Tragedy: A Very Short Introduction, 14 in reference to ancient writers 
ascribing events as ‘tragic’ without reference to ‘tragedy’ in its Greek or literary form. 
3
 Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 212.  
4
 An objection might be made at this point that nowhere does Williams’ describe his own theology as ‘tragic’ and such a 
category might force Williams’ own theological tendencies into a potential Procrustean bed. Obviously, a full response to this 
objection awaits the development of this thesis but at this stage several things can be said. Firstly, if there was anyone in 
twentieth century theology who would undoubtedly by classified as expounding a ‘tragic theology’ it was Donald MacKinnon, 
who more than anyone else sought to bring ‘tragedy’ into conversation with the discipline of theology. And if this is case (as this 
study will show), then Williams, who follows his teacher on pretty much all points (except for his rejection of the privatio boni), 
then it follows that applying the category of ‘tragic theology’ to Williams is by no means a stretch. Furthermore, if MacKinnon is 
not expounding a ‘tragic theology’, then the critique of David Bentley Hart (a by no means unintelligent reader) directed against 
‘tragic theology’ (in particular MacKinnon and Nicholas Lash) makes little sense.  
Secondly, if we compare Williams to someone like John Milbank, some further points can be advanced for using this 
description to describe Williams’ theology. In the first instance (as we will show), Milbank is by no means opposed to 
appropriating a ‘tragic’ perspective within theology (something that Williams fully aware of); and yet Milbank believes that 
theology must ultimately move beyond tragedy. Furthermore, he is suspicious particularly of MacKinnon’s reference to tragedy, 
and it is because of these factors that I will classify Milbank as ultimately a ‘post-tragic’ theologian. Nonetheless, such factors 
have not stopped someone like David Toole ascribing the appellation of ‘tragic theology’ to Milbank’s theology (see his study 
Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo). If this is the case, then applying the description of ‘tragic theology’ to Williams (who is more 
reticent in regard to Milbank’s ‘post-tragic’ sentiments) does not seem to be forcing Williams into a Procrustean bed of any kind.  
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perspectives remains an open question. Some (like George Steiner) regard the religion of the Hebrew 
Bible and the Christian scriptures to be anti-tragic since it is ultimately concerned with justice and 
recompense for human suffering. However, such a sweeping judgement has been criticized by biblical 
scholars themselves who have shown that biblical stories
1
 and Jewish midrash
2
 can be read in fruitful 
dialogue with tragic theory. It is also a well-known fact that the biblical stories (mostly stemming, at 
least in the Old Testament, from the so-called Deutronomistic History) have been used as tragic 
material for artists and playwrights (including Samson, Saul, David to mention a few), and the tragic 
sentiments of the books of Job and Ecclesiastes have also been noticed. The psalms of lament can 
also provide fruitful comparison in this regard (cf. Ps. 88), Furthermore, the early church preserved 
some sayings of Jesus which complicate any simplistic relation between sin and suffering, thereby 
complicating attempts at theodicy and any one-to-one causality between human action and the 
experience of evil (Luke 13.1-4, John 9.1-3), opening the possibility for a Christian perspective to 
embrace the ‘tragic’ sensibility that we often suffer beyond desert or calculation (Christ’s cry of 
dereliction also provides some poignant reflection in this regard). We also know that the Hellenization 
process of paideia allowed Jews and Christians from early on to imbibe the cultural artefacts of Greek 
culture, including the tragic poets.
3
 Also, in the sixth century, we have Boethius describing the 
incarnation and divine conception of Christ as ‘tremendous tragedy’ (tanta tragoedia)
4
, probably in 
reference to the divine kenosis of God in Christ.
5
 And in the twelfth century, we have an example of 
the story of Christ’s passion being re-imagined along Euripidean lines (the so-called Christus Patiens, 
whose authorship is unclear).
6
 What these examples show (there are others) is that it is by no means 
obvious that the Judeo-Christian tradition is inimical to tragedy, though there are some ancient views 
expressing their difference.
7
 Certainly, it is true that some kinds of tragedy and theology do not sit well 
together. For example, Paul Ricoeur, speaking about the tendency of Attic tragedians towards a 
‘predestination towards evil’ says that ‘Perhaps tragic theology should be rejected as soon as it is 
thought’.
8
 However, as we have shown above, tragedy and theology are by no means mutually 
exclusive, if we are willing to accept a broader understanding of ‘the tragic’.  
In what follows, I aim to give a survey of the relation between tragedy and theology, as it has been 
discussed by contemporary theological thinkers. I do not aim to be comprehensive, nor can I engage 
in detailed readings with every thinker. I will simply attempt to situate each thinker as best as I can 
within the three categories discussed earlier, namely theology as tragic or paradoxically tragic, 
theology as anti-tragic or non-tragic, and theology as post-tragic or partially tragic. The purpose of this 
survey is to situate Rowan Williams within this debate.  
                                               
1
 J.. Cheryl Exum, Tragedy and Biblical Narrative: Arrows of the Almighty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); 
Thomas C. Römer, ‘Why Would the Deutronomists Tell about the Sacrifice of Jepthah’s Daughter?’, Journal for the Study of the 
Old Testament 77 (1998), 27-38; Ben Quash, ‘Four Biblical Characters’, in Christian Theology and Tragedy, 15-32.  
2
 For this, see Avivah Gottlieb Zornberg, Genesis: The Beginning of Desire (Philadelphia-Jerusalem: The Jewish Publication 
Society, 1995), 123-143.  
3
 Werner Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia (London-Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1961).  
4
 Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestoriam, trans. H.F. Stewart and E.K. Rand. Loeb Classical Library (Harvard: Harvard 
University Press, 1918), chap. 5, 105. 
5
 This is the opinion of Terry Eagleton, Sweet Violence, 12 
6
 ‘Introduction’, in Christian Theology and Tragedy, 7.  
7
 We know that Clement of Alexandria was fond of quoting the Attic tragedians, though this was sometimes to precisely to 
distinguish the Christian story from Greek tragedy. On this, see Clement of Alexandria, Protrepicus 12.118.5-119.1. Patrologia 
Gracae 9, (ed.) J.-P. Migne (Petit-Montrouge Excudebatur, 1857). I owe this reference to Cyprian Krause.  
8
 The Symbolism of Evil, 212. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
31 
 
Among modern theologians, one of the first to deal with the theme of the tragic was Reinhold 
Niebuhr in his book Beyond Tragedy
1
, which – as its title suggests – was an attempt to come to an 
Christian understanding of history which was able to account for the reality of tragedy, while at the 
same time being able to move ‘beyond tragedy’.
2
 Niebuhr’s understanding of history and God’s action 
within it are ‘dialectical’ in the sense that ‘The relation between the temporal and the eternal is 
dialectical. The eternal is revealed and expressed in the temporal but not exhausted by it.’
3
 Since 
Christianity rejects pantheism and dualism, this perspective seems to be the only option which moves 
between these twin errors. God cannot be identified with the movement of history, characterised as it 
is by limitation and human sinfulness, which Niebuhr characterises as ‘egoism’ in its essential form
4
 
and ‘tragic’ in the sense that humanity denies its ‘most essential nature’. However, ‘The God of the 
Christian faith is not only creator but redeemer. He does not allow human existence to end tragically. 
He snatches victory from defeat. He [sic] is Himself defeated in history but He also is victorious in that 
defeat.’
5
 As such then, ‘The Christian faith consequently does not defy the tragic facts of human 
existence by a single victory over tragedy; nor does it flee the tragedy of temporal existence into a 
heavenly escape.’
6
 He goes onto say that ‘The ultimate fulfilment of life transcends the possibilities of 
history. There is no hope of overcoming the contradictions, in which life stands, in history…God must 
overcome this inescapable contradiction’.
7
 For Niebuhr then, ‘Christianity is a religion which 
transcends tragedy…The cross is not tragic but the resolution of tragedy’.’
8
 In terms of his own 
definition of tragedy, Niebuhr holds to a pretty standard interpretation of the tragic, focusing mostly 
Greek tragic drama as the model in which the defiant tragic hero
9
 is paramount, and in which suffering 
is ‘self-inflicted’.
10
 He also holds to the view that while Christianity and tragedy are similar in the sense 
that both deny that ‘the titanic forces of human existence’ can ‘easily be brought under the control of 
some little scheme of prudent rationality’, and he believes that Christianity denies ‘the inevitability of 
guilt in all human creativity’ because ‘Sin emerges…out of freedom and is possible only because man 
is free.’
11
 Therefore evil is not ‘a part of essential man’.
12
 For Niebuhr (as he has written elsewhere): 
‘the tragic antinomies of life’ are ‘the consequence of the corruption of freedom’.
13
 
                                               
1
 Reinhold Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedy: Essays on the Christian Interpretation of History (London: Nisbet, 1938).  
2
 ‘It is the thesis of these essays that the Christian view of history passes though the sense of the tragic to a hope and an 
assurance which is “beyond tragedy”. The cross, which stands at the centre of the Christian worldview, reveals both the 
seriousness of human sin and the purpose and the power of God to overcome it.’ (Ibid., x).  
3
 Ibid., 4.  
4
 Ibid., 11.  
5
 Ibid., 19.  
6
 Ibid., 20.  
7
 Ibid., 23.  
8
 Ibid., 155.  
9
 ‘In true tragedy the hero defies malignant power to assert the integrity of his soul. He suffers because he is strong and not  
because he is weak. He involves himself in guilt not by his vice but by his virtue. This tragic level of life is an achievement of 
few.’ (Ibid., 156).  Niebuhr also spoke elsewhere about the inability of ‘modern experience’ to accept ‘irony’ and ‘pathos’, but 
that it was unable to be grasped under the rubric of ‘tragedy because contemporary culture has no vantage point of faith from 
which to understand the predicament of modern man. It is therefore incapable either of rising to a tragic defiance of destiny, as 
depicted in Greek drama, or of achieving a renewal of life through a contrite submission to destiny, as in Christian Tragedy’. 
This quote can be found in Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History: A Comparison of Christian and Modern View of History (New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1949), 9. It should also be said here that Niebuhr seems to have a preference for the Greek 
tragedians over Greek philosophy, since in their understanding of history they were able to recognize that ‘there are tragic 
antinomies in life which can not be brought into a simple rational harmony’ and as such ‘were closer to the ultimate truth about 
life than the philosophers’ (Faith and History, 155).  
10
 Beyond Tragedy, 160.  
11
 Ibid., 165-166.  
12
 Ibid., 168.  
13
 Faith and History, 58.  
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From this, we can see that Niebuhr is able to give space to the tragic within history, but it is 
presupposed that such tragedy is analogous to the Attic forms of tragedy (which is understood in 
largely homogenous and generalized terms), and that Christian hope moves ‘beyond’ such tragedy. 
He also assumes that tragedy teaches or presupposes a radical understanding of evil, in the sense 
that evil is an ‘essential’ part of nature. Such an assumption again presupposes a particular construal 
of ‘the tragic’ which is not universally applicable to all forms of tragedy, Furthermore, his 
eschatological position on tragedy does not seem to given adequate account of how history itself is 
redeemed, because the Christian hope lies largely beyond history since it transcends the limitations of 
time. But the question that might be posed to Niebuhr is how – eschatologically – are we able to give 
dignity (without trivialisation) to our distinctly human existence as temporal beings within such a 
schema? These are questions which deserve further attention, something which Niebuhr does not 
discuss in detail. And it is these questions which haunted T.S. Eliot in the Four Quartets, and 
consequently Rowan Williams himself when he wrestled with these texts (to be discussed in chapter 
three). Furthermore, Niebuhr’s appropriation of ‘the tragic’ (and his whole project of ‘Christian 
realism’) has been interpreted by some thinkers (like Milbank and Hauerwas) as simply an 
underpinning of contemporary neo-liberalism, thereby excluding theology from any substantive 
contributions to understanding the socio-political order of things. In these schema, liberalism becomes 
simply a ‘tragic necessity’ which needs to embraced, since a properly Christian politics centred on the 
love of God revealed in the cross of Christ cannot (in Niebuhr’s interpretation) be the basis for a 
legitimate socio-political program.
1
 Rowan Williams himself has expressed reservations about Niebuhr 
(echoing the critiques of Milbank
2
 and Hauerwas
3
) regarding ‘the tragic’ being used as ‘a vehicle for 
absolution’ apart from considerations of the ‘complex motivations’ of certain actions.
4
 In light of these 
comments, while we can commend Niebuhr for his attempt to appropriate ‘the tragic’ for theological 
thought, there are several questions that still need to be answered.  
Another theologian who engaged extensively with ‘the tragic’ was Niebuhr’s contemporary Paul 
Tillich. One can see that from early on (already from his time as a professor at Frankfurt) that Tillich 
was interested in questions of philosophy, fate and necessity. This fact can been seen in his inaugural 
lecture as the Professor of Philosophy at Frankfurt entitled ‘Philosophie und Schicksal’ (1929)
5
, and 
translated into English as ‘Philosophy and Fate’.
6
 Here we can see that Tillich is concerned with 
                                               
1
 This is also tied to Niebuhr’s belief in the dialectical (and even conflictual) relation between love and justice. Niebuhr has said 
that ‘The higher possibilities of love, which is at once the fulfillment and the negation of justice, always hover over every system 
of justice’ in Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man I (Louisville-London: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 285. Later on, 
he says that ‘sacrificial love’ is related to ‘mutual love’ in the same way that we understand ‘the general relation of super-history 
to history’ in Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man II, 69.  
2
 John Milbank, ‘The Poverties of Niebuhrianism’, in The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1997), 233-254. Milbank argues that Niebuhr’s ethic is ultimately more ‘Stoic’ than ‘Christian’.  
3
 Stanley Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe: The Church’s Witness and Natural Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 
2001), 87-140. Hauerwas claims and argues that Niebuhr’s liberalism ultimately led him to a theology that was based on 
anthropology and a Jamesian understanding of religious experience that he never ultimately disavowed.  
4
 Rowan Williams, ‘The Health of the Spirit’, in Michael W. Brierley (ed.), Public Life and the Place of the Church: Reflections to 
Honour the Bishop of Oxford (Aldershot; England: Ashgate, 2006), 219. Williams probably has in mind here Niebuhr’s 
acceptance of nuclear armament as some kind of ‘tragic’ reality which needs to be accepted, if not endorsed.  
5
 For the original German text of this lecture, see Paul Tillich, Philosophical Writings/ Philosopische Schriften, (ed.) Gunther 
Wenz, in Main Works/ Hauptwerke, vol. 1, (ed.) Carl Heinz Ratschow (Berlin-New York: Walter De Gruyter, 1989), 310-319. 
Tillich was interested in these questions even before he received his professorship, as can be seen from his essay ‘Kairos und 
Logos: Eine Untersuchung zur Metaphysik der Erkenntnis’ (1926), in Philosophische Schriften, 269-296.  
6
 For the English text, see Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, trans. James Luther Adams (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1948), 3-15.  
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question of how philosophy may speak of ‘truth’ (in the Platonic sense) when it is entwined with ‘fate’. 
In his words ‘Fate is the transcendent necessity in which freedom is entangled’ and that ‘there is no 
freedom, there is no fate; there is simply necessity. A merely physical object that is conditioned in all 
respects is entirely without fate because it is wholly bound to necessity. The more freedom there is, 
that is, the more the self-determination (or the greater the autonomous power), the more the 
susceptibility to fate.’
1
 As such, the philosopher is caught up into the flux of time and fate, and cannot 
extricate him or herself from this reality, since philosophy is a time-bound discourse.
2
 As such there is 
no access to ‘truth’ apart from ‘fate’ in the dialectic between ‘freedom’ and ‘necessity’
3
 and he argues 
that it was the deficit of Greek philosophy that it sought to move out of the realm of fate and tragedy, 
whereas tragic literature sought to hold onto the ideal of ‘the hero who in freedom endures and 
overcomes his fate.’
4
 However, Tillich believes that with the dawn of Christianity, we have something 
new that enters the horizon in which ‘time triumphs over space’
5
 in the sense that the Judeo-Christian 
view of history replaced the Greek cyclic view of time, thereby undermining the presuppositions of 
Greek tragedy and philosophy.
6
 
Tillich’s more mature reflections however display that he is willing to allow the tragic sensibility of 
life to invade his theological reflections and that he is willing to give them space in his reflections on 
Christian doctrine. Such reflections come particularly to the fore when Tillich discusses the themes of 
created finitude, namely the movement from ‘essence to existence’ (‘Creation’) that coincides with 
(but is logically distinct from) ‘estrangement’ (‘The Fall’).
7
 Such a transition from essence to existence 
is the basis for humanity’s freedom, but it is also the basis for our estrangement from the Ground of 
Being, the reason for humanity’s ‘anxiety’
8
 regarding its existence within the dialectic of being and 
non-being.
9
 For Tillich, ‘the Fall’ is primarily a ‘symbol’ of humanity’s condition universally and does 
not refer to a particular event within time, but is rather the presupposition of every free human act. 
                                               
1
 The Protestant Era, 13-14.  
2
 Ibid., 4: ‘Not only the philosopher as a man but also the philosopher as philosopher has a fate, and this means that philosophy 
itself has a fate [italics original].’ 
3
 Ibid., 15: ‘[T]he history of philosophy shows that all existence stands in fate. Every finite thing possesses a certain power of 
being of its own and thus possesses a capacity for fate. The greater a finite thing's autonomous power of being is, the higher is 
its capacity for fate and the more deeply is the knowledge of it involved in fate.. Hence even our knowledge of the fateful 
character of philosophy must at the same time stand in logos and in kairos. If it stood only in the kairos, it would be without 
validity and the assertion would be valid only for the one making it; if it stood only in the logos, it would be without fate and 
would therefore have no part in existence, for existence is involved in fate..’ 
4
 Ibid., 5: ‘Tragedy presents the hero who in freedom endures and overcomes his fate. Philosophy gives knowledge, a 
knowledge by means of which man is united with the eternal One, beyond fate. This attitude of Greek philosophy, whereby it 
deprived all things and all forms of life of their ultimate power and concentrated the power of being in one substance, in the 
result of the highest abstraction, in "Pure Being," is not intelligible except as the consequence of a dire need. It is the need to 
overcome the bondage to fate and tragedy.’  
5
 Elsewhere, Tillich writes of the relation between ‘space’ and ‘tragedy’ (in a way that seems to complicate his earlier strong 
distinction between tragedy and philosophy) that ‘Human existence under the predominance of space is tragic…Greek tragedy, 
philosophy, and art were wrestling with the tragic law of our spatial existence. They were seeking for an immovable being 
beyond the circle of genesis and decay, greatness and self-destruction, something beyond tragedy’, in Paul Tillich, Theology of 
Culture, (ed.), Robert C. Kimball (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 33.  
6
 The Protestant Era, 8: ‘The irreversible, unrepeatable character of time, its meaningful directedness, replaces the cyclic, ever 
recurrent becoming and passing-away. A "gracious" destiny that brings salvation in time and history subdues a demonic fate 
which denies the new in history. Thus the Greek view of life and the world is overcome, and with it the presupposition of Greek 
philosophy as well as of Greek tragedy.’ 
7
 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology II (Great Britain: University of Chicago, 1957), 33-50. For Tillich, since the transition from 
‘essence to existence’ coincides with ‘estrangement’, it difficult to avoid the conclusion that ‘Creation’ and ‘the Fall’ correspond 
to the same reality (something that Tillich acknowledges and accepts). It should be said here that Tillich is drawing the 
language of ‘estrangement’ from Hegel. Regarding Hegel, Tillich interpreted him ‘tragically’ in the sense that Hegel’s ‘system’ 
represented for Tillich an example of tragic ‘hubris’. On this, see Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought: From Its Judaic 
and Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism, (ed.) Carl E. Braaten (New York: Siimon & Schuster, 1967-68), 411-414.  
8
 Systematic Theology, vol. 2, 35-41.  
9
 For more on this, see Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology I (Great Britain: University of Chicago, 1951), 197-227.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
34 
 
And it is this underlying reality, ‘the myth of the transcendent Fall’ that is the basis for the ‘the tragic-
universal character of existence’ in which ‘Existence is rooted both in ethical freedom and in tragic 
destiny’.
1
 Such a ‘tragic universality’ and ‘estrangement’ is the basis for humanity’s enmeshment 
within sin (which Tillich analyses according to the traditional tripartite division of ‘unbelief’, ‘hubris’, 
and ‘concupiscence’).
2
 In regard to ‘hubris’, Tillich makes explicit reference to the heroes of Greek 
tragedy who, because of their ‘greatness’ aspired to ‘the self-elevation of man into the sphere of the 
divine’
3
, and it is precisely this ‘greatness’ that is the basis for ‘the tragic’ since ‘The self-
transcendence of life, which reveals to man the greatness of life, leads under the conditions of 
existence to the tragic character of life, to the ambiguity of the great and the tragic. Only the great is 
able to have tragedy.’
4
 Within this matrix of ‘hubris’ and ‘greatness’, however, Tillich does make a 
distinction between ‘the tragic’ and ‘the demonic’. He writes that ‘The tragic is the inner ambiguity of 
human greatness. But the subject of tragedy does not aspire to divine greatness. He does not intend 
‘‘to be like God’’. He touches, so to speak, the divine sphere, and he is rejected by it into self-
destruction, but he does not claim divinity for himself. Wherever this is done, the demonic appears. A 
main characteristic of the tragic is the state of being blind; a main characteristic of the demonic is the 
state of being split.’
5
 
‘Tragedy’ does provide some context for Tillich’s understanding of redemption and ‘New Being’ 
that is found in the reconciling act of Christ, who remained united to the Source of Being, despite 
being involved in ‘finitude’ and ‘the tragic element of existence’ in which his saving act of death on a 
cross is at the same time the creation of ‘guilt’ for those who were involved in his death.
6
 Christ, 
despite these tragic realities, is able to bring these ‘negativities’ into union with God: ‘The conquest of 
existential estrangement in the New Being, which is of the Christ, does not remove finitude and 
anxiety, ambiguity and tragedy; but it does have the character of taking the negativities of existence 
into unbroken unity with God’.
7
  
Regarding human action, Tillich believes that human freedom is always bound by ‘destiny’ and 
‘finitude’ in the flux of ‘dynamic and form’ and we cannot seek to remove ourselves from such a 
context. Therefore, human history always remains potentially open to ‘the tragic’ and ‘the demonic’, 
which can manifest itself in human culture, including religious and socio-political systems.
8
 
Nonetheless, hope is not vanquished (even though we cannot overcome finitude and tragedy
9
), but 
                                               
1
 Systematic Theology, vol. 2, 43 
2
 Ibid., 51-63.  
3
 Ibid., 57.  
4
 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology III (Great Britain: University of Chicago, 1963), 98.  
5
 Ibid., 109.  
6
 Systematic Theology II, 144-155.  
7
 Ibid., 154.  
8
 Systematic Theology III, 108-113.  
9
 ‘No life is able to overcome finiteness, sin, and tragedy. The illusions of our period have been that modern civilization can 
conquer them, and that we can achieve security in our own existence. Progress seemed to have conquered tragedy; the divine 
order seemed to be embodied in the progressive, historical order. But for nearly three decades our generation has received 
blow after blow, destroying that illusion, and driving to despair and cynicism those who wanted to transform, and thought they 
could transform, the historical order into a divine order. Let us learn from the catastrophe of our time at least the fact that no life 
and no period are able to overcome finiteness, sin, and tragedy’, in Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1953), 22.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
35 
 
remains positioned within the dialectic of hope and tragedy in which we may hope for ‘guilt’ and 
‘wrath’ to be finally conquered.
1
 
From our examination above, it seems to be the case that Tillich could be said to advance a 
‘paradoxically’ tragic theology. His strong emphasis on the relation between finitude, as well as the 
binding together of ‘creation’ and ‘fall’ however open the path for a tragic theology of a rather stringent 
kind, and this is where a potential problem arises for Tillich (as can be seen already in Niebuhr’s early 
criticism of his theology of sin
2
): if creation and estrangement ‘coincide’ in which ‘Actualised creation 
and estranged existence are identical’ (taking into account his emphasis on their ‘logical difference’ 
and that fact that ‘the leap from essence to existence’ is not a ‘structural necessity’)
3
, then how, firstly, 
might we understand accepting our properly temporal and material being as moving us towards God, 
rather being ‘estranged’ from God? Does not the incarnation and kenosis of God-in-Christ, in which 
the limitation and weakness are accepted, move Christ towards God rather than from God (cf. Phil. 
2.6-11)? And does not this coincidence of creation and estrangement reaffirm the perennial 
‘androcentric’ perspective whereby spirituality and materiality are sundered from one another?
4
 In 
other words, how are we to understand creation and materiality as fundamentally good within this 
paradigm? Secondly, does not Tillich’s equation of ‘creation’ and ‘estrangement’ move sin and 
separation from God into an ontological necessity not merely a contingent necessity (to echo the 
language of David Tracy)? Within Tillich’s scheme, is not sin simply a flowering of what we are 
(‘estranged’ from our Source of Being) rather than a distortion of what of our ‘essence’ is? How are 
we to understand sin as a perversion of the good, rather than just a manifestation our existence as 
already estranged from God?
5
 As J. Heywood Thomas wrote, in an early critique of Paul Tillich’s 
theology, does not Tillich’s ‘half-way demythologization’ of the myth of the Fall (in which he does not 
distinguish between ‘the myth itself and his interpretative concept’)
6
 result in ‘a strange 
intellectualization of the myth, and its employment of the concepts of implication makes the necessity 
of sin suspiciously like logical necessity. If this is the case then there is no further possibility of 
retaining the distinction between finitude and sin.’
7
 More recent studies come to similar conclusions: 
Samuel Loncar has shown the incoherency of Tillich’s theology of human agency and the Fall (an 
inconsistency which Loncar traces to Tillich’s Idealist heritage), namely in relation to the fact that 
                                               
1
 Tillich asks the question (The Shaking of the Foundations, 74): ‘[I]s tragedy stronger than hope? Does the past conquer the 
future? Is wrath more powerful than mercy? We are driven to and fro between melancholy and expectation—from tragedy to 
hope, from hope to tragedy. In this situation we may be ready to receive the message of a new being, a new kind of existence 
which is not only hope, but also reality, in which Divine wrath and human guilt ultimately are conquered. Christianity is based on 
this message: God subjecting Himself to transitoriness and wrath, in order to be with us. And thus is fulfilled the hope of which 
the psalmist sings: "Let thy work appear unto thy servants and thy glory upon thy children." 
2
 Reinhold Niebuhr, ‘Biblical Thought and Ontological Speculation in Tillich’s Theology’ in Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. 
Bretall (eds.), The Theology of Paul Tillich (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), 215-226.  
3
 Systematic Theology II, 50.  
4
 For an appreciative, but also critical interpretation of Paul Tillich generally, see Rachel Sophia Baard, ‘Tillich and Feminism’, 
Russell Re Manning (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Paul Tillich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 273-287.  
5
 It should be said that in regard to the topic of sin, Tillich followed the traditional Augustinian distinctions (unbelief, hubris, and 
concupiscence); however, his move towards equating creation with the privatio boni is definitely a move beyond the 
Augustinian tradition. 
6
 One common critique of Tillich’s correlation method is that in his attempt to situate Christian theology within the matrix of 
existentialist and secular thought, he predetermines the answer Christian tradition can give to the modern person by 
circumscribing it within a priori existentialist categories. In relation to his use of concept of ‘estrangement’, Oswald Bayer has 
applied this criticism to Tillich’s doctrine of sin referencing the possible dangers of correlation method which can become ‘a 
closed circle’ because its questions already determine its answers in a radical way. For more on this, Oswald Bayer, ‘Tillich as 
a Systematic Theologian, in The Cambridge Companion to Paul Tillich¸ 23-25.  
7
 J. Heywood Thomas, Paul Tillich: An Appraisal (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1963), 131. 
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Tillich wants to articulate an atemporal Fall, while at the same time he also desires an agent to enact 
it (an inescapably historical concept). If such an agent is not human (since that would imply 
temporality), then who is the agent? Is it God, or a demiurge, or something else? Since Tillich wants 
to avoid the Manichaean conclusion, it is difficult not to conclude that the agent is God. But then it 
would seem that for Tillich, God creates a world that is already fallen, since for the movement from 
‘essence’ to ‘existence’ that constitutes creation involves a ‘distancing’ between Creator and creature, 
which is the substantial basis for our fallenness.
1
 If this interpretation is correct, then it would seem 
that Tillich lays the foundation for a radically tragic theology that will flower later in feminist thinkers 
like Kathleen Sands, a position which we will distance ourselves from in this study.  
Some other significant theological thinkers of the twentieth century, like Karl Rahner and Karl Barth 
wrote little concerning the subject of tragedy or ‘the tragic’ in general. The Church Dogmatics very 
rarely references tragedy at all. There is one reference to the Greek tragedian Euripedes, but he is 
mentioned in a context that makes no reference to tragedy per se.
2
 When Barth does make reference 
to ‘tragedy’ or ‘the tragic’, there is little explication what he means by these terms. However, one can 
extrapolate from some of his statements the way Barth would have dealt with the topic of ‘tragedy’ 
within his theological reflections. Since tragedy is bound up the with the inherent finite and bounded 
quality of human existence, one could argue (as Larry Bouchard does)
3
 that Barth would have placed 
‘tragedy’ and ‘the tragic’ within ‘the negative aspect’ of creation, which while sorrowful and even 
painful, should not be equated with Das Nichtige (as discussed in §50 of CD III/3).
4
 Furthermore (as 
we can see from Barth’s only explicit treatment of tragedy within the Church Dogmatics), our pain and 
suffering is denied a tragic interpretation since God, through divine mercy, has freely accepted our 
‘anguish’, leaving us little to ‘lament’ since God has already assumed our agony into the divine heart. 
Any reference to an experience of ‘divine pain’ or ‘tragic consciousness’ is ‘presumptuous’ because 
as a result of God’s merciful act in Christ ‘the tragedy of human existence is dissolved’. Because of 
this, we cannot lament because of our pain, but have to admit our existence as ‘sinners and debtors’ 
towards God.
5
 Based on these remarks, it would seem that for Barth (after Christ) humanity cannot 
really claim the category of ‘tragedy’ for itself since this would absolve it of admitting its complicity 
within sin, and further it would deny that in Christ God has ‘dissolved’ tragedy within the divine being. 
With this, the foundation is laid here for Balthasar’s later denial that there is any ‘tragedy’ in the true 
sense after Christ. Pertaining to this position, it could be said that this move is part of the 
‘Christomonist’
6
 tendency
1
 within Barth’s theological project whereby Christ becomes the cipher and 
                                               
1
 Samuel Loncar, ‘German Idealism’s Long Shadow: The Fall and Divine-Human Agency in Tillich’s Systematic Theology’. 
Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 54.1 (2012), 95-118.  
2
 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics III.2: The Doctrine of Creation, trans. H. Knight et al (London-New York: T & T Clark, 1960), 
279.  
3
 Bouchard, Tragic Method and Tragic Theology, 49ff.  
4
 Barth, Church Dogmatics III.3: The Doctrine of Creation, trans. G.W. Bromiley and R.J. Ehrlich (London-New York: T & T 
Clark, 1960), 295-302. For a discussion of Barth’s theology of Das Nichtige, see Wolf Krötke, Sin and Nothingness in  the 
Theology of Karl Barth, trans. Phillip G. Ziegler and Christina Maria Bammel. Studies in Reformed Theology and History 
(Princeton: Princeton Theological Seminary, 2005); Matthias D. Wüttrich, ‘Das >>fremde Geheimnis des wirklich Nichtigen<<. 
Karl Barths einsamer Denkweg in der Frage des Bösen‘, in Michael Beintker, Christian Link, Michael Trowitzsch (eds.), Karl 
Barth im europäischen Zeitgeschehen (1935-1950): Widerstand – Bewährung – Orientierung (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag 
Zürich, 2010), 395-411.  
5
 Barth, Church Dogmatics II.1: The Doctrine of God, trans. T.H.L Parker et al (London-New York: T & T Clark, 1957), 374.  
6
 I am aware that the term ‘Christomonist’ is a controversial interpretation of Barth’s Christology, and I by no means use it as a 
blank description of Barth’s entire Christology. By ‘Christomonist’ I appropriate the definition of Wolf Krötke (made in reference 
to Paul Althaus) in which he says that ‘Christomonism’ is a concept that ‘levels out the contradictory experiences of the his tory 
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an alembic through which all history, experience and suffering is understood, to such an extent that 
the trauma and afflictions history are absorbed into the Christ-event. Such a tendency within Barth 
lacks the appropriate attention to contingency of history (since everything the Christ-event is 
essentially a part of the divine Urgeschichte that is simply actualized in time)
2
, an appropriate 
pneumatology in which our own suffering is made ‘present’ with the sufferings of Christ rather than 
just absorbing them
3
, and a Christology of ‘representation’ rather than a sweeping Christology of 
‘substitution’ which is able to give dignity to the suffering and oppressed by distinguishing them as 
truly Other from Christ while at the same time giving their suffering meaning by patterning it after his 
passion (cf. Matt 25. 31-46).
4
 However, despite all these points, it should be admitted that Barth is not 
entirely consistent on this point. An examination of his mature reflections on the book of Job
5
 show 
that he was able to positively appropriate the concept of lament into his theology, in which the 
suffering and second-person experience
6
 between God and Job escapes broad and sweeping 
systematizations which are ‘permanently and universally valid’ because such assertions are unable to 
account for the freedom of God in particular relation to Job.
7
 Such an avenue might provide a more 
fruitful engagement between Barth’s legacy and tragic theory, which is concerned fundamentally with 
the particularity of human suffering.   
When we examine Karl Rahner’s magnum opus Theological Investigations we find a few scattered 
references to ‘tragedy’ or ‘the tragic’ but these are almost always very generalised uses of the word, 
                                                                                                                                                  
of God and humanity on the basis of a particular principle’, in Krötke, ‘Christocentricism’ in Hans Dieter Betz et al (eds.), 
Religion Past and Present, vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 620.  
1
 I say ‘tendency’ because I am aware that Barth’s Christology is not fully consistent, as I will point out shortly in this text. In 
regard to the Barth’s doctrine of reconciliation (CD IV/1ff.), Jüngel states in Karl Barth: A Theological Legacy, trans. Garret E. 
Paul (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1986), 46, that, “[t]his doctrine was both a massive recapitulation and a thorough 
revision of Barth’s entire dogmatics...” For more on these tensions, see McCormack, ‘Karl Barth’s Historicized Christology: Just 
How Chalcedonian is It?’, in Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 
2008), 201-233). Bruce McCormack argues in detail elsewhere that a shift occurred in Barth’s theology as a result of his 
appropriation of an anhypostatic-enhypostatic Christology into dialectical theology after his move to Göttingen, thereby granting 
more place to the story of Jesus as an extension over time than was possible in Barth’s use of consistent eschatology in Der 
Römerbrief. On this, see  McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Reatlistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development 
1909-1936 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 327-374. On how Barth’s later attendance to narrative Christology creates aporias in 
relation to Barth’s earlier theology of revelation in CD I/1, see Rowan Williams, ‘Barth on the Triune God’ in Wrestling with 
Angels,106-149. Williams’ whole discussion on this topic is illuminating where he argues that Barth’s later reflections on the 
Trinity in CD IV/1ff., as it is rethought through the lens of Barth’s doctrine of God’s eternal self-determination for an historical 
existence in Jesus Christ (CD II/2), opens up possibilities for a greater emphasis for human participation in the revelation 
process, one that is able to include contingency, doubt, uncertainty, and weakness. However, are these possibilities which 
Barth did not expound upon, and they remain in tension with Barth’s earlier theology of revelation in CD I/1. The question 
remains however whether Williams is interpreting Barth here through a more Balthasarian lens than a Barthian one.  
2
 This is the criticism of Barth that is made by Rowan Williams in his essay, ‘Barth on the Triune God’ and by Nathan R. Kerr, 
Christ, History and Apocalyptic: The Politics of Christian Mission (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2009), 63-92.  
3
 See Williams, ‘Word and Spirit’, in On Christian Theology, 107-127; Ingolf U. Dalferth, Malum: Theologische Hermeneutik des 
Bösen (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 113-117. Dalferth’s comments should be read in light of his comments concerning the 
modes of divine presence which ‘perfects’ itself and ‘adapts’ to the multiplicity of world contingencies. On this, see Ingolf U. 
Dalferth, Becoming Present: An Inquiry into the Christian Sense of the Presence of God (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 152-156.  
4
 Pannenberg states the beginning of Christology of ‘inclusive representation’ to P.K. Marheineke, and finds exemplary 
expression in the work of Dorothee Sölle. For Pannenberg, Barth’s Christology of ‘substitution’ is ‘totalitarian’ since it amounts 
to ‘a replacement of those represented’. For more on this, see Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology II, trans. G.W. 
Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994), 429-437. One can also read a philosophically and theologically acute (but brief) 
critique of substitutionary Christology in John Milbank, Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being and the 
Representation of the People (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 77-80. Milbank argues that ‘substitution alone’ model is linked to 
an ‘instrumentalised Christology’ whereby Christ is understood to compensate for humanity’s ‘lack’ rather than ‘exceeding the 
occasion of his arrival’. And precisely because it is instrumentalised it results in ‘a fetishistic, over-pious and too literally mimetic 
devotion to Christ’s life and death’ which is ‘reduced to literal terms and shorn of its allegorical links with the intrinsic shape of 
every human destiny’ (p. 80).  
5
 Barth, Church Dogmatics IV.3.1: The Doctrine of Reconciliation, trans. G.W. Bromiley (London-New York: T & T Clark, 1961), 
453-461.  
6
 The language of second-person experience is drawn from Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the 
Problem of Suffering (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), 75-81.  
7
 Barth, Church Dogmatics IV.3.1, 458.  
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without any significance reference to tragic theory. Any assumptions about what constitutes tragedy 
are left in the background.  Most of the references are to be found in contexts where Rahner is 
dealing with the questions of freedom
1
, salvation
2
 and the church
3
 within the context of temporality 
and finitude, tragic guilt
4
, sin and death.
5
 In reference to existentialism, Rahner also coins the term 
‘tragic humanism’ but does not develop it much further in this context
6
 (though Terry Eagleton has 
taken up this same phrase more recently to distinguish the ‘tragic humanism’ of Marxism, Christianity 
and psychoanalysis from the ‘liberal humanism of modernity’).
7
 However, generally speaking, Rahner 
largely remains within the minimalist bounds of a more generalised treatment of tragedy-as-empirical 
experience rather than tragedy-as-discourse. As result, there is no sustained treatment of the theme 
of tragedy; therefore, we will not go into more detail regarding his thought on this point.  
Johann Baptist Metz (a student of Rahner) however does bear some mention in this regard. He 
does not make mention of ‘tragedy’ or ‘the tragic’ per se in the text I will examine, but he does make 
mention of holding onto the memory of suffering (memoria passionis) in a radical way, as well as 
some other themes which make his position cohere with the kind of ‘tragic’ theology I am pursuing in 
this thesis. Metz’s seminal essay entitled ‘Future in the Memory of Suffering’ (originally published in 
1972)
8
 is an exemplary exposition of this idea. I cannot go into full detail regarding this essay, but it 
seems clear that Metz’s emphasis on the memoria passionis as a form of political imagination against 
                                               
1
 ‘The tragic conflict between the objectively justified and obligatory demand, on the one hand, and the subjective conscience in 
good faith, on the other, is insoluble in practice. Its tragedy must be accepted with patience and mutual respect as a sign of the 
imperfection of the order here below’, Karl Rahner, ‘The Dignity and Freedom of Man’, in Theological Investigations: The 
Centenary Electronic Edition, vol. 2, trans. Karl H. Kruger (Limerick, Ireland: Mary’s Immaculate College, 2004), 252.  
2
 ‘Salvation-history interprets the history of the world as something antagonistic and veiled. Precisely because salvation is not 
simply the immanent fruit of profane history, Christianity is sceptical towards profane history. It lets man go out to his worldly 
task, because it is precisely in the obscurity and ambiguity of this earthly task that man must work out his salvation which is by 
faith. Yet for Christianity this very task in the world is something which will always remain unfinished and which will ultimately 
always again end in failure. For as far as the individual is concerned, this task always finds an absolute limit in death, in the 
same way Christianity also shows that death is to be found even in the midst of universal history. This implies a futility arising 
from the fact that what can always be planned only partially will always remain incalculable – a futility which always springs 
afresh out of man’s evil heart, even over and above the inherent tragedy of everything finite. Christianity knows no history which 
would evolve of its own inner power into the kingdom of God itself and it does not really matter whether one conceives this 
kingdom as the realm of the enlightened mind, or of the fully civilized man, or of the classless society or in any other way 
whatsoever’, in Rahner, ‘The History of the World and Salvation-History’, in Theological Investigations, vol. 5, 111.  
3
 Rahner speaks of ‘[the] dark tragedy of the Church’s history of ideas is all the more depressing, since it always or often 
involved questions which have a profound influence on the concrete life of human beings, for such false precepts (which 
objectively were never valid or had long become [80] obsolete through cultural and economic changes not at first recognized by 
the institutional Church) imposed burdens on human beings (at the same time endangering their salvation) which were not at all 
legitimate in the light of the freedom of the Gospel’ in ‘On Bad Arguments in Moral Theology’, Theological Investigations, vol. 
18, 79-80.   
4
 ‘…[M]an can also never find himself, objectively speaking, in the tragic situation of being able to choose only between different 
ways of becoming guilty, so that no matter what alternative he chooses, he necessarily incurs guilt. In certain situations the only 
choice open to us may lie between two actions, both of which must be regarded as harmful and wrong in a certain respect; yet, 
objectively speaking, no situation can ever force us into guilt’ in Rahner, ‘Guilt and its Remission: The Borderland Between 
Theology and Psychotherapy’, in Theological Investigations, vol. 2, 267.  
5
 ‘The Christian doctrine of original sin, the full implications of which cannot of course be developed here, seems to me to 
involve the conviction that sin as selfishness, opposed to the unifying force of love, always and everywhere – not merely in the 
dimension of a personal interiority, but also in social life –affects the history of mankind and that this tragic situation will remain 
a permanent existential of mankind’s history to the very end’ in ‘The Unity of the Church – The Unity of Mankind’, in Theological 
Investigations, vol. 20, 161.  
6
 ‘The Theological Dimension of the Question about Man’, in Theological Investigations, vol. 17, 54.  
7
 Terry Eagleton, Reason, Faith and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 
2009). Eagleton defines ‘tragic humanism’ in the following way (p. 168-169): ‘Tragic humanism shares liberal humanism’s 
vision of the free flourishing of humanity; but it holds that this is possible only by confronting the e very worst. The only 
affirmation of humanity worth having in the end is one which…seriously wonders whether humanity is worth saving in the first 
place…Tragic humanism, whether in its socialist, Christian, or psychoanalytic varieties, holds that only by a process of self-
dispossession and radical remaking can humanity come into its own. There are no guarantees that such a transfigured future 
will ever be born. But it might arrive a little earlier if liberal dogmatists, doctrinaire flag-wavers for Progress, and Islamophobic 
intellectuals did not continue to stand in its way.’  
8
 This essay can now be found more accessibly in Metz, ‘The Future in the Memory of Suffering’ [1972], in Johann-Baptist Metz 
and Jürgen Moltmann, Faith and the Future: Essays on Theology, Solidarity and Modernity. Concilium Series (New York: 
Maryknoll, 1995), 3-16.  
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contemporary forms of technological progress and efficiency which obviate the reality of suffering (a 
point clearly inspired by Walter Benjamin and others from the so-called Frankfurt School) point 
towards a more ‘tragic’ tone in his understanding of history.
1
 The remembrance that the Church is 
commissioned with is ‘to keep alive the memory of the crucified Lord…as a dangerous memory of 
freedom in the social systems of our technological civilization’.
2
 Such a memory constitutes a kind of 
‘antihistory’ in which the ‘the vanquished and the destroyed alternatives’ are taken into account
3
, 
something that is made possible by the Christian belief in the resurrection in which ‘the vanquished 
and the forgotten’ have ‘a meaning that is as yet unrealized’.
4
 Metz insists that such suffering is 
‘antiteleological’ (resisting any final ‘reconciliation of man and nature’ or any ‘scholasticism of 
suffering’ which tries to give meaning to meaningless suffering) and that it is ‘antiontological’ (resisting 
any ‘ontologization of human torment’). For Metz, suffering shows the contrast between nature and 
history, teleology and eschatology
5
 and this is part of his project to hold onto the openness of history
6
 
in which the ‘history of suffering has no goal, but – at most – it has a future’.
7
 Based on these 
statements, it would seem that while Metz does not use the language of ‘tragedy’ or ‘the tragic’ in this 
essay explicitly, his resistance to resolving the problem of suffering, his scepticism of theodicy and a 
teleology of suffering (especially after Auschwitz)
8
, his emphasis on the irresolvable conflict between 
man and nature, ultimately point towards a ‘tragic’ theology which avoids, firstly, any attempt to 
ontologize violence or human torment, and secondly, does not resign itself to fatalism or 
hopelessness since it seeks to advocate a socio-political and liberatory imagination based on the 
memoria passionis. As such, Metz coheres with the kind of ‘tragic’ theology that we will be advancing 
in this essay.  
In distinction from Barth and Rahner, one continental theologian who did have a lot to say about 
tragedy was Hans Urs Von Balthasar. He devotes an entire chapter to the Greek tragedians in the 
fourth volume of his Herrlichkeit.
9
 We cannot examine in detail Balthasar’s in-depth and sometimes 
beautiful engagement with Greek tragedy
10
, but can only bring out its specific contours. For Balthasar, 
                                               
1 In a Benjaminian inspired statement (referencing the first thesis of Benjamin’s ‘On the Concept of History’), Metz says (Ibid., 
6) that ‘Political imagination will prevent itself from ultimate absorption by the restrictive grasp of technology, as long as it keeps 
the moral imagination and power to resist that have grown out of the memory of suffering accumulated in history. The dwarf 
stands for the memory of this suffering: in our advanced social systems, suffering is pictured as insignificant, ugly, and better 
kept out of sight’. For a brief discussion of Benjamin’s relation to Metz, see Bernhard Wunder, Konstruktion und Rezeption der 
Theologie Walter Benjamins: These I und das Theologisch-Politische Fragment. Epistemata, Würzburger Wissenschaftliche 
Schriften Band 223 (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1997), 41-44.  
2
 Ibid., 7.  
3
 Ibid., 9.  
4
 Ibid., 12.  
5
 Ibid., 9.  
6
 The concept of the real ‘openness’ of history is central to Metz more in-depth study Faith in History and Society: Toward a 
Practical Fundamental Theology (New York: The Seabury Press, 1980).  
7
 ‘The Future in the Memory of Suffering’, 10.  
8
 Metz advocated a revising of Christian theology in light of the Auschwitz and the sufferings of Jews. He argued that Christians 
can only confess and testify to God together with Jews since the God-question cannot be thought without the historical 
experience of the Shoah, and spiritual experience of the Jews in the death camps. For a full discussion, see Johann-Baptist 
Metz, ‘Facing the Jews: Christian Theology After Auschwitz’, in Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza and David Tracy (eds.), The 
Holocaust as Interruption. Concilium: Religion in the Eighties (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1983), 26-33. In this this text, Metz 
criticises Moltmann and Sölle for their appropriation of Jewish stories of suffering, like the ones found in the writings of Elie 
Wiesel (pp. 29-30). He also states quite poignantly and provocatively that ‘We can pray after Auschwitz, because there were 
prayers in Auschwitz’ (p. 29).  
9
 Hans Urs Von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics IV: The Realm of Metaphysics in Antiquity, trans. 
Brian McNeil et al (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), , 101-154.    
10
 The particular strength of Balthasar’s treatment of Greek tragedy is that he seeks to emphasize the difference and 
uniqueness of each of the tragedians he discusses, rather than homogenizing them under a general rubric of ‘Greek tragedy’.   
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tragedy is the epitome and climax of Greek art, with Greek artistic endeavours collapsing thereafter.
1
 
In fact, Balthasar goes as far as to say that after Sophocles and Euripides, Greek tragedy could never 
reach the same heights again.
2
 Within this chapter, Balthasar aims to place the Greek tragedians 
under the category of ‘glory’ in which ‘the divine presence is announced in heightened suffering’
3
 
which manifests itself within absence and concealment: ‘if the glory of God is only ever concealed, 
then it is the glory of the agonised heart which finally prevails, of a heart which endures more than 
ever could be expected of it’
4
. Obviously the kind of god pictured here is a rather malicious god who 
consigns the tragic hero to a certain fate rather whimsically and arbitrarily, against which the tragic 
hero has to assert himself or herself.
5
 Balthasar clearly acknowledges the religious backdrop for 
tragedy, fully aware of the regular assertion that its origins lie in the Dionysian rituals and festivals
6
. 
He even suggests that ‘tragedy’ has a ‘glory’ that is comparable to ‘the quality of sacramentality’ 
which (as he beautifully puts it), points towards ‘the present situation’, ‘the tragic situation’ which 
‘remains a knot that cannot be loosed, where the solution cannot be sought beyond it, only within’. He 
writes that tragedies do ‘indeed signify something but not that which is other. They point to their own 
fullness and depth. They are not only symbolic, but also that which is symbolised. They point to 
something (which embraces a mode of absence), because they are at the same time full of an 
abundant presence’.
7
 Throughout Balthasar’s study of tragedy, one can find some wonderful 
theological commentaries on Aeschylus (regarding grace and revelation)
8
, Sophocles (regarding 
negative theology and divine absence)
9
, and Euripedes (regarding suffering, death and 
contradiction).
10
 Important for our purposes, however, is how Balthasar relates tragedy to Christian 
theology. Balthasar states that it was ‘Greek tragedy, and not Greek philosophy, with which the 
Christians primarily entered into dialogue’ since it formed ‘the great, valid cypher of the Christ event’. 
However, ‘The absolute gravity of great tragedy, together with its understanding of glory, directly 
enters and is so subsumed by the drama of Christ that, after Christ, it cannot be repeated’.
11
 He goes 
on to say that there is ‘no possibility of creating and staging a tragedy in the highest sense after 
Christ, who has performed this role to its perfection. The glory of tragedy is absorbed into the glory of 
the Kyrios.’
12
 It is here that the ‘Christomonist’ tendency in the Barthian legacy comes to the fore, 
along with its proclivity towards ‘exclusive substitution’ rather than ‘inclusive representation’.
13
 In this 
regard, furthermore, as Ben Quash has argued, even though Balthasar aims to construct a truly 
‘dramatic’ understanding of history (one that is open, contingent and ‘unframeable’) he often tends 
toward an ‘epic’ interpretation (in the Hegelian sense) of certain stories and texts, which tends 
                                               
1
 Ibid., 101.  
2
 Ibid., 101, 131-133. It should be said here that Balthasar is simply repeating a sentiment that has been echoed from Hegel’s 
reflections on tragedy. For more on this, Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy: From Plato to Žižek, 110-138.  
3
 Ibid., 106.  
4
 Ibid., 107.  
5
 Ibid., 102-103; 112-113.  
6
 Ibid., 102. This thesis has been placed in doubt by the work of Gerald Else (amongst others). Else argues that the origins of 
tragedy likely stem from more ‘secular’ motives, related to the socio-political contexts of Athenic literary creation.  
7
 Ibid., 106.  
8
 Ibid., 120-121 
9
 Ibid., 122-131.  
10
 Ibid., 131-154.  
11
 Ibid., 101.  
12
 Ibid., 104.  
13
 For a critique of Balthasar along similar lines, see Kevin Taylor, ‘Hans Urs Von Balthasar and Christ the Tragic Hero’, in 
Christian Theology and Tragedy, 133-147.  
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towards grand encompassing themes and systems that are unable to deal with the more ‘lyrical’ and 
‘dramatic’ elements of tragedy.
1
 In fact – turning Barth against Balthasar – Quash argues that 
Balthasar is sometimes even more ‘epic’ than Barth in his interpretation of the God-world relation
2
, 
and of certain biblical texts (e.g. Job)
3
. So while Balthasar’s presentation and exposition of Greek 
tragedy deserves to taken seriously, we need to seriously question his assumption that Christ 
overcomes and ‘absorbs’ all other ‘tragedy’ so that tragedy is not repeatable after the passion of 
Christ.  
Furthermore, though we cannot engage in detail with this possibility, it should be mentioned as a 
side note that regardless of the merits of Balthasar’s analysis of these ancient texts, we should 
practice (at a minimum) a reasonable hermeneutics of suspicion regarding Balthasar’s preference 
(ideologically-speaking) for pre-modern texts (including Greek tragedy). As Paul Silas Peterson
4
 has 
shown (along with others), some of Balthasar’s early writings evince anti-modernistic, and even a 
nationalistic, anti-Semitic tendency. Even though these traits might not be as marked in his later 
writings, we need to keep these possible undertones in mind as we examine his later writings.   
Within the British context, we encounter an affirmation of ‘the tragic’ in the Anglo-German 
theologian Ulrich Simon, namely, in his contribution to a post-Auschwitz theology. He writes that  
 
‘Auschwitz compels us to incorporate the tragic reality in the redemptive process. 
Resurrection is not the easy way out, but the validation of the tragic itself. This is not new to a 
religion which portrays the Risen One with wounds in hands and feet and side. Resurrection 
does not obliterate the marks of tragedy but translates them from the level of passing incident 
to that eternal worth. Auschwitz is not overcome by tragic resignation but by victory over 
impersonal and meaningless torment in personal love’.
5
 
 
He goes onto say that while the ‘climax of the resurrection stands beyond tragedy’ since it requires 
‘the transcendence of self-interest’, it involves suffering since all ‘self-transcendence’ involves a 
‘tragic’ element (Simon references Tillich’s concept of tragic greatness here). As such, Auschwitz 
loses its isolation because he has raised Christ from the dead.
6
 Simon does not go into much detail in 
relation to what he means by ‘tragedy’ but he seems to be referring to ‘tragedy’ mainly as an empirical 
experience within history, rather than building on any tragic mythology, since for Simon Auschwitz 
causes us to ‘abandon everything remotely connected with mythology’ because we must ‘see and 
comprehend the conflict in its factual light’.
7
 Since Simon does not engage in more detail with the 
tragic, we will not go further, except to say that, within the spectrum of different responses to the 
                                               
1
 Ben Quash, Theology and the Drama of History (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2005), 137-155.  
2
 Balthasar accused Barth’s early theology of tending towards ‘monergism’, thereby effacing the reality of the creature. 
However, Quash argues that Balthasar himself tends (sometimes) towards a ‘monergistic’ theology of the God-world relation. 
For more on this, see Quash, Ibid., 156-162.  
3
 He compares Barth and Balthasar’s interpretation of the Book of Job, and he finds that Barth’s interpretation is more open to a 
‘dramatic’ reading than Balthasar’s.  
4
 Paul Silas Peterson, ‘Anti-Modernism and Anti-Semitism in Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Apokalypse der deutschen Seele‘. Neue 
Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 52.3 (2010), 302-318. It could also be mentioned here that 
these insights should give pause to those who enthusiastically embrace Balthasar as a counter-modernity thinker (against other 
Catholic modernists like Karl Rahner).  
5
 Ulrich E. Simon, A Theology of Auschwitz (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1967), 101.  
6
 Ibid., 102.  
7
 Ibid., 24-25.  
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tragic within theology, Simon seems to occupy theology as paradoxically tragic rather than simply 
post-tragic.  
Dietrich Ritschl engages in a brief treatment of ‘the tragic’ within the context of Christology
1
, and 
he seems resistant to any effacing of the problem of suffering.
2
 He says that the suffering of Christ 
cannot be understood as ‘tragedy’ if ‘tragedy’ means ‘a hopelessness without a future’, but he 
nonetheless admits that ‘the world is full of tragedy in precisely this sense of the word’ so that no 
‘tragic element’ can be said to be ‘finally done away with and overcome by the death and resurrection 
of Jesus’. Ritschl certainly acknowledges that death as ‘a punishment and separation from God’ has 
been overcome, but this does undermine ‘the dimension of irreversibility and thus de facto 
hopelessness’ which the experience of the tragic implies, although ‘the Christian understanding of 
tragedy differs from the Greek in the freedom to accept forgiveness’.
3
 In response to tragedy, Ritschl 
suggests two possible responses: firstly, in light of the coming of Christ and the belief that ‘the tragic’ 
is not something willed by God (thereby accepting that there might be ‘no possibility of reinterpreting 
tragedy’) believers can at least ‘offer meaningful and constructive interpretation of what opportunities 
are nevertheless now evident ‘, even though they should not attempt to ‘make sense’ of events like 
Auschwitz but should rather ‘seek the meaning of the future, even if should consist in accepting 
hopelessness’. Secondly, Ritschl suggests an account of divine providence in which the Triune God is 
engaged in responding to and ‘interpreting’ the world, as understood in the light of ‘God’s sharing in 
Israel’s suffering and his presence in Jesus, in any form of the tragic’.
4
 Again, like Simon, Ritschl does 
not engage much with tragic theory, but he does seem to presuppose Greek tragedy as a 
fundamental referent for our understanding of tragedy, even though he does reference a ‘Christian 
understanding of tragedy’ that is different from its Greek counterpart. Taking these factors into 
account, it would seem that Ritschl falls within the spectrum of theology as tragic or at least as 
paradoxically tragic.  
Other German theologians like Jürgen Moltmann and Eberhard Jüngel have not engaged too 
much with tragic theory or the theme of tragedy per se, but what they have written bears some 
comment. Since both of these thinkers are contemporary acolytes of theopaschite or staurocentric 
theories of the Trinity in which suffering and death are not excluded from the divine life, and the 
classical doctrines of impassibility are rejected in favour of the compassionate, suffering love of God, 
it would seem that their theological projects would be amenable to a tragic or paradoxically tragic 
theology (obviously depending on how ‘tragedy’ is being understood). Moltmann makes few explicit 
references to tragedy; there are some brief allusions in The Crucified God to Greek myth and tragedy 
in his discussion of human freedom
5
, divine apatheia
6
, and the law of parricide in Freud
7
. However, no 
                                               
1
 Dietrich Ritschl, The Logic of Theology: A Brief Account of the Relationship between Basic Concepts in Theology, trans. John 
Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), 192-196. It should be said here that Ritschl makes mention of Donald MacKinnon 
(p. 193) in this regard, and he seems to be influential on this point for Ritschl.  
2
 In this regard, Ritschl has famously said (The Logic of Theology, 38) that ‘Anyone who wants to say that Auschwitz – as 
paradigm of evil and suffering in our time – is willed by God or good, even if we only realise it late, has to shut up, because 
such statements mark the end of both theology and humanity’. 
3
 Ibid., 192.  
4
 Ibid., 195-196.  
5
 Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology, trans. R.A. 
Wilson and John Bowden (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1974), 221-22.  
6
 Ibid., 267-268.  
7
 Ibid., 303-307.  
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detailed treatment of tragedy per se is to be found here, though one could argue the entire of theme 
of Godforsakenness and the ‘negativity’ of the cross falls under the rubric of tragedy’s own ‘negative 
dialectic’ (as Larry Bouchard argues).
1
 In God in Creation, we find a brief reference to the tragic 
quality of creation that is subject to ‘futility’.
2
 He also makes mention of tragedy in reference to the 
work of Miguel de Unamuno while discussing the Spanish mystical idea of ‘the sorrow of God’ 
(congoja).
3
 However, Moltmann’s most detailed discussion of tragedy is in reference to the work of the 
Russian mystical philosopher Nicholas Berdyaev.
4
 Here Moltmann seems to approve of the idea a 
‘tragedy in God’ in which God struggles for freedom within time so that ‘the tragedy of human history 
is God's own tragedy too.’
5
 We will not engage in a detailed critique of this position, which (besides 
presupposing ‘social doctrine of the Trinity’ and all its consequential problems
6
) articulates a very 
strong relation between the dramas and contingencies of history and the internal life of the Triune 
God. I will only say that if such a ‘historical’ drama is made internal to the life of God (with all its 
concomitant horror, suffering and evil) then are not ‘suffering’, ‘tragedy’ and ‘evil’ made ‘necessary’ 
since they are part of God’s being?
7
. One cannot arbitrarily divide history into parts, saying God 
identifies with ‘the good bits’ while leaving out all the more objectionable bits: if God ‘identifies’ 
Godself with a certain portion in history, then where does the regression stop? In this schema, is it not 
the case that God can only be exempted from the ‘evil’ of history when ‘history’ is understood in a 
very unhistorical manner?  
Jüngel does not mention tragedy in a significant way in his writings; however, if we take into 
account what he says, in his reflections on death and the resurrection (in a phrase that echoes the 
sentiments of other theologians like Barth, Moltmann, and Rahner)
8
, that ‘the Christian resurrection 
hope should not be allowed to obscure the fact that this human life of ours is temporally limited. 
Although it has been frequently has been and will be interpreted in this way, the hope of the 
resurrection cannot involve the expectation that life’s temporal limitations will be dissolved’. This is 
because ‘any dissolution of the temporal boundaries of human life would involve the dissolution of 
                                               
1
 Bouchard, Tragic Method and Tragic Theology¸229-234; 250-251.   
2
 Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation – The Gifford Lectures 1984-1985, trans. Margaret 
Kohl (London: SCM, 1985), 68: ‘The unredeemed character of the body which believers sense in themselves corresponds to 
the tragedy of non-human creation, which is subject to futility. Nature has fallen victim to transience and death. It has not fallen 
through its own sin, like human beings. To talk about 'a fallen nature' is therefore highly dubious. And yet a sadness lies over 
nature which is the expression of its tragic fate and its messianic yearning. It is enslaved and wishes to be free, for it is 
transitory and wishes for 'an abiding habitation'.  
3
 Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1981), 36-42.  
4
 Ibid., 42-47.  
5
 Ibid., 42: ‘History exists because man is free. But because man continually misuses and suppresses his freedom, human 
history is a tragedy. It is a tragedy of freedom, not a tragedy of doom. Because God himself wants man to be free, the tragedy 
of human history is God's own tragedy too. God desires the freedom of his image on earth, and yet cannot force freedom on 
him; he can only create it and preserve it through the suffering of his eternal love. Consequently the history of man's freedom is 
simply the side of the history of God's passion which is open to our experience and perception. God's suffering stands at the 
centre only because God wants freedom.’  
6
 Such a model has been criticized for its tendency towards tritheism, and for its modelling of the divine persons on modern 
egalitarian subjects. On this point, in an interview with David Cunningham (‘Living the Questions: The Converging Worlds of 
Rowan Williams’, Christian Century 119.2 (2002), 26) Williams says that he has been tempted to use the model of the ‘social 
Trinity’. He says ‘When I first started thinking about it I was very taken with the whole "social Trinity" model—God as, by 
definition, a communion of persons in relation—the Trinity as the perfect social structure, a model society. It seemed a 
wonderfully apt analogy. But in trying to think through that and to live with it, I find that I've got to rein in the urge to use it. The 
idea of the social Trinity is crying out, "Use me, use me!" And I have to say, "No, no. That's too easy, too fast."’ 
7
 David Bentley Hart lodges such a criticism against Robert Jenson’s theology of the economic Trinity in The Beauty of the 
Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 155-167 
8
 For more reflections on a concept of ‘eternal life’ that does not efface the limitations of earthly life and death (which also brings 
into conversation several significant figures within German theology) see Nicholas Lash, Theology on Dover Beach (London: 
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1979),164-180.  
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human personality’.
1
 And when one combines this with Jüngel’s dictum that God is ‘the unity of life 
and death in favour of life’
2
 we have an understanding of God that is trying to give dignity to 
temporality, while at the same acknowledging God’s power for live enhancement within the historical 
world.
3
 No doubt it is possible to critique Jüngel on some of the same points that we can critique 
Moltmann (though I do think Jüngel is a little more nuanced than Moltmann on this score). 
Nonetheless, since Jüngel does not discuss tragedy per se in detail, we will not spend further space 
on him here.  
Returning to the Anglo-American world of theology, it should be said Donald MacKinnon remains 
the most significant theologian of the tragic within the English-speaking world. More than any other 
theologian in his time, he sought to emphasise ‘tragedy’ as a category that Christian theology had to 
take seriously. However, since he is a very important thinker for Rowan Williams’ early development, 
we have left our discussion of him to a later chapter.
4
  
Regarding MacKinnon’s student Nicholas Lash, it can be seen that he takes tragedy seriously as 
an important task for Christian theology, and his emphasis on the problem of contingency and history 
in relation to theological hermeneutics bears this out.
5
 We can also see in his discussions on 
Marxism, in relation to the theme of Christian eschatology, that he seeks to place Christian hope 
between optimism and despair, a hope that is able to take account of the tragic: ‘Hope, as one form of 
expression of the tragic vision is more reticent [than optimism and despair]. The mood of its discourse 
is less that of assertion and prediction than of interrogation and request.’
6
 Furthermore, Lash’s 
reflections on the theme of death and eternal life, whereby the resurrection does not cancel out the 
limitations and dignity of temporal life, provide an interesting comparison for Eliot’s and Williams’ 
concern for taking time seriously, not nullifying it eschatologically.
7
 
Stanley Hauerwas
8
 has dealt with the theme of tragedy within the context of ethics (particularly 
focusing on the realm of medicine). Hauerwas aims to construct an ethics based on narrative rather 
than just instrumental reason, believing that the modern tendency towards efficiency and a rationality 
developed apart from stories leads to an ethic or morality that is ‘no one’s in particular’, and also 
tends to obviate that which cannot be instrumentalised or removed, namely the reality of moral 
                                               
1
 Eberhard Jüngel, Death: The Riddle and the Mystery, trans. Iain and Ute Nicol (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1974), 
119.  
2
 Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of the Crucified One in the Dispute 
between Theism and Atheism, trans. Darrell L. Guder (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1983), 184-225.  
3
 Since Jüngel holds onto a strong correlation between the economic and immanent trinity, one could argue that Jüngel (like 
Moltmann and Jenson) is in danger of identifying God’s life ad intra with God’s life ad extra. While this always remains a danger 
for those who seek to relate immanent and the economic trinity in a stringent sense, Jüngel does attempt to distinguish them. 
For him, the ‘immanent trinity’ is ‘the summarizing concept’ (a Hegelian phrase) of ‘God’s history with man’ (God as the Mystery 
of the World, 346.), arguing that (Ibid., 346-347) the economic Trinity refers to ‘God’s history with man’ while immanent Trinity 
refers to ‘God’s historicity.’ For Jüngel, ‘God’s history is his coming to man. God’s historicity is God’s being as it comes (being in 
coming)’.Elsewhere in this book, he speaks about the identity of the immanent and economic trinity as ‘paradox’ in the same 
way that love is paradoxically ‘selflessness’ amidst a greater ‘self-relatedness’, a joining together or agapē and eros (Ibid. 369). 
Furthermore, Jüngel’s has a very nuanced and novel account of analogy (the so-called ‘analogy of advent’, of God’s coming to 
the world) which does allow for an ‘analogical’ interval between God and creation in which the major dissimilitudo is maintained 
within the context of an even greater major similitudo, so that ‘worldly obviousness’ is made to speak for something ‘even more 
obvious’ in light of God’s identification with the crucified, dead, and risen Jesus Christ (Ibid., 181-198).  
4
 See chapter three, where we create the context for Williams’ lectures on the Four Quartets.   
5
 For an exemplary collection in this regard, see Nicholas Lash, Theology on the Way to Emmaus.  
6
 Theology on the Way to Emmaus, 208.  
7
 Lash, Theology on Dover Beach, 164-180. 
8
 Stanley Hauerwas (with Richard Bondi and David B. Burrell), Truthfulness and Tragedy: Further Investigations into Christian 
Ethics (Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1977).  
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tragedy.
1
 For Hauerwas, moral tragedy involves willing lesser evil within a moral act
2
; here, he uses 
the paradigmatic example of the medical profession as a place where moral tragedy often occurs, 
where sometimes the only choice is ‘between wrong and wrong’.
3
 It should also be mentioned here 
that Hauerwas is aware of the difficulty of defining ‘tragedy’ (‘”tragedy” has no one meaning’)
4
, and he 
is also conscious of distinguishing ‘accidents, unfortunate events, and tragedy’ by ‘seeing how certain 
“events” fit into a narrative context’, thereby allowing one to make the right distinctions between these 
different categories.
5
 Based on these statements (as well as some to be found elsewhere)
6
, along 
with the trajectory to be found in the work of his doctoral student David Toole, it could be said that 
Hauerwas most likely lies within the spectrum of a tragic or paradoxically tragic theology.  
One of the most significant treatments of tragedy in relation to theology that has appeared in 
recent times is Larry Bouchard’s Tragic Method and Tragic Theology: Evil in Contemporary Drama 
and Religious Thought. Larry Bouchard attempts to develop a very precise account of the relation 
between theology and tragedy, both from a literary and existential perspective.
7
 Bouchard 
summarises the content of his argument in the following way: ‘The literary theme of this book may be 
stated in a single clause: tragedy is a method of inquiry into the tragic. The religious theme is 
suggested by a single proposition: theology that reads well the art of tragedy must discover itself 
blinded by thoughts of theodicy.’
8
 He defines tragedy as ‘an aesthetic method of disclosure and 
inquiry that interprets and criticizes various sorts of actions and characters, and worlds wherein evil is 
experienced as a problem for thought.’
9
 For Bouchard ‘tragedies’ (as art form and experience) reveal 
‘the tragic’ (as analogy).
10
 Following the work of Paul Ricoeur, Bouchard seeks to extract several 
themes from Greek tragedy (pride, delusion, the wicked god, etc.)
11
, thereafter using them as a 
heuristic for interpreting various Christian thinkers (Augustine, Niebuhr, Barth, and Tillich)
12
. The 
centre of the book consists of an analysis of three literary figures (Rolf Hochhuth, Robert Lowell and 
Peter Shaffer) who bring together tragic and theological themes into their work.
13
 In the final chapter, 
Bouchard seeks to understand tragedy under the rubric of an ‘ontology’, a ‘negative dialectics’
14
, or 
more specifically, ‘a negative dialectic of culture.’
15
 As such, tragedy is a form of cultural criticism and 
                                               
1
 On this, see his treatment of ‘the standard account’ of rationality, in ibid., 15-39.  
2
 Ibid., 222n.  
3
 Ibid., 184.  
4
 Ibid., 243n.  
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Stanley Hauerwas, ‘Why Time Cannot and Should Not Heal the Wounds of History, But Time Has Been and Can Be 
Redeemed’, which can be found in Hauerwas, A Better Hope: Resources for a Church Confronting Capitalism, Democracy, and 
Postmodernity (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2000), 139-154. 
7
 From reading Bouchard’s work, one can see that he stands within the tradition of ‘correlation’ theology (e.g. Tillich, Tracy, 
Gilkey, etc.) in which ‘theology’ and ‘culture’ are seen to be mutually enlightening enterprises. Furthermore, one can see that he 
also has influenced strongly by hermeneutical philosophy, like we see exemplified in Paul Ricoeur. 
8
 Tragic Method and Tragic Theology, 1. For Bouchard, ‘’all the artistic forms called tragedy expose the errors of various 
theodicies’ (Ibid., 2).  
9
 Ibid., 5.  
10
 As Bouchard says (Ibid., 224), ‘analogies give…order to a critical framework’ but ‘analogues distort if they are not kept 
tensive with particularity’.  
11
 Ibid., 10-48. It should be said here that although Bouchard draws on these themes, he does not do so without engaging in 
some appropriate demythologisation of them (e.g. his equation of ‘negativity’ with ‘malevolent transcendence’ of ‘the wicked 
god’).  
12
 Ibid., 49-84.  
13
 Ibid., 95-215.  
14
 Bouchard references the work of Adorno, Booth and Derrida in this regard. He defines ‘negative dialectics’ as expounding 
‘”nonidentity” of thought and reality’ (Ibid., 219).  
15
 Ibid., 228.  
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a praxis-orientated
1
 interpretation
2
 that awakens us to the reality of ‘negativity’ or ‘malevolent 
transcendence’ in the forms of evil and human suffering. Such negative dialectics aims to uncover ‘the 
limits of finitude and the limits of fault, which may defeat or displace any thoughtful claim to “to know 
the whole”’. Furthermore, such a praxis always returns to ‘real negativity’ in order that ‘facile illusions 
may be exposed’ - not just a ‘negativity-in-principle but by particular encounters or specific insights 
into negativity that call thinking into critical judgement.’
3
 Such an exposure to ‘real negativity’ for 
theology can occur as it thinks and wrestles with its own traditional resources (‘intramural relations’)
4
 
and with occurrences of human culture and history that are not limited to Christianity’s own internal 
resources (‘extramural relations’).
5
 However, it must continue  to remain focused on the particular 
form that ‘tragedies’ take, and it is because of this experience that we can continue to make analogies 
regarding ‘the tragic as an existential or religious dimension’
6
. For Bouchard, ‘tragedies’ continue to 
remain ‘irreducible’; however Bouchard says that this ‘irreducibility’ can be understood in two ways. 
We can understand tragedy under the category of ‘ultimacy’ (which ‘connotes our existential 
orientation to the limits of our own reality and the world’) or ‘finality’ (which ‘connotes what lies beyond 
those limits, beyond the ultimate horizon, which may be expressed symbolically but not 
propositionally’). He uses David Tracy’s distinction between ‘limit-to’ (ultimacy) and ‘limit-of’ (finality) to 
express this difference between these two words. For Bouchard, tragedy-as-ultimacy implies that 
within our horizon of thought, tragedy cannot find resolution or reduction, while tragedy-as-finality 
implies that ‘everything is tragic’. The problem with tragedy-as-finality is that if everything is tragic 
then, in a sense, no-thing is tragic because every-thing is tragic.
7
 As such, a tragic worldview is 
affirmed at the cost of losing the multiplicity and particularity of individual tragedies. However, even 
though Bouchard leans towards accepting tragedy-as-ultimate, he is resistant towards deciding 
between the two, arguing that it is this undecidability that forms part of the risk of real tragedy, it is a 
part of its ‘data’. He says that ‘The irreducibility of the tragic…is limned by ultimacy and finality’
8
, that it 
‘oscillates’ between ‘the discernments of ultimacy and finality’.
9
 This is part of the symbolic function 
and difficulty of ‘tragedies’, and analogically speaking, ‘the tragic’.
10
 After this discussion, he ends the 
book through some theses on the cross, making use of the lenses of tragic theory.
11
 
Evaluating Bouchard’s important book, it can be said that he has made some advancement in the 
discussion between tragedy and theology. His attention to the particularity of the tragic, without 
                                               
1
 Following critical theorists, he argues for ‘the primacy of praxis informing theory’ (Ibid., 222).  
2
 Bouchard says that ‘The tragic is given in the act of human interpretation’ (Ibid., 244).  
3
 Ibid., 223-224 
4
 Bouchard’s references here (Ibid., 229-234) the way the theology of the cross has been expounded by figures like Moltmann 
and Metz.  
5
 Ibid., 234-243. Here he references the human experience of contingency (in reference to the work of James Gustafson) and 
the death camps (in reference to the work of Richard Rubenstein).  
6
 Ibid., 244.  
7
 ‘To say that the tragic is final would be to say that everything is tragic, that being-itself has the essential character of evil-as-a-
problem-for-thought, that God is evil. To so predicate the tragic with finality is incoherent. Not only would a totalization of the 
tragic be propositionally meaningless, but it would foreclose the interpretative and heuristic character of the tragic in art and life’ 
(Ibid., 246)…’The tragic can be conceived as ultimate but not as final (Ibid., 247)’.  
8
 Ibid., 247.  
9
 Ibid., 248.  
10
 Bouchard wonders whether events like Hiroshima and the Shoah can really be classified as tragedies rather than just 
‘events, brutal facts, of such enormity as commonly to provoke the sense that they are different from ordinary events, beyond 
the grasp of reason’ but then backtracks a little by saying that maybe these events change the way we perceive what ‘tragedy’ 
or ‘the tragic’ even means, and writes that ‘there has never been much warrant for demanding that tragedies comport to 
sacrosanct formulas’ (Ibid., 249).  
11
 Ibid., 250-251.  
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seeking to circumscribe too restrictively the realm of ‘tragedy’ or ‘the tragic’, coheres with the aims of 
this thesis. Furthermore, his distinction between tragedy-as-ultimate and tragedy-as-finality will be 
important to keep in mind as we go on further. And, while Bouchard does seem to prioritise the 
primordial experience of Greek tragedy, he moves beyond it through appropriate demythologisation 
and by examining modern works of tragedy. However, we will distance ourselves from his reflections 
on tragedy’s ‘ontological’ dimension.  
Wendy Farley has also engaged with tragedy in her book Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion: A 
Contemporary Theodicy. The aim of her book is to expound a practical theodicy centred on 
compassion, rather than finding a solution to the problem of evil. She defines the elements of tragedy 
as suffering, the problem of freedom, resistance, finitude, and compassion.
1
 Farley argues that 
tragedy is not inherently fatalistic or necessarily pessimistic but rather contains resources for 
resistance (e.g. Prometheus)
2
 and compassion in response to the realities of evil in the world (her 
study particularly focuses on divine compassion).
3
 Farley’s focus on a practical theodicy and 
compassion in relation to the tragic is worth bearing in mind as we continue in our study of Williams. 
However, since Farley limits her understanding of the tragic largely to Greek tragedy, we will need to 
develop a tragic theology which is more inclusive regarding what the term ‘tragedy’ implies and 
consists of.   
Some other feminist theologians have also dealt with the theme of the tragic. Kathleen Sands has 
authored a provocative study entitled Escape from Paradise: Evil and Tragedy in Feminist Theology. 
We will discuss Sands a bit more in a later chapter
4
, but it can be said here that her contribution to 
tragic theory is suspicious regarding any idea of a transcendent, metaphysical ‘Good’ as bequeathed 
to theology through the classical Augustinian tradition. She dubs such a position ‘moral dualism’
5
 
since it tries to assert a good that is separate from the entanglements of time and tragedy. For Sands, 
there is no ethical action that is devoid of the potential for evil and tragic consequences. As such, the 
good is something radically contingent and non-metaphysical, and therefore can be classified as an 
‘immanent good’ rather than a ‘transcendent’ one.
6
 This requires us (and especially women in Sands 
case) to acknowledge ‘the absence of a limitless and transcendent good’ and thereby ‘take 
responsibility for sin and grace into [our] own hands’.
7
 We will not go into a detailed critique here of 
this position (Williams will provide that later in this thesis), but we will say here that while we cannot 
separate the Good from its entanglements in time and the possibility of tragic consequences 
(MacKinnon and Williams say similar things in this regard), Sands’ rejection of any transcendent Good 
(and a ‘metaphysical’ God along with it) makes it difficult to understand how we can understand, 
conceive, or even recognise the Good if there is no continuity of ‘the Good’ between the different 
immanent contexts we find ourselves in. If the Good is understood in this radically contingent manner, 
not seen as more fundamental than evil (Sands rejects the Augustinian privatio boni), and if tragedy is 
                                               
1
 Wendy Farley, Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion: A Contemporary Theodicy (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 
1990), 19-39.  
2
 Ibid., 27-29.  
3
 Ibid., 115ff.  
4
 See chapter 5.  
5
 Kathleen M. Sands, Escape from Paradise: Evil and Tragedy in Feminist Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994),17-36.  
6
 Ibid., 43-54.  
7
 Ibid., 143.  
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viewed to be so radically pervasive in everything, then how (as Bouchard says) can we even 
recognise ‘tragedy’ to begin with? Does not Sands position lead us not only to a moral nominalism, 
but a ‘nominalism’ of ‘tragedy’ and ‘the tragic’ as well?  
The Armenian-American theologian Flora Keshgegian follows in Sands footsteps regarding her 
critique of moral dualism, but does not expand this theme to the same length as Sands. Her emphasis 
on tragedy and trauma comes within the context of her discussion of hope. Such a focus on tragedy 
allows her to develop a chastened idea of hope that is not too certain or optimistic that the future will 
turn out the way we want or desire, but that we continue to hold to an ‘ethics of risk’ (following Sharon 
Welch) and a ‘tragic hope’ that acknowledges the limits and uncertainties of living as finite beings.
1
 
Since Keshgegian’s account of moral dualism is not as radical as Sands’ treatment, we cannot 
reproduce our criticisms of Sands given above (though it is difficult to tell since she does not expand 
much on what she exactly means by ‘moral dualism’). Nonetheless, Keshgegian’s account of a 
Christian understanding of hope that does not move simplistically beyond tragedy should be kept in 
mind as we continue.  
David Toole has also authored a book entitled Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo: Theological 
Reflections on Nihilism, Tragedy, and Apocalypse, focusing on how tragedy and apocalypse might 
provide us with options for moving beyond the nihilism and the experience of meaninglessness. The 
metaphorical backdrop for this study is the story of Susan Sontag’s production of Samuel Beckett’s 
Waiting for Godot, within the war-torn surroundings of the Bosnian ethnic conflict.
2
 Through an 
examination of the works of Nietzsche (who Toole interprets in a more positive light), John Milbank, 
Michel Foucault, and John Howard Yoder, he seeks to articulate ‘metaphysic of the tragic’
3
 as well as 
a ‘tragic politics’
4
 combined with reflections on the idea of the apocalyptic
5
 to articulate an idea of 
Christian socio-political engagement that is open both to tragedy and apocalypse, which while hopeful 
is unable to decide ultimately between tragedy and apocalypse. Toole’s advocacy of a hopeful politics 
that is willing to act (despite possible failure), and his belief that ‘tragedy’ as an art-form is able to 
create stories that are emplotted within a meaningful context (against nihilism) are helpful for our 
purposes in this thesis.  
There are several other theologians who we could deal with, but for lack of space are unable to 
deal with in more detail. Some of these thinkers include J.F. Worthen
6
, Anthony Cane
7
, David Ford
8
, 
Ben Quash
9
, Charles Mathewes
10
, Graham Ward
11
, Paul Janz
12
, Allen Verhey
1
, Reinhold Bernhardt
2
, 
Cyprian Krause
3
, and Kenneth Surin
4
, amongst others.  
                                               
1
 Flora A Keshgegian, Time for Hope: Practices for Living in Today’s World (New York-London: Continuum, 2006), 96-127.  
2
 Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo: Theological Reflections on Nihilism, Tragedy, and Apocalypse, 1-21.  
3
 Ibid., 89-128.  
4
 Ibid., 129-204. 
5
 Ibid., 205-266.  
6
 J.F. Worthen, ‘Christianity and the Limits of Tragedy’. New Blackfriars 70.825 (1989), 109-117.  
7
 Anthony Cane, ‘Ontology, Theodicy and Idiom – The Challenge of Nietzschean Tragedy to Christian Writing on Evil’. New 
Blackfriars 77.901 (1996), 84-97.  
8
 Ford, ‘Tragedy and Atonement’, in Surin, Christ, Ethics and Tragedy, 117-130.  
9
 Quash, Theology and the Drama of History, 85-118; Quash, ‘Christianity as Hyper-Tragic’, in Christopher Hamilton, Otto 
Neumaier, Gottfried Schweiger and Clemens Sedmak (eds.), Facing Tragedies. Perspectives on Social Ethics, vol. 2 (Wien-
Berlin-Münster: LIT Verlag, 2009), 77-88.   
10
 Charles T. Mathewes, Evil and the Augustinian Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 25-30.  
11
 See Ward, ‘Tragedy as Subclause’, Ward, ‘Steiner and Eagleton’, and Ward, ‘Philosophy as Tragedy or What Words Won’t 
Give’. Modern Theology 27.3(2011), 478-496.  
12
 God, the Mind’s Desire, 171-175. We have already referenced Janz in this paper, and we will do so again.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
49 
 
 In the remainder of this section however, I would like to deal with David Bentley Hart’s criticisms of 
‘tragic theology’, which can be found in The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth, in 
a section entitled ‘The Consolations of Tragedy, the Terrors of Easter’.
5
 Amongst the rather verbose 
‘rhetoric’ of Hart’s critique of ‘tragic theology’, three salient points of criticism emerge: Firstly, the cultic 
and ritual context of Attic tragedy implies ‘a sacrificial logic of totality’ whereby the social violence 
exhibited in the suffering of the tragic hero is justified as an attempt to ward off the cosmic violence 
from the chthonic realm of the gods.
6
 Such a philosophy justifies the status quo rather than providing 
liberation from the cycle of violence. Secondly, Attic tragedy, according to Hart, presupposes a tragic 
necessity to evil that humanity and even the gods are bound to. For Hart (and for classical Christian 
theology) such a move dehistoricises evil and turns it into an ontological positive entity, rather than 
something inherently parasitic and privative.
7
 By turning evil into some kind of metaphysical necessity, 
human suffering becomes part of the ontological fabric of reality, thereby undermining the horrendous, 
punctiliar and real tragic quality of evil events, like Auschwitz. Thirdly, any attempt to read the gospel 
and the cross through the lenses tragedy will only ultimately distort the radically new and irruptive 
quality of the resurrection, since tragedy does not bring about any eschatological novelty, but simply 
more of the same.
8
 Amongst these main criticisms, there are some other rather rhapsodic tirades 
against tragic theology, but the three points mentioned are the main points that I will respond to, since 
they are the most central.  
Firstly, Hart’s fundamental assumption regarding tragic theology is that it is predicated upon the 
themes and perspective of Attic tragedy. I will not enter into a critique Hart’s interpretation of Greek 
tragedy since others have done that
9
, nor will I contest in detail his presupposed ‘religious’ backdrop 
for Attic tragedy (a common belief that has been questioned by Gerald Else
10
), nor the complex 
relation between Greek myth and de facto religious belief.
11
 For the purposes of my critique I will 
assume his interpretation is correct. I will assume (for the sake of the argument) that if ‘tragic 
theology’ is based upon the kind of theology exemplified in the Greek tragedians (as interpreted by 
Hart) then the project of ‘tragic theology’ will be problematic. However, as we have shown by 
                                                                                                                                                  
1
 Allen Verhey, ‘Manager and Therapist as Tragic Heroes: Some Observations of a Theologian At a Psychiatric Hospital’. 
Studies in Christian Ethics 21.7 (2008), 7-25.  
2
 Reinhold Bernhardt, ‘Die Erfahrung des Tragischen als Herausforderung für Theologie. Versuch zur Theodizee’. Theologische 
Zeitschrift 59 (2003), 248-270. 
3
 Cyprian Krause, ‘Ist Christentum Tragisch? Die Bakchen des Euripides als Laboratorium metatragischer Stellvertretung: eine 
Hermeneutik zwischen Mysterium und Metapher.‘ Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 103 (2006), 206-252.  
4
 See Kenneth Surin, ‘Some Aspects of the 'Grammar' of Incarnation' and 'Kenosis': Reflections Prompted by the Writings of 
Donald MacKinnon’, in Christ, Ethics and Tragedy, 93-116; The Turnings of Darkness and Light: Essays in Philosophical and 
Systematic Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 57-135; Surin, ‘Theology and Marxism: The Tragic and 
the Tragi-Comic’. Literature & Theology 19.2 (2005), 112-131.  
5
 Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 373-394.  
6
 ‘Tragedy might well represent the most pronounced instance in Greek religion of that mystification of violence that sustains 
the sacred order of pagan society, the consecration of social violence as a restraint of cosmic violence, natural and divine’ 
(Ibid., 384).  
7
 ‘…Christianity proves resistant to a tragic reading: theology must insist upon ‘’historicizing evil’’, treating it as the superscribed 
text of a palimpsest, obscuring the aboriginal goodness of creation’ (Ibid.).  
8
 ‘…Theologians must not embrace [the] suggestion that the crucifixion be read as a kind of tragic drama, in the hope that 
tragedy’s concern for the irresoluble contradictions of the particular might put theology on guard against any metaphysical 
solace that would ease Christian discomfort before the terror and desolation of the cross: metaphysical solace is precisely what 
the tragic is’ (Ibid., 386).   
9
 Francesca Aran Murphy, ‘David Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: A Response’. Scottish Journal of Theology 60.1 (2007): 80-
89.  Murphy states that what Hart says is ‘tragedy’ would be better called ‘melodrama’.  
10
 Else, The Origin and Early Form of Greek Tragedy. 
11
 Paul Veyne, Did the Greeks Believe in Their Myths? An Essay on the Constitutive Imagination, trans. Paula Wissing 
(Chicago-London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988). 
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examining the arguments of modern scholars of tragedy like Raymond Williams and Terry Eagleton 
(amongst others)
1
 against thinkers like George Steiner
2
 and Paul Ricoeur (two thinkers who are 
primary sources for Hart’s discussion of tragedy), ‘tragedy’ is by no means limited to the themes and 
perspectives of Greek tragedy, but as an analogical predication is always bound to the specific 
occurrences of ‘tragedy’ and ‘the tragic’. And further, when ‘tragedy’ is not understood in such a 
narrow manner, then both ‘tragedy’ and ‘Christianity’ are by no means opposing perspectives, as was 
assumed by some earlier theorists of the tragic. In my estimation, it seems that Hart’s rejection of 
‘tragic theology’ is largely predicated upon believing (like Ricoeur) that the Greek experience of 
tragedy is fundamental for all interpretation of tragedy, and it is this assumption that is questionable. If 
teleology exceeds genealogy
3
, then the assumption of ‘a sacrificial logic of totality’ as a background 
for all tragic theology is rendered as a significantly problematic assumption.   
Secondly, Hart argues that ‘tragic theology’ presupposes the metaphysical necessity of evil, 
something inimical to orthodox Christian belief. What Hart’s analysis lacks however is a proper 
attention to the different meanings or nuances of the word ‘necessity’. Hart assumes throughout that 
the word ‘necessity’ within the context of ‘tragedy’ implies the strong, metaphysically stringent kind of 
‘necessity’, indistinguishable from fatalism. However, one could differentiate different meanings of the 
word ‘necessity’.  As we have already mentioned, one could differentiate between ‘absolute necessity’ 
and ‘contingent necessity’ following the scholastic distinctions between necessitas absoluta, and 
necessitas conditionalis.
4
 Furthermore, one could differentiate metaphysical necessity from the kind of 
necessity that is inherent to ‘dramatic’ narration (like Murphy mentions in her critique of Hart). If we 
can allow such distinctions, then Hart’s protestations against ‘tragic theology’ in light of its belief in 
some kind of metaphysical necessity lose some of its weight. Rather, as assumed by this thesis (and 
Rowan Williams), one can hold onto the importance of taking serious ‘the tragic’ while at the same 
time holding onto the traditional privatio boni. In this light, one could understand ‘necessity’ in a more 
modest manner, in the sense that our involvement in time and finitude implies that our freedoms are 
curtailed, that we are subject to forces and dynamics that are beyond our control and prevention. 
These realities are already the stuff of potential tragedy; one does not need to buttress it with 
mythological musings on the Greek concept of fate or tragic heroism to make such experiences more 
‘tragic’ than they already are.  
Thirdly, in relation to Hart’s rejection of interpreting the cross of Christ through the lens of tragedy
5
 
because it is unable to deal with the liberation and newness of Christ’s resurrection, I think some 
                                               
1
 The collection of essays to be found in Christian Theology and Tragedy: Theologians, Tragic Literature and Tragic Theory are 
a further example of a movement beyond the perceived opposition between Christian theology and tragedy.  
2
 We have already registered the complexity of Steiner’s understanding of Christianity’s relation to tragedy; the fact that Hart 
only references The Death of Tragedy (an early work of Steiner’s) shows that Hart’s interpretation of Steiner (at least in The 
Beauty of the Infinite) needs to be nuanced and revised a little more in light of Steiner’s later work.  
3
 I owe this phrase to Christoph Schwöbel, gleaned from a private conversation while in Tübingen.  
4
 Reinhold Bernhardt, ‘Die Erfahrung des Tragischen als Herausforderung für Theologie‘, 268-269.  
5
 I could mention here that Hart is not opposed to using the term ‘tragic’ in a more general way to the story of Christ (without all 
the implications of Greek religion). In David Bentley Hart, Atheist Delusions: The Christian Revolution and Its Fashionable 
Enemies (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 2009), he has mentioned in passing (p. 173) that ‘Try as we might, we 
shall never really be able to see Christ’s broken, humiliated, and doomed humanity as something self-evidently contemptible 
and ridiculous; we are instead, in a very real sense, destined to see it as encompassing the very mystery of our own humanity: 
a sublime fragility, at one tragic and magnificent, pitiable and wonderful.' It should however also be said that his rather bleak 
view of Greek religion and culture (including tragedy) remain intact. On this, see Atheist Delusions, 129-145. However, that 
does not mean that he is not able to identify with the pathos of Greek culture. For this, see his story ‘The House of Apollo’ in 
The Devil and Pierre Gernet: Stories (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), 64-88.  
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background needs to be given. It should be said that Hart has a strong antipathy towards modern 
attempts at revising the classical doctrine of divine impassibility or apatheia. Therefore, Hart rejects 
the projects of various modern theologians of the cross (e.g. Jüngel, Moltmann) who attempt to 
advocate a theology of divine suffering, or an eternalizing of the crucifixion within the divine life. In 
Hart’s opinion, such a move ends up making evil necessary to the divine identity. In this light, Hart 
(following from Hart’s own Orthodox sentiments) shies away from any particular emphasis on the 
cross itself, focusing less on Good Friday and more on Easter Sunday. From Hart’s perspective, the 
resurrection is not an eternalizing of the cross but rather a vindication of the crucified one, who was 
executed by the Roman ancien régime. To eternalize the cross, in Hart’s viewpoint, is to eternalize 
the forces that brought about the crucifixion, hence Hart’s rejection of any ‘tragic theology’ which 
endorses the political status quo or makes the existence of evil a metaphysical ‘necessity’ in the 
stringent sense of the word.  
Several things need to be said in response to this statement. I will not contest Hart’s interpretation 
of the various theologians of the cross, but rather focus Hart’s minimalizing of the cross itself.
1
 Firstly, 
it would be interesting to see Hart’s response to several passages found in the NT, particularly those 
found in the writings of Paul and John. One thinks here of those passages where Paul emphasises 
the belief that the resurrected Christ remains the crucified one (1 Cor. 1.23, 2.2, Gal. 3.1, 2. Cor. 
13.4), that the cross is part of the logic of God’s action and election in the world (1 Cor. 1.18ff.), part of 
the wisdom ordained before the ages (1 Cor. 2.6ff.), and the pattern of kenosis and servanthood to be 
found in Christ (Phil. 2.6-11).
2
 In the Deutro-Pauline tradition, we find references to Paul filling up what 
is lacking in Christ’s afflictions (Col. 1.24), and in the Synoptic tradition the life of discipleship is 
described as taking up a cross and following Jesus (Mark. 8.32). One also thinks here of the 
Johannine theology of exaltation whereby the cross itself (combined with the resurrection) is seen as 
Christ’s exaltation to the right hand of the Father (John. 3.13-14, 8.28, 12.32), or the references in the 
book of Revelation which speak of the slaughtered Lamb being able to open up the meaning of 
history (Rev. 5.1-14), the Lamb who was slain before the foundation of the world (Rev. 13.8). What 
this concatenation of passages is meant to show is that the significance of the cross within early 
Christianity moves beyond merely a negative moment that is overcome in the effulgent life of the 
resurrection, but rather takes on a significance of its own, pointing towards the manner of God’s 
action in the world, a narrative into which the faithful may understand their own discipleship and 
suffering. Such a narrative context has been used throughout the history of the Church to understand 
experiences of suffering. It has also been used within the ambit of Christian spirituality and mysticism 
to understand experiences of Godforsakenness and ‘the dark night of the soul’ that we find in spiritual 
writers like St. John of the Cross.
3
 All of these factors point against the minimalist space Hart gives to 
the theology of the cross in his account of tragic theology.  
                                               
1
 For Hart’s reflections on the cross and atonement, see The Beauty of the Infinite, 320-327.  
2
 For a further discussion of these passages, see Udo Schnelle, Theology of the New Testament, trans. M. Eugene Boring 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009), 241-245.  
3
 It should be said here that such a spirituality of the cross does not originate with St. John, and is not the product of Latinate 
styled mystics. Already in early monasticism we find examples like in the Letters of Ammonas (who is believed to be an acolyte 
of St. Antony), in which there is a bringing together of the so-called Himmelsreise (the ascent into heaven) with a theology of 
the cross, a theologia and devotia crucis. On this, see Rowan Williams, Faith and Experience in Early Monasticism: New 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
52 
 
Secondly, Hart’s resistance to reading the story of Christ through the lens of tragedy is only valid 
as long as his assumptions and interpretation of ‘tragedy’ and ‘the tragic’ remain in effect. If these 
assumptions are questioned then it remains an open question whether the gospel can be interpreted 
as tragedy, at least in part.
1
 Hart’s critiques of Donald MacKinnon and Nicholas Lash on this point are 
largely based on this point (although his critique of Lash is a little more complex)
2
. As seems clear 
from Hart’s argument as a whole, he is not opposed to ‘tragedy’ per se as an art-form, as he is not 
opposed to using non-Christian philosophy as a conversation partner and tool for interacting with and 
expounding the classical Christian tradition. What Hart contests, however, is using ‘tragedy’ as a lens 
for interpreting the gospel. But as has already been said, if Hart’s rejection of ‘tragic theology’ and 
interpreting the drama of the incarnation through the perspective of ‘tragedy’ are wedded to his 
understanding of Attic tragedy, then such a thread can be cut if ‘tragedy’ is given a broader and more 
complicated meaning.  
Thirdly, since Hart’s adherence to a privative account of evil and divine apatheia are behind his 
rejections of ‘tragic theology’ and various theologies of the cross, it seems beneficial to make an 
important distinction (one I am sure Hart would endorse). It is one thing to say that evil per se is 
meaningless, without substance, ontology – namely, it is essentially nothing (as the Augustinian 
privatio boni teaches). This can be endorsed without much trouble among orthodox Christian thinkers. 
However, this is something completely different from saying human suffering (what Simone Weil 
called ‘affliction’) is nothing.
3
 Such a belief can only dismissed as a monstrous fantasy; the 
machinations of the Nazi death camps may be the example of ‘the banality of evil’ (as Hannah Arendt 
one said controversially)
4
, but to say that the horrendous suffering of Auschwitz - as experienced 
subjectively by those who were there – is ‘banal’ displays an insensitivity almost amounting to 
psychopathy. Surely this is a distinction that any Augustinian theologian would want to uphold.
5
 In The 
Beauty of the Infinite, Hart is resistant to any theology of the cross in which God somehow has to 
‘reconcile’ or come in contact with death and suffering. This is tied to his antipathy towards Hegel, and 
his rejection of any theopaschite theology. However, the question remains: if we are going to say that, 
then – somehow – we still have to account for the traditional and orthodox Judeo-Christian belief in 
divine compassion, which asserts that the pain of suffering creation is in some sense ‘real’ for God. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Perspectives on the Letters of Ammonas. Akademische Reden und Kolloquien der Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen- 
Nürnberg, Band 20 (Erlangen: Universitätsbibliotek Erlangen-Nürnberg, 2002), 19-36.  
1
 Cf. Worthen, ‘Christianity and the Limits of Tragedy’, who attempts to show that Greek tragedy is actually (in some examples 
of it) close to the Christian perspective of the world, and vice versa that the Christian gospel is closer to tragedy than a prima 
facie reading might suggest. Worthen also shows how even on a purely ‘Augustinian’ perspective, the reality of tragedy is 
difficult to deny.  
2
 His critique of Lash (The Beauty of the Infinite, 382-390) is basically centred around what he takes to be the Hegelian 
implications of Lash’s ‘eternalizing’ of the cross in which the Hegelian theoria (the Absolute Spirit’s self-contemplation) implies 
an infinite return to sameness, an eternal hall of mirrors. It is precisely this reading of Hegel (if Lash is to be read within this 
light, since Lash does not mention Hegel once in either of the referred essays in both Theology on Dover Beach and Theology 
on the Way to Emmaus) that contemporary scholars of Hegel have tried to counter-act, with Gillian Rose and Rowan Williams 
included in this trajectory of scholars.  
3
 It should be mentioned here that Hart in no way should be accused of making human suffering to be really ‘nothing’ (cf. the 
eschatological perspective of someone like John Hick). Hart’s writing in relation to the topic of evil and human suffering is filled 
with a commendable amount of pathos and intelligence, one that refuses to take human suffering (especially the suffering of 
children) as something divinely ordained or meaningful-in-itself. For Hart’s discussion of these themes, one can read his short 
book entitled The Doors of the Sea: Where was God in the Tsunami? (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), as well as his 
beautifully sombre tale ‘A Voice from the Emerald World’, in David Bentley Hart, The Devil and Pierre Gernet, 89-122.  
4
 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: The Viking Press, 1963).  
5
 For a discussion of these themes, but in relation the theology of Julian of Norwich (who was undoubtedly influenced by the 
Augustinian vision), see Denys Turner, Julian of Norwich, Theologian (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 2011), 68-
99.  
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Certainly, God comes from a different ‘perspective’ than the afflicted, so the suffering will be ‘seen’ in 
a different light. But to say that human suffering and affliction is nothing to God undermines a 
fundamental tenant of the Christian tradition (and decent humaneness). And if we are to say that God 
expresses and experiences a deep compassion for created being, should we not say that primary 
locus for such compassion is to be found in the incarnation, suffering and death of Jesus Christ? And 
further, does not such a narrative context (incarnation, death, resurrection) provide a particular 
‘representative’ story into which at least some human suffering can be emplotted? Are not various 
theologies of the cross – at their best – an expression of this impetus? And lastly, does not tragedy 
(understood less restrictively) provide an opportunity to represent the dignity of the afflicted, the 
oppressed, and those who suffer (despite what Hart has to say about Greek tragedy or melodrama); 
and if this is so, cannot tragedy and the gospel story be brought into fruitful conversation?
1
 Is there 
potential for both to be mutually enlightening? All of these are just some of questions I want to pose to 
Hart’s proposal which point to the limitations of his critique against tragic theology.  
John Milbank is also an important figure in relation to critiquing tragic theology. However, he is 
more open than Hart (it would seem) to using tragedy within his theological reflections. Since we shall 
discuss Milbank later when we come to his essay on Donald MacKinnon, we will not engage in a 
detailed treatment at this point. So with these reflections, I will bring this rather elongated section to a 
close, and move onto a summary of Rowan Williams own contribution.  
 
1.5. Rowan Williams 
 
In the concluding section of this chapter, I aim to define as best as possible Williams’ own 
approach to tragic theology. In the process of doing so, I will also define the four motifs I am 
proposing for interpreting his basic approach, namely: contingency, contemplation, compassion, and 
non-closure.  
 
i) Contingency  
 
By proposing contingency as a motif for interpreting Williams’ understanding of tragedy, I am 
simply attempting to expound his belief (which he shares with pretty much all classical and orthodox 
Christian belief) that created being is finite and subject to the temporal fluctuations of time.
2
 Created 
being is not an ens necessarium, but rather something that is profoundly contingent; it lacks 
necessity, and therefore is understood primarily as ontologically gifted since its essence is distinct 
from its existence (as classical Christian theology as understood it). In other words, created being is 
temporal being. As I will show in the following chapter and the final chapter, Williams follows the 
teachings of Augustine in which time and the creatio ex nihilo are held together and are coeval. In 
                                               
1
 One should mention here Richard Sturm who explicitly seeks to relate ‘gospel’ as a NT term, to tragedy. On this, see ‘The 
Ancient Origin and Sense of Tragedy’, 21-27.  
2
 For some reflections on this theme, see Nicholas Lash, ‘Recovering Contingency’, in Theology for Pilgrims (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 52-67. For a more detailed and poignant treatment of this theme within the context of a 
discussion of classical metaphysics, see David Bentley Hart, The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss (New 
Haven-London: Yale University Press, 2013), 87-151.  
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relation to Williams’ understanding of human suffering and tragedy, the problem of time and limitation 
become especially important since as limited beings we are unable to extract ourselves from the 
upshots and vicissitudes of temporal life. The awareness of this reality occurs within the context of us 
living as creatures before God (coram deo): when we come to a realization of our ‘absolute 
dependence’ (to echo Schleiermacher), our undeniable limitations as created beings, this opens us to 
the possibility of the transcendent in the sense that whatever ‘makes the world new and makes me 
strange to myself, forcing me to see my contingency, my participation in the world’s uncontrollable 
flux: this is God’.
1
 However, living within time means that within the development of the universe; the 
growth and maturation of freedom cannot happen without the reality of conflict in which the possibility 
of all goods being realized is suspended since limitation and finitude create a hindrance from every 
benevolent potential coming to fruition. Furthermore, we as creatures are not only constituted as 
active beings, bestowed with liberty and free self-determination, but also passive in the sense that are 
we are dependent upon our environments and subject to the dynamics that constitute such a milieu. 
Such a passivity is the basis for the possibility of suffering and human tragedy, which while not 
ontologically necessary (not fatalistic or determined in the stringent sense, since human freedom is a 
factor that is involved) can be understood as a contingent necessity in the sense that time and finitude 
brings with it the inevitable experience of limitation, pain, loss, and suffering. Human development 
cannot take place without the horizon of such tragic potentialities.  
 
ii) Contemplation  
 
By drawing attention to contemplation as a motif in Williams’ theology of the tragic, here I seek to 
make apparent the fundamentally realist perspective
2
 of Williams’ philosophical tendency (something 
he shares and inherits from his teacher Donald MacKinnon). By proposing contemplation as a theme, 
all I am aiming to do is to articulate Williams’ emphasis on what can be called the ‘objectivity’ of the 
world.  By using the term ‘objectivity’, I am using it in the very precise sense of ‘objectiveness’ or the 
‘over-againstness’ (Gegenstand in German) of the object in relation to the subject, in order to 
distinguish it from a naïve positivism or reductionism. By saying this, I am articulating Williams’ 
fundamental belief in the saturated quality of reality that continues to give itself, or the fact that it 
resists tidy descriptions in that it refuses to be circumscribed within the representational activities of 
the ego.
3
. I am obviously aware that the word ‘contemplation’ has overtones of spiritual practices and 
prayer (something that has importance for Williams), and so by proposing the language of a 
contemplative stance towards the reality of the tragic (one that keeps the difficulty of the tragic and 
suffering alive rather than seeking to close it down prematurely either through theodicy or fantasy), I 
am aware of such ambiguity nonetheless. I do want to stress, however, that such a contemplative 
                                               
1
A Ray of Darkness: Sermons and Reflections (Cambridge, MA: Cowley, 1995), 102.  
2
 Nicholas Lash has proposed in ‘What Authority has our Past’, in Theology on the Way to Emmaus (p. 51) that contemplation 
is associated with realism, and therefore with worship, whereas explanation is more associated with idealism.   
3
 This is not to say that Williams believes that there are ‘neutral’ realities ‘out there’ waiting to be linguistically represented; 
rather it, for Williams, it is precisely within the dialectic and continued discourse of language, whereby we represent, stake 
positions, engage, converse that we discover the silence within our speech, and the ‘beyond’ of speech. For more on this, see 
Williams’ recent Gifford Lectures entitled ‘Representing Reality’ (4 November 2013) and ‘No Last Words: Language as 
Unfinished Business’ (7 November 2013), available from http://www.ed.ac.uk/about/video/lecture-series/gifford-lectures, 
3/19/2014.   
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stance should not be understood as if the ‘the tragic’ were a divine reality itself to be adored or a God-
ordained pedagogy in which tragedy is reduced to some kind of spiritual lesson to be contemplated 
for personal growth and maturation.
1
 Rather, by suggesting contemplation as a response to tragedy, I 
am trying to articulate Williams’ desire to let tragedy be tragedy rather than simply transforming it or 
trying to make it less difficult than it is. By using ‘contemplation’, I acknowledge its continuities and 
discontinuities with Williams’ other uses of the same term
2
. Here, however, my definition of the term is 
simply the movement whereby we come to terms with ‘what is awkwardly and meaninglessly there’
3
 in 
which we allow ‘what is there, and prior to us, just to be itself’
4
, which is entwined with his sense of the 
real difficulty of conceptualising reality in the sense that ‘even in banal contexts, we are aware that our 
pigeonholes for things, people, emotions, and perceptions are often lagging well behind the fluidity of 
the real world, with its subtle, rapid interactions and its puzzling quality.’
5
 
 
iii) Compassion  
 
As far as I am aware, Williams has no thoroughly worked out concept of sympathy, empathy, or 
compassion. When he uses these terms, it is assumed that we know what he means by them. 
Obviously, there is an extensive debate on the differences between these terms, one that seeks to 
parse out the nuances between the different designations.
6
 For the sake of this study, I will not try to 
distinguish too carefully between these words since such distinctions will not really aid us in our study 
of Williams, who does not seem to reflect (at least in the texts I will examine) the differences between 
them. I am sure that Williams is aware of the debate surrounding emotional knowledge, in which 
feeling, emotion, judgement, and intellect cannot be easily separated,
7
 but in this study I shall not 
enter this debate. My reason for bringing up the concept of ‘compassion’ is that we find Williams using 
such terminology when it comes to his understanding of grasping poetic meaning within the world 
                                               
1
 Williams writes (in Faith in the Public Square, 316) in an essay on Etty Hillesum entitled ‘Religious Lives’ that ‘unavoidable 
suffering is what it is, not a stimulus to a longing for a better place or a pedagogy for moral improvement, but a datum which our 
humanity must humanize.’  
2
 For example, ‘Contemplation is a giving place to the prior actuality of God…Contemplation…is a deeper appropriation of the 
vulnerability of the self in the midst of the language and the transactions of the world’ (Williams, ‘Theological Integrity’, in On 
Christian Theology, 11-12). It should be mentioned here however that originally, contemplation (in the Greek sense of theoria) 
included both empirical and spiritual connotations. As George Steiner has written: ‘A ‘theorist’ or ‘theoretician’ is one who is 
disciplined in observance, a term that is itself charged with the two-fold significance of intellectual-sensory perception and 
religious or ritual conduct’, in Real Presences (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 69. One can see this within 
the Neoplatonic tradition, associated with Plotinus, Proclus, Iamblichus, and Damascius, particularly in relation to its theurgic-
mystical elements. For more on this, see Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press, 2002), 157-171. So it is not without justification that my use of the term might inhabit that the borders of both 
these meanings.  
3
 Williams, ‘The Suspicion of Suspicion: Wittgenstein and Bonhoeffer’ [1988], in Wrestling with Angels, 195.  
4
 Williams, ‘The Spiritual and the Religious: Is the Territory Changing?’, in Faith in the Public Square, 92.   
5
 A Ray of Darkness, 99. In relation to tragedy, such a position has significant consonance with Donald MacKinnon’s realistic 
position of ‘transcendence’ vis-à-vis tragedy in which tragic suffering provides an escape route from the idealistic or Kantian 
limitations of reason and knowledge, and provides us with a kind of ‘finality’ that cannot be effaced, harmonised into some 
greater perspective, or done away with. The difficulty continues to provoke the question. As already mentioned, the language of 
‘finality’ here is drawn from Paul Janz (God, the Mind’s Desire, 171-175), though it should be mentioned here that Janz’s use of 
the term ‘finality’ is to be distinguished from Bouchard’s use of the terms of ‘ultimacy’ and ‘finality’. Janz’s frame of discussion is 
different from that of Bouchard’s since he is dealing with the problems of reference and realism, rather than the properly 
hermeneutical discussions of Bouchard. In relation to Bouchard’s terms, Janz would more likely be placed with ‘tragedy-as-
ultimacy’ than ‘tragedy-as-finality’.   
6
 For more on this, Ingolf U. Dalferth and Andreas Hunziker, ‘Einleitung: Aspekte des Problemkomplexes Mitleid, in Ingolf U. 
Dalferth, Andreas Hunziker, and Andrea Anker (eds.), Mitleid: Konkretionen eines strittigen Konzepts (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2007), IX-XXII.  
7
 Cf. Eberhard Hermann, ‘Emotions as Part of Making Reality’, in Mitleid, 1-17. Martha Nussbaum is been an important figure in 
this debate.  
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despite its disordered quality. For Williams, the attentive and contemplative awareness that form an 
important part of poetic artistry are intrinsically connected the movements and feelings related to the 
vulnerability and openness of compassionate practice. To attempt to see the world as it is, without 
fantasy or evasion, to allow reality to show itself, is part of the dispossessive process of the spiritual 
life whereby we become open towards what is beyond us, and to being in all its infinity and 
particularity. Such a posture implies a movement outside of the self towards the other, whether that 
be humanity, or creation generally.
1
 The relation between ‘compassion’ and ‘tragedy’ is already well-
known; already from the time of Aristotle, ‘compassion’ (ἔλεος) was seen to be inseparable from Attic 
tragedy. Admittedly, the understanding of ‘compassion’ within Attic tragedy is different in comparison 
to the Christian understanding
2
, but nonetheless if we argue (as I have been thus far) that our 
understanding of ‘the tragic’ should not be confined to Greek tragedy (as it is usually understood), but 
should continue to find ‘family resemblances’ or performative similarities between different kinds of 
tragedies, then our understanding of ‘tragic compassion’ can be fruitfully ‘demythologised’ and 
distinguished from the superstructure and architectonics of Hellenic scapegoating and the sacrificial 
ideology (assuming that is an adequate way to read Attic tragedy anyway, of which I have some 
doubts). In such an instance, we will be able to engage with empirical and literary tragedy in a way 
that enables us to practice and learn the art of compassion, in which the reality of the suffering other 
is made ‘real’ for us, even if the fullness of their experience remains to some extent unknown or 
mysterious. 
 
iv) The Resistance to Closure  
 
By making use of the language of ‘closure’, I am making reference to the fact that for the Williams, 
in relation to tragic experience, there is revealed a woundedness of being which cannot be easily 
sutured or remedied. The problems and difficulties presented to us in the experience of tragedy and 
suffering are real problems, and so we should be wary of any easy solutions or attempts to explain 
the metaphysical ‘reasons’ for suffering or tragedy since such explanations often seem to shipwreck 
against the rocks of brutal particularity. Williams continues to remain hopeful, and is not ardently 
pessimist or melancholic, but he nonetheless is awakened to the real challenge of human tragedy and 
the difficulties it proposes for any kind of closure. We have already mentioned this, in regard to 
tragedy, namely that as an art-form and as a form of representation it resists easy closure or 
delimitation, and that it continues to propose for us the difficulty and challenge of human suffering. In 
this regard, Williams’ seems to have a consonant attitude and does not seek to resolve the 
epistemological and existential challenges it poses.  
Williams’ vision is, admittedly, quite stark, but it is something he learned from reading T.S. Eliot’s 
Four Quartets, which he interpreted in a strongly incarnationalist fashion. The question for Eliot was: 
                                               
1
 By saying this, I am not suggesting that ‘compassion’ should be understood as some kind of utilitarian or instrumentalised 
process in which the other is treated as merely an expansion of the self, and am I also aware of the complicated history of 
reflection on the concepts of ‘sympathy’, particularly on the relation between active, imaginative identification with the other, 
and the more spontaneous experiences of the sensus communis. For a brief reflection on this theme, see Milbank, ‘‘The 
Invocation of Clio: A Response’. Journal of Religious Ethics 33.1 (2005), 33-36 
2
 On this, see Robert C. Roberts, ‘Compassion as an Emotion and Virtue’, in Mitleid, 119-137.  
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how can time be redeemed while, at the same time, not abolishing its temporal quality? For Williams, 
redemption can only have the shape of the incarnated God who ‘enters’ into the realm of time, with all 
its vicissitudes and potential meaninglessness. Williams argues (along with Eliot, as he interprets him) 
that redemption can only be glimpsed incarnationally, that is, by taking time, materiality, and its 
entanglements as seriously as possible. For Williams, a saviour who was not subject to the same 
wounds could not provide healing for those wounds (as Gregory Nazianzen already intuited).
1
 
Regarding woundedness, Williams writes in one of his poems (entitled ‘Twelfth Night’), a rather 
sombre stanza, that ‘Behind the stars no happy end, / no dissolution of our scars’. However he 
nonetheless also believes that redemption remains possible: ‘…here is / not innocence but absolution, 
for / your scars are true but I (always) / will bleed in them’.
2
 We are not given ‘innocence’ nor the 
absolute certainty that all our woundedness will be made whole, since we are always, as finite beings, 
entwined with tragic contours of temporality which constitutes as persons, even redeemed persons. 
And yet, we are promised that the wounds of Christ are precisely the wounds that grant forgiveness 
and absolution, in which ‘Christ makes his own our lament, our penitence, and our fear by adopting 
the human condition in all its tragic fullness as the material of his Body’.
3
 So even though Williams 
remains eschatologically agnostic about whether the problems of history, suffering, and tragedy will 
be ever solved, he remains hopeful that things can change and that salvation is possible, that we 
should not surrender to the status quo, or drearily accept the some kind of amor fati, which simply 
leaves things the way they are, namely at the mercy of mythologized realities which may continue to 
go unchallenged (viz. ‘the end of history’, ‘progress’, etc.).  
 
1.6. Summary 
 
As we bring this chapter to a close, I should summarise what I have attempted to lay out the thus 
far. In this chapter, we have attempted to the complicate the often assumed incompatibility of the 
Christian faith with tragic insights. I did this by sketching how modern scholarship has made any 
simple definition of tragedy problematic, especially when that definition is tied in a strong way with the 
examples of Greek tragedy. Thereafter, we sought to provide a survey of how tragedy has been 
appropriated by modern theologians, from the twentieth century onwards. In this context, we briefly 
sought to lay out Williams’ own position within this context, adumbrating briefly his modest and 
particularly circumscribed understanding of tragic theology, one that is able to move around some of 
the potential pitfalls of certain renderings of tragic theology. However, full justification and exposition 
await the remainder of this thesis.  
                                               
1
 Williams has not changed his fundamental position in this regard. For more on Williams’ thoughts on Christology, temporality, 
and redemption, you can read his reflections on icons and ‘the broken image’ in Williams, Dostoevsky: Language, Faith, and 
Fiction (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2008), 189-226, as well as his interpretation of the figure of Prince Myshkin in 
The Idiot (pp. 47-57).  
2
 Williams, ‘Twelfth Night’, in The Poems of Rowan Williams, 23, 25. It is also worth mentioning here some comments Williams 
has made in respect to R.S. Thomas, to found in ‘Williams, ‘Adult Geometry: Dangerous Thoughts in R.S. Thomas’, in M. Wynn 
Thomas (ed.) The Page’s Drift: R.S. Thomas at Eighty (Wales: Seren, 1993), 86-89, where Williams (via Thomas) questions the 
idea of God as solution to all wounds, in which divine Being can be seen as ‘a canopy of meaning’ which will ‘unite and explain 
things’. Williams does question some of Thomas’ more ‘dangerous thoughts’ in this regard, but it would seem (following what 
Williams says elsewhere in, for example, ‘Trinity and Ontology’, ‘The Finality of Christ’ and ‘On Being Creatures’) that to project 
God as the unifier of all meanings, and the solution to every dissonance is itself, most likely, a projection of the ego which 
desires stability against the flux and uncertainty of historical situatedness.  
3
 Williams, ‘Augustine and the Psalms’. Interpretation 58.1 (2004), 20.  
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In the following chapter, I will seek to expound some of Williams’ Augustinian reflections on time 
and creation, and the beauty thereof. Such a move is a gambit against construing Williams’ 
understanding of materiality, time and history in a particularly negative fashion. By doing so, I am 
being obedient to his fundamental and classically orthodox position that the goodness and beauty of 
the world are the primordial realities and co-ordinates, in relation to which we must orientate 
ourselves. Evil, suffering, and tragedy are not ontological realities, but are privative - a distortion of 
reality - rather than a manifestation of it 
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2. The Beauty of the Contingent  
 
 
I will attempt to show here that the theme of the goodness of creation, and the inherent limitations 
and vulnerability that come with it, are important themes to take note of if we are to understand the 
assumptions that Williams makes in regard to his understanding of tragedy. To live as creatures 
means to live within in the bounds of time, to have finite resources at one’s disposal, and to inhabit a 
particular place and perspective within the creaturely. This is not a bad thing, but rather is a part of 
our dignity as creatures, who live and love as temporal beings. Since we are not God, we cannot 
claim the infinite for ourselves, and so we are bound to the orders of time and materiality in which we 
inhabit. This is not something we should seek to escape since creation, time and matter continue to 
mirror the beauty and goodness that is endowed to it. The attempt to escape from the constraints of 
time is bound up with our primeval attempt to arrogate divinity and power to ourselves, against God 
and one other. As such, we have to continue to remain humble and conscientious of our limitations. 
However, as we will get to later in this thesis, to live within time means to inhabit a place where all 
goods cannot be achieved, where unforeseen consequences, intentional and non-intentional 
dynamics, result in loss, failure, and even horrendous suffering. And so we have to be able to hold 
together this bittersweet reality – that life is both good and tragic. This is the reality which we inhabit, 
as Williams sees it.  
As we think of this theme, we should continue to keep in mind the themes of contingency, 
contemplation, compassion, and the question of closure. We shall firstly deal with Williams’ reflections 
on creation, time, and reality of human limitations that are intrinsically a part of our existence as 
creatures. I shall also deal with Williams’ reflections on sin, since – from a Christian perspective – 
creaturely limitation is bound up with the question sin and moral failure. Furthermore, I shall also deal 
with Williams’ reflections on the body, as well as beauty and art within the context of time-taking.  
The reason why I am discussing Williams’ thoughts on creation, the body and beauty is because I 
would like to emphasise the Williams’ belief in the fundamental goodness of createdness and 
temporality. Since we are going to spend a large part of this thesis talking about a slightly darker 
theme, namely the reality of the tragic, it seems prudent to preface our thesis with Williams’ 
affirmation of bodiliness, time, and the created order. To leave such thoughts aside might lead to a 
one-sided interpretation of his theology.  
 
2.1. Creation, Temporality, and Sin 
 
Creation and time for Williams are realities which cannot be separated into consequential facts; 
they are two sides of the proverbial coin. On this point, like many others within his wider theological 
project, Williams remains within the classical Augustinian tradition that precedes him. Createdness 
and temporality are theologically, existentially, and philosophically coeval:  to exist as a creature is to 
live within the bounds of a temporal process, a movement in time within which change and 
development are assumed. Expounding Augustine, he writes that creation is ‘the setting in being of a 
living system destined to grow toward beauty and order, even if this beauty and order is not at any 
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given moment fully apparent. Thus…the temporal character of the world is axiomatic: it is a world in 
motion, a set of processes in which potential is realized.’
1
  He goes on to say ‘The story of creation as 
a whole...is …a story, a process. Its goal is certainly something beyond time, though not exactly an 
eternal stasis: there is still the movement of love, the steady pressure towards God, the pondus 
drawing and holding things in God-centred harmony.’
2
   From this it can be argued that once creation 
is there, time and potentiality are there as well: ‘Time begins when this realm of potentiality begins to 
move, to actualize its possibilities.’
3
 To be created is to exist in time, movement, and flux. For Williams 
this is a credo essential to the belief that we are creatures existing in the material world.  However, 
according to a classical distinction inherent within the Christian tradition (Augustine, Aquinas, etc.), we 
need to make a distinction here between creation as an existing reality, and creation as an act. The 
category of time applies to the former, but not to the latter. This has some important implications. 
God’s creative act makes time possible – but it cannot be seen as an act that occurs within time.  
On this score, Williams is careful to distinguish the divine act of creation from the Neoplatonic 
doctrine of creation whereby the material world flows out of the One as the result of a natural growth 
‘outwards’.
4
  Elsewhere Williams also denies that the act of creation itself is some kind of process; 
rather the creative act of God is ‘a summons, a call which establishes the very possibility of an 
answer.’
5
 In other words, it makes time possible, but it is not itself a predicate of time.  It is clear from 
this that Williams is simply expounding the classical doctrine of creatio ex nihilo
6
; but Williams adds a 
twist: to believe that God creates out of nothing does not imply an exercise of power over, or an 
attempt to impose a definition on something which already exists; rather, it is the basis for any kind of 
relation between God and creature. Following Aquinas, Williams states: ‘creation itself is no sort of 
process; it is not a change…’creation’ simply points you to existing reality in relation to a creator.’
7
  In 
other words, the act of creation itself is not locatable within creaturely time, there is no before and 
after in relation to the creative act of God.
8
 In fact, Williams can even say, following in this tradition, 
that ‘creation is going on now’ because creation is primarily about God establishing ‘an active 
relationship that never stops…within in every circumstance, every object, every person, God’s action 
                                               
1
    Williams, ‘Creation’ in Allan Fitzgerald (ed.), Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1999), p. 252. On the idea that Williams is probably inflecting his interpretation of Augustine with a dose of Hegel, see Jeffrey 
McCurry, ‘Traditioned Creativity: On Rowan Williams and the Grammars of Theological Practice’ (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke 
University, 2006), 263-270.  
2
  Ibid., 253. 
3
  Ibid., 253. 
4
  Ibid., 252. 
5
  Williams, ‘On Being Creatures’ in On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 68. 
6
 We cannot enter into the debate here as to whether creatio ex nihilo has explicit or implicit endorsement within the biblical 
narrative. For an argument that denies the OT teaches creation out of nothing, see Jon D. Levenson, Creation and the 
Persistence of Evil: The Jewish Drama of Divine Omnipotence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). For a well-
researched account that denies that early Hellenized Judaism and nascent Christianity held onto creation out of nothing, but 
rather that it was belief drawn out in conflict with Gnosticism, see. Gerhard May, Creatio ex nihilo: The Doctrine of ‘Creation Out 
of Nothing’ in Early Christian Thought, trans. A.S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1994), 1-38.  For a critique of May’s 
research that is sensitive to the problems of an explicit affirmation of creatio ex nihilo in scripture and early Palestinian Judaism, 
but nonetheless sees it as an implicit belief, see Markus Bockmuehl ‘Creatio ex nihilo in Palestinian Judaism and Early 
Christianity’. Scottish Journal of Theology 65 (2012), 253-270.  
7
 ‘On Being Creatures’, 68. 
8
  One could also make this argument from an Augustinian perspective since for Augustine God is timeless and the material 
world as a contingent totality is shaped by forma and pondus. Without forma and pondus – form and balance - there would be 
no way to register what change might actually mean, because in total formlessness and contingency, change and process are 
meaningless. On this, see Williams, ‘Good for Nothing? Augustine on Creation’. Augustinian Studies 25 (1994), 17-18. 
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is going on, a sort of white heat at the centre of everything…Creation is an action of God that sets up 
relationship between God and what is not God.’
1
 
As can be seen, Williams’ understanding of the creatio ex nihilo is traditional in the sense that he 
holds onto classical doctrines of God’s timelessness, and onto the co-occurrence of time and 
creaturely existence. However, Williams draws some interesting conclusions, in light of contemporary 
ecological and feminist critiques of divine power.  Williams argues rather surprisingly that the classical 
doctrines of divine aseity, timelessness and creatio ex nihilo actually preserve creaturely freedom and 
dignity since ‘creation is not an exercise of divine power…Power is exercised by by x over y; but 
creation is not power, because it is not exercised on anything.’
2
  As seems clear, this has implications 
for our understanding of the nature of God, divine power, creaturely existence as imago dei, the 
extent and full implications of which cannot be entered into here.
3
  
To elaborate a little more: if creating is ‘the sort of thing that God does’
4
  because it is ‘wholly in 
accord with the divine being as being-for-another’
5
  and points to ‘a creator who works in, not against, 
our limits, our mortality’
6
, then it means that we are released from the idea that creatureliness, 
vulnerability, interdependence, and limitation are things which are to be shirked, that history and 
process are things to be overcome either through technological control, or through ideological 
assertions of ‘the end of history’. If God has entered into our limitations –‘the limits of particularity, of 
bodiliness and mortality…or creatureliness’
7
 - we are consequently released to embrace the dignity of 
our createdness, and to acknowledge that we are inescapably thrown into a context of finitude and 
limited perspectives. Because if this is how the divine manifests itself within our time, incarnationally 
through ‘The creative life, death, and resurrection of Jesus’
8
, why should we expect more for 
ourselves?  Our desire to assert ourselves against the world, to establish for ourselves a safe and 
secure context, a place where we are free to express untrammelled control and management is a 
fantasy. According to Williams, at the root of our striving to establish our ‘divine’ status in the world is 
the belief that ultimately God’s purpose for us is opposed to our best interests, what is ‘natural’ for us 
is opposed to what God wants for us. But as Williams says ‘creation emphatically isn’t…any kind of 
imposition or manipulation: it is not God imposing on us divinely willed roles rather than the ones we 
might ‘naturally’ have’, or defining us out of our systems into God’s. Creation affirms that to be here at 
all…is ‘of God’; it is because God wants it so. And this implies that the Promethean myth of humanity 
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struggling against God for its welfare and interests makes no sense: to be a creature cannot be to be 
a victim of an alien force.’  Instead of saying that God superimposes some alien meaning or sovereign 
power against nature, Williams says, ‘God’s sovereign purpose is what the world is becoming’
1
 . Even 
though God creates ‘in God’s interest’ (since there could be no other motive for creation since God is 
not impelled by any inner or external necessity), that ‘interest’ is not for ‘the building-up of the divine 
life, which simply is what it is, but its giving away. For God to act for God’s sake is for God to act for 
our sake.’
2
   
This implies that our dignity as creatures is found within the acceptance of humility since being 
creatures is ‘learning humility, not as submission to an alien will, but as the acceptance of limit and 
death.’
3
  As Williams says, being a creature is ‘in danger of becoming a lost art’
4
 – we tend to seek 
total perspectives with the purpose of achieving a ‘godlike’ control and power over our environment.  
He says that ‘it is not natural to us to be natural.’
5
 We can imagine ourselves as ‘self-regulating’ but 
this is misguided, because ‘our fundamental need is for identity in relation, conversation, mutual 
recognition…There is no self-awareness outside the commerce of agents and speakers….My 
meaning is given by the context I depend on.’
6
  Therefore, we do not need to compete with God, or 
impose definitions on others: God doesn’t need us, so therefore we do no fulfil any need in God which 
means that ‘God does not and cannot lay claim upon me so as to ‘become’ God; what I am cannot be 
made functional for God’s being; I can never be defined by the job of meeting God’s needs’ which 
means that we live properly as ‘creatures not when we attempt to resign from nature by treating ‘God’ 
as a successful rival for our attention or devotion over against the things and persons of the world, but 
by our being-in-the-world’. To have being-in-the-world then implies that ‘all attempts in the world at 
providing definitions for other persons and groups’ are ‘attempts to escape the world’ since ‘only one 
‘power’ is entirely gift, entirely directed away from its needs (because it has none)’. As a result, all 
earthly powers are ‘unmasked and demythologized’ since ‘The creator’s power-as-resource cannot be 
invoked to legitimize earthly power’.
7
 
To acknowledge our humility and finitude as also to confess belief in sin, which Williams defines as 
‘our deeply rooted aversion to our own creatureliness’.
8
  In his doctoral thesis (referring to the work of 
Lossky), he states that ‘Nature is initially deformed by Adam’s perverted use of his liberty, and now, 
with tragic appropriateness, this personal liberty becomes enslaved by nature, and the vicious circle 
of fallenness is completed’.
9
 Elsewhere, he says that human beings are ‘perennially vulnerable to the 
temptation of arrogating divinity to themselves. It is the temptation manifest in the refusal to accept 
finitude, creatureliness and dependence’.
10
  He goes on to explicate this further by saying that we are 
‘born into a world where there is already a history of oppression and victimization…before we can be 
conscious of it, the system of oppressor-victim relations absorbs us. It is this ‘already’ which theology 
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(sometimes rather unhelpfully) refers to as original sin  - the sense of primordial ‘diminution’ from 
which we all suffer before ever we are capable of understanding or choice.’
1
 For Williams, the drive to 
overcome and transcend our finitude is what the church has called sin – such a denial of our ‘being-
towards-death’ (to steal a line from Heidegger) is the source of our attempts to assert power and 
domination over one another. The source of evil and horror is precisely the rejection of our fragility, 
limitedness, and impotence; that is, our fear of contingency.
2
 Writing more recently in an essay on the 
theme of temptation, Williams says, that to live within time means that we are subject to things 
beyond our control: ‘to live in the material and temporal world is to be vulnerable to the impact of 
unstable circumstances’ but ‘it is how we deal with those circumstances that will bring to light who and 
what we actually are…what Christ delivers us from is not bodily circumstance, contingency, or 
instability…but from the habits of mind and heart that that make of this environment only a theatre for 
our private obsessions to be staged and our lust for control to be exercised.’
3
 
It would be beneficial here to dwell a little longer on the theme of sin, particularly as it relates to the 
Williams understanding of Augustinian privatio boni, also known as the steresis agathou or privation 
theory regarding the origin of sin. Since the theme of tragedy is bound up with the reality of evil and 
sinful disorderedness, it seems appropriate to expound this theme a little more. As we have seen 
already, critics of tragic theology have sought to emphasize that classical Christian theology rejects 
the movement of ontologizing evil and tragedy. David Bentley Hart writes that ‘theology must insist 
upon ‘’historicizing evil’’, treating it as the superscribed text of a palimpsest, obscuring the aboriginal 
goodness of creation.’
4
 John Milbank similarly says ‘Christianity refuses, having recognized a 
universal tragic condition, to ontologize this, but makes the move of seeing the universal itself as but a 
contingent narrative upshot.’
5
 Both of these statements occur within a context where tragedy in 
relation to the Christian vision is being discussed, and critiqued theologically. However, if it can be 
shown that tragic theology does not fall within the purview of this critique, then we have problematized 
further the rejection of tragic theology as viable Christian response to the reality of evil and suffering. 
Rowan Williams, in relation to the question of the ontological status of evil, remains a classical 
Augustinian.  
The most in-depth treatment of this theme is to be found in essay written for Gerald Bonner’s 
Festschrift
6
. He opens his essay with Augustine’s own summation: Malin enim nulla natura est; sed 
amissio boni mali nomen acceptit. Evil has not positive nature, but is simply the loss of the good. 
Williams goes on to comment by saying that ‘Talking about evil is not like talking about things, about 
what makes the constituents of the world the sort of things they are; it is talking about a process, 
about something that happens to the things that there are in the universe. Evil is not some kind of 
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object…but we give that name of ‘evil’ to that process in which the good is lost.’
1
 This constitutes 
Augustine’s understanding of the ‘grammar of evil’, and we should understand, from this perspective 
that ‘evil is not a subject to which qualities can be ascribed, not a substania.’
2
 The effect of sin upon 
creaturely being is that our ability to see and know God is hindered, and even distorted: ‘To see evil 
as privation is to see it as something that affects my own perception of what is good for me: if evil is 
the absence of good, it is precisely that misreading of the world that skews my desires.’
3
  
Here it should be said that one of the common criticisms of the privation theory of evil is that a 
mere privation of the good does not account for the severe, horrifying positivity of evil itself. Williams 
however argues that the terrifying quality of evil stems not from the fact that it has some ontological 
positivity, but rather because it perverts the elements in the world which are ‘most alive and active’. 
He goes on to say that evil is ‘dreadful and potent because of the kind of world this is, a world in 
which the active, joyful, goodness of God is mirrored or shared by creatures.’ The potency and horror 
of evil derives from a distorted will, which results in ‘a vast misapprehension, a mistaking of the unreal 
and the groundless for the real’.
4
 Such a misapprehension is particularly severe in the case of human 
beings (rather than animals for example) because human beings – as social and interdependent 
creatures – can cause significant harm to one another in their relational interactions. The starkness of 
evil derives from the fact that something beautiful and excellent has become misdirected and 
distorted. As such, Augustine’s understanding of evil as ‘insubstantial’ grants moral responsibility to 
human agents; this is because we should not understand evil as some ‘external’ force or entity which 
impinges upon our relations, but should rather find ‘the location of evil in the malfunctioning of 
relations between subjects, not in the relation of this of this or that subject to some other thing called 
‘evil’’. Williams uses a musical analogy to explain this by saying that ‘[a] discord on a musical 
instrument is not the result of the instrument being interfered with by an external agency called 
discord, it is the function of the workings of what is there, of what constitutes the instrument itself.’
5
 As 
Williams writes elsewhere, Augustine effectively ‘demythologizes’ the concept of evil, since for 
Augustine evil is ‘not a thing in the universe’
6
 but rather a distortion of reality itself.  
The essay continues, but I will expound the rest later in this thesis since Williams thereafter moves 
onto a discussion of the tragic from an Augustinian perspective. Since such a discussion fits more 
with the genealogical study I will engage with later, I have left such an engagement until then. 
However, for our purposes here, we have shown that Williams cannot be accused of ‘ontologizing’ evil 
or equating it with some ahistorical or aprioristic datum. As we have seen, he understands evil to be 
the result of a historical process, which does not exist as a ‘positive’ entity part from its privative action 
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upon creaturely will and action. Since evil is ‘insubstantial’, it does not exist apart from its parasitic 
actuality in relation to the good. Therefore, if we are to consider Williams a coherent thinker and 
theologian, we should say that his understanding of tragedy does not contradict his understanding of 
evil. We will expand on this further as this thesis develops.  
To summarize thus far, I have sought to show in Williams’ theology the connection between 
creation and time. I argued that while the act of creation itself should not be understood as a process 
itself, once creation is here, time and movement are an inevitable reality that flows from it. Thereafter, 
I sought to show that for Williams true creatureliness involves the acceptance of our limited nature, 
our dependence, and vulnerability. Attempts to transcend our status as creatures are not necessary 
because our dignity is found precisely within this matrix. We do not have to assert our rights with God, 
or try to compete with God since God is not opposed to what is best or ‘natural’ for us. The attempt to 
transcend our finitude and limited perspectives is precisely the source of the primordial violence and 
manipulative power we use to assert ourselves against the world. It results in a denial of our bodily 
existence as creatures. I also dealt with Williams’ Augustinian understanding of evil, and how it 
liberates him from certain criticisms which might be lodged against a viable tragic theology.  
 
2.2. Body, Materiality and Time  
 
‘If the body is always deep but deepest at its surface…’
1
 
 
In relation to the theme of the body, Williams has spoken about the ‘the inescapable significance 
of time as a correlate of bodiliness’ which is part of ‘a return to ‘surfaces’  or appearances’ which is 
‘conscious of the irreducible elements of history and contingency in the formation of knowledge and 
religious faith’.
2
 For Williams, attention to materiality and bodiliness are essential for theological 
thinking because thinking about such issues opens us to the reality of limit and finite perspectives, 
and it forces us to be aware of the fact that our theologizing and reflective enterprises are part of a 
shared network of interdependence and conversation which is irreducible. He says that ‘theology 
must rediscover itself as a language that assists us in being mortal, living in the constraints of a finite 
and material world without resentment.’
3
  Williams understanding of bodiliness includes a theory of 
language that refers to limit and vulnerability, and to the reality of a shared discourse from which we 
cannot extract ourselves. As a person, I am ‘born into a continuum of language and interaction I did 
not choose or invent.’
4
 The appeal to ‘surfaces’ and ‘appearances’ mentioned above is reference to 
Williams’ belief  that we will think more profoundly if we attend to the materiality of our engagement 
and discourse with the world. That is, rather than seeking to find the truth about ourselves in some 
realm that is beyond language, or in some interiority that is discrete from the world of discourse, it is 
only in continued discourse that we can learn. Here Williams is opposing such a method to one in 
which we seek to find truth in some kind of private interiority, as if what is ‘interior’ were not itself the 
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product of interaction with the world and shared discourse. The implications of this for theological 
reasoning are that we cannot seek to escape the contingent and cultural process of meaning-making 
that is inherent in all our interactions with the world: we are shoved against limits and the sheer 
materiality of things (‘what is awkwardly and meaninglessly there’
1
) which will not be confined or 
reduced to any ‘systematic’ description or unifying discourse since ‘The search for the single story of 
humanity reflects…the flight from the risks of discourse’.
2
  So as a result, theological reflection should 
‘equip us for knowing and being known humanly, taking time with the human world and not aiming to 
have done with knowing (and desiring)’.
3
   
In reference to the physical human body, Williams writes that ‘the body is never helpfully described 
as an object like other material objects. By that curious material transaction called language, we 
continue to recognize that the oddity of this material reality that is my body is an oddity shared by 
other materially recognizable bodies.’
4
  For Williams, following the Thomistic tradition, ‘the body is the 
soul - that is, the body does not become intelligent, purposeful, endowed with feeling and so on 
because something is added to it. This is what the body is - a meaning portion of matter’.
5
 We can see 
that Williams understands the physical body as ‘site’ of interaction with the world, that it is ‘necessarily 
intelligent’
6
, though not in a reductive sense whereby ‘intelligence’ is understood as simply 
computable information. Rather, we should understand the body in space and time as that which 
interacts with the world in a myriad of complex relationships, relationships that are ‘not easily 
reducible to function because it seems to work with ‘information’ of a less determinate character, less 
capable of being rendered in items of information.’
7
 The body we inhabit is the place where make 
ourselves available to and addressable by others. As such, the body is capable of language and 
communication with the world, the complexity of which opens us to the inherent limitations and 
finitude we inhabit because ‘what we are are our limits, that we are here not there, now not then, took 
this decision, not that, to bring us here and now.’
8
   
And it is precisely here – in our vulnerability and limits - that we opened to ‘the being-at-hand of 
love’
9
 in relation to God and to others, because we realize that ‘the self God deals with is not some 
mysterious inner core, but my body’ and that bodies are ‘where we learn and where we speak and 
share. If we cannot love our mortal vulnerability, our own frail flesh, we shall love nothing and 
nobody’.
10
 According to Williams, the only way we can interact lovingly with our environment and God 
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is through attention to our bodiliness, with all its hindrances and fragilities since this is the matrix 
where we learn what it means to be ‘spiritual’
1
, what it means to love and to have communion with 
God and one another: ‘before God, we can only celebrate the fact that we are, and are free to be 
human with God for God and because of God; and wait without clear prediction or absolute 
conceptual security for the further perception of and delight in God’s being God.’
2
  Elsewhere, he says 
that ‘we encounter God truly only when we accept our mortal fragility for what it is, do not seek to 
escape it, but put our trust in a God who speaks and relates to us through flesh.’
3
  In other words, we 
should not look to some inner part of ourselves (soul, intellect, will) that is more ‘godlike’ and therefore 
more capable of communion with God since these are ‘as much creaturely as the body and the 
passions, and so as much in need of transformation’
4
, and this means that we cannot long for a 
spirituality that seeks to escape the body, language, or from the continuing discourse that occurs 
within human conversation since to do so would be to return to a kind of Gnostic escape from the 
world of the temporal and the fleshly. For Williams, ‘fleshly life is not a burden to be borne, nor a 
prison to be escaped from, but a task to be perfected in grace.’
5
 It is precisely within the life of the 
body that we learn and are transformed through the divine working of holiness within the fragilities of 
time, where we come to ‘the recognition of the holy within the contingent order’ even though it is 
‘always undercut by the disruptive, discontinuous elements in a narrative which is inescapably one of 
exile and alienation, loss and death.’
6
 The emphasis on bodiliness and time is based on the goodness 
of creation, but it has a further basis in the divine incarnation: ‘The embrace of our creatureliness, and 
resistance to all that draws us away from the recognition from the centrality of time – these are 
consequences of the act of the incarnation.’
7
 He goes on to say that ‘By the incarnation, God binds us 
to the temporal world as always and inescapably our starting point and dispossesses us of the illusion 
that there is a point within the temporal world where we can settle. Every point in the temporal order 
becomes a point of departure.’
8
 
To summarize, I have shown that for Williams that materiality and bodiliness are realities that have 
to be acknowledged and accepted if we are to live as creatures before God, confessing and accepting 
our limitations as concomitant with our existence in time. An acceptance of this reality means that we 
have to learn to understand ourselves as vulnerable to time and flux, and that we live in a world of 
interdependence and discourse from which we cannot extricate ourselves – even if we wanted to. But 
I have also shown that Williams believes that acceptance of our bodiliness is essential to 
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understanding our relationship with God, the world, and one another. As such, it is essential to our 
spirituality and understanding our materiality as fundamentally good.  
 
2.3 Art, Beauty and Time-Taking  
 
In this brief concluding section to this chapter, we will discuss Williams’ reflections on beauty, art, 
and its relation to temporality. Such reflections are there to further confirm Williams' axiomatic belief in 
the goodness and beauty of created life. For Williams, the artist is someone who seeks ‘to add to the 
world, to co-operate in the making of the world’
1
. However, this making of the world is not an 
imposition of meaning, but rather the discovery of beauty that is already there, hidden within the 
density of reality, unfolded through the labour of attention, discipline and patient artistry.  
In a short article published for an art exhibition at St. Matthew’s Church in Northampton
2
, Williams 
explicitly brought the theme of art into conversation with the theme of ‘time-taking’ and ‘making 
sense’.
3
 He says that ‘art is an image of how human beings can use time and the things that live in 
time (bodies, sounds, stories, and textures) to make sense – that is, to make a world that can be 
shared by other beings with mind and feeling.’ He goes on to say good art is not the result of the artist 
imposing his or her will upon on their material, but is rather a process of ‘discovery’ and ‘releasing’ 
what is in some sense already ‘there’ since ‘artistic labour is way of profoundly living in the world, built 
on the knowledge that human beings can exercise their proper human intelligence only in, not over or 
against, a world that is beyond their plans and preferences.’ And as such, good art demands our time 
and patience to acknowledge ‘the time and patience built into the work.’ As such, a work of art in its 
beauty and ‘excess’ invites joy and admiration, but it also invites ‘pain and judgement’ since it recalls 
us to ‘our fragility and the limits of our power over who we are and what we are’. Taking time can be a 
painful process that opens us to vulnerability because it reminds us that ‘we live in our skins’. It 
reminds us that we live in our bodies and in time. For Williams, the production of art requires time-
taking, allowing the work of art to ‘unfold’ itself through the process of patience and even self-
renunciation or metanoia.
4
 It is through this process that ‘the world’ can become a true object within 
the contemplative practice of artistic labour. From this we can not only see that Williams ascribes 
                                               
1
 Williams, ‘Eric Gill’. Sobornost: The Journal of the Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius 7.4 (1977), 265.  
2
 Williams, ‘Art: Taking Time and Making Sense’, in T. Devonshire-Jones (ed.), Images of Christ. Religious Iconography in 
Twentieth Century British Art. An Exhibition to mark the Centenary of St Matthew's Church, Northampton (St Matthew's 
(Northampton) Centenary Art Committee, 1993), 25-27. I would like to thank Ben Myers for alerting me to this article. All 
quotations in this paragraph are taken from this text. 
3
 For more on the temporal quality of William’s hermeneutic of patience and ‘making sense’, see Medi Volpe, ‘’Taking Time’ and 
‘Making Sense’: Rowan Williams on the Habits of Theological Imagination’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 15.3 
(2013), 345-360.   
4
 It could be mentioned here in passing that Paul Evdokimov once suggested that the ‘reverse perspective’ of icon-writing was 
itself a form of artistic metanoia. Williams mentions this in his first published review entitled ‘Review of Paul Evdokimov, La 
Connaissance de Dieu selon la Tradition Orientale, Lyon: Xavier Mappus, 1967. Sobornost: The Journal of the Fellowship of St 
Alban and St Sergius 6.5 (1972), 360. He goes on elsewhere to say that art demands from ‘the artist himself [sic]…a radical 
metanoia, the burying of his individuality in the canons of the tradition, the acceptance of anonymity’. For this quotation, see 
Williams, ‘Christian Art and Cultural Pluralism: Reflections on “L’art de l’icone”, by Paul Evdokimov’. Eastern Churches Review 
8.1 (1976), 39-40. For more reflections on the social responsibilities of the artist, and their contribution to communal meaning-
making, see Williams, ‘Eric Gill’, 261-269. 
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beauty to the created order but further, that it is time itself that opens the portal to seeing beauty 
within the material world.
1
  
For Williams, the artist is concerned about uncovering what is, in some sense, already there within 
the world, the objectivity of the world that cannot be reduced to the ego of the artist. There is an 
‘excessiveness’ to the world
2
 that cannot be reduced to mere functionality
3
, and that it is such 
superfluity that opens the way for artistic labour. But nonetheless, what is posited and put forward is 
something new, and cannot be deemed as simple repetition. For Williams, ‘the poetic embrace of the 
concrete’ is a movement and praxis which cannot be equated with a ‘repetition or reproduction of 
what is given’ but rather ‘evokes or realizes the given in a new way, it posits a new world which is the 
depths of the old.’
4
 As he has said elsewhere: ‘The artist…is involved at a very deep level in trying to 
do justice to [the] divine principle of non-repetition.’
5
 But this process of creation is something that can 
only unfold within the process of time.
6
  
Williams’ most sustained treatment of the theme of art is to be found in his Clark Lectures, 
delivered in 2005, published as Grace and Necessity.
7
 He writes that art engages us in ‘an 
unforeseen pattern of coherence and integrity’ and further that ‘art uncovers relations and resonances 
in the field of perception that ‘ordinary’ seeing and experiencing obscure or even deny…Thus art in 
                                               
1
 In relation to various forms of art, Williams has also suggested that music is the preeminent art form in which time-taking is 
necessary. He uses music as a theological analogy when he says, ‘There's no way of thinking about or responding intelligently 
to music that isn't about taking time; the meaning is in the taking of time. That speaks to me very forcefully because certainly 
one dimension of theology is about the time, the history of relationship with God. There are things that cannot be said without 
the taking of time.’ (Breyfogle, ‘Time and Transformation’, 229)  In sermon on ‘Keeping Time’ (A Ray of Darkness, 216-217) , 
he says “"The authority of music, what silences and holds us, is…one of the fullest parables we have of the authority of God, 
not in commanding and imposing from outside, but in asking for our time, so that it can become a time of mending and building. 
In that double gift — time given away, time given back — we are taken more deeply into the wisdom of God, and freed from the 
destructive illusion that we are supposed to be God. There is no wisdom for us if we cannot receive it as gift...’  Examples and 
analogies in this regard could be multiplied: theatre, sculpting, parables and film (Andrey Tarkovsky come to mind here) could 
also be mentioned. Cf. Myers (Christ the Stranger, 71), where he uses a scene of Tarkovsky’s Stalker to illustrate the 
significance of the incarnation in Williams’ thought: ‘…the camera slowly pans across the endless trail of debris, observing each 
thing with a disquieting, undiscriminating attentiveness. It is a scene like this that we can, for once, glimpse the meaning of the 
incarnation.’  Tarkovsky, in a watershed moment for cinematic art, sought to show how the actuality of time was central to the 
art of film-making. On this, see Andrey Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time: Reflections on the Cinema, trans. Kitty Hunter-Blair (New 
York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1987). It should be mentioned in passing that one of Williams favourite films is Tarkovsky’s Andrei 
Rublev, a film about the medieval Russian iconographer (cf. James MacIntyre’s New Statesman interview with Rowan Williams: 
http://www.newstatesman.com/religion/2008/12/williams-archbishop-lambeth). That this film has had in an influence on Rowan 
Williams understanding of ‘the icon’ is difficult to deny after you have read his reflections ‘the broken image’ in Williams, 
Dostoevsky: Language, Faith, and Fiction (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2008), 189-226. 
2
 Williams is also influenced here by Balthasar, particularly in his concept of analogy, in the sense that Balthasar sought to 
understand the excessiveness and ‘unfinishedness’ of the world as something that finds correspondence with the beauty of 
God. For more on this, Williams, ‘Balthasar and Difference, in Wrestling with Angels, 77-85. For a more sustained recent 
treatment of this theme, see David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 241-249, and John R. Betz, ‘The Beauty of the 
Metaphysical Imagination’, in Peter M. Candler Jr. and Conor Cunningham (eds.), Belief and Metaphysics (London: SCM 
Press, 2007), 41-65.   
3
 For Williams, art in an exemplary manner (like religion in its best manifestations) resists the managerial and functionalist 
practices of what he calls ‘programmatic secularism’ which is unable to deal with potentially unforeseen perspectives, and with 
a sense of the tragic – the belief that human society can be endlessly technologized without coming up against limitation, or 
that which cannot be reduced to ‘functionalist’ procedures. For more on this, see Williams, Faith in the Public Square (London, 
Bloomsbury: 2012), 11-22. In a review of Alister McGrath’s book on C.S. Lewis, he makes similar statements regarding ‘late 
modernity’ in which we have ‘[a] tyranny of reducing issues to technological problem-solving, [a] deep schism between the 
human and nature, [a] lethal impatience with the limits of the body’, in Williams, ‘An Intellectual Presence? Alister McGrath on 
C. S. Lewis’. Theology 116.6 (2013), 408.  
4
 Williams, ‘Suspending the Ethical: R.S. Thomas and Kierkegaard’, in Damien Walford Davies (ed.), Echoes to the Amen: 
Essays after R.S. Thomas (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2003), 218.  
5
 Williams, ‘Making It Strange: Theology in Other(‘s) Words’, in Jeremy Begbie (ed.), Sounding the Depths: Theology through 
the Arts (London: SCM, 2002), 30   
6
 It might also be important here to emphasise the importance of ‘memory’ and recognition for the whole aesthetic operation, 
whether it be in artistic creation, or in noticing beauty. For more on this, see Graham Ward, ‘The Beauty of God’, in John 
Milbank, Graham Ward and Edith Wyschogrod, Theological Perspectives on God and Beauty (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press 
International, 2003), 35-65.  
7
 Grace and Necessity: Reflections on Art and Love (London-New York: 2005).   
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one sense ‘dispossesses’ us of our habitual perception and restores to reality a dimension that 
necessarily escapes our conceptuality and control. It makes the world strange.’
1
 Quoting the Catholic 
philosopher Jacques Maritain, he says that ‘things are more than they are’ and that they ‘give more 
than they have’.
2
 In the same lectures, he also described the artistic process as ‘a spiral of self-
extending symbolic activity’ that is ‘inescapably mobile, time-related’. This is because ‘truthfulness 
unfolds…and makes possible different levels of appropriating or sharing in the activity that is the 
world’
3
 since ‘the life of reality is what unfolds in time, generating more and more symbolic structures, 
not a timeless and relation-free definition.’
4
 
So what we have seen in thus far is that for Williams, the excessiveness and beauty of the created 
world is something that can only be perceived in the taking of time. Such a practice of time-taking 
implies seems to acknowledge that temporality is central to the discovery of beauty within the material 
order, and therefore is part of the aesthetic and creative process of artistic labour. And therefore we 
can affirm again that for Williams the existence of materiality within temporal process is bound up with 
the ontological goodness of creation.  
To bring this chapter to a conclusion: herein, I sought to explicate theme of creation, time, and 
bodiliness. In terms of our wider theme,  I sought to show that living within time and materiality is 
something good and created by God. To be a creature means to be subject to the flux of time and 
material forces, and this is something that cannot be shirked, without significant problems arising. But 
if being a creature means being subject to the vicissitudes of history and finitude, this implies that 
being a creature means being open to the reality of the tragic. Since there are many dynamics and 
movements within time that are the product of creaturely action, which are not always subject to 
control and technological manipulation, tragedy remains a continual possibility. Creation and time are 
a result of divine action, but the shadow side of finitude and creaturely limitation are bound up with its 
goodness. I sought also to show that for Williams the body and language are essential for our 
existence as creatures, because it is only through accepting our bodies, and the limitations they 
involve, that we can be open to love. And lastly, we also briefly dealt with some of Williams reflections 
on art and time-taking to show once again that Williams holds the created order to something that 
displays superfluous beauty, and that the temporal process of time and patience are essential 
features for discovering this beauty.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 Ibid., 37. One can also compare some similar comments made by Williams regarding ‘sign-making’ and a rejection of ‘crude 
representationalism’ in ‘Christian Art and Cultural Pluralism’, 40.  For some similar reflections on poetry, you can read the 
preface to John Milbank, The Mercurial Wood: Sites, Tales, Qualities (Salzburg-Oxford-Portland: University of Salzburg, 1997), 
xii-xiv. In reference to song, poetry and fiction, he speaks of ‘the apostrophic invocation of the unknown which lurks always 
behind the site itself’ (p. xiii).  
2
 Ibid.  
3
 Ibid. 137.  
4
 Ibid. 139-140.  
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3. The Four Quartet Lectures: The Development of a 
Historical and Visionary Consciousness  
 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I will engage in a detailed reading of Williams’ unpublished Four Quartet lectures.
1
 
As far as I know, this will be the first sustained treatment of these texts, even though they have been 
dealt with elsewhere briefly. Through this analysis, I aim to show that Williams is engaging in a 
theological reading of these texts which seeks to expound the theme of enduring the 
meaninglessness and tragedy of time, and that it is only through such patient endurance that a 
Christian understanding of hope can be purged from ‘the world of speculation’ (as Eliot terms it). For 
Williams, as he reads Eliot, we come to a vision of redemption only within time, because it is only 
within history and time that sense can be made of the apparent irredeemability of history and 
temporality. The underlying motif of the incarnation, only hinted at in the Quartets themselves, is a 
theme which provides the matrix for an interpretation of the Eliot’s tragic vision of history. By 
analysing these texts in more detail, I aim to show that Williams’ understanding of tragedy cannot be 
reduced to simplistic acceptance of pain tout court, or that it is eschatologically pessimistic. 
Furthermore, I seek to further my contention that his tragic vision does not rest on an ontology of 
violence, vis-à-vis the critique of John Milbank and David Bentley Hart. Rather, for Williams, tragedy is 
a predicate of dwelling within creaturely time. Since we are creatures, bounded by time and 
materiality, we cannot seek to usurp or transgress our temporality. As we have shown previously in 
our chapter on creation, body, and time, the attempt to break out of time and our finitude is 
concomitant with our own sinful will-to-power (libido dominandi) in which we seek to overcome our 
own limitedness. But since we are inherently and inextricably bound within time, this means we are 
subject to the vicissitudes of time, and the potential for tragedy which comes with it.  
I also aim in this chapter is to further deepen my contention that Williams’ construal of tragedy is 
entwined with the themes of contingency, contemplation, compassion, and the problem of closure. 
Williams’ and Eliot’s attentiveness to the contingency – and the concomitant tragedy it involves – 
stems from a practice of contemplative reflection in which the reality and indubitablity of the world is 
taken seriously. Contemplative (or attentive) practice is viewed as an antidote to the machinations of 
ego in which the external world is reduced to the fantastical projections of the self. Furthermore, 
attentiveness to the sheer thereness of tragedy in the world – in all its rebarbative effects towards the 
ego – opens one to the experience of compassion, whereby one is taken outside of oneself towards 
the other. Such a practice of compassion is grounded in the divine movement of compassion to be 
found in the incarnating-act of God (though it should be admitted that the theme of compassion does 
not come up a lot in these lectures). And in turn, this practice of patience, attentiveness, and 
compassion puts before us the reality of non-closure in relation to our dealings with the world, and 
that we cannot seek to escape the existential and theological difficulty that tragedy proposes.  
                                               
1
 I owe a debt to Ben Myers for giving me access to these texts.  
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Before we begin in our detailed reading, we have to give a little more background before we 
engage. More than any other poet, it was Eliot who influenced and absorbed Williams’ concentration 
during his early twenties and thirties.
1
 In 1974, he was invited to deliver lectures on the Four Quartets 
at the General Theological Seminary situated in Manhattan, New York. He also delivered the same 
lectures to the sisters at Fairacres in 1975.
2
 It was an important time for Williams since it was during 
this period that he was completing his doctoral dissertation under Donald Allchin at Oxford.
3
 Further, it 
was also during this period (1974) that he published one of his earliest journal articles on the theme of 
‘The Spirit of the Age to Come’. This essay bears further examination since it touches on relevant 
themes to our discussion. However, before we come to that, it seems prudent to give some 
background in relation to Williams’ interest in the theme of tragedy. And here the figure of Donald 
MacKinnon looms large.  
 
3.2. Donald MacKinnon
4
  
 
Already from his time at Cambridge before he moved onto Oxford
5
, Williams was influenced very 
early on by theological vision of Donald MacKinnon, his teacher there. It was MacKinnon and 
Shakespeare (particularly King Lear)
6
 that awakened the young Williams to stark and intractable 
difficulty of tragedy. MacKinnon thought that Christian theology, historically speaking, had laid much 
more emphasis on metaphysical problems inherited from Greek philosophy, while forgetting another 
significant contribution of the Greeks, namely the art form of tragedy: ‘There is a sense in which 
Christian theology may be much more than it realizes the victim of the victory won in the person of 
Plato by the philosophers over the poets, and in particular the tragedians.’
7
 Mackinnon did not 
promote – as can be seen clearly from this quotation - a kind of de-Hellenization of Christianity; 
rather, MacKinnon sought to investigate how tragedy as an art-form might provide insights, and even 
revelation, into human nature and theology. Why should the believer assume that there were ‘no 
revelations concerning the human situation to be found in Sophocles and Shakespeare’?
8
 It should be 
said here that this is in harmony with MacKinnon’s broader argument that the philosopher of religion 
occupies ‘borderlands’ in which he or she may ‘feel a peculiar kinship with those who, from similarly 
situated territory, make protesting raids upon the theologians cherished homeland.’
9
 It seems then 
                                               
1
 David Cunningham, ‘Living the Questions: The Converging Worlds of Rowan Williams. Christian Century 119.2 (2002), 29.  
2
 It is this later version which I will reference in what is to follow. The lectures are dated 18 February – 11 March 1975. For more 
information on this, see Rupert Shortt, Rowan’s Rule: The Biography of the Archbishop (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2008), 
89-91.  
3
 The thesis was finished and passed in early 1975. The thesis was entitled ‘The Theology of Vladimir Nikoleivich Lossky: An 
Exposition and Critique’. Lossky was very influential on Williams’ appropriation of negative theology, a fact which one should 
not ignore as we come to his interpretation of the Four Quartets. In his interview with Todd Breyfogle (‘Time and 
Transformation: A Conversation with Rowan Williams’, Cross Currents (1995), 308), Williams has stated that it was ‘[Vladimir] 
Lossky who rubbed my nose in the whole idea of the theology of negation and what it did and didn't mean.’  It is also a well- 
known fact among interpreters of the Quartets that negative theology had an influence on Eliot’s composition. Figures like St. 
John of the Cross lie in the background.  
4
 I have been helped significantly in this section by Giles Waller, ‘Freedom, Fate and Sin in Donald MacKinnon’s Use of 
Tragedy’ in Christian Theology and Tragedy: Theologians, Tragic Literature and Tragic Theory (Great Britain: Ashgate, 2011), 
101-117.  
5
 For more on this period, see Shortt, Rowan’s Rule, 61-63 
6
 Breyfogle, ‘Time and Transformation’, 295. 
7
 MacKinnon, Borderlands of Theology and Other Essays (London: Lutterworth Press, 1968), 100.  
8
 Ibid., 50.  
9
 Ibid., 54. MacKinnon seems to have influenced Williams in a significant way on this point. Williams does not make this 
hermeneutical influence explicitly obvious in any writings that I am aware of, but one only has to compare MacKinnon’s essay 
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that MacKinnon’s interest in Greek tragedy stems – partly at least - from a hermeneutical concern to 
create a dialogue between the literary-tragic vision of the poets, and Christian theology. This is not the 
only reason, or even the main reason for MacKinnon’s insistence for a tragic theology, but it does 
provide a particular perspective on MacKinnon’s desire to promote tragedy as one ‘system of 
projection’
1
 (amongst others) which acts as ‘a means of representing the relations of the familiar to the 
transcendent…a form of representation that by the very ruthlessness of its interrogation enables us to 
project as does no available alternative, our ultimate questioning.’
2
 
It would be difficult to understand MacKinnon’s thought here if one did not situate him within the 
contexts of the philosophical debate between idealism and realism. MacKinnon published quite 
extensively on this topic, and it pervades the tenor of his entire theology.
3
 And it is within this debate 
that MacKinnon’s reflections on tragedy gain particular force. In terms of his own situation within the 
debate, MacKinnon comes down on the side of realism; and the main reason for him doing so is tied 
to his reflections on tragedy. It could be said that MacKinnon advocated a kind of ‘tragic realism’ in 
which the particularity of human suffering was taken seriously, and provided a way of dealing with the 
impasse between these two philosophical poles.
4
 For Mackinnon (as Ben Myers puts it), tragedy is 
‘morally and metaphysically irreducible’
5
 and thereby cannot be equated with a more idealistic 
approach in which the structures of the world are just a result of construction. For MacKinnon, tragedy 
opens a way out of the vicious circle of the realism-idealism debate. In his well-known Gifford 
Lectures
6
, MacKinnon sought to make use of the concept of tragedy as a way to overcome the 
traditional Kantian strictures on the limits of metaphysical knowledge since for MacKinnon, the reality 
of tragedy forces us to a decision: we either have to say that tragedy is a construction of the mind, 
and therefore trivial or revisable, or we have to acknowledge the particularly dignity of tragedy, 
thereby acknowledging its transcendent dimension, that is, something that cannot be constructed or 
reduced to the strictures of apperception. He writes that ‘we are constrained in pondering the 
extremities of human life to acknowledge the transcendent as the only alternative to the kind of 
trivialisation which would empty of significance the sorts of experience with which we have been 
concerned’
7
, namely suffering and the experience of tragedy. Such an experience acts as ‘a kind of 
ontological intrusion that makes such experience not simply a matter of wilful fantasy or even 
imaginative indulgence, but rather a response to what is there.’
8
 MacKinnon’s emphasis here on the 
                                                                                                                                                  
‘Borderlands of Theology’ and Williams article’ ‘The Judgement of the World’ (now collected in On Christian Theology) to see 
the obvious points of convergence.  
1
 For more on this, see MacKinnon, ‘The Problem of the System of Projection’ Appropriate to Christian Theological Statements’ 
[1969], in Explorations in Theology 5 (London: SCM Press, 1979), 70-89.  
2
 MacKinnon, The Problem of Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 136.  
3
 For a sample of some of his treatments of this theme, see MacKinnon, ‘Idealism and Realism: An Old Controversy Renewed’ 
[1976] and ‘ The Conflict between Realism and Idealism: Remarks on the Significance for the Philosophy of Religion of a 
Classical Philosophical Controversy recently renewed [1977] in Explorations in Theology 5, 138-150, 151-165. For more on the 
debate between realism and idealism in relation to MacKinnon’s theology, see Fergus Kerr, ‘Idealism and Realism: An Old 
Controversy Dissolved, in Kenneth Surin (ed.), Christ, Ethics and Tragedy: Essays in Honour of Donald MacKinnon 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), 15-33; Nicholas Lash, ‘Dissolved, Renewed, Remembered: MacKinnon and 
Metaphysics’. New Blackfriars 82.969 (2001), 486-498.  For a more recent in-depth treatment of MacKinnon’s thoughts on 
realism and idealism, see Paul D. Janz, God, the Mind’s Desire: Reference, Reason and Christian Thinking (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 80-101.  
4
 On this theme, see Benjamin Myers, Christ the Stranger: The Theology of Rowan Williams (London – New York: T & T Clark, 
2012), 21-27. 
5
 Ibid., 22 
6
 Published as The Problem of Metaphysics  
7
 Ibid. 145.  
8
 Ibid. 154.  
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tragic within human experience acts as counter-acting force towards any reductive naturalism in 
which human nature and the world were understood simply as biological and physical processes 
since such a procedure of investigation was unable to deal with the moral problem of suffering.  
In this light, MacKinnon was critical of any attempt (in even within scripture) of presenting ‘the 
catastrophic course of events as expressive of the working of a traceable providential order’ and 
rejected ‘the emergence of an apologetic style which seeks to make the intolerable bearable, even 
edifying, which seeks also to eliminate the unfathomable mystery by an attempt to move beyond 
tragedy.’
1
 Instead, MacKinnon suggested that Christianity might provide us with the faith ‘to hold 
steadfastly to the significance of the tragic’ whereby we can guard ourselves against ‘that sort of 
synthesis which seeks to obliterate by the vision of an all-embracing order the sharper discontinuity of 
human existence’
2
. Such a vision would refuse to be involved in ‘shrinking the tragic’
3
  to something 
less than it is. MacKinnon goes as far as to say that tragedy is ineradicable (even eschatologically) 
and that the problem of evil ultimately has no solution; he considers all theodicies to be an inadequate 
attempt to solve the problem of evil. As MacKinnon strongly puts it: ‘It is sometimes said by fools that 
Christianity offers a solution to the problem of evil. That is quite simply a lie, nor more, no less than 
sheer falsehood’.
4
 
The focus on suffering and the problem of evil, leads MacKinnon to an emphasis on the cross and 
the materiality of the history of Jesus, and its involvement in time. MacKinnon seeks to apply his 
understanding of tragedy to his Christology and his understanding of the Trinity: to be involved in 
time, as God does through Christ, implies that one is subject to ‘the sort of fragmentation of effort, the 
curtailment of design, the interruption of purpose, distraction of resolve that belongs to temporal 
experience.’
5
  It involves what MacKinnon has called an analogy of limits, specifically as it is applied 
to the incarnation of God in Christ, in a similar manner to the way we use the analogy of personality in 
relation to Christological and Trinitarian dogma.
6
 The limitation and materiality of incarnation implies 
that God works within the movements and vicissitudes of time; and this means that it is entwined with 
the tragic entailments that time involves. The dereliction of the cross, and its effective history
7
, 
disillusions us from the possibility that we shall find in this event ‘a metaphysically assailable solution 
of the problems set by the world’s existence, and allow ourselves to be measured by its rough, untidy, 
always concrete actuality’ whereby we are ‘alerted to refuse the solution of a humanly tidy dismissal 
                                               
1
 Ibid.,129.   
2
 Ibid.,135. 
3
 Mackinnon, ‘A Master in Israel: Hans Urs Von Balthasar’, in Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Engagement with God (London: SPCK, 
1975), 8. MacKinnon is using this phrase in reference to the theology of Balthasar 
4
Borderlands of Theology, 155, For an examination, and sympathetic critique of MacKinnon on this point, see Brian 
Hebblethwaite, ‘MacKinnon and the Problem of Evil’, in Christ, Ethics and Tragedy, 131-145. It should be said here that 
MacKinnon also rejects the privatio boni or steresis as a solution to the origin of evil. For MacKinnon, understanding evil as 
privation of the good cannot deal with the radical nature of evil; on this point, Williams would disagree with his teacher. For a 
pretty orthodox defense of the privatio boni that attempts to take into account this critique, see Williams, ‘Insubstantial Evil’, 
105-123.  
5
 MacKinnon, ‘The Relation of the Doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity’ in Richard McKinney (ed.), Creation, Christ and 
Culture: Studies in Honour of T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1976), 104.   
6
 Ibid.  
7
 MacKinnon has emphasized in several places throughout his writings that we cannot understand the cross apart from its 
effective history, and this means that the history of anti-Semitism in the Christian West – culminating in the Shoah – should be 
seen (from a tragic perspective) as part of its story. Cf. his comment (The Problem of Metaphysics, 130), where he says that 
‘[t]he events of the present century and in particular what happened in Germany between 1933 and 1945 rob any serious 
theologian of the remotest excuse for ignoring the tragic element in Christianity. It was in the long Christian centuries and by the 
styles of persistent Christian behaviour that the ground was prepared for the acceptance of the holocaust of the Jewish people’. 
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of life’s roughest edges.’
1
 Here we can see that for MacKinnon, creaturely entwinement with the 
reality of the tragic is something that remains a perpetual possibility for beings living within the time 
and finitude that created existence implies. Living within time implies limitation, and being subject to 
forces and dynamics which cannot be easily trammelled by human power and technology. For 
MacKinnon, such a reality applies even to God’s incarnating–act in Christ. Time involves us in limited 
options and possibilities, with some of those options being good and right; and yet, contingency 
constrains us, and it further renders us a creatures tied to our pasts, to a history that cannot be 
undone or obviated.
2
 
However, it should be said here that for all the emphasis that MacKinnon places on the reality of 
the tragic, and the intractable nature of evil, MacKinnon does not endorse a defeatist viewpoint. 
Speaking on the religious language used to promote an acceptance of suffering, MacKinnon says that 
‘The notion of acceptance is viciously ambiguous, and can be invoked in defence of attitudes to evil, 
both moral and physical alike, which very little reflection reveals as at once sterile and humanly 
unworthy, as indeed something suggesting that Christian faith has a kind of vested interest in human 
failure and disaster.’
3
 He has also protested against preachers and theologians who ‘fob off men and 
women crying out for a word of hope with an academically precise pessimism, which seems to glory 
less in the Cross than in the disintegration of human societies and in the coming of despair.’
4
 But he 
would continue to say that the reality of tragedy forces us to ‘renew our sense of the sheerly 
intractable in human life’
5
, and to focus our attention on the particularity of human suffering. Hope 
must distinguish itself from fantasy or mere wishful thinking. The strongly ethical aspects of tragedy, 
while providing a moral sensibility in relation to suffering, also provide us with the chastening 
experience of the limitation of hopeful action within creaturely time – a kind of ‘ethical version of 
negative theology’ to quote Ben Myers.
6
 To quote MacKinnon on this score: ‘Our morality is 
paradoxically something to which we are constrained and something from which we would be 
delivered…Christianity does not obliterate the complexity of human life, although it is often presented 
as doing so. Rather it presents a new context in which the complexity is seen; the problems are as 
before, but set in the context of Christ’s endurance they are transformed.’
7
  
At this point, it would be good to point out again how MacKinnon’s portrayal of the tragic avoids 
some of criticism lodged against him by David Bentley Hart
8
. I will not engage again in a full critique of 
Hart in relation to his view of tragic theology. As I have already said, Hart engages in an essentialising 
of tragedy, in which he argues that the ‘sacrificial logic’ inherent in the tragic perspective – particularly 
Greek tragedy – is not really liberatory at all but rather serves to maintain the socio-political status 
quo. When it comes to interpreting MacKinnon, Hart basically critiques MacKinnon for interpreting the 
gospel through the lens of Greek tragedy, thereby implicating him – in Hart’s opinion – in the ultimate 
ontological and political conservatism it entails. However, what one finds when one examines Hart’s 
                                               
1
 MacKinnon, ‘Absolute and Relative in History: A Theological Reflection on the Centenary of Lenin’s Birth [1971], in 
Explorations in Theology, 68.  
2
 For more on this, see MacKinnon, ‘Some Notes on the Irreversibility of Time [1975], in Explorations in Theology, 90-98.  
3
 MacKinnon, Borderlands of Theology, 53.  
4
 Ibid. 119.  
5
 MacKinnon, ‘Ethics and Tragedy’ [1971], in Explorations in Theology, 187.  
6
 Christ the Stranger, 26.  
7
 Borderlands of Theology, 151.  
8
 Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 273-294.  
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interpretation of MacKinnon is not really an attentive hermeneutical process but a variation on the so-
called genetic fallacy, a kind of ‘guilty by association’ interpretative method whereby the implications 
and trajectory of MacKinnon’s theology is equated with his essentialised view of tragedy. In other 
words, MacKinnon’s endorsing of tragic theology ultimately implies, in Hart’s opinion, that it be subject 
to the ‘sacrificial logic’ imbricated by tragedy – though he does not engage in an analysis of 
MacKinnon’s texts to prove that MacKinnon believed this (he says that ‘tragic theology’ ultimately 
implies such a view, even if it does not express it explicitly). Earlier on, we have argued against such 
a reductive viewpoint in which ‘tragic’ literature in general is reduced a simple and easily tractable 
dynamic and tendency.
1
 With this central criticism rendered questionable, the bulk of Hart’s criticism 
against MacKinnon is disarmed from a having a significant impact on MacKinnon’s main insights. One 
could, following Hart, criticise MacKinnon for focusing (in a traditionally Latin fashion) on Good Friday, 
upon the dereliction, kenosis, and suffering it implies, without paying the same amount of head 
towards the Easter vision and its radical implications. However, the same criticism could be reversed 
against Hart in regard to his minimalist reception of the theologia crucis – that is, his eclipsing of the 
cross in favour of the resurrection (possibly in line with his Orthodox commitments). In short, Hart 
criticisms of tragic theology could hold water only for certain forms of tragic theology, based upon 
particular renditions and scripts found in Greek sources, particularly understood. But if it can be 
shown that tragic theology should not be equated with these sources, then the question of the 
legitimacy of tragic theology still remains an open question.  
Returning to Williams, the remaining criticisms of Hart towards MacKinnon’s theology are further 
problematized, since we have here a person who was and is profoundly influenced by Orthodox 
theology. He has deeply engaged with Orthodox thought in many publications (including his Ph.D), 
and has interacted with key figures of Orthodox theology (Lossky, Bulgakov, Florovsky, Florensky, 
and many others) throughout his career.
2
 Furthermore, Hart’s concern with ‘ontologizing’ evil and 
violence is preserved within Williams’ theology who remains essentially a classical Augustinian (as we 
have already shown) in relation to the questions of steresis and the origins of evil, unlike MacKinnon 
who is equivocal on this point
3
.  
When we come to John Milbank’s critique of MacKinnon
4
, we get something more nuanced, and a 
criticism that is a little more difficult to address. Milbank’s basic problem with MacKinnon’s privileging 
                                               
1
 See chapter one above, but also cf. the compare the Eagleton, Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic (Oxford, Blackwell, 
2003), 1-22 for a criticisms of simplistic reductions which aim at the ‘essence’ of tragedy.  
2
 On this point, John de Gruchy has suggested to me that Rowan Williams might be privileging a certain trend of Orthodox 
thought over others due to his preference for the Dostoevskian vision, which emphasises pathos and existential anguish, rather 
than the more victorious language we find in other Orthodox figures. This is a tantalizing suggestion, thought I am not quite 
sure what to make of it. That Dostoevsky has made a lasting impression on Williams is beyond doubt (his book Dostoevsky: 
Language, Faith and Fiction testifies to this fact). Furthermore, as we will see when we examine his essay ‘The Spirit of the Age 
to Come’, Williams does attempt to blend a darker vision of human reality with an Orthodox theology of the Spirit. However, I 
have doubts that Williams’ choice for a certain trend of Orthodox theology over a more ‘triumphalist’ one can be reduced to 
personal taste.  As he revealed in his interview with Todd Breyfogle (‘Time and Transformation’, 306-307), it was largely 
through the influence of Nicholas Zernov and his doctoral supervisor Donald Allchin that he was introduced to Russian 
Orthodox thought, and it was at the instigation of Allchin that he even embarked upon a dissertation which had Lossky as its 
central focus.  
3
 Cf. MacKinnon, Explorations in Theology, 103.  
4
 Milbank, ‘’Between Purgation and Illumination’: A Critique of the Theology of Right’, in Surin (ed.), Christ, Tragedy and Ethics, 
161-196. This is essay is reprinted without any substantial changes in Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, 
Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 7-35. The only difference I could find was in his discussion of MacKinnon’s dependence on 
Aristotle (cf.  Christ, Tragedy and Ethics, 176 and The Word Made Strange, 20). It seems that (by comparing these quotes) 
Milbank has grown more critical of Aristotle as his theology has matured (hence the deletion of ‘non-dialectical’ from his earlier 
quote). It should be said here that Milbank is not only focused on MacKinnon in this essay; he aims to counter-act the entire 
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of the tragic in relation to theology and ethics is that tragedy behaves in MacKinnon’s theology in a 
similar way to the Kantian ethical sublime (as mediated through the tradition of Butler). For Milbank, 
MacKinnon’s focus on ‘tragic indecision…occasions a kind of exit from the narrative instead of 
remaining in the plot and seeking for resolutions. One’s suspicion here is that it is not that MacKinnon 
simply discovers history to be tragic, but that he emplots history within a privileged tragic framework.’ 
The kernel of Milbank’s argument here is that MacKinnon’s take of tragedy is not historical enough, 
since it seeks to place tragedy within a presupposed tragic schema that is unable to deal with the 
complexity of actual history, what one could call the histoire totale (though Milbank does not use that 
term here). From Milbank’s perspective, MacKinnon’s understanding of the tragic undermines the fact 
we are ethically constructed within the context of narrative and stories, since (in Milbank’s opinion) it 
take us to the edge of those stories into a more ‘neutral’ realm in which the vicissitudes of narrative do 
not impinge themselves. Such ‘a piety of the tragic’ actually undermines tragedy by making it 
ultimately a ‘speculative’ affair
1
 rather than something that is engaged with real stories and constituted 
by a multitude of complex and historical relationships. Milbank argues that MacKinnon converts tragic 
into something like the categorical imperative whereby ‘it is only in tragic perplexity that we know we 
are free, and at the same time are brought up against the very margins of the humanly responsible 
world. When we do not any longer know how to act, then we discover ourselves as transcendent 
subjects standing ‘above’ our usual narratively instantiated characters. But this has to be read as an 
extremely subtle vision of the aesthetics of the sublime, of the liberal discourse of modernity.’
2
 
Essentially, Milbank is critiquing MacKinnon’s view of tragedy as being one more example of the 
modernist subterfuge to extract ethics from the context of narrative and particularity (hereby echoing 
the arguments of Hauerwas and other postliberal theologians). Milbank is arguing that MacKinnon’s 
view of the tragedy contributes to the modernist tendency to escape the world of public and rhetorical 
engagement, thereby reaffirming the liberalism’s social imagination in which ‘the public sphere of 
objective, and strictly equivalent justice’ is set in opposition to ‘the private sphere of forgiving 
cancellation of fault’.
3
 Furthermore, Milbank critiques MacKinnon’s rejection of the steresis, and states 
it is ‘legitimate to ask whether the ultimate Christian perspective may not be one of tragic-comic irony 
rather than unappeased tragedy – that is to say in retrospect it may become possible to determine our 
                                                                                                                                                  
Kantian tradition within theology, through his particular (some would even say idiosyncratic) reading of Aquinas. For a critical 
discussion of Milbank’s interpretation of Aquinas in this essay, see Paul J. DeHart, Aquinas and Radical Orthodoxy: A Critical 
Inquiry (New York-London: Routledge, 2011), 37-48.  
1
 Being Reconciled, 156. It should be mentioned here that Milbank here particularly alluding to the philosophical tradition of 
German Idealism (Kant, Schelling, Fichte, Hegel, etc.), a movement on which he has pronounced some serious skepticism. 
The relevance of this for Milbank’s critique of MacKinnon is that while MacKinnon’s metaphysical interest in tragedy supposedly 
— according to Milbank — aims a thoroughly realist recovery of metaphysical language (since ‘tragedy’ can only be understood 
as ‘tragedy’ against a ‘transcendent’ backdrop), his participation ‘the cult of tragedy’ (like many other Idealist thinkers) leads to 
a furthering of the idealist cause (though Milbank does not spell out exactly what he is implying by this accusation within the 
context of this quotation). There are several prima facie problems with this generalization, of which I will mention two. Firstly, 
since MacKinnon’s metaphysical interest in tragedy is concerned (as Paul Janz has argued) with the problem of real ‘reference’ 
within philosophical discourse, we can distance him from the Kantian exclusion of metaphysics within the realm of pure reason, 
and therefore from the trajectory of Kantian idealism. Secondly, when Milbank speaks about Idealism, one gets the impression 
that he is making very sweeping judgements about the movement as a whole, without attending to the particularities of the 
arguments and the differences between different idealist thinkers, as can be seen, for example, in the difference between Hegel 
and Schelling on the question of tragedy, or in relation to Hölderlin’s rejection of Fichte’s theory of ‘the Absolute I’ in which there 
is no ‘outside’ or ‘object’ (‘Gegenstand’). For more on this, see Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy: From Plato to Žižek, 71-73; 
95-168. For more on Hegel and tragedy, see Migel de Beistegui, ‘Hegel: or the Tragedy of Thinking’, in Migel de Beistegu and 
Simon Sparks (eds.), Philosophy and Tragedy (London: Routledge, 2000), 10-36. For an excellent discussion of Hölderlin, see 
Jean-François Courtine, ‘Tragic Metaphor’, Philosophy and Tragedy, 57-75.  
2
’Between Purgation and Illumination’: A Critique of the Theology of Right’, 178.  
3
 Ibid. 179.  
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failure to attain the Aristotelian mean, or else we may be able to trace these sorts of ‘perverse 
upshots’ of apparently desirable action, to a lack of integration in our society, the lack of a sufficiently 
encompassing social imagination’.
1
 What Milbank is saying here is that in order for us to make sense 
of tragedy we have to reject a view that privileges tragedy as a backdrop for a robust narrating of the 
Christian story.
2
 Furthermore, we should not look for a resolution to the problem that tragedy 
proposes by retreating from continued engagement with history and social interaction with talk of 
‘limits’, ‘the transcendence of the tragic’, or whatever disengages us from the continuing story. We 
should not consider tragedy to be some fundamental background to all our historical dealings, but 
merely as ‘perverse upshots’ due to our lack, in thought and practice, of an embracing social vision.  
For Milbank, evil (and tragedy) is always the result of some ‘lack’, ‘some sort of symbolic distortion, 
some sort of imperfect vision’, that which is ‘ontological predatory’ on created being. He writes that ‘if 
evil is not a surd element outside the world-text which human beings write, then within this narrative it 
can be constantly re-enacted, re-presented, shown up as mere subjectivity, and so contained’.
3
 
Milbank further argues that if evil is not privative on being, and remains a perpetual part of the story 
indefinitely within ‘the context of providence as kenotic suffering’, as a continuing ‘limit’ within which 
we have to orientate ourselves, then ‘kenotic theology itself…may become a new mode of consolation 
or theodicy’ because one is simply resigned to its continued existence in the world.
4
 Like Hart, 
Milbank is arguing that the tragic vision resigns itself to the way things are, and does not seek to 
change them; socially speaking, it is inherently Luddite.   
However, what makes Milbank’s treatment so nuanced is that he does give space for the reality of 
the tragic to impinge on theological and ethical reflection.
5
 Referencing the work of Stanley Hauerwas, 
and his resolute commitment to pacifism in relation to complex political realities (like South Africa) 
Milbank wonders whether the Church can be ‘…robbed of certain possibilities of realizing certain 
practices that should define its nature…Here peaceableness may be precisely not exercising other 
Christian virtues such a s justice, or even comfort and support of others. In this sort of situation does 
one not have to say that our action is in a way alienated from itself, such that we cannot evade tragic 
choices, none of which seems perfectly to instantiate integrated ‘practices’.
6
 From this, we can see 
that while Milbank rejects the attempt to emplot the Christian narrative within a preconceived context 
of tragedy, he is more open to using tragedy within the context of theological reflection. From this, it 
can be seen that Milbank has an astute and particularly nuanced critique of MacKinnon and ‘tragic 
theology’ that requires a response. 
                                               
1
 Ibid.  
2
 One could actually go further here and say that for Milbank there is no ‘backdrop’ for the Christian story since the Christian 
mythos is self-grounding, without any ‘foundational’ referent. It is groundless (like many other beliefs and philosophies), but it 
shows its superiority through a rhetorical overthrow of contemporary nihilism by narrating a better and more beautiful narrative 
of the world, gesturing towards a truth which shows itself via narrative, allusion and mythos rather than through purely linear 
argumentation. For Milbank’s reflection on this, see Milbank, ‘The Invocation of Clio: A Response’, 3-13; 41-42.  
3
 Ibid. 179-180.  
4
 Ibid. 180-181.  
5
 For more on Milbank and tragic theology, see David Toole, Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo, 53-87.  
6
 Ibid. 191.  
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 I will not comment on Milbank’s interpretation of the Kantian tradition
1
 as it impinges on his 
interpretation of MacKinnon and tragedy
2
 (others like Paul Janz have seriously questioned the 
Strawsonian reading which Milbank subscribes to
3
). But I will make some remarks here to point to 
some problems with Milbank’s critique of MacKinnon. My critique will basically take the following form: 
(1) MacKinnon should not be interpreted as advocating a general tragic, de-historicized ‘worldview’ 
but rather someone who sought to emphasise the particularity of human stories of suffering. 
Furthermore (2), it could be argued that Milbank himself (because of this suspicion of any social 
theory and his emphasis on self-referring narratives) obscures the proper histoire totale
4
 into which 
the story of the church is to be understood. By doing this, his narrative of the church becomes 
‘idealized’ and is unable to account for the way the church learns its language from its encounters 
(and mistakes) in relation with the world, and also how the Church itself has contributed extensively 
towards human suffering and ‘tragedy’. And (3), while we do need to take account of how tragedy is 
understood in its wider historical context, and allow for the possibility of resolution in some cases, it 
just seems difficult for such an insight to be applied in every case. Some stories just continue to resist 
such resolution. I will unpack these criticisms a bit further.  
Firstly, when Milbank says that MacKinnon does not read off tragedy from history and particularity, 
but rather places them within a presupposed tragic framework, he does not engage with any specific 
texts to prove his point, but simply makes his suspicion known that he thinks that this is actually the 
case (based on MacKinnon’s Kantian-Butlerian heritage). One could just as well assert (through a 
reading of MacKinnon’s texts) that MacKinnon was doing exactly the opposite, namely that he 
perceived the particularity of suffering to such a degree that this forced him to ‘reject any narrating of 
history which overcame or harmonized suffering and pain into a presupposed teleological framework. 
As we know from MacKinnon himself, he rejected any generalized or ‘melodramatic invocation’ of ‘the 
tragic sense of life’ especially when it came to difficult ethical issues (like nuclear armament).
5
 
Nicholas Lash, in his inaugural lecture as the Norris-Hulse professor at Cambridge (a position which 
we took over from MacKinnon himself), remarked that as a student of MacKinnon
6
 he had he had 
learned from him to embrace a ‘passionate preoccupation with the significance of the particular’ which 
counteracted against ‘the evasiveness of facile generalisation’.
7
 This personal testimony of Lash 
points against a conclusion that MacKinnon was (generally speaking) one who engaged in 
                                               
1
 While Milbank tries to critically place MacKinnon within the trajectory of Kantian transcendentalism, he does not emphasise in 
this essay the way in which MacKinnon’s use of tragedy occurs within a context in which MacKinnon is precisely trying to move 
beyond the strictures of Kantian reason, with hope of returning to a rational discussion of metaphysics.  
2
 It should be mentioned here, in passing, that Julian Young (in The Philosophy of Tragedy: From Plato to Zizek, 263ff.) has 
argued that we have two philosophical traditions within modernity regarding tragedy: the ‘Kantian’ tradition of the sublime 
(Höderlin, Schopenhauer, Wagner, Nietzsche, Camus etc), and the ‘Hegelian’ tradition of ethical conflict (Hegel, Kierkegaard, 
Schmitt, Miller, Žižek, etc.). The first is associated with confronting one with the limitations and finitude of human existence, 
opening up thereby into reflections or experiences of ‘the sublime’ (most specifically in the realm of music, as can be seen in 
Wagner). The second tradition is concerned with the problems of limitation as well, but focuses more upon the moral dilemmas 
that are placed upon tragic figures. Obviously, these two traditions are not irreconcilable, but they are distinct. In this regard, 
Milbank’s critique of MacKinnon would seem to be directed at what he deems to be the overly ‘Kantian’ contours of 
MacKinnon’s thinking regarding tragedy (though Milbank would probably have problems with the Hegelian tradition as well). For 
the sake of this thesis, I do not think placing Williams within any particular tradition is helpful, since he is influenced by 
MacKinnon’s ‘Kantian’ tendencies, as well as Hegel’s more ethical focus (as can be seen in ‘The Spirit of the Age to Come’, to 
be discussed shortly), as mediated (in more recent times) through the work of Gillian Rose.  
3
 Janz, God, the Mind’s Desire, 123-167.  
4
 For Milbank’s thoughts on historicism more generally, see Milbank, ‘The Invocation of Clio’, 3-45.  
5
 Borderlands of Theology, 186.  
6
 He had studied with and worked with MacKinnon for about ten years at this point in time (1978).   
7
 Nicholas Lash, Theology on Dover Beach (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1979), 4.  
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subordinating the particular to any generalization.
1
 Williams himself (in his obituary for MacKinnon) 
made the same observation, particularly in relation to the problem of evil and tragedy.
2
 Now it 
obviously still is possible that on the issue of tragedy MacKinnon might have undermined 
(unknowingly) his usual modus operandi and proceeded by a method which went against his usual 
method of investigation. However, such an assertion is difficult to prove, and one could just as easily 
come to a different conclusion – like Williams himself does in his own contribution to the Festschrift for 
MacKinnon.
3
  
Secondly, on this score, one could also critique Milbank himself as engaging in sweeping historical 
and theological claims which undermine a resolute attention to the particularities of history (the 
histoire totale)
4
, thereby reversing the critique aimed at MacKinnon back onto Milbank. One could 
argue that Milbank’s own ecclesiology lacks an attentiveness to historical complexity and constitution, 
especially when it comes to acknowledging the various social forces that formed the church from the 
outside, as well as modes of learning that constituted its history in which the church, to echo the 
phrase of Michael Ramsey, has attempted to learn and re-learn ‘in humiliation’
5
. Christopher Brittain 
                                               
1
 This is also confirmed by MacKinnon’s friend, George Steiner. For his comments on MacKinnon’s strongly historical and 
materialist sensibilities (implicated in his fascination with Leninism), see George Steiner, ‘Tribute to Donald MacKinnon’. 
Theology 98.781 (1995), 2.  
2
 ‘Like many, I heard him first at length on the problem of evil; and his Cambridge lectures on this were a paradigm of his style. 
You might start thinking that here was an issue needing a solution, the kind of solution that a really first-class brain ought to be 
able to come up with (this is still how a fairish percentage of writers in the English-speaking world seem to approach it). After 30 
minutes, you were devastatingly aware that you needed to become more, not less, worried by evil as a theologian; that most 
available "solutions" were sophisticated ways of helping you to be untruthful about the reality of suffering; and that if the 
Christian vision had anything to contribute, it might be, not a consolatory word, but a recognition that tragedy was built in to a 
contingent world. Not even Jesus' choices could be unshadowed: the triumph of the cross is the shipwreck of Judas and the 
beginning of the pathologies of anti-Semitism. Donald would not allow you to evade the particular, and his hostility to grand 
schemes that "answered" the problem of evil was much to do with this. What might have been a maddeningly anecdotal style of 
exposition was really, if you were patient enough to wait, an insistence that what you said theologically had to have something 
to do with specific pains and horrors’, from Rowan Williams, ‘Obituary: Donald MacKinnon’. The Tablet (March 12, 1994), 31.  
3
 Williams, ‘Trinity and Ontology’, in Christ, Tragedy and Ethics, 71-92. This essay is now included in On Christian Theology, 
148-166.  
4
 This is a critique that David Ford makes in his review of Radical Orthodoxy as a movement. On this, see Ford, ‘Radical 
Orthodoxy and the Future of British Theology’. Scottish Journal of Theology 53.4 (2001), 385-404. A similar critique is made by 
Jeffrey Stout in Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 100-107, whereby he argues that some 
of the historical figures Milbank recommends as proposing resources for a ‘anti-modern’ political practice are abstracted from 
their context. 
 It could also be mentioned here that John Milbank’s sweeping historical genealogies owe something to Heideggerian 
methodology in relation to his practice of charting the history of philosophy’s reception of Being. On this, see Paul J. DeHart, 
Aquinas and Radical Orthodoxy: A Critical Inquiry 1-14. Furthermore, one could also quote here the statement of Gillian Rose 
when she says that ‘From Marx to Heidegger (and before and beyond), it has become de rigueur to charge your predecessor 
with adherence to 'metaphysics', and to claim .your 'new method' to be, exclusively and exhaustively, the overcoming of the 
tradition. Ethical integrity is reclaimed by each new generation who must murder their intellectual fathers in order to obtain the 
licence to practise the profession that they learnt from them’, in Rose, Mourning Becomes Law: Philosophy and Representation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1.  
One could actually say that Milbank (and others within the Radical Orthodoxy movement) have a tendency to engage in what 
Slavoj Žižek has called ‘negative totalization’ (see his interview with the New Statesmen, available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hvWkWYHmMxg, Accessed 3/25/ 2014). Within continental philosophy, practitioners of 
‘negative totalization’ aim to retroactively characterise the philosophy that lead up to this moment under a certain ‘critical’ or 
‘negative’ rubric in which the history of philosophy is understood in a totalized manner, for example under the category 
‘metaphysics’ (Heidegger) or ‘the metaphysics or presence’ (Derrida). For Milbank, such a category would be ‘nihilism’. The 
problem with such sweeping genealogies is that you can elide particularities and make history (more or less) to say what you 
want it say. In this regard, it might be beneficial to remember (apropos Milbank and his account secularisation and nihilism) of 
the advice of Hans Blumenberg when he said in The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 1983), 119, 117 that ‘Not only does the secularization thesis explain the modern age; it explains it as the wrong 
turning for which the thesis itself is able to prescribe the corrective…‘the kind of 'cultural criticism' derivable from the concept of 
secularization, which hands out "guilty" verdicts in its search for the most distant possible object to which to attach responsibility 
for a feeling of discontent with the present, that ought to be called to account for irresponsibility in relation to the burdens of 
proof associated with what it presupposes.’ I owe this reference to Paul DeHart.  
5
 For a discussion of this, see Williams, ‘Michael Ramsey (1904-1988): Theology and the Churches’, in Anglican Identities, 87-
102. It could be said generally that one lacks a sense of the ‘kenotic structure’ of the church within Milbank’s ecclesiology. 
There is a tendency towards a triumphalistic tone of speech regarding, on which several people have made comment, alluding 
to the paradox that ‘the ontology of peace’ is articulated within the context of ‘rhetorical violence’. For this, see Kevin W. Hector, 
“Ontological Violence and the Covenant of Grace: An Engagement between Karl Barth and Radical Orthodoxy,” in Bruce L. 
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has critiqued Milbank (and Hauerwas)
1
 on this score by saying that their respective ecclesiologies are 
‘eschatologically over-determined’, in the sense that that church is constructed according to a 
‘nonfoundationalist’ story that reflects little of the ‘external’ and complex social forces that formed and 
are forming to the church. Furthermore, Milbank seems to whitewash the church’s history, focusing on 
the proposed ‘peaceful’ narrative the church has to offer, rather than the actual history of the church’s 
entwinement with tragedy and its contribution to the suffering of others (e.g. the Crusades, the 
Inquisition, anti-Semitism, colonialism, androcentricism, homophobia).
2
 Such a critique is echoed by 
Sarah Coakley as well.
3
 Reading Milbank’s reflections on ecclesiology, one does not catch a strong 
sense of how the church has learned its language through failure, mistakes and missteps.
4
 Instead, 
one is presented with an ‘idealized metanarrative’ of the church, separated from the complexity of the 
story of the church, including its tragic entanglements, as Rowan Williams in his critique of Milbank 
and ‘postliberal’ theology has said.
5
 Elsewhere, Williams has also said that, ‘My reservation about 
Radical Orthodoxy, and my continuing, slight and amicable disagreement, concerns the tragic. 
Granted that violence isn't primary, it might still be going a bit too far and too fast to say that the 
church within history achieves the peace it speaks of. Some of the rhetoric of Radical Orthodoxy just 
seems to come a bit too fast; I think it's important to emphasize that the brokenness, the 
woundedness of the Christian body in history, at every level, just doesn't go away.’
6
 
 Nicholas Lash also considers Milbank’s theology to have a ‘theocratic tendency’, regarding 
particularly his understanding of the relation between theology, metaphysics and philosophy, whereby 
theology as a discipline (as the queen of the sciences) is seen to absorb other disciplines within its 
particular story.
7
 Even Stanley Hauerwas in his own response to Milbank’s essay on MacKinnon 
                                                                                                                                                  
McCormack and Clifford B.Anderson (ed.),  Karl Barth and American Evangelicalism, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 323–
46. 
1
 It should be mentioned here that while the mutual projects of Hauerwas and Milbank are very similar in some areas (e.g. the 
emphasis on narrative, a strong critique of liberalism, etc.) they are very different in other areas (e.g. questions of non-violence 
and pacifism). Hauerwas himself has said that the difference between Milbank and himself is that while Milbank wants 
‘Christians to win’, Hauerwas wants ‘Christians to endure’. For this quote, see Stanley Hauerwas, Performing the Faith: 
Bonhoeffer and the Practice of Nonviolence (London: SPCK, 2004), 217n.4.  
2
 Christopher Craig Brittain, ‘Against Eschatological Over-Determination’, in Christopher Craig Brittain and Francesca Aran 
Murphy (eds.),Theology, University, Humanities: Initium Sapientiae Timor Domini (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2011), 150-172. 
William Meyer has also argued that because of Milbank’s Platonic tendencies, and his preference for an ontology of peace over 
and ontology of conflict, this makes it difficult for him to understand history as precisely something that develops in conflict and 
tragic limitation; here the story of the church is understood to be ‘static’ rather than ‘dynamic’. For this critique, see Wi lliam J. 
Meyer, Metaphysics and he Future of Theology. Princeton Theological Monograph Series 126 (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2010), 
467-471.  
3
Speaking in regard to Milbank’s rejection of the Enlightenment project and its social sciences, Coakley writes (Coakley, God, 
Sexuality, and the Self, 73-74) that ‘the danger of this…theological alternative…is that it invites a nostalgia trip to another, pre-
modern age which simultaneously decries the entire Enlightenment programme (forgetting the blood that was spilt to achieve it, 
and the profound political achievements it garnered). Moreover, in rejecting at the same time the whole project of sociology of 
religion…it again undercuts the possibility of receiving complicating and embarrassing reports from the ecclesiastical trenches. 
Not least is this worrying where abuses to women and the underprivileged are concerned, especially given the stringently 
critical assault that this type of theology simultaneously makes on ‘liberation theology’ as yet another ‘modern’ option.’   
4
 In fact (if I am allowed to be a little pugnacious myself), one feels that for Milbank the worst thing that happened ever 
happened to the church was Ockham and Scotus when the church suffered the fate that univocalism, nominalism, and 
(thereafter) Kantianism brought upon it, with the more ostensible failures like the Crusades and anti-Semitism being cast aside, 
and sometimes almost justified (in the case of the Crusades) as can be seen in his reflections on violence in chapter 2 of Being 
Reconciled.  
5
 Williams, ‘Saving Time: Thoughts on Practice, Patience and Vision’. New Blackfriars 73.861, 319-326; Williams, ‘The 
Judgement of the World’, 29-43. For Milbank’s response to Williams, in regard to the tragic, see Milbank, ‘Enclaves, or Where is 
the Church?’.  New Blackfriars 73 (1992), 348-352.  
6
 Cunningham, ‘Living the Questions’, 24. One possible reason for this tendency in Milbank’s thought (as Christoph Schwöbel 
suggested to me, in private conversation) probably lies in his penchant for a revival of Neoplatonic ontology as the only serious 
alternative to an ontology of violence. Within such a schema, all dissonance is ultimately cancelled, and absorbed into the sea 
of divine esse, in which all reality ultimately analogically participates.   
7
 Nicholas Lash, ‘Where Does Holy Teaching Leave Philosophy? Comments on Milbank’s Aquinas’. Modern Theology 15.4 
(1999), 333-344. However, it seems that Milbank has taken some of these criticisms to heart, and has clarified his assertions a 
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argued that in relation to the church and the world, we are not ultimately dealing with one story, but at 
the minimum two. In Hauerwas’ opinion, the church’s own self-narration cannot absorb the story of 
the world.
1
 Now, Milbank would probably contest this claim by saying that he is not attempting to 
absorb the story of the world into the Church, but that he is aiming for something more modest 
(though no less pugnacious and combative), namely a rhetorical overthrow of the contemporary 
narrative of liberalism and post-Nietzschean nihilism through a more beautiful vision of the Christian 
narrative of peace.
2
 However, in practice, one could argue that Milbank moves beyond such 
epistemological modesty and advocates something more totalizing, and that in practice his theology 
cannot evade violent dynamics, in which ontological violence is rejected in favour of accepting 
epistemological violence and coercion.
3
 One could argue that Milbank’s ecclesiology is simply another 
rendition of the Lindbeckian ‘postliberal’
4
 attempt to absorb the world into the Christian text For 
Milbank ‘only Christian theology now offers a discourse able to position and overcome nihilism itself. 
This is why it is so important to reassert theology as a master discourse; theology, alone, remains the 
discourse of non-mastery.’
5
 
On this score, it is interesting to contrast Rowan Williams
6
 in regard to his seminal essay ‘The 
Judgement of the World’. In this essay, he critiqued the totalizing attempt to restrict the possibility of 
the world itself passing criticism and judgement on this church, particularly as this witness of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
little in this regard. It would seem that Milbank now does not affirm any simplistic ‘superiority’ of theology over philosophy, but 
rather that philosophy should always be practiced in the ambience of theology. For more on this, John Milbank, Beyond Secular 
Order: The Representation of Being and the Representation of the People, 19-28. However, his political sentiments (as 
adumbrated in Beyond Secular Order) do still seem to have ‘theocratic’ overtones, since for Milbank, the ideal political 
arrangement would be an international commonwealth, in which the Pope and a constitutional monarchy would hold sway (with 
the monarch subordinate to the priest). How such an arrangement would work is not enunciated, but it would be obviously 
entail a ‘Eurocentric’ political order (since it is only within Europe that such a Christian monarchy could have any historical 
basis).   
1
 Hauerwas, ‘On Being ‘Placed’ by John Milbank: A Response’, in Christ, Tragedy and Ethics, 197-201. It should be said here 
that by bringing Hauerwas into the conversation here with Milbank that I necessarily endorse Hauerwas’ dualistic language 
between the church and the world, or that ultimately Milbank or Hauerwas are radically different in relation to their respective 
ecclesiologies. Obviously, Hauerwas’ espousal of pacifism is more radical than Milbank. But it could be argued that Hauerwas 
with his endorsement of the Church defined over against neo-liberalism endorses a similar dualism to what we find in Milbank’s 
schema of Christianity versus secular reason. For a critique of Hauerwas on this point, see Nathan R. Kerr, Christ, History and 
Apocalyptic: The Politics of Christian Mission (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2009), 93-126. For a critique in turn of Kerr’s 
interpretation of Hauerwas, see Daniel Colucciello Barber, ‘Ideology and Apocalyptic’. Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 
10.2 (2010), 167-172.  
2
 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (2
nd
 ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 2006). For a critique of Milbank’s 
preference for ‘rhetoric’ over ‘rationalism’, see Myer, Metaphysics and the Future of Theology, 471-481. Myer argues that there 
is no rhetorical persuasion without some rational deliberation that cannot simply be reduced to or internalized within the 
Christian mythos (as Milbank constructs it) since to do so either results in arbitrary voluntarism or in a kind of surrender of 
freedom that is indistinguishable from a blind obedience to ecclesial authority.  
3
 Tom Jacobs, ‘The Problem of Postmodern (Theological) Epistemology, or the Temptation of a Narrative Ontotheology, in M. 
Lamberights, L. Boeve, and T. Merrigan (eds.), Theology and the Quest for Truth: Historical-and Systematic Theological 
Studies (Leuven: Leuven – Peeters, 2006), 61-75. William Myer argues that – ontologically speaking – Milbank’s preference for 
the One over the Many leads to his endorsement of ecclesiastical coercion; see Myer, Metaphysics and the Future of Theology, 
475-481 for more on this.  
4
 I place postliberal is quotation marks because I am aware that there is no unified postliberal programme, as has been shown 
by Paul DeHart in his excellent book, The Trial of the Witnesses: The Rise and Decline of Postliberal Theology (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2006).  
5
 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 6.  
6
 Rowan Williams is sometimes referred to as the father of Radical Orthodoxy because of his close engagement with many of 
the leading figures of the movement (John Milbank, Graham Ward, etc.). In an interview with Rupert Shorrt, he stated that he 
has expressed some of his reservations about the movement as a whole, but that basically, he thinks it is on ‘the right lines’ (in 
Shortt, God’s Advocates: Christian Thinkers in Conversation (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2005), 18). However, such 
a statement can be misleading if it is taken to imply that Williams should be included simplistically within the trajectory of 
Radical Orthodoxy. One only has to take into account Williams’ criticisms of Milbank’s work, his deep appreciation of Hegel as 
a positive theological resource, his rejection of ‘intratexuality’ and his concomitant plea for an ecclesial openness to judgement 
stemming from so-called ‘secular’ readers of Christianity to see that we have a distinct trajectory in Williams’ work. However, it 
is admitted that Milbank’s theological vision cannot be equated with Radical Orthodox vision tout court; one only has to 
compare the respective work of Milbank and Ward to see that there are some noticeable differences.  
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church is refracted back to her in the effective histories it produces.
1
 Even regarding Christology, he 
has said that ‘the meaning of Jesus is not the container of all other meanings but their test, judgement 
and catalyst. Jesus does not have to mean everything; his ‘universal significance’ is a universally 
critical question rather than a comprehensive ontological schema…A finished account of Christ as 
containing all meanings would make Christology non-eschatological’.
2
 Such an approach has 
similarities to MacKinnon’s own ‘philosophical pluralism’
3
, particularly as it related to his concept of 
‘borderlands’ and what he has called ‘same-level criticism’ in relation to the interplay between 
theology, philosophy, and literature.
4
 Milbank’s procedure to absorb the multiplicity of stories (or 
philosophy in general) into the story of the church can be seen – as Tom Jacobs has put it – as kind 
of ‘narrative ontotheology’ in which it becomes difficult to avoid ‘violence’ or agonistic dynamics of 
some kind.
5
 Furthermore, one could argue (potentially) that since Milbank subordinates philosophy 
and rationality to theology in a radicalized manner (at least in some of his writings) it is difficult to 
avoid the charge ultimately his theology (or his theological practice) is anti-philosophical and anti-
rationalistic
6
, thought this claim is debatable.
7
 And if Milbank’s plea for an oppositional dynamic 
between ‘secular’ nihilism and theology, and his radical and totalizing either/or is to be taken 
seriously, then it is difficult to avoid a kind apocalyptic dualism between the church and world
8
, and 
thereby (at least in Milbank’s construal) world of conflict, violence, and coercion – even if this is done 
in the name of an ultimate peaceability.
9
 However, if we are to assert a stronger relation between 
nature and grace (like Milbank and Radical Orthodoxy, have done), then how can be so certain and 
strenuous in our rejection of secular political institutions, sociology and liberalism? Even though they 
participate in the sinful order of things, are they excluded from grace and redeeming potential?
10
 
Thirdly, while Milbank’s plea for continuing with the story and its narrative outwork ings (despite its 
tragic inflections) should be given its due, it seems difficult to deny that there are some stories that 
just continue to resist closure of such a kind. Certainly, it will be admitted that some tragic 
                                               
1
 Williams, ‘The Judgement of the World’, in On Christian Theology, 29-43.  
2
 Williams, ‘The Finality of Christ’, On Christian Theology, 94. It is precisely this drive towards an eschatological universality that 
makes Williams’ brand of Anglo-Catholic ecclesiology more self-critical, while at the same time maintaining the strongly 
sacramental understanding of the Church’s witness to Christ and the gospel. For more on this, see Williams, ‘The Nature of 
Sacrament’ and ‘Sacraments of the New Society’, in On Christian Theology, 197-208; 209-221. A more detailed (and amicably 
critical) analysis of Williams’ ecclesiology can be found in Theo Hobson, Anarchy, Church and Utopia: Rowan Williams on 
Church (London: Darton, Longman & Todd Ltd., 2005).  
3
 I have taken this term from Giles Waller’s essay on MacKinnon, referenced above.  
4
 MacKinnon, Borderlands of Theology¸ 41-54.  
5
 Tom Jacobs, ‘The Problem of Postmodern (Theological) Epistemology’.  
6
 Paul D. Janz, ‘Radical Orthodoxy and the New Culture of Obscurantism’. Modern Theology 20.3 (2004), 363-405; Myer, 
Metaphysics and the Future of Theology, 450-455.  A further criticism which could be lodged at Milbank is his interpretation of 
Kant’s philosophy. This is a point that has been vigorously and thoroughly argued by figures like Janz. One of Milbank’s chief 
criticisms of MacKinnon is his more positive appropriation of Kant’s transcendental approach to philosophy , with its supposed 
ideal of achieving ‘pure objectivity’, a dogmatic rationalism in which the claims of reason are separated from the realms of 
sense, experience, and historical contingency. This seems to underlie Milbank’s criticism of MacKinnon’s ‘Kantian’ deployment 
of the experience of the tragic as a transcendental sublime that removes the ethical subject from a continued engagement with 
the story and narrative of the Christian telos. However, Janz argues that Milbank fundamentally misinterprets Kant (making 
Kant say virtually the opposite of what he does actually says). Janz argues that Kant’s critique of pure reason was precisely an 
attempt to articulate the limits of reason, and furthermore that Kant did not aim to separate sensibility and understanding, but 
attempted to hold them together. 
7
 Cf. ‘The Invocation of Clio’, 41-42; John Milbank, ‘The Mystery of Reason’, in Peter M. Candler Jr. and Conor Cunningham 
(eds.), The Grandeur of Reason: Religion, Tradition and Universalism (London: SCM Press, 2010), 68-117.  
8
 Cf. Jeffery Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 107-117. I probably would not go as far as Stout in claiming that Milbank’s 
theology implies an ‘enclave’ mind-set. However, one could be forgiven for coming to such a conclusion since Milbank’s 
invective against liberal democracy sometimes does have such an ‘apocalyptic’ tinge to it.   
9
 On this, see Milbank’s provocative (even idiosyncratic) reflections on violence in Being Reconciled, 26-43.  
10
 For a discussion on Milbank (and Hauerwas) in regard to these matters, in which the inconsistency of Milbank’s approach is 
made apparent, see Eric Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of Democratic Citizenship (Chicago-
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 125-148.  
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occurrences within the lives of people can be resolved within the continuing of their life-story – even 
suffering of a particular acute kind (e.g. the death of a child, a terminal illness, etc.). It will also be 
admitted that we should not appeal to a generalised or abstract theory of ‘the tragic’ or ‘necessity’ as 
some kind of ‘sublime’ escape route from the particularities of our stories, in which possibilities for 
reconciliation and forgiveness remain possible. Such potential reconciliations would in their enacting 
thereby – in a fundamental sense – change the way these events were perceived.
1
 Furthermore, it will 
also be admitted that since people are formed by complex narrative and biographical factors, the 
manner in which evil or tragedy is perceived is might differ from person to person: what might be 
tragic or unbearable to one person might be bearable for another.
2
 Nonetheless, I remain 
unconvinced that any or all of human suffering can, apodictically, be assumed to be redeemable or 
that every human story can be assumed to find some kind of reconciliation within the continuing story. 
For some, the agony and pain remains particularly lucid, and reconciliation with the past remains 
elusive.
3
 Milbank might respond by saying that we cannot look at the human plane since true 
reconciliation and forgiveness is only possible from the divine perspective and memory of the world. 
For Milbank (following Augustine and Thomas), since evil has no being (because it is merely parasitic 
upon being), and since creaturely existence only has being by participating in the divine, it would 
seem that evil does not ‘exist’ for God but only for created being.
4
 For Milbank it would seem then that 
it is only the divine perspective that is the ‘true’ perspective, and further that the effects of evil cannot 
have a place within the God’s ‘memory’ of the world. However, the immediate question that arises 
here is: if this is the case, if evil has no ‘reality’ for God, and the perspectives of the sufferers  are 
absorbed into the divine perspective, then how would be able to understand (like we mentioned 
earlier in relation to Hart) something like divine compassion? How are we to understand the God of 
the Exodus who responds to the cries of his people, and to the God who identifies with our human 
condition in the incarnation? If the divine perspective does not allow for the perspective of the 
sufferer, it would be difficult to understand these fundamental motifs of traditional Christian theology. 
Evil and suffering must have some kind of existential ‘objectivity’ (even though it is ontological null or 
privative)
5
, if we are to use such language of compassionate feeling, which at a minimum implies that 
the suffering and hurt of the sufferer becomes ‘real’ for the one expressing sympathy.  
                                               
1
See Milbank, Being Reconciled, 44-60 where we speaks about forgiveness. However, in Milbank’s opinion, it is only God who 
can ultimately supply forgiveness truly – due to the immensity of the world’s complexity and suffering. However, since evil has 
no being (Milbank is following the classical Christian tradition here), Milbank goes on to say that evil has no reality for God. And 
if that is the case, then – eschatologically speaking – the memory of human suffering and disaster will be thoroughly 
transformed into something fundamentally different because the ‘memory’ of the world will be absorbed into the divine ‘memory’ 
(since divine forgiveness can change the significance of particular histories retroactively).  
2
From a more phenomenological perspective, Ingolf Dalferth has spoken of ‘the relativity of evil’ in the sense that evil is always 
the perversion of something (von etwas) for a particular individuals (für jemanden). For more detail on this argument, see Ingolf 
U. Dalferth, Malum: Theologische Hermeneutik des Bösen, 86-88.  
3
 This is similar to the comment made by Daniel Colucciello Barber in his review of Eleonore Stump’s book on the problem of 
evil. For his comment, see Barber, ‘Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering, by Eleonore Sump 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)’. Religious Studies 47.1 (2011), 437-441.  
4
 Being Reconciled, 61-78.  
5
 William Myer has argued that Milbank, because of his preference for the One over the Many, and because he holds to a 
strong theology of participation, tends towards a kind of ‘panentheism’ and even (Myer suggests) a ‘pantheistic monism’ 
(Metaphysics and the Future of Theology, 476) in which ‘The creation is nothing more or other than the unfolding of the Creator’ 
(Ibid., 463). Such a tendency seems to undermine a genuine theology of creaturely autonomy (in Myer’s opinion), which 
explains why he does not give significant place to the dignity of human suffering or tragedy since ‘evil’ does not ‘exist’ for God. 
A theology of divine compassion, however, would have to somehow take account of how God is able to sympathise with 
creatures and their pain, thereby giving their ‘pain’ some kind of ‘reality’ for God (even if it is seen from a different perspective, 
and so cannot be said to be ‘co-suffering’ in a simplistic sense).   
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 Furthermore, the spectre of theodicy raises itself here so that the protest of Ivan Karamazov might 
apply: if the perspective of the sufferer is eschatologically and liturgically ‘absorbed’ into the divine 
memory, then either the suffering is effaced (as if it did not happen, which is an unacceptable 
fantasy); or it is transformed within a different perspective (which while possible, needs to take 
account of the acuteness of certain kinds of suffering – especially ‘horrendous’ suffering within the 
context of the first person perspective); or some kind of good for the sufferer is enacted in the wake of 
the suffering itself (thereby raising the question of whether it would be preferable that such a good 
could be achieved without the suffering in question, especially when that suffering is of the 
horrendous kind). For more Milbank, the question I have is the following: how are the screams of 
burning children in the Auschwitz crematoria to be so absorbed (either liturgically or eschatologically)? 
What potential good could be gained? What perspective could justify or absorb their suffering? I will 
readily admit, of course of one has to be aware of the differences between immediate reaction to 
horrendous suffering (which should not be primarily philosophical but pastoral), and the largely 
questions of ‘meaning’ that we have to wrestle with after the fact, as the sufferer in some way seeks 
to integrate such an experience with their wider existential and aesthetic categories.
1
 However, the 
question does remain as to how far such ‘integrating’ experiences can be successfully accomplished, 
and to whether such a process can be applied generally to all experiences of suffering.  
Lastly, regarding MacKinnon’s rejection of the privation theory of evil (as mentioned above 
already), Williams cannot be placed on the same trajectory as his teacher on this point. As I have 
shown already, Williams remains pretty much a traditional Augustinian on this matter, so any criticism 
of MacKinnon on this matter should not be transferred onto Williams. Milbank’s criticism of MacKinnon 
at this point is justified, if one goes along with the traditional Augustinian opinion of this matter.  
I shall end my critical comments here on Milbank and move onto a more positive reconstruction of 
Williams’ own position on this matter, particularly focusing in this chapter on Williams’ Four Quartet 
lectures. Before we analyse those texts in particular however, I would like to examine an essay 
Williams wrote shortly before delivering the lectures on Eliot. The reason I would like to do this 
because they touch on themes that are relevant to our discussion.  
 
3.3. ‘The Spirit of the Age to Come’ (1974) 
 
As already mentioned, Williams wrote this essay in the period in which he was involved in the 
study of Russian Orthodoxy, and this can be seen in the introduction to the essay where he says that 
the genesis of the paper lay in his investigations of the doctrine of the Spirit, as is it was expounded 
by leading figures in this movement, particularly in the later nineteenth and early twentieth century.
2
 
The essay, as suggested by the title, navigates around the themes of eschatology in relation to the 
doctrine of the Spirit, particularly as it relates to the experience of hope, an experience in which new 
possibilities are opened by the Spirit within history, in ‘the sense of the promise of the future which is 
                                               
1
 On this, see Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Suffering and the Goodness of God. Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of 
Religion. (Ithaca – New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), 181ff. We will discuss Williams’ critique of Adams later in this 
thesis.  
2
 ‘The Spirit of the Age to Come’, Sobernost: The Journal of the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius 6.9 (1974), 613.  
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in no sense conditioned or determined by the limits of the present and the past’.
1
 This does not mean 
that history is negated or abolished by this experience. Rather ‘a fresh level of God’s activity has been 
manifested in it, and thus new levels of human activity have been made possible.’
2
 Williams 
emphasizes the point that the eschatological work of the Spirit makes available new possibilities 
within the creaturely order of being, and seeks to distance himself from an eschatology that sets 
nature and grace in opposition - ‘the age to come’ contra ‘the present age’. Such a move goes against 
a coherent doctrine of creation, as found within the Christian tradition. Furthermore, he wants to say 
that ‘the age to come’ is not a datable event within a historical series of events, because then it would 
be just like any other event within the continuum of time (which it is not)
3
, and so, as Williams 
suggests, Christian eschatology does not involve ‘a rigidly schematised philosophy of history.’
4
 
Instead, the Spirit opens us to hope for new creation in the present time, whereby the present reality 
is ‘infinitely open to the transfiguring and glorifying action of God.’
5
 
But what is the context in which we hope? It is here that the theme of tragedy comes into play. 
Williams says that in the contemporary moment, there is ‘an awareness of present reality as divided, 
fragmented, liable to internal struggle and frustration, an awareness, in fact of the tragic.’
6
 Following 
Hegel’s definition of tragedy, Williams suggests that tragedy is not so much the conflict of good with 
evil, but rather a conflict between competing goods. This is because ‘in our world ‘good’ is not unitary, 
each of the partial goods appears to have a claim upon us which often seems absolute’ and so ‘we 
are sometimes conscious of two or more seemingly absolute demands upon us which are mutually 
exclusive and incompatible.’
7
 As such, all true moral dilemmas have a tragic quality about them, 
because in some cases you will be doing harm no matter what choice you make.
8
 After discussing 
this, Williams seeks to respond to a belief among some philosophers and literary critics
9
 that Christian 
experience cannot be reconciled with a tragic view of the world. Referencing the work of Donald 
MacKinnon, Williams suggests that there are resources within the Christian tradition
10
 that counteract 
the tendency to obviate the tragic dimension of experience.  
Williams goes on thereafter to reflect on the theme of the Spirit and the Cross. He says that ‘any 
theology of the Spirit...must face the problem of the exegesis of Christ’s cry of dereliction on the 
                                               
1
 Ibid., 614.  
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Ibid., 614-615. Because of this, Williams believes that the Church was right to distance itself from the theology of the 
Montanists, Joachim of Fiore, and the various ‘chiliastic’ movements – ‘Third Age’ theologies - that have manifested themselves 
throughout history, in both religious and secular forms. For more on the history and trajectories of ‘Third Age’ eschatology, see, 
Jacob Taubes, Occidental Eschatology, trans. David Ratmoko (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 85ff.  
4
 ‘The Spirit of the Age to Come’, 615.  
5
 Ibid., 616.  
6
 Ibid.  
7
 Ibid. Williams has in mind here the tragedy of Antigone, particularly as it has been interpreted by Hegel, but he references 
other examples drawn from life and history. Williams goes onto schematize the difference between ancient and modern tragedy 
by saying the while ancient tragedy was concerned with the question ‘What is truth?’, modern tragedy is concerned with the 
question ‘Who is right?’. It should be mentioned here, however, that the reason for Plato’s rejection of the poets from the ideal 
city (tragedians included) seems to stem largely from his belief that their insight into truth are largely divinely ‘ecstatic’, 
inconsistent, and therefore unreliable in terms of proper mode of τέχνη. For Plato, it was philosophy rather that was able to 
adopt a more consistent practice, being able to distinguish the Good (τό επέκεινα τῶν ὄντων) from evil, truth from appearance . 
For some general commentary on this, see Dalferth, Malum, 370-374; Julian Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy: From Plato to 
to Žižek, 3-20; Sean Kirkland, The Ontology of Socratic Questioning in Plato’s Early Dialogues, 59-91.  
8
 Ibid.  
9
 Williams has in mind here figures such Karl Jaspers, George Steiner, and D.D. Raphael.  
10
 Williams mentions a favourite example of MacKinnon, namely the fact that in order for redemption to occur, Judas had to 
suffer damnation.  
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Cross.’
1
 In this event, we can see – within a Trinitarian context – ‘the most extreme case conceivable 
of the tragic gulf between truth and reality. God-as-man, because he is existing ‘as man’, is alienated 
from His Father’.
2
 For Williams, ‘the Incarnation is a necessarily tragic event…for God enters into the 
humanity whose mode of being is God-less-ness.’
3
 Obviously, incarnation cannot be separated from 
resurrection, but as Williams says ‘we cannot in any sense imagine that the dereliction is in any sense 
blotted out by the Resurrection….the theologia crucis is a theologia gloriae.’
4
 To give a longer quote: 
‘When we have faced the Cross, then we may begin to speak about the Spirit, not before; and 
precisely because the Cross reveals to us the tragedy, the exigency of man’s present mode of being, 
we must speak of the Spirit as the bearer of a new mode of being and thus as a bearer of the 
eschaton and the New Age.’
5
 
For Williams, the transcendence opened to us through the resurrection does not negate the tragic 
(contra the suggestions of Karl Jaspers). If the tragic can be appropriated into artistic representations
6
 
as well as philosophical treatments, while still remaining tragic, then Williams sees no a priori reason 
why Christianity cannot do the same: ‘if the Church allows full weight to the death of her Lord, it is 
never in a position to qualify the fact of tragic destruction, catastrophe.’
7
 As such, the communion of 
believers in the Spirit is ‘a communion in horror and in glory’, because we are still ‘in history, that 
history where tragedy occurs, and the gift of the Spirit is a gift that increases our vulnerability to a 
terrifying degree, we are left exposed and humanly defenceless before the universal weight of 
tragedy’ since the Spirit into which we are incorporated is a ‘Spirit of kenosis’ that translates into our 
varying contexts the experience of the cross, which is also the experience of glory.
8
 And this is the 
foundation for an understanding of hope that does not bypass the experience of tragedy within time. 
The experience of the Sprit is always an eschatological occurrence, whether in suffering or glory, and 
thereby points to the limits of the present age, opening to us the opportunity to protest against 
suffering and injustice (of which prayer, intercession, and ‘tragic’ art, play an important part).
9
 Hope is 
not abolished by meaningless suffering, but continues to remain and an ever-present cry of resistance 
(like the art form of tragedy itself which acts as a kind of protest against the loss of meaningful 
existence in history). Resistance and intercession is tied to our existence within a communion of 
vulnerability and shared suffering in which we are given ‘power and confidence to act’ because of the 
vision of the future put before us.
10
 As can be been seen from this, Williams is not advocating an 
                                               
1
 ‘The Spirit of the Age to Come’, 618.  
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Ibid. 619.  
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid.  
6
 For more on the theme of artistic representation, as it relates to the theme of the tragic (and particularly the figure of 
Nietzsche), see David Toole, Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo: Theological Reflections on Nihilism, Tragedy, and Apocalypse 
(Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), 89-128. 
7
 ‘The Spirit of the Age to Come’, 620.  
8
 Ibid., 622-623. The biblical logic behind such a statement can be seen (as is well known) in the Johannine theology of the 
cross whereby the imagery of being ‘lifted up’ has a dual reference towards the glorification and dereliction of the cross. Such a 
conclusion is widely accepted among NT scholars. For a sample, see Udo Schnelle, Theology of the New Testament, trans. M. 
Eugene Boring (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009), 694-701.   
9
 ‘The Spirit of the Age to Come’, 623-624. Williams is influenced here by Johann Baptist Metz, whose famous article on 
memory and suffering had been published in 1972. Metz wrote, regarding the ‘dangerous memory’ of suffering, that ‘the 
Christian memoria insists that the history of human suffering is not merely part of the prehistory of freedom, but remains an 
inner aspect of the history of freedom’, The Future in the Memory of Suffering’, 11. Such a conclusion distinguishes such an 
attentiveness to suffering from fatalism, or sheer hopelessness.  
10
 ‘The Spirit of the Age to Come, 624-625. 
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understanding of tragedy that endorses quietism and passivity in the face of suffering, but endorses 
activity and protest when possible. However, Williams steers clear of any kind of triumphalism in 
which tragedy and suffering are effaced and for the sake of ultimate glorification and eschatological 
harmonization.  
What this essays shows, is that from early on Williams is not only concerned to take tragedy 
seriously, but that he understands our communion in suffering as also a communion in glory, thereby 
opening our experience of pain to the reality of hope that protests against the potential 
meaninglessness that suffering induces. The importance of resistance in all its forms (art, prayer and 
intercession on behalf of others) is emphasized by Williams in this essay, and shows that his 
theological construal of tragedy cannot be understood as fatalistic, or that it endorses passivity in the 
face of suffering. In fact, Williams would argue that tragedy (following MacKinnon and others) is itself 
a form of protest against meaninglessness and a closed historical continuum since it is only in a 
‘transcendental’
1
 dimension that tragedy can have a dignity which does not reduce it to mere triviality.
2
 
The existence of ‘tragic art’ in all its forms can already be seen as pointing in a direction away from 
meaninglessness and mere passivity, and seems to be involved in a process of active meaning-
making and protest.
3
 By examining this essay, we have given some background to Rowan’s thoughts 
on this matter before we engage more deeply in his reading of the Four Quartets.  
 
3.4. The Four Quartet Lectures (1974-1975)  
 
(a) Burnt Norton – A Place of Disaffection 
 
As already mentioned above, Williams engaged quite early in his theological formation with the 
thought and poetry of T.S. Eliot. During the period of 1974-1975 he delivered the same lectures on 
two different occasions, engaging in an in-depth treatment of each of the Quartets. The following 
textual summary is based on the second cycle of these lectures. As will be seen, interspersed 
throughout are Williams’ attempts to appropriate Eliot’s vision for explicitly theological purposes, and 
furthermore, such reflections touch on themes related to our topic. While the following analysis below 
will be the most sustained engagement I am aware of, in relation to these texts, I am not the first to 
attempt an interpretation of these texts. Rupert Shortt in his biography of Williams deals with them 
shortly
4
, and Benjamin Myers engages in a short analysis of these texts in Christ the Stanger, in a 
chapter focusing on the theme of tragedy.
5
 
It should also be said at this stage that I am not ultimately concerned with whether Williams is 
successful in his interpretation of the Quartets or not. When it comes to assessing his exegesis of the 
                                               
1
 Cf. MacKinnon, The Problem of Metaphysics,122-135 on the concept of ‘the transcendence of the tragic’. 
2
 One should compare here Giorgio Agamben in relation to his concept of ‘The Irreparable’ (found in the appendix to The 
Coming Community), which almost seems to imply passivity before what cannot be altered or changed, but which ultimately 
points in a different direction. For Agamben, it is only through accepting what cannot be changed, entering fully into the world 
as it is that we come against limit, and thereby experience the transcendent: ‘At the point you perceive the irreparability of the 
world, at that point it is transcendent’ (p. 105). 
3
 ‘The Spirit of the Age to Come’, 624: ‘the literary form of tragedy is clearly protest, but equally it is protest which is also 
‘demand’, and therefore hope, demand for the saeculum, the order which is totally different.’ 
4
 Shortt, Rowan’s Rule, 89-91.  
5
 Myers, Christ the Stranger, 21-27.  
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poetic vision contained herein, I am more concerned with Williams as a thinker and a theologian than 
with the debate on how the Quartets are to be interpreted. Obviously, I believe that his interpretation 
is compelling in some ways, and sheds light of certain aspects of the text; however, deciding whether 
Williams is right in his interpretation is not my main concern in this chapter. At the end, I will reference 
some criticisms of an incarnational interpretation of the Quartets, and try to engage them a little, but 
they cannot be my ultimate concern in this chapter since my aim is expound Williams’s theology, 
rather than the correctness of his interpretation per se.  
Williams opening remarks in the lecture lay out an ambitious project to depart from the ‘majority of 
opinion among literary critics’.
1
 Williams understands the Quartets to be an attempt to think about the 
meaning of the incarnation within history, how this event opens up ‘meaning’ and ‘vision’ within time. 
Williams does make a concession that the language of the Quartets is not ‘religious’ and that it is ‘very 
rarely dogmatic’, but he does believe that the incarnation is ‘constantly presupposed’ throughout the 
series. One criticism often lodged against the Quartets is that it expresses a longing to escape from 
time, and that therefore rather than expressing a Christian vision of the world, the resulting viewpoint 
is more Manichaean than Christian. Williams rejects this opinion and suggests that in comparison with 
Eliot’s previous works the Quartets are the most affirmative despite their talk of dereliction and 
renunciation. He suggests that the Quartets rather offer Eliot’s ‘most serious attempt to work out the 
consequences of incarnational religion’, and Williams goes as far to suggest that Eliot is doing little 
more than ‘proclaiming the gospel’.
2
  
In line with this ambitious project, Williams also wants to dissent from the opinion that the Quartets 
represent a unified, worked out theme, namely that Eliot was unpacking an idea which he had already 
stated fully in Burnt Norton. No doubt this is true in some aspects
3
 as Williams knows, but to say that 
the remaining Quartets are a kind of poetic midrash on the Burnt Norton is a mistake. To support his 
case, Williams states the well-known fact that Eliot published Burnt Norton as an individual poem 
before he even conceived the tetralogy, and that later he decided to include it in the series.
4
 The 
Quartets may express ‘a unity, but they are not
5
 one poem’. Instead, Williams suggests that the 
continuation of the series after Burnt Norton implies that Eliot saw it as ‘inadequate in itself, not only 
inadequate in expression, but inadequate in content, needing not expansion or revision, but the kind 
of correction, or perhaps, the kind of reply which only another poem can provide.’ This means that a 
verse or passage cannot be lifted out of context, and be said to represent Eliot’s ‘point of view’. The 
Quartets rather express an experiment in ‘dialogue’ where ‘statements are proposed, explored, and 
                                               
1
 Williams, Four Quartets (unpublished manuscript), 1. From here on, the manuscript shall be abbreviated to FQ. Numerals 
refer to the different sections of the lectures, and the numbers refer to the pagination.  
2
 Ibid. On this point, Williams has not changed his opinion even in thirty years since he delivered these lectures. In his interview 
with David Cunningham (‘Living the Questions’, 29), he said that ‘I spent a long time mulling over the Four Quartets in my 20s 
and 30s. Ultimately it seems what he's doing is quite the opposite of what he’s sometimes said to be doing: he is giving a very 
deep valuation of the self in time, an incarnational picture, with all the ambivalence that incarnation entails.’ 
3
 For example, the insight that ‘Only though time time is conquered’ is an idea carries on throughout the series, and lays bare 
the central problematic that Eliot is dealing with (in Williams’ opinion).  
4
 For more on this, see Helen Gardner,The Composition of Four Quartets (London: Faber & Faber, 1978), 14-28. However, 
Williams would probably not agree with Gardner’s interpretation of Burnt Norton. The marginalia for this passage suggests that 
it is written ‘contra Helen Gardner’. I cannot determine whether this is Williams’ own handwriting, or was added later.  
5
 For the sake of accuracy, I have underlined those words underlined in the text since there are no italics in the typed 
manuscript. 
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sometimes, if not rejected, at least qualified seriously’
1
 since it is only through ‘a multiplicity of 
possible and provisional statements’ that ‘a poet [can] point with any precision and integrity to what he 
[sic] is saying.’
2
 
After these initial reflections, Williams moves onto an exegesis of the text of the Quartets, starting 
with Burnt Norton. From the opening lines, Williams says we are presented with an understanding of 
‘the present moment’ which is ‘limited and bleak’, a moment that is ‘utterly immutable, necessarily 
what it is’. If the future is contained in the present and amounts to ‘innumerably determined moments’ 
then time cannot be transformed, there is no redemption or salvation possible: ‘the vision of freedom 
and contingency is an illusion’ because we continue to return to ‘the immutable present’.
3
 As the  
poem continues, Williams says that the second part suggests (more optimistically) that the present 
itself might offer some kind of ‘release’ since it contains within itself ‘the complete moving pattern of 
things’, ‘the circling pattern of the cosmos’, ‘the dance’, ‘the still point of the turning world’. But 
ultimately this vision provides little comfort since it merely protects us from ‘heaven and damnation’, 
as we are held between the ‘partial ecstasy’ and ‘partial horror’ of the moment. As such, the second 
section of Burnt Norton provides a reply to the first section: ‘the present is fixed but there is release; 
not through a deliberate evasion of the present into the ‘world of speculation’, but through the 
grasping the present for what it is.’
4
 This emphasis on experiencing and seeing time for what it is will 
return again and again in the remainder of the Quartets, and in Williams’ continuing interpretation of 
them.   
The third section again consists of a kind of rebuttal to section two. The third section describes ‘a 
flickering succession of meaningless happening, at once boring and distracting’ in which ‘the intense 
awareness of the present moment’ described in the second section two is rejected. In light of this 
such a perspective, Williams suggests that Eliot is experimenting with the idea that ‘the present 
moment’ is not ‘a vehicle for ‘meaning’, but the utter static isolation of knowing one is not free to 
change the world, knowing that to act or not to act makes no difference.’
5
  While the second section 
might imply some ‘meaning’ in which we are reconciled with a cosmic rhythm and pattern of the 
universe, the third section implies that ‘The descent into the real darkness of the present moment 
                                               
1
 FQ I, 1. Cf. ‘Living the Questions’, 29: ‘…what I love about the Quartets is precisely what their tide indicates: they're meant to 
be different voices. Some of those voices are wonderfully lyrical; Eliot has this Shakespearean facility for the memorable 
compressed lyric…And then he will quite deliberately scramble it, as if you pressed a "scramble" button, and you'll go into an 
abstract, clumsy mode as if to say, as he does say at one point in the Quartets: 'That was a way of putting it." Don't listen to the 
music—just shuffle, clatter, and hear the words going around— don't hang onto that. And that alternation between the lyrical 
and die fragmented, I think, takes you so close to the edge, and to the niche of real poetry.’ One can also say with confidence 
that Williams is using here a dramatic or diachronic method of reading this text, in the same way that he uses the same method 
to interpret the biblical text. In fact, he explicitly uses the Four Quartets as an example of the diachronic method of reading. For 
more on this, see Williams, ‘The Discipline of Scripture’, in On Christian Theology, 45-47. For more on Williams’ hermeneutics 
and theory of a sacred text, see Williams, ‘The Unity of the Church and the Unity of the Bible’. International Kirchliche Zeitschrift 
91.1 (2001), 5-21; Williams, ‘Historical Criticism and Sacred Text’, in David Ford and Graham Stanton (eds.), Reading Texts, 
Seeking Wisdom (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004). For a friendly and critical discussion of Williams’ understanding of 
Scripture, see John Webster, ‘Rowan Williams On Scripture’, in Markus Bockmuehl and Alan J. Torrance (eds.), Scripture’s 
Doctrine and Theology’s Bible: How the New Testament Shapes Christian Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 
2008), 105-123. 
2
 FQ, 2. It should be said that Williams is not the only one to make such a suggestion regarding the Quartets; postmodern 
interpreters of Eliot have also noticed this point. On this cf. William V. Spanos, ‘Hermeneutics and Memory: Destroying T.S. 
Eliot’s Four Quartets’ [1978], in Graham Clarke (ed.), T.S. Eliot: Critical Assessments III (London: Christopher Helm, 1990), 
230-272 for some Heideggerian reflections on this theme.  
3
 FQ I, 2. Cf. Burnt Norton I, 177: ‘If all time is eternally present/ All time is unredeemable’, in Eliot, Collected Poems: 1909-
1962 (London: Faber & Faber, 1963).  
4
 FQ I , 3.  
5
 Ibid., Cf. Burnt Norton III, 181: ‘This is the one way, and the other/ Is the same…’ 
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reveals a void, a total helplessness in the face of an impersonal and unstoppable cosmic process.’
1
 
As we can see, already within Burnt Norton, there is a reply and response pattern that is mirrored in 
the rest of the Quartets.  
The section that follows thereafter is the shortest in Burnt Norton, and constitutes a kind of 
summary of what has been debated so far. Some have sought to find religious undertones in some of 
the imagery used in this section (‘the kingfishers wing’, for example), but Williams does not decide 
either way. At this stage, the language is still has a ‘cryptic and ambiguous character’.
2
 In the last part 
of the poem, Eliot confronts us with ‘the actual problem of poetic language, of communication itself’ 
and further, in relation to the conclusion of the poem itself, we should ‘not look for straightforward 
resolutions…but accept its provisional character’. The occurrence of speech brings us back 
‘decisively back into the world, into time; and it is released into silence by the emergence of form’
3
, a 
‘form’ in which the end and beginning ‘co-exist’ in the present and offer a ‘total explanation’ of ‘the 
whole historical process’. Unfortunately, the present cannot bear this burden since ‘The detail of the 
pattern is movement / As in the figure of the ten stairs
4
 / Desire itself is movement / Not in itself 
desirable…’ The present seeks to impose ‘form’ because it seeks redemption and meaning, but this 
remains elusive (‘…the Word in the desert’) since the present itself implies movement (and so cannot 
remain still), and redemption can only be found beyond the world in the realm of the timeless (Love is 
itself unmoving, / Only the cause and the end of movement, / Timeless, and undesiring / Except in the 
aspect of time…’). As a result, ‘there is no hope of…perceiving a total pattern’ within time.
5
 Language 
in its attempt to impose form continues to break down and remains fluid and fungible, escaping 
attempts to circumscribe a solidified pattern.
6
 
After bringing his detailed reading to a close, Williams goes on to draw some conclusions and 
gives some additional theological commentary. In Burnt Norton he says we are confronted with 
‘bewildering tensions and paradoxes, dissatisfied and uneasy.’
7
 Meaning seems to be found in ‘the 
‘timeless moment’ of ecstasy’, but from where does it derive meaning if it is cut off from time? Time 
remains unredeemed, cut off from its source of salvation. Eliot (as well as Williams) is unsatisfied with 
such a conclusion, which is why Burnt Norton marks both a beginning and an end, an end to a certain 
understanding of the relation between ‘historical consciousness’ and ‘visionary consciousness’, and a 
beginning to a series of reflections which will occur in the rest of the Quartets. The dualism present in 
Burnt Norton, a dualism in which time is considered to be a ‘waste’ is at odds with a Christian doctrine 
of incarnation. Echoing the sentiments of George Florovsky, Williams says that ‘Christianity is the 
                                               
1
 FQ I, 4.  
2
 Ibid.  
3
 Ibid., 4-5. Cf. Burnt Norton V, 181-182: ‘Only by the form, the pattern/ Can words or music reach/ The stillness…’  
4
 This is an allusion to St John of the Cross  
5
 FQ I,  5  
6
 Burnt Norton V, 182: ‘…Words strain, / Crack and sometimes break, under the burden, / Under the tension, slip, slide, perish, / 
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place, Will not stay still…’ Paul Fiddes suggests that in his part of Burnt Norton, we 
might have in nuce the debate between structuralism and deconstruction. On this, see Fiddes, The Promised End: Eschatology 
in Theology and Literature (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 119-123. Fiddes suggests that Eliot does not fall into either category 
clearly but rather endorses ‘the transcendental signified’. On this score, it is worth taking into account that even though E liot 
could not have known about Derrida, some of his approaches to writing and language provide some fecund resources for 
deconstructionists. Here, one can consult Cleo McNelly Cearns, ‘Negative Theology and Literary Discourse in Four Quartets: A 
Derridean Reading’ in Edward Lobb (ed.), Words in Time: New Essays on Eliot’s Four Quartets (London: Athlone Press, 1993), 
131-157. 
7
 FQ I,  5.  
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justification of time’
1
 because it is within the framework of the incarnation that history is given a pattern 
and a meaning. It is precisely this framework which Eliot seeks to work out in the rest of the Quartets, 
according to Williams. The implications of this for understanding Eliot are significant because it 
implies that we cannot take what Eliot has said previously (in Burnt Norton, Ash Wednesday, The 
Rock for example) as representing ‘Eliot’s viewpoint’ since the Quartets themselves constitute a kind 
of challenge to Eliot’s own previous sentiments on this matter. Williams even uses the language of 
μετάνοια (repentance) to describe the artistic process of the Quartets, a continual process of 
reformation and self-questioning which destabilizes any static or ‘totalized’ perspective.  
The ‘paradoxical’ sentiments of Burnt Norton rule out the solution offered by some ‘existentialist 
theologies’ which advocate an ‘interiorisation’ of history (Williams has in mind here the theology of 
Bultmann).
2
 Some of the language of Burnt Norton (with its talk of the ‘moment’ and ‘timelessness’) 
can be construed to endorse such an opinion, but the internal dialectic of the poem itself counteracts 
such a conclusion since Eliot is engaged in a debate with himself on these very issues.
3
  Man cannot 
be saved outside of time (‘Only through time time is conquered’), and any attempt to understand 
redemption unhistorically must be rejected because it offers ‘a false picture of man’s subjectivity’ and 
leads to ‘an almost schizophrenic cleavage between the historical and non-historical consciousness.’
4
 
There will be no meaning to a Christian understanding of redemption unless history is taken into 
account. And so, Burnt Norton poses important theological questions around the issue of faith and 
history and how redemption, or ‘the absolute’ can appear in time.
5
 However, at the end of the poem, 
we are left with ‘a blank wall of paradox’, an unsatisfactory ending which has to be teased out further 
in the remainder of the series. 
 
(b) East Coker – A Wholeness of Vision 
 
According to Williams, East Coker provides ‘a very comprehensive statement of the cyclic 
character of human enterprise of all kinds’ and ‘the death that is implicit in every ‘generation’’.
6
 The 
patterns of birth, sexual reproduction, and death are presented as symbolising the rhythms of life 
which rather than providing liberation are ‘an intensification of imprisonment’. Eliot however conveys 
such patterns with a lyrical beauty that is ultimately ‘an unkind sarcasm at the expense of the reader’
7
 
because Eliot (in Williams’ estimation) is deliberately stylizing his text in such a way to see if we are 
drawn to and ‘hypnotized’ by the form while missing the content of what the poem is actually saying. 
The conscious stylizing of section one (Eliot’s attempt at ‘a deliberate tour de force’) is followed by 
section two in which Eliot ostensibly rejects his manner of presenting the cyclic nature of life. In 
distinction from first section, the part that follows is eminently prosaic and even intentionally clumsy – 
the point being that language can bewitch us, acting as ‘a cushion against the threat of the cosmic 
                                               
1
 Ibid., 6.  
2
 By mentioning this, I am by no means endorsing Williams’ interpretation of Bultmann. Modern scholarship on Bultmann has 
complicated such an image.  
3
 Ibid., 7-8.  
4
 Ibid., 8 
5
 Williams is referencing here Ernst Troeltsch.  
6
 FQ II, 1.  
7
 Ibid., 1-2.  
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vortex, the progress towards destruction.’
1
 There are sentences that explicitly confirm this opinion: 
‘That was a way of putting it – not very satisfactory:/ A periphrastic study in a worn out poetical 
fashion / Leaving one still with the intolerable wrestle / With words and meanings. The poetry does not 
matter.’
2
 The attempt to impose form onto experience always fails, because experience and nature 
continually outstrip form, and any attempt to impose structure on what is fluid and moving entails 
dishonesty and unreality regarding the nature of the world. Regularity and security are the result of 
fantasy because we cannot deal with ‘the terrifying emptiness of the world’
3
 (‘…There is, it seems to 
us,/ At best, only a limited value/ In knowledge derived from experience./ The knowledge imposes a 
pattern, and falsifies,/ For the pattern is new in every moment / And every moment is new and 
shocking / Valuation of all we have been…’).
4
 At the end of this section, Eliot seems to suggest that 
the only response to such a reality is an acknowledgement of ‘what is there’, avoiding the temptation 
to fly into ‘a world of speculation’, and in the process enter into a place ‘where there is no secure 
foothold’
5
. In such a context, the only wisdom we can endorse is humility, because ‘humility is 
endless’.
6
 
The third section begins by expounding the fact that everything we do is unreal and doomed if 
we think we can ‘impose meaning by our achievements’.
7
 Death comes to everyone, and no one is 
intrinsically more important than anyone else; further, there is not a coherent person in the first place 
(‘Nobody’s funeral, for there is no one to bury’). This applies even to the poet and the artist. For 
everyone, there is a silence and emptiness around which we constantly circle, a vortex (‘the darkness 
of God’), and death is a lifting of a veil, like in a theatre, which reveals the nothingness which 
illuminates our existence, an emptiness that is ever-present in everything we do. Within an environs 
such as this, even hope and love cannot be used as an escape route, but are included in faith, which 
seems to be understood as simply ‘a blind non-rational commitment, waiting for what we do not and 
cannot know’
8
 (…wait without hope…wait without love).
9
 In this context of almost nihilistic language, 
the theme of ecstasy (and negative theology) returns again, but with a firmer rooting in reality, in ‘the 
way things are’, which does not ‘soften the impact of the present.
10
 The language of St. John of Cross 
is clearly evident here (‘You must go by a way wherein there is no ecstasy…You must go by a way 
which is the way of ignorance…You must go by the way of dispossession…You must go through the 
way in which you are not).
11
 The recurrence of this theme here cannot be equated with Eliot’s use of 
the theme of ecstasy in Burnt Norton because Eliot has gone through a process whereby the earlier 
experimentation with the ‘timeless’ moment in which time is gathered up into a redemptive ‘event’ 
outside of time has been rejected as a false solution that leaves time itself unredeemed. Here, at the 
end of section three, despite moving through the experience of darkness and meaninglessness, Eliot 
                                               
1
 Ibid. 2.  
2
 East Coker II, 186.  
3
 FQ II, 2.  
4
 East Coker II, 186. 
5
 East Coker II, 186.  
6
 Ibid. Williams suggests (FQ II, 2) that such a response has similarities with Simone Weil’s concept of ‘attention’. For an 
exemplary exposition of this theme, see Weil, Waiting on God, (Glasgow: Collins, 1977). 
7
 FQ II, 2 
8
 Ibid., 3.  
9
 East Coker III, 188.  
10
 FQ II, 3.  
11
 East Coker, 188-189.  
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seems to be articulating the most affirmative statement we have seen so far in the poem. The 
negative way of the ‘dark night’
1
 offers a possible avenue for making sense of the apparent emptiness 
of life. As such, the connection between the Quartets and negative theology seems undeniable at this 
point.
2
 
The fourth section continues by suggesting that we accept the death that is ‘the precondition of 
our salvation’ because God himself shares the same sickness and is vulnerable to ‘the destructive 
force of the historical vortex’
3
. God bleeds as we do, and this opens us to the experience of God’s 
compassion and co-suffering (‘The wounded surgeon plies his steel/ That questions the distempered 
part;/ Beneath the bleeding hands we feel / The sharp compassion of the healer’s art / Resolving the 
enigma of the fever chart’).
4
 The imagery of the cross, Good Friday, as well as Eucharistic imagery 
pervades this section of East Coker. In the cross, God has subjected Godself to time, change, and 
death – and as such our faith, our waiting, is grounded upon God’s own submission to ‘darkness and 
meaninglessness’
5
 because in order for God to heal our wounds, God must be wounded. This means 
that it is only through enduring the pain and darkness of history that we can come to healing (‘Our 
only health is the disease….to be restored, our sickness must grow worse’).
6
  
Section five starts with an autobiographical note, referencing the wasted ‘twenty years’ in which 
he has tried to use language to grasp a ‘wholeness of vision’
7
 and has seemed to have failed. 
According Williams, there is a deeper ‘humanism’ to these lines than almost anywhere else in Eliot’s 
poetry.
8
 The imagery of a continuing journey that starts from where we are at
9
, and continues to 
acknowledge ‘Not the intense moment/ Isolated, with no before and after,/ But a lifetime burning in 
every moment’ in which there is ‘perhaps neither gain nor loss…there is only the trying…’ and a 
moving into ‘another intensity…a further union, a deeper communion/ Through the dark cold and 
empty desolation.’
10
 The ‘tragic’ quality of the whole poem is acknowledged by Williams (echoing the 
sentiments of Helen Gardner): there is an opening to ‘a possibly hopeful future’ but it involves our 
‘casting out into the deep, leaving cheap and facile explanations behind’, in which ‘risk and real 
insecurity’ must be faced in light of God’s own vulnerability.
11
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 We can already see here Williams’ concern with locating the ‘dark night’ and an experience of the ‘negative’ moment within 
the concrete experience of history. For more on this, see Williams, A Ray of Darkness, 80-84, 99-104. Also, cf. his thoughts on 
‘the risk of a negative theology in abstraction’ and the ‘de-politicized aesthetic’ inherent in some postmodern theorists, which is 
suspicious of engaged political negotiation and historical engagement. On this, see Williams, ‘Hegel and the Gods of 
Postmodernity’, in Wrestling with Angels, 29-33.   
2
 For more reflections on the relationship between the Quartets and negative theology, Cearns, ‘Negative Theology and Literary 
Discourse in Four Quartets: A Derridean Reading’.   
3
 FQ II, 3. 
4
 Easter Coker IV, 189.   
5
 FQ II, 4. 
6
 Easter Coker IV, 189.   
7
 FQ II, 4.   
8
 Ibid.  
9
 East Coker V: ‘Home is where one starts from.’ 
10
 Ibid.  
11
 FQ  II, 5.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
95 
 
(c) The Dry Salvages – Abandonment and Risk 
 
Williams accords the theme of ‘risk’ a significant place in this poem, a fact which should be seen 
as ‘a protest’ against the drastic implications of East Coker.
1
 Williams admits that it is a difficult poem 
and that in certain sections it is badly written, but he tentatively argues that the style is result of ‘an 
ironic adoption of a certain style of voice and belief, not wholly absurd or wholly contrary to the ‘voice’ 
of East Coker, but hesitating, qualifying, drawing back from the full seriousness of East Coker.’
2
 The 
opening of section one again plays with the themes of cosmic rhythms, this time using the imagery of 
a river and the sea. The river ‘within us’ points to ‘the constant and constantly forgotten movement of 
a sub-rational pattern in ourselves’ which awakens us to ‘an alarming vision of the chaotic and 
inexhaustible life of the ‘sea’ outside us’.
3
 He goes on to say: ‘The conscious mind, in its attempts to 
discern a pattern intelligible to itself, succeeds only in immobilising ‘subjective’ time, so that past and 
future become equally meaningless, swallowed up in a blank, featureless and interminable present; 
while the progress of the sea’s time continues relentlessly. Only the bell out at sea marks any kind of 
advance, and it is a movement which has nothing to do with us, with our consciousness and volition.’
4
 
Here, the disaffection found in Burnt Norton is recalled and the problem is raised in relation to the 
problem of how ‘wholeness of vision’ (East Coker) is possible when there is ‘too deep a dissociation 
between conscious human subjectivity and the rhythms of non-conscious life’.
5
 
The second section of the poem has been criticized for its ‘forced rhythms and unnatural or even 
meaningless locutions’ but Williams suggests that we should consider ‘the occasional weakness or 
carelessness as an intensification of the overpowering sense of lassitude, helplessness, and defeat in 
the lyric’. These lines are mean to be ‘incantatory, even soporific, an almost dreamy lament’ which 
continues until we are woken up by ‘the monosyllabic roughness of the penultimate lines’
6
 (‘Clangs/ 
The bell.’).
7
 Here the seeming pointlessness of human endeavour is expounded, and death is 
described as ‘God’ because it seems that within this context physical death can provide ‘the only 
imaginable liberation’. Here, talk of the ‘Annunciation’ or the event of God-becoming-flesh as 
providing meaning is questioned because if ‘the movement of the world is so separate from human 
life, thought, aspiration, the existence of God-as-man can hardly be supposed to make any 
difference.’
8
 However, in the second part of this section, a more complex picture seems to be forming, 
history is not merely a sequence of ecstatic moments: ‘The impersonal rhythm of the river 
does…preserve a human history, even if it is only a history of failure and agony and meaningless 
‘wreckage’…There is something, and not merely the ensemble of ecstatic moments, which the 
encroaching of the ‘sea’ does not destroy or render trivial and futile: a more complex history, of 
varying subjective significance, but unquestionably there, ‘given’, just as much as the sea is ‘given’.
9
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In the third section, Eliot reflects further on the movement of time: ‘The pattern is movement, 
movement, change, is our mode of existing.’
1
 In this movement, there is no healing provided by time 
(‘…time is no healer’
2
) because ‘the mere passage of time does not wipe away sorrow or hurt’.
3
 And 
so, we given the injunction to ‘Fare Forward’, that is ‘moving from moment to moment in a continuous 
awareness that does not project fantasy on to past or future; a self-renouncing contemplation of the 
temporal world of which we are part, in every moment.’
4
 Such a moment opens us to the experience 
of death and abandon (‘…the time of death is every moment’
5
) in which we refuse ‘to hold on to the 
illusion of being static subjects with a ‘real’ existence in an extended ‘present’ from which we can 
survey the present moment with detachment. This is what we are called to do: not to be detached in 
this sense, not to try and stand out of our lives, but to live in the moment, to abandon ourselves to the 
present moment’ in which we trust that the ‘renunciation of system-making is our only road to sharing 
in the life of our fellows.’
6
  
Section four is the shortest section in the poem and constitutes a prayer for the casualties of the 
sea. The prayer is addressed to the Virgin (‘the Queen of Heaven’), the same one who saw her son 
go the way of the cross. According to Williams, in his interpretation of these lines, the event of the 
incarnation opens up the possibility that every moment, each portion of history is now open to ‘the real 
presence of God’. This does not change what history is: ‘the sound of the bell does not change, it is 
only heard in a different context, a different world of meaning’.
7
 The incarnation does not permit us to 
view the world through the eyes of fantasy, but it does allow us to place history in a context that does 
provide some kind of meaning.  
The last section of the poem seeks to list various ‘fantastic’ interpretations of history. The language 
covers fields that range from psychoanalysis, fortune-telling, and drug use. All of these are seen as 
examples of attempts to escape historical experience, to impose a pattern which is not there. And yet, 
reference to the ‘saint’ and the ‘The hint half-guessed, the gift half-understood, is Incarnation’ does 
point to the possibility of a telos, an aim in history, which will probably not come to completion in our 
life time, but does point to something we can hope for – even if that hope is nothing more than 
contributing in some way to the lives of others (‘The life of significant soil’
8
 ). And so we continue to 
journey, we continue trying (‘For most of us, this is the aim / Never here to be realised; / We are only 
undefeated/ Because we have gone on trying’
9
).  
Williams concludes the lecture by summarising the themes of the Quartets thus far. As has already 
been said, within the Quartets themselves, there has been a movement away from the ‘ecstatic’ 
solution of Burnt Norton: in East Coker, the solution to the problem or time is a sheer waiting in ‘hope’ 
and ‘love’ while The Dry Salvages points towards an abandonment of security, and entering a path of 
risk that has its basis in the incarnation. There is ‘the threat of sheer chaos, of meaningless and all-
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engulfing flux’ and yet we are promised something more: ‘the vision of time in the hands of God, as 
the means of our purification, the apparently impersonal rhythms of the non-human and pre-human 
environment as reflecting, pointing to God’s action in history’ and more significantly ‘God’s passion in 
time’ in which ‘time is revealed as ‘in the hands of God’ not by any unquestionable, perspicuous and 
triumphant epiphany, but in the shipwreck of a human life’.
1
 He goes on to say, expounding this theme 
of divine passion by saying  
 
‘God, wounded as we are wounded, existing as a human being in time, is revealed as 
compassionate, in the strict sense of the word: he suffers fear, darkness, and 
meaninglessness, exactly
2
 as we do. And if God is seen as voluntarily joining us in our 
condition, His whole activity, of creation as well as redemption, is revealed as 
‘compassionate’. The ‘kenotic’ impulse which brings God into time as man reflects the 
‘kenosis’ of creation, the initial self-abandoning of God to darkness, to a freedom which He 
makes to be other than Himself out of love. The darkness of created temporal existence is 
sustained at every point by this kenotic compassion of the Creator. God’s ‘acceptance’, in 
creation and incarnation, calls men to respond, by themselves accepting the same darkness, 
the same death, mirroring the self-renouncing act of God: so that through the darkness we 
may touch the hands and know them as healing…God is present beyond the chaos of 
temporality, withdrawn on the far side, yet with us in our own launching into the deep. God’s 
effectual absence from temporal process, the absence of an overruling power evident in the 
contingencies of history, is, paradoxically our reason for accepting, embracing this history, 
grounded in the paradoxical presence and absence of God
3
 in the life of Jesus – present only 
as hidden and ineffective, in the last analysis, hidden on the Cross.’
4
  
 
To sum up what has been said in the Quartets thus far: we have seen that, as the Quartets have 
progressed, the solution to the problem of time suggested in Burnt Norton, the ecstatic moment 
outside of historical flux, has been rejected as unsatisfactory since time itself is left unredeemed. East 
Coker in response to this problematic sought to emphasize an entering into history, an embrace of 
death, and a further entry into the ‘dark night’ in order for a wholeness of vision to appear, one not 
circumscribed by speculation or fantasy. Such a movement is energized by the posture of waiting in 
faith and love, not by asserting an imposed order on to time, or by engaging in fantastical projection.   
The Dry Salvages sought deepen further the insights of East Coker by suggesting that our living in 
time involves risk and abandonment, which opens us in a minimalist sense to hope, a hope in which 
our lives may contribute to the lives of future generations. With this, we move onto the final poem of 
the series.  
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(d) Little Gidding – The Crowned Knot of Fire  
 
According to Williams, Little Gidding has ‘a certain finality’ about it – not only because it concludes 
the cycle of poems but also because it was one of the last poems Eliot wrote.
1
 Williams suggests that 
it represents Eliot’s closest approach to ‘a reconciliation with language’.
2
 More than the other poems, 
Little Gidding attempts assert a strong emphasis on historical particularity, respecting the fact that 
even though ‘history in itself is silent about God’, it does point to God. In Williams’ estimation, 
interpreting Eliot’s intention (through some Wittgensteinian lenses), preserving the ‘silence’ of history 
may in itself by revelatory because it allows God to make Godself manifest. Such an opinion finds 
basis in what the earlier poems have said about the darkness and silence of God in history, and 
further, how the incarnation and death of Jesus point to God, even within absence and apparent 
Godlessness. Such a silence can be ‘revelatory if it is allowed to be itself and not distorted through 
the prism of system–making and ‘explanation’, the struggle of the ego for conceptual control of the 
world.’
3
 Further, the emphasis in the poem on historically particular places and events has provoked 
many readers to see the poem as an ‘icon’ of ‘sacramental Christianity’.
4
 
The poem opens with a reflection on ‘Midwinter spring’, the experience of a warm day in midst of 
winter’s frost. The occurrence of such an event seems to provoke the conclusion that generally it is 
possible to find some warmth and comfort, despite the coldness and deadness of winter. And further, 
speaking more metaphorically, might we not also, if we look close enough, find comfort and 
consolation when death seems to surround us. ‘Midwinter spring’ still remains a part of the seasonal 
changes and the natural cycles, and yet it might point to a particular event from which comfort may 
spring – a ‘pentecostal fire/ In the dark time of the year’
5
. Such a unique and particular event can 
however in its ‘concrete form’ become ‘the indispensable vehicle of the unchanging significance. 
Independently of our approach, when we come and where from, there is an objective continuity of 
meaning in this place: objective because it is in no way our creation.’
6
 In the words of the poem itself, 
this punctiliar event is not a construct of our fancy because ‘…what you thought you came for / Is only 
a shell, a husk of meaning / From which the purpose breaks only when it is fulfilled.’ And further: ‘If 
you came this way, / Taking any route, starting from anywhere, / At any time or at any season, / It 
would always be the same’.
7
 In light of such an event, we have to abandon ‘Sense and notion’ and go 
the way of prayer and attention to the ‘intractably given’. The way of prayer is the way of surrender 
because it constitutes ‘a non-conceptual response’ to the ‘given’, one that is ‘deeper than any 
‘conscious…act’.
8
 Through attention to the ‘given’, the sheer historical ‘thereness’ of the world, we can 
discover that ‘…the communication / Of the dead is tongued with fire beyond the language of the 
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living.’
1
 Here again we have a reference to ‘the timeless moment’ which ‘Is England and nowhere. 
Never and always’
2
 but again we cannot equate this with ecstasy or fantasy because the ‘moment’ is 
tied to a specific time and place, namely England, and the here and now in which history has reached 
a specific point.   
The second section of the poem continues the theme of historical particularity, and it draws its 
imagery from Eliot’s experience as an air-raid warden during World War II. Eliot alludes here to 
Heraclitean imagery (air, wind, fire, earth) to make a slightly different point (than Heraclitus that is) 
about ‘the destitution of human existence and human effort.’
3
 It is also well-known that this section of 
the poem is influenced by Dante (particularly the Inferno), but further it seems that there are allusions 
to other poetic figures as well. The section describes Eliot meeting ‘a familiar compound ghost’
4
 (who 
seems to be an amalgamation of various poets and voices), who along with Eliot had a concern for 
speech, and it is was such speech that ‘impelled us / To purify the dialect of the tribe’
5
, an attempt 
which is revealed, according to Williams, as ‘frustration and waste’
6
 since time has shown – 
retrospectively – that all attempts to purify language fall far short of their goal, because hidden 
motives and dynamics are revealed in the process which question the earlier attempts at purification.  
In section three he returns to the theme of historical particularity in which we ‘recognise things as 
significant in themselves, as not depending on us for their importance’
7
. And further: ‘Particularities, 
concrete finite realities, of necessity have their imperfections, yet they unite, in a pattern of unified 
beauty.’
8
 However, such a perspective of unity and beauty is only seen as we look back since unity, is 
‘a function of our perspective as heirs of the world’. Meaning is ‘present in every moment of time; but 
it is for others, it is never accessible in the present to the individual subject.’ As such, this section 
constitutes one of Eliot’s ‘most careful and honest passages, a decisive turning away from any kind of 
archaism, while affirming most positively the authentic value of the past’.
9
  
The fourth section is in Williams’ estimation is the ‘finest of the many superb lyrical passages’ to 
found in the Quartets. The imagery here, of ‘The dove descending breaks the air / With flame of 
incandescent terror’ in which we are placed with ‘…the choice of pyre or pyre - / To be redeemed from 
fire by fire’
10
, points both to the events of Pentecost and the bombing of London during the war. As 
such, metaphorically speaking, we have put before us two understandings of history: is it ‘the vortex 
of annihilation’ or ‘the cauterising iron of the divine surgeon’
11
. We cannot escape the question, nor 
find solace in some ecstatic moment removed from history (‘…human power cannot remove’
12
); rather 
‘We only live, only suspire / Consumed by either fire or fire.’
13
 There is no other choice before us. 
According to Eliot, such an experience is founded upon the working out of Love in history (presumably 
a reference to God). Williams goes on to comment and say: ‘The Incarnation validates history, indeed; 
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but what this means in practice is that it condemns us to history, to unresolved tensions, to the clash 
of apparent absolutes, to puzzlement and darkness, failure, death, all seen as the only mode of 
created existence possible, and to the only vehicle of salvation possible’.
1
 This manifestation of Love 
is strange, but as we have come to expect in the poem ‘our expectations are wellnigh [sic] bound to 
stand in the way of clear and true vision’.
2
 
In the final section of Little Gidding, the themes of the ‘beginning’ and the ‘end’ resurface again, 
alluding particularly to East Coker. Reference to ‘the end is where we start from’ implies that ‘death, 
silence, darkness’ are ‘our initiation into the world of meaning’, are ‘our birth out of the womb of 
humility.’
3
 Reflecting this reality, a reconciliation with language is possible because it can ‘dance’ to 
‘the measure of the world, reflecting and respecting its ambiguities and silences’, and can even reflect 
‘a kind of death’
4
 since ‘Every phrase and every sentence is an end and a beginning, / Every poem an 
epitaph.’
5
 Williams goes on to say that, according to Eliot, we must ‘accept and share the flux of the 
world, the process of generation and corruption, accepting and sharing even in moments of utter 
failure, destitution, and extinction’ since it is through this process that we can experience ‘our 
redemption from the prison of temporality’.
6
 This redemption does not amount to ‘the abrogation of 
history’ since ‘A people without history / Is not redeemed from time’ because ‘…history is a pattern / 
Of timeless moments.’
7
 These ‘timeless moments’ form a ‘totality’ of ‘all possible historical 
configurations, each one significant’, and are ‘timeless’ in the sense that they constitute ‘meaning for 
others’ outside of its ‘form of limitation’. Taking this into account implies that even when past historical 
events, people, and individuals seem to end in failure, they have made ‘the place what it is for those 
who succeed’ and have created through their death ‘a vehicle of meaning’.
8
  
Thereafter, Williams moves to a conclusion of the lecture series. He writes that throughout the 
Quartets, we have ‘learned to recognise the hand of love in history, drawing us onwards towards 
death which will ‘fructify in the lives of others’, calling us to continue on our way in ‘unknowing’ and 
trust’, in a continued ‘exploration’ which will find its goal in ‘the full acceptance of our starting-point – 
our selves [sic] in our present condition…There is a final ‘retour-en-soi’, in which we learn fully to ‘live 
our own subjectivity’ in each moment, to live in full awareness of where and who we are, which is the 
root of all our action and speculation.’
9
 Such a subjectivity, as should be realised now, is not an 
attempt of the subject to escape from history into a ‘timeless’ moment since even that ‘timeless’, 
ecstatic moment is now included in ‘the crowned knot of fire’, along with other moments and events, 
and is given its due respect and attention. As Williams has reiterated throughout the lectures, there 
has been a movement away from the vision of Burnt Norton as providing the solution to the 
redemption of time. Burnt Norton was characterised by ‘a sense of fatality in the fixed, given character 
of the present moment’ which results in ‘the need for redemption outside this structure’. But as Eliot 
moved through the Quartets, he realised that this conclusion was unsatisfactory. As Williams 
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summarises: the Quartets constitute ‘an extended exploration of man’s historical consciousness; and 
the significant modification that occurs in the course of this exploration is that man [sic] ceases to be 
seen…as a subject ‘over-against’ his historical environment’. Instead Eliot offers ‘a picture of man as 
irrevocably bound to this environment’ in which ‘authenticity’ is not found by ‘the act of the heroic 
individual defying the enmity of circumstance, but by living through and with circumstance’.
1
 And all 
this is grounded upon the fact – in Williams’ view – that the Quartets move towards ‘the acceptance of 
historical ambiguities by way of an incarnational theology’.
2
 However, as we have already mentioned 
before, this is done without explicit reference to ‘God’ (only East Coker does this). In Williams’ 
estimation, this points to the fact that the ‘theology’ of the Quartets is ‘pre-eminently, negative, 
apophatic’ not only because there is reference to the language of St. John of the Cross, but also 
because ‘they are themselves, in their entirety, an essay in ‘apophatic’ statement’, that the entire 
sequence of poems constitute ‘a search for the silence within speech.’
3
 
But does all this talk of negative theology ignore ‘the revelatory aspects of the Incarnation?’ In 
Williams’ opinion, Eliot refuses ‘to operate with any simple notion of revelation that might solve this 
problem’ and that his refusal of explicitly theistic language is a testament to his ‘success’ in dealing 
with the problem since ‘the explicit introduction of theistic language would be, in his terms, an attempt 
to ‘get behind’ the world to a God uninvolved in it, and thus a denial of the incarnation itself. If God is 
involved in the world, then it is a world in which there are no absolutely self-authenticating marks of 
His presence; and if we are to be true to the world, we must represent it as it really is, in its practical 
‘Godlessness’’. For Eliot, ‘‘the place of ‘meaning’ is the senseless flux of history, and the place of the 
Incarnation is the place where God is overwhelmed, defeated, by time. God is known as active in time 
only in His passion in time.’
4
  
This leads Williams to reflect on the question of the historical Jesus
5
 (a question as hotly debated 
then as it is today). In this text, Williams believes that the life of Jesus ‘cannot compel faith’ and may 
even be ‘the object of doubt as much as faith’. Jesus continues to remain a σκάνδαλον (scandal) and 
a point of κρίσις (decision, judgement) since the manifestation of God in time always carries with it the 
paradoxical quality of ‘sharing in the general characteristics of time – the absence of obvious and 
unambiguous theistic references’ and as such ‘there will be no relief, no solution, or total clarification 
within history’ in relation to this problem.
6
  
Concluding the lectures, Williams reflects on the problem that this lack of theistic imagery has on 
our interpretation of the poem. As has been already mentioned, some interpret Eliot’s reflections in 
the Quartets to be little more than a thinly-veiled Manichaeism. Others, however, take the opposite 
route and interpret the poems as a ‘labyrinthine Christian cryptogram’ in which every line must contain 
some hidden theological ‘message’.
7
 Williams rather seeks to move between these two poles and 
suggests that Eliot has ‘imaginatively embodied his belief so faithfully that its theological or dogmatic 
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structure is left almost totally unspoken’. Furthermore, if the theological presuppositions are accepted, 
some may consider Eliot’s interpretation of the incarnation to be ‘bleak and pessimistic’, but what Eliot 
is attempting to do is to expound a theologia crucis in which ‘darkness and defeat’ are used for our 
liberation, in which in spite of everything ‘we call this Friday good’
1
 so that while – admittedly - the 
vision of Quartets is ultimately ‘tragic’ it is not ‘pessimistic’.
2
  
Such reflections lead Williams to talk about the contemporary situation of the church within the 
world: the church has to be awakened again to its call to ‘poverty and humility’, and theology has to 
take into account ‘the ambiguities inherent in faith’ without seeking refuge in ‘rationalism’ or 
‘reductionism’ which seek to eliminate ‘the incarnational paradox’. And he goes on to say that only ‘if 
we are ready to look honestly at the world’s dereliction and understand what is involved in claiming 
that this is the theatre of God’s action, can we begin to talk about transfiguration and healing; only 
when we have some idea of how difficult it is to speak of God’s action at all can we intelligibly speak 
of His saving action.’
3
 
 
3.5. Summary  
 
We are in a position now to summarise what Williams has been saying thus far. Throughout the 
lectures, Williams argued that we have to read the poems as a dialogue of voices
4
, rather than a 
single developing line of thought. As the Quartets progress, there is a process of revision, 
questioning, and dialectic that continues to unfold. This means that we need to be reticent about 
assuming that a particular verse or passage represents Eliot’s viewpoint, without taking into account 
the whole movement of the poems themselves. We have seen that each poem seems to develop a 
certain theme that is formed in response to or in contrast to the poem that preceded it.  
Burnt Norton response to the meaninglessness of time came in the form of the ecstatic, timeless 
moment in which meaning was to be found - a moment outside of time, and the historical continuum. 
However, East Coker responded to this by saying that such an escape does not solve the problem of 
how time itself is redeemed. We live as historical beings, and if history in itself cannot be redeemed, 
then it means that redemption will not reach us either. The perspective East Coker sought to develop 
was that a redemptive vision can only be glimpsed if we accept the way things are, by entering more 
fully into the meaninglessness and darkness of history, in hope that some kind of healing and 
redemption may be experienced and glimpsed. Such a perspective is grounded upon the narrative of 
divine incarnation – ‘the wounded surgeon’ – who enters into history fully in order to redeem it. To 
quote Ben Myers, in his summary of the lectures: ‘God’s loving endurance of the world produces a 
new and redemptive vision of what is, in itself, tragically disordered.’
5
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The Dry Salvages however sought to emphasize the disjunction between humanity and the natural 
orders of the world. The world and its movements seem to carry on, impervious to the existence of 
humanity. In this context, the question is asked: how can the incarnation make a difference when the 
wheel of nature and fortune continues to turn without consideration for us? Despite this challenging 
question, the poem does suggest that there is a story preserved by nature, by ‘the river’ - a history of 
disaster and wreckage, but a history nonetheless. In this context, our response cannot be to escape 
these movements since that would be only a flight into fancy, into the ‘world of speculation’. Our 
response can only be to accept risk and abandon ourselves to the seeming ‘Godlessness’ of time. 
Again, this done in reference to the incarnation, and the dereliction of the cross (‘The hint half-
guessed, the gift half-understood, is Incarnation).   
Little Gidding is the most hopeful poem of the series. It suggests that while history may seem to 
consist in nothing more than death and dereliction, there remains the hope of ‘Midwinter spring’, the 
‘pentecostal fire’, which while not separated from the movements of time, does provide a way of 
understanding time in meaningful way. Amidst the coldness of winter, there remains the possibility of 
warmth and healing. Amidst the fire of destruction, there remains another fire, a pentecostal one, in 
which the concrete moments of time of gathered together into redemptive possibility (‘All shall be well 
and / All manner of things shall be well’
1
). But it is only through enduring time that we can see 
redemptive possibility; we cannot escape time, or extract ourselves but have to submit ourselves to 
the frightening flame of Love as we encounter it in the vortex of time.   
What all this implies for Williams own view of tragedy and time will be developed further in the next 
chapter when we look at the trajectory of the Four Quartets in Williams’ later reflections of the theme. 
What can be said at this stage is that through an emersion in these texts from early on (influenced 
also no doubt by the general theological trend of MacKinnon), Williams was fully acquainted with a 
kind of ‘tragic realism’ which sought to emphasize the irreducibility of the ‘tragic’ as we encounter in 
our personal and collective histories. The point that Eliot drove home for Williams was that we cannot 
seek to escape time to find meaning to history – it is only in time that the problems of time can be 
overcome (‘Only through time time is conquered’).
2
 It is only through enduring time that we can truly 
see a redemptive vision which is not subject to the world of fantasy and projection. To quote Myers 
again: ‘The possibility of the world’s transformation…emerges from endurance, from a truthful and 
unprotected seeing of what is really there.’
3
 This means that already at this stage, Williams’ 
understanding of tragedy cannot be ultimately defeatist or pessimistic; hope does remain, but the 
hope that remains is one that has been purged through the fire and ‘torment’ of divine love. In other 
words, it is through learning to see the world as it truly is, in all its tragic and painful contours, not 
escaping into the world of speculation, that we are able to glimpse a hopeful vision – even as it is 
chastened by the onslaught of doubt. History does not provide easy solutions, and God’s presence in 
the world is not unambiguous or apparent, it remains paradoxical, a presence-in–absence. To quote 
                                               
1
 Little Gidding V, 209.  
2
 Burnt Norton II, 180. One should reference here, since it would important for Williams thought as well, the rule of Gregory 
Nazianzen in relation to classical atonement theology whereby what is not assumed is also not healed.  
3
 Myers, Christ the Stranger, 25.  
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Eliot himself: ‘the demon of doubt is…inseparable from the spirit of belief.
1
 That is, hope must pass 
through the funnel of tragedy and doubt if it is not to be just a variation of wishful thinking, or a facile 
utopianism. Redemption and meaning remain real options in world, since according to the confession 
of the Christian church, the sheer thereness of the incarnation – God’s entry into time – means that 
meaninglessness does not have the last word. To quote Shakespeare: ‘the worst is not / so long as 
we can say, ‘This is the worst’’.’
2
 To see the world as it desperately is is already to see something 
beyond it.  
In relation to the motifs that are important for Williams’ own developing theory of the tragic, we can 
see that the Quartet lectures exemplify his focus on contingency, in the sense that the factor of time is 
taken seriously and is deemed to be central for Williams understanding of the tragic. Taking time 
seriously, being attentive to its contours, makes one realise that tragedy is simply a part of living 
within time. Suffering, apparent meaninglessness, and even chaos are products of radical 
contingency. Furthermore, our attention to the particular shape of history, and its tragic 
consequences, help us to leave ‘the world of speculation’, open us to the ‘objectivity’ of the world. 
Such a motif coheres with Williams’ practice of contemplation, confirming a practice we find 
throughout Williams’ work, and in relation to his treatment of the tragic in particular in which the tragic 
is taken in its full ‘objectivity’. And lastly, we have seen that by focusing on tragedy Williams sought to 
expound an understanding of Christian hope that does not bypass the difficultly of history. 
Redemption cannot be envisioned through bypassing the world; and it is through the incarnation that 
we are able to impute meaning to the fluctuations of time. But this does not mean that we have 
thereby overcome the difficulty that tragedy proposes. As we saw when we examined Williams’ essay 
on ‘The Spirit of the Age to Come’, Christian hope must be understood within the context of tragedy, 
and such a hope cannot look past the horrors that history proposes – the starkness and the difficulty 
remain. The question is (as Williams penned in a review around the same time), what ‘eschatology 
can cope with this [the epiphany of human catastrophe] without diminishing its seriousness?’
3
 
Williams’ is not pessimistic or despairing, but rather seeks to emphasise a tragically realistic vision 
that does not bypass the problem and question that human suffering continues to propose. Ben Myers 
confirms this opinion by saying that for Williams ‘Whatever Christian eschatology might mean, it 
cannot posit any final triumph over human imperfection and limitation. To eliminate tragedy would be 
to do away with the difference that makes us human.’
4
 He continues elsewhere to say that ‘Christian 
hope is most pronounced where history is experienced as a spiritual catastrophe. Christian hope does 
not invalidate the tragic vision, but reaffirms it – just as Christ’s resurrection does not cancel out the 
crucifixion, but transfigures it and discloses its inner significance.’
5
 Such a vision is tied to Williams’ 
‘imaginative asceticism’ whereby ‘eschatological language is legitimate only to the extent that it 
refuses to posit any theory of the end.’
6
 This perspective can be more briefly summarised in the words 
of Silouan the Athonite (1866-1938), a Russian Orthodox theologian and mystic: ‘Keep your mind in 
                                               
1
 T.S Eliot, ‘Introduction’ [1958] in Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans W.F. Trotter (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 2003), 
xv.  
2
 King Lear 4.1.29-30.  
3
 ‘Christian Art and Cultural Pluralism: Reflections on “L’art de l’icone”, by Paul Evdokimov’, 42.  
4
 Christ the Stranger, 56.  
5
 Ibid., 94. 
6
 Ibid., 95.  
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hell – and despair not’.
1
 That is, the challenge we are faced with is how we are to conceive of hope 
and a genuine visionary consciousness within the infernal and sometimes terrifying undulations of 
history.  
In this sense, what Eliot and Williams seem to be proposing is an understanding of redemption 
that is able to adapt itself to the specific contours of history and time, and the particularities of tragedy. 
‘What is not assumed is not healed’ (Gregory Nazianzen), and so the redemption of time and tragedy 
needs to give dignity to these realities of human development and temporality, not simply effacing 
them, or cutting the Gordian knot (eschatologically speaking). How we are to understand the 
redemption of temporality and tragic suffering, without erasing its quiddity remains a challenge for 
theology. Consequently, if I am permitted to extrapolate a little, our theology will need to adopt a 
soteriological perspective which is able to hold onto (if I can coin the term) a redemption-of structure 
(in analogous sense to way Lacan and Badiou speak of an ethics-of structure)
2
, within the context of 
an orthodox, Christo-pneumatological understanding of salvation, one that ‘shapes’ and ‘conforms’ 
itself to the particular events, by making them ‘present’ through the kenotic, transformative, poetic, 
and diversifying agency of the Spirit
3
 (a kind of soteriological Aufhebung if you will) in which the 
resurrection does not cancel out limitation, temporality, or even (necessarily) the wounds of tragedy, 
but rather gives them the dignity they have, especially in regard to the personal identities of those who 
have been formed by such realities. Or to use more classically Christian idioms (referencing Gregory 
of Nyssa, Augustine, and Maximus the Confessor), the human ‘soul’ (psychē) is ‘always implicated in 
contingent matter, and even its final pilgrimage into God depends…upon the deployment and 
integration of bodiliness and animality’
4
 so that the particular eidos or imago dei is not cancelled by 
the resurrection, but rather redeems individuals in all their narrative particularity
5
, including those 
experiences of pain and tragedy which have in some sense been constitutive of a particular person’s 
narrativized identity.  
 Nonetheless (it should be admitted), after all of this one could debate with Williams’ interpretation 
of the poems. One could argue that his interpretation of Eliot is tendentious in places, and that he 
smooths out some of the rough edges. Rupert Shortt – Williams’ biographer – says as much in his 
summary of the lectures.
6
 In relation to the idea of incarnation and historical embodiment, Terry 
Eagleton says that the Quartets are ‘performative contradiction’ in which the form of the poem is ‘at 
odds with its content’, particularly in relation to the underlying theme of Eliot’s incarnational theology. 
Eagleton says that the Quartets in their cumulative effect imply two contrasting visions where ‘the 
                                               
1
 Quoted as an epigraph in Gillian Rose, Love’s Work (Great Britain: Vintage, 1995). For more biographical material on Staretz 
Silouan, as well as a commentary on this saying, which he apparently received in a divine vision, see Archimandrite Sophrony, 
The Monk of Mount Athos: Staretz Silouan 1866-1938, trans. Rosemary Edmonds (London-Oxford: Mowbrays, 1973).  
2
 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. Peter Hallward (London-New York: Verso, 2001), 27-28.  
3
 Ingolf U. Dalferth, Malum: Theologische Hermeneutik des Bösen (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 113-117; Ingolf U. Dalferth, 
Becoming Present: An Inquiry into the Christian Sense of the Presence of God (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 152-156. By way of 
analogy, to clarify what I mean, the ‘poetic’ agency of  the Spirit would need to enact a redemption of temporality in a 
comparable way to the way an artist transforms suffering into painting or poetry. One thinks here of Paul Celan’s attempt to 
write a form of poetry after Auschwitz that sought to conform the German language to the historical experience of the 
extermination camps, thereby redeeming the German language, while at the same time taking account of existential rupture 
that Auschwitz-Birkenau created for language.   
4
 Williams, ‘Macrina’s Deathbed Revisited: Gregory of Nyssa on Mind and Passion’, 244. 
5
 Ibid., 245.  
6
 Shortt, Rowan’s Rule, 90.  
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incarnation makes all the difference and no difference at all’. In Eagleton’s opinion, ‘the poetry 
remains resolutely anti-incarnational’.
1
  
Now obviously such an eminent opinion has implications for Williams own strongly incarnational 
interpretation of the poems. However, I cannot here engage fully in details seeking to defend Williams 
own exegesis against those who would interpret the Quartets differently, or formulate how Williams 
himself might respond to such opinions. In relation to Eagleton’s interpretation, Williams might say 
that one cannot focus on the collective vision of the poems together, since there are parts – as we 
have seen in Burnt Norton – where an anti-incarnational perspective does seem to surface. However, 
Williams would argue that Eliot does not remain there: instead he moves beyond such a perspective 
to a more incarnational vista in which time and the difficulties it involves are taken up into the ambit of 
redemption. Instead of summarising the poetic vision of the Quartets in a singular manner, Williams 
would advocate a dramatic or diachronic reading
2
 whereby the poems are read within the context of 
movement, development, and change – amidst the differing voices that clamour within. Again, I 
cannot guarantee such an opinion against further critique, but I believe that Williams has an offered 
an interpretation of the Quartets which deserves to be taken seriously. Our purposes here, however, 
have been primarily to see how Eliot’s vision within the Quartets had an impact of Williams own 
appropriation of tragic theology, as it relates to a resolute historical consciousness.  
In this chapter, I have sought to map how a tragic vision made its way into Williams’ thought 
processes. I have shown that the seeds are laid early on for the later flowering of Williams’ more 
mature thought. By examining the thought of MacKinnon, and some of Williams’ early texts, we have 
shown that Williams appropriated a tragic understanding of theology and history from an early stage 
in his development. At this early stage, tragedy is entwined with questions of time and the movement 
of history. Tragedy occurs because we live as creatures bounded by time – a possibility which we 
cannot escape as long as we live as creatures within time. And yet, Williams does not adopt a 
pessimistic vision but rather a strongly realist one in which the ineffaceability of tragedy is taken 
seriously within the context of a critically-circumscribed understanding of eschatological hope and 
God’s ultimate victory. Such a hope has to proceed through the fires of purgation, through the dark 
night of the tragedy so that Christian hope may be truly a desire for redemption of this world – a world 
of loss, of the irreparable  
In the following chapter, I will develop our genealogical study further by showing how the insights 
displayed in the Quartets lectures are developed further in later years. I shall focus on Williams’ 
understanding of the poetic, in relation to his emphasis on taking the tragic nature of the world 
seriously. Further, we shall attempt to show how Williams’ suspicion of ‘fantasy’ developed more 
pertinently in the period following his lectures on the Quartets.  
 
 
 
                                               
1
 Eagleton, Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 49.  
2
 In fact, in his essay on ‘The Discipline of Scripture’ (On Christian Theology, 44-59) Williams explicitly uses the Four Quartets 
as an example for such a diachronic or dramatic text (pp. 45-47), one that if read outside of this movement will be 
misinterpreted since one moment of the text is extracted from the trajectory of the entire movement.  
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4. The World of Speculation  
 
In this chapter I hope to map out a little more the influence that the Quartets had on Williams’ later 
published reflections. I shall focus here on some essays and sermons, some explicitly focusing on this 
trajectory, and others in which the theme appears only in a tangential way. I aim to show that while 
Williams understanding of this theme matures in his later reflections, the starkness of the vision has 
not dissipated. In fact, in some cases, it has become even more pointed and emphasised, even if the 
language has changed a little. In our examination, we shall begin with those texts written shortly after 
or around the same time that he delivered his lectures on the Quartets, and work our way up to those 
texts that are more recent. Some significant texts
1
 have been left out of this genealogy and have 
rather been postponed to the following chapter since while they are connected to the discussed 
theme, they are part of a slightly distinct trajectory which should be teased out separately. 
Remembering our themes of contingency, compassion, contemplation, and non-closure, we will focus 
our attention particularly on the themes of contemplation and compassion. In the first essay we will 
examine we will see that Williams’ emphasis on contemplation is related to the process of artistic and 
creative endeavour. The practice of contemplation is linked to a poetic, artistic sensibility and 
imagination, which is linked to the experience of tragedy. The artist, through opening himself or 
herself to reality as it presents itself, is able to enact a protest against the world as it stands by 
seeking to find an alternative possible world within the reality that confronts us. 
Furthermore, we will see that the theme of fantasy also comes to the fore in way that is more 
accented than we find in the Four Quartets lectures. Williams’ largely negative stance in relation to 
fantasy
2
 is related to his understanding of Christian spirituality. For him, fantasy is largely entwined 
with the ego’s attempt to construct a world of self-protection and self-placating in which God becomes 
just one more palliative used in the ego’s attempt to mollify itself. Williams’ more accentuated 
emphasis on this theme here, while being grounded on his Augustinian sensibilities towards truthful 
self-confession, is to be explained by his deeper engagement with Freud during the late 1970’s and 
early 1980’s. It is within this context that the experience of contemplation and the experience of the 
‘dark night’ enter as a kind of antidote to the projection theory of religion which was articulated so 
forcefully by Freud and others.    
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 I am referring here to ‘Trinity and Ontology’, Williams’ most sustained engagement with the work of Donald MacKinnon, a text 
which was published originally in the Festschrift for MacKinnon (Christ, Ethics and Tragedy, edited by Kenneth Surin), but now 
collected in On Christian Theology. I have chosen to devote a chapter, along with his reflections on theodicy to another 
separate section.  
2
 It should be clear here that Williams’ is not opposed to ‘fantasy’ in its more neutral sense, since ‘fantasy’ and ‘imagination’, for 
example, often interplay with one another. Williams’ suspicion of ‘fantasy’, when he is referring to it negatively, implies a retreat 
from the world, or when it is used to pacify the ego in its self-referentiality against the resistant otherness of reality as its 
presents itself. His critique of ‘fantasy’ would fall generally under his suspicion of cheap consolation, and no doubt has echoes 
of Iris Murdoch (amidst others) within it.  I want to thank Robert Vosloo making me aware of the possible misunderstanding 
regarding this distinction.   
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4.1. ‘Poetic and Religious Imagination’ (1977) 
 
In an early sermon that Williams delivered about a year after the Four Quartets lectures, the 
influence of the Eliot’s vision can still be seen when he says that God will not wipe the tears from our 
eyes until ‘we have learned to weep’.
1
 As we have seen in the general thrust of the lectures (as 
expounded in the previous chapter), Williams is concerned here to articulate an understanding of 
redemption and healing that does not bypass the reality of suffering, pain, and the existence of the 
tragedy within time. The emphasis on experiencing healing only through engaging with the reality of 
the world’s tragic contingency is still present here. In the same year, Williams published an essay on 
Christology in which some of the language found in the Quartets lectures resurfaces, particularly in 
relation to God’s passion within time (‘God is revealed in the death of Jesus, revealed in his cry of 
dereliction, revealed in Gethsemane, all this is straining language to the breaking point; because what 
we are affirming is that God is revealed by his absence, revealed in the condition of ‘Godlessness’…a 
world of chaos, anguish and senselessness’.)
2
 However, the most sustained published work from this 
period that engages explicitly in the themes contained in the Four Quartets lectures is to be found in 
an article he wrote on the topic of poetic and religious imagination.
3
 We shall engage with this text in 
more detail.  
Williams writes that ‘Poetry it seems is not grounded in some celebratory sense of being at home 
in the world, but rather in the acute awareness of the world not being at home in itself, in a sense of 
dislocation.’
4
 The background literary context for this statement, and the essay as a whole, is the 
biblical narrative of Job. In this context, Williams argues that Job turns away from ‘the neat, facile 
explanations, solutions and evaluations which his comforters import into his disordered experience.’ 
Rather, as the end of the book shows (cf. Job 37-42), ‘The brutal and overwhelming monologue which 
[YHWH] addresses to Job and his friends is essentially a long statement of the utter alienness and 
inaccessibility of the order of the world to the mind of man, the impossibility of an ordered linguistic 
picture of it.’
5
 Williams’ argument in this essay is that artistic endeavour and poetic representation of 
the world are not mere resignation or a mere acceptance of the way the world is, but rather – with Job 
– a refusal to accept ‘the world as it is’.
6
 Job refusal to accept the world as it is forms a protest against 
the disorderedness of reality since Job understands experience as ‘a question which can only be 
answered with more questions. His world is not a complete structure to which there can be only a 
passive response, nor is it a problem to which he, his consciousness, is the solution. It is a disordered 
flux within which he has to find a place; but this finding of a place (a possible definition of personal 
maturity) is also to adopt a 'position', in every sense: to make an option about reality, to be committed 
to a 'direction'… of and in the world.’7 
                                               
1
 Williams, ‘To Give and Not to Count the Cost: A Sermon Preached at Mirfield in February 1976’. Sobernost: The Journal of 
the Fellowship and St. Alban and St. Sergius 7.5 (1977), 403. 
2
 Williams, “Person’ and ‘Personality’ in Christology’, Downside Review 94 (1976), 259. The language to be found in his lecture 
on The Dry Salvages is the closest parallel to the language used here.  
3
 Williams, ‘Poetic and Religious Imagination’. Theology 80 (1977), 178-187.  
4
 Ibid., 178.  
5
 Ibid.  
6
 Ibid. 179.  
7
 Ibid.  
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Following Jacques Maritain, Williams seeks to advance an understanding of poetic enterprise 
which desires to construct ‘a world more real than the reality offered to the senses'.
1
 In the artistic 
process of creation and representation, Williams says that ‘the poet adds to the world (as does every 
artist), to the totality of language; thereby proclaiming his dissatisfaction with the existing world and 
existing linguistic options. The reality before him [sic] is obscurely incomplete: it proposes to the poet 
the task of making it significant - which does not mean imposing upon it an alien structure of 
explanation. Significance is a function of communication, and as such is social and political: it is a 
setting of something in a new context, a creation of new possibilities of understanding and 
appropriating the world in human language.’
2
 
Moving on, he says that before poetry is able to do the work of re-creation there must be ‘an 
entirely committed immersion in the world, a watching and listening in silence’. However, ‘the deeper 
this immersion becomes, the less is it possible to translate the world into new words, new images.’ 
This is because ‘the world moves towards its future, but this is not at my disposal.’
3
 Here again the 
theme of redemption returns particularly regarding the ability to make sense and meaning of the world 
(a theme we have encountered in the Quartets lectures). The language of ecstasy, a retreat simply 
into the present moment apart from the flux of time, does not give us a sense of the wholeness 
necessary for a redemption of time itself. An attempt to make sense of reality involves the risk of 
returning to language, in the hope that the labour of meaning-making and significance – as occurs 
within the realm of public discourse and negotiation – will bear some kind of fruit, some ‘grace’: ‘The 
return to language requires an act of faith; and an acceptance of the probability of failure. It is, as 
such, an exercise in radical humility and an expression of the hope of 'grace', communication 
surviving the perils of words.’
4
 While commenting on Little Gidding a little later in the essay, we again 
come across this idea of a redemptive vision that is only grasped through the process of death, 
fragility, and irony
5
: ‘Every word is a step towards death, yet the exploration must continue: death is 
the cost of honesty, of seeing clearly’. And it is only by taking this risk, this return to language and to 
the difficulties of the present, that we can see such a movement is ‘not simply a pointless and 
disastrous martyrdom, but is itself obscurely redemptive.’
6
 As such ‘Utter, unqualified silence is not a 
final option for the poet, because it is a retreat into pure subjective 'experience'. The poet, if he [sic] is 
at all serious, is already committed to the world, he has made moral options in his initial movement of 
                                               
1
 Ibid. It is interesting to note that Williams more mature reflections on art simply expound this initial insight further. The theme 
of patience, attention and time-taking in order to allow what is there to show itself remains an important insight in relation to 
Williams understanding of art, as we have already discussed in chapter two.  For more on this, cf. Williams, ‘Art: Taking Time 
and Making Sense’, 25-27.Cf. here also Paul Ricoeur’s comment on the poetic, one that would be influential on Williams’ later 
reflections on the topic of revelation: ‘…poetic language alone restores to us that participation-in or belonging-to an order of 
things which precedes our capacity to oppose ourselves to things taken as objects opposed to a subject. Hence the function of 
poetic discourse is to bring about this emergence of a depth-structure of belonging-to amid the ruins of descriptive discourse’, 
in Ricoeur, ‘Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation’. The Harvard Theological Review, 70.1-2 (1977), 24.  
2
 ‘Poetic and Religious Imagination’, 179-180.   
3
 Ibid. 181. Williams makes comparisons here with Simone Weil’s concept of ‘necessity’. It is here that he also quotes a 
segment of Burnt Norton III (Collected Poems, 181): ‘The world moves / In appetency, on its metalled ways / Of time past and 
time future.’ 
4
 Ibid. 182.  
5
 Williams is drawing here a parallel here between the experience of death, risk, and the self-ironizing of the poet. Here is a 
fuller quotation to give some context (Ibid., 184): ‘If irony is total absence, the poet can never be entirely an ironist: he has at 
last to confess what his whole utterance has pointed towards, his own incompleteness, exigency and poverty. To others, he 
may offer new possibilities, a renewal of speech, a kind of transfiguration or resurrection of language; but he, no less that other 
men [sic], is in need of mercy. His [sic] irony is a measure of his impotence to save himself: his words remain his words, he 
cannot avoid self-assertion, of however refined a kind’.   
6
 Ibid. 184.  
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protest, and so has bound himself to the task of changing the world, giving it 'direction'... His calling is 
to compassion.’ He rhapsodizes further by saying that ‘To 'consent to' the world is to recognize it as 
abandoned by God, devoid of the unambiguous signs of God's presence and activity, marked by the 
signs of absence; and this 'consent' is the source of compassion for the whole creation. It is this 
compassion, and nothing else which makes God present in the world, uniting creatures to God. To 
feel and show compassion to a creature is to accept it unconditionally, and this unconditional 
acceptance is precisely the action of God.’
1
 
The language of divine absence and compassion here some of themes we encountered earlier in 
our discussion of the Quartets lectures. What Williams seems to be saying here is that poet, by 
adopting a position of irony in relation to his or her words, does not adopt complete speechlessness 
because such a speechlessness would be out-of-sync with the poetic drive to protest against divine 
absence, and the seeming meaninglessness of the world. To return to language, to admit to the frailty 
and weakness that is inherent in our interactions with the world, opens us to the experience of 
compassion, which is a form of God’s action in the world, an opening of divine glory hidden within the 
experience of dereliction. The compassionate person, acknowledging the world as it is directs ‘the 
world towards reconciliation, brings the 'glory of God' into the world, even as he [sic] protests at its 
outrage. His protest witnesses to a 'possible future', the knowledge that things might be otherwise, a 
new world: in this sense, God is the future…the possibility of reconciliation. And the protest of 
compassion is his effective presence in the world, and so, in itself, a step towards the realization of 
that possibility.’
2
 For the poet (who may or not believe in God), the creative process involves an 
awareness of hope and the promise grace pointing towards the world’s ‘alternate possibilities’, to a 
grace that cannot ‘absolve us from that fanatical attention to particulars, to what the world is, to the 
linguistic past, without which our notions of 'experience' and 'reality' will be cheap and trivial. And the 
stirring of pity…cannot absolve us from the looking towards a future in which the trap of the past, the 
history of disaster and of failure…can be transcended; without this, there can only be cynicism, 
fatalism, or despair.’ Speaking of the poetic figure again: ‘On both these counts the poet is a humanist 
and a radical; that is to say, he is concerned with man and his future, or his redemption. He is also a 
converted man, one whose knowledge has changed him. He is the beginning of a new world, in his 
                                               
1
 Ibid. For more on the relation between tragic theology and an ethic of compassion, see Wendy Farley, Tragic Vision and 
Divine Compassion (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990).  
2
 ‘Poetic and Religious Imagination’, 185. As a side comment, it should be said that Williams would argue (following classical 
Christian thought) that we participate in God’s being–in–act of love and compassion, not God’s essence, since that would 
undermine the triunity of God. This seems to be Williams’ appropriation of the doctrine of theosis to be found in Eastern 
Orthodoxy. He is critical of certain trends within Orthodoxy (Lossky included) which seem to uncritically appropriate the thought 
of Gregory Palamite. For more on this, Williams, ‘The Philosophical Structures of Palamism’. Eastern Churches Review 9.1-2 
(1977), 27-44. Williams is uncomfortable with the whole ousia and energeia structure associated with Palamite theology. He 
seems to opt rather for the actus essendi of Aquinas: we as creatures participate ‘intentionally’ by grace in the Trinitarian being-
in-act of God, rather than in God’s essence itself. To participate in God’s essence would be to deny the trinity, but to distinguish 
the being of God into ousia and energeia (as Palamas does), making participation apply to the latter rather than the former, 
implies (within the philosophical tradition that Palamism inherits), that creation is necessary rather than contingent. Here, 
Williams prefers the solution of Aquinas; he is fond of quoting Eliot’s line from The Dry Salvages, ‘You are the music while the 
music lasts’ in this regard. For more reflections on this musical analogy, in relation to Williams understanding of our 
participation in the trinity, see Williams, ‘The Deflections of Desire’, 129-30. For more on the theme of theosis and deification, 
see Williams, ‘Deification’, in Gordon Wakefield (ed.), A Dictionary of Christian Spirituality (London: SCM 1983), 106-108.  
It could also be mentioned here, in relation to the Filioque debate, that Williams (referencing the work of Paul Evdokimov), once 
suggested that he thought that the model of the Son proceeding ex Patre Spirituque, in a comparable manner to the ex Patre 
Filioque, might be a more helpful model than the essence-energies distinction (though he did also go onto suggest that such 
suggestions, echoing Barth, might be ‘Godless speculations). For this comment, see Williams, ‘Review of Paul Evdokimov, 
L’Esprit Saint dans la Tradition Orthodoxe, Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1969. Sobornost: The Journal of the Fellowship of St Alban 
and St Sergius 6.4 (1972), 284-5. As far as I am aware, this was Williams’ first published contribution to a theological journal. 
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remaking, his reappropriation of his speech and his history. He is himself, for his hearers or readers, a 
sign of hope, however confused or desperate his biography may be. He has come back alive, though 
not unscathed, from the borders of language to confirm our suspicions that the world is not to be 
merely accepted, but accepted and transformed; to teach us how to praise the elusive possibility of 
God, the future we can never quite succeed in naming.’
1
 
Returning to the theme of dislocation, encountered at the beginning of the essay, Williams turns to 
another Old Testament figure – namely Jacob, and his encounter of wrestling with an ‘adversary’. He 
writes, firstly speaking more christologically, that ‘the Christian the name of God is Christ crucified, the 
ultimate symbol of dislocation’. Referencing the story in an almost midrashic manner, he says that for 
‘the poet the marks of his discontent and dislocation must be the 'name of God' the impulse which 
refuses to allow him to retreat from the exposed frontier, the deserted riverbank in the dark, but 
pushes him always back to his adversary and questioner, savage [YHWH] assaulting him out of the 
whirlwind. The poet praises, but he does not simply and unequivocally affirm and celebrate; if nothing 
else, he can praise the strength and resilience of his adversary, and of the world which he sees 
reflected in the adversary's eyes.’
2
 
To summarize what we have seen in this essay, we could say that while the focus of this essay is 
slightly different to what we encountered in the Quartets lectures (the emphasis being here on the 
poetic process and the risk of language, rather than the vicissitudes and contingency of time). 
However, the vision encountered here is fundamentally the same. The poet discovers him or herself 
in a place of dislocation, in a place of tragic disorderedness and particularity. In this context, the 
temptation could be to remain silent and simply accept this reality tout court. But according to 
Williams, the poet should not rest content with the status quo, simply accepting the world as it stands. 
Rather, the poet testifies to an alternative reality, a hope beyond the failure of words in order to 
express this reality. The poetic work is a protest against the world as it stands. It is an attempt to 
arrest meaning from the apparent chaos and meaningless of what stands before us in the present. As 
such, it’s a profoundly ethical and hopeful disposition – even as it takes seriously the sheer actuality 
of tragedy. Ben Myers, in his book on Williams, summarises the content of this essay by saying that 
‘The poet ventures to speak not because speech is adequate but because it is a necessary moment 
in the continuing struggle for meaning. You stake a position not because it is right, but because 
staking a position is the only way to enter into process of learning and growth.’
3
 As we have seen in 
Williams other essays, and in the Quartet lectures, hope and protest remain possible, even 
paradoxically, despite a tragic perspective. The theologia crucis is at the same time a theologia gloria 
                                               
1
 Ibid. 185-186.  
2
 Ibid. 186. It should be noted here that the identity of the adversary in Gen. 32.25-50 remains thoroughly ambiguous (an angel, 
God, a human being). One could argue here for a kind of ‘symbolic displacement’ along the lines that Roland Barthes suggests, 
whereby Jacob’s struggle with ‘God’ is a displacement for his lifelong struggle with Esau, as entwined with his desire to receive 
blessing over against Esau (cf. Gen. 27). For more on this Roland Barthes, ‘’The Struggle with the Angel: Textual Analysis of 
Genesis 32: 22-33’, in Roland Barthes et al, Structural Analysis and Biblical Exegesis: Interpretational Essays, trans. Alfred M. 
Johnson (Pittsburg: The Pickwick Press, 1974), 21-33.  
3
 Myers, Christ the Stranger, 26. It should be stated here that Myers seems to be, in my opinion, interpreting Williams in light of 
Williams’ later engagement (from the later 1980’s onward) with the thought of Gillian Rose, particularly as it is found in her book 
The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). Myers is not engaged in a genealogical study, like I 
am trying to do here, but is rather attempting a coherent understanding of Williams as it relates to his entire theological 
development. In this sense, his interpretation is correct. However, I am not quite sure that some of the accents he places in his 
interpretation of this essay are visibly present in Williams by this stage (1977), although definitely the seeds are sown for later 
development.   
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(in the Johannine sense of this equation).
1
 Hope is a possibility within the tragic disorderedness of 
time so that an emphasis on the risk, loss and contingency that time involves does not imply despair 
or fatalism (as some interpretations of tragedy imply). Instead, we could say already at this stage in 
Williams’ thought a theology of tragic hope is already in place. 
The 1970’s do not provide us with any other major reflections on this theme, but we do have hints 
of what is to come later, particularly in relation to tragic limitation. In The Wound of Knowledge (1979), 
referencing Ignatius, he says early Christianity, unlike other cults, was concerned with ‘historical 
reality’ and remarks further that it ‘pointed to a human life characterized by severe conflict and tragedy 
as a revelation, not of the hopelessness of the human condition, but of the hope to be uncovered in 
tragedy and the character of a God who elects for himself the experience of the tragic and destructive 
suffering as a means of self-gift.’
2
 Speaking of Augustine, Williams makes reference to ‘the tragic, the 
senseless, the irremediable in human pain’, as well as making a statement that ‘the compulsion 
towards the love of God’s beauty comes not only from the loveliness but also from the horror of the 
world. The love of God looks in hope for joy already begun, but also looks for the healing of the 
world’s wounds; like all authentic hope, it is in some degree protest.’
3
 Another relevant passage 
comes at the end of the book. Here, some of language to be found in Williams’ Quartets lectures 
(particularly his lecture on Little Gidding) is apparent:  
 
‘Christianity begins in contradictions, in the painful effort to live with the baffling plurality and 
diversity of God’s manifested life – law and gospel, judgement and grace, the crucified son crying 
to the Father. Christian experience does not simply move from one level to the next and stay 
there, but is drawn again and again to the central and fruitful darkness of the cross. But in this 
constant movement outwards in affirmation and inwards towards emptiness, there is life and 
growth…In the middle of the fire we are healed and restored – though never taken out of it [italics 
mine]. As Augustine wrote, it is at night that his voice is heard. To want to escape the ‘night’ and 
the costly struggles with doubt and vacuity is to seek another God from the one who speaks in 
and as Jesus crucified. Crux probat omnia. There is no other touchstone.’
4
 
 
There are some other minor references, namely in some early reflections on nation and statehood
5
, 
as well as his discussion of the metaphor of Eucharistic sacrifice
6
, which touch similar themes during 
                                               
1
 One could argue that the basis for this it be found in his Christology in which the divine presence exists within the world 
precisely as a presence-in-absence which the theologia crucis is also a theologia gloria. Cf. ‘The Spirit of the Age to Come’, 
619; ‘Person and Personality’, 259; FQ III, 9.  
2
 The Wound of Knowledge, 22 
3
 Ibid.,, 80-81. I have compared the revised edition to the original 1979 edition, and this passage quoted remains completely 
unchanged. Throughout this thesis, I will refer to the later 1990 edition rather than the original 1979 edition. 
4
 Ibid., 182.   
5
 ‘Life in the polis is life in the world from which God has withdrawn for the sake of its liberty. It is thus life charged with 
ambiguity, vulnerable to the tragic. There are no final solutions – the very words have appalling connotations. History and the 
polis are where God is condemned to death’. For this quotation, see Williams, ‘Mankind, Nation, State’, in Paul Bellard and Huw 
Jones (eds.), This Land and This People (Cardiff: Collegiate Centre of Theology, University College, 1979), 124.  
6
 For example, in Williams’ study of the use of ‘sacrifice’ in Eucharistic imagery, one can find the following statements: ‘God 
acts, offers, gives, in order to bring creation into fellowship with him; and, because that fellowship is so strange to fearful, self-
enclosed, human beings, it requires a uniquely creative gift – a gift which involves God’s manifesting himself without power of 
threat. He ‘distances’ himself from the stability of the divine life in order to share the vulnerability and darkness of mortal men 
and women. By the ‘gift’ of his presence – in the presence in our world of an unreserved compassion and an unrestricted hope 
– he establishes communion; but this can only be clearly shown only in conditions of final rejection and dereliction. The gift is 
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this period, but enough has been said to trace the continuity of the ideas embodied in the earlier 
lectures. 
 
4.2. Eliot. Freud, and the Self: The 1980’s 
 
In relation to what we have been discussing, the most significant text available which shows us 
how the poetic and theological vision of the Quartets is still active in Williams’ thought well into the 
1980’s is a sermon he delivered, entitled ‘Lazarus: In Memory of T.S. Eliot’.
1
 The year that this was 
delivered is 1984
2
, nearly ten years after he delivered the Quartets lectures. Williams begins the 
sermon by grappling with the common criticism that ‘Eliot is a Manichee, a despiser of the world and 
its joys’. Eliot’s stark vision of the early twentieth century seems to be pretty grim and bleak from a 
certain perspective. So the question is posed is: ‘Is he incapable of love?’ Is Eliot able to grasp a fuller 
world and vision which points beyond the barrenness that he sees? Williams poses the question – 
asked by those who knew Eliot – does Eliot’s conversion to Christianity ‘merely set the final seal on 
his devaluing of humanity’? Was ‘the pose of the helpless observer…now fixed for ever by the myths 
of sin and redemption’? Williams comments that people will continue saying things like this about 
Eliot, and that it is easy enough to do so. However, what is less easy to do is ‘to enter into the 
sensibility of a man for whom the consciousness of being human was so constantly and nakedly the 
consciousness of pain and failure, loss of simplicity and single-mindedness…It is easy to complain of 
Eliot’s negativity or “pessimism,” because most of us do not have the honesty to risk seeing the world 
in that way - the vision of a heart of darkness, of people devouring and being devoured, where we are 
all old, weighed down with terrible knowledge and guilt.’
3
 
In Williams’ estimation, Eliot was a man who was ‘exceptionally alive to the possibilities of illusion 
and self-deception in human lives’ and that he ‘risked exposure to a terrible and unanswerable truth’. 
And it is precisely ‘the crucifying demand of this incarnate truth’ that led Eliot to wrestle with this 
problem in the Quartets. Here, Williams repeats what we have recorded earlier – in relation to the 
unpublished lectures – that the sequence of poems is ‘constantly turning back on itself, replying to 
itself, qualifying, correcting’ and that sequence has commonly been read ‘as if it added nothing to 
Eliot’s earlier poems, as if it simply repeated his weariness and longing for reposeful death’. Williams 
argues that the sequence rather is concerned with the question of the redemption of time. In relation 
Burnt Norton, Williams repeats his earlier judgement (in light of Eliot’s later treatment of the theme in 
East Coker and The Dry Salvages) that ‘the timeless moment’ – as expounded in Burnt Norton - 
‘cannot cope with, cannot heal, the pain of mortality, the anguish and despair of human beings living 
in a senseless world that seems no more than a vortex of destruction.’ 
                                                                                                                                                  
consummated in the cross’. He goes on further to say that ‘If we are to be fully a gift to the Father, given by ourselves yet also 
by and through the crucified, by our association with that prior gift, we must bear the cost – which is the loss of all we do and all 
we possess to defend ourselves against God and others and death (‘Their fear of fear and frenzy, their fear of possession, of 
belonging to another, to others, or to God’, wrote Eliot in East Coker), against sharing the real vulnerability of the finite world, 
against the real need and poverty of ourselves and our brothers and sisters. The cost is a loss of images and fantasies, of 
clear, tight frontiers to the self. If we can even begin to give in this way, it is only because of the depth of the assurance implied 
in the gift given us in Calvary.’ For these quotations, see Williams, Eucharistic Sacrifice: The Roots of a Metaphor. Grove 
Liturgical Study 31 (Bramcote, Notts: Grove, 1982), 28-29.  
1
 A Ray of Darkness, 186-191.  
2
 The year of delivery for this sermon is recorded by Myers, Christ the Stranger, 25.  
3
 A Ray of Darkness, 187-188.  
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The question that remains then is: where then is healing to be found? Williams summarises Eliot’s 
stark vision once again: ‘there is no escape, except into fantasy. There is only a penetrating further 
into the blackness and destructiveness of the world. Face the truth; face the fact that the world is a 
world of meaninglessness, of destruction, violence, death and loss, that no light of ecstasy can 
change this. Only when we stop projecting patterns on to the world can we live without illusion, and 
living without illusion is the first step to salvation.’
1
 Williams goes onto say that the ‘starkness’ of 
Eliot’s vision gives way to the gospel because 
 
 ‘…if there is a God whose will is for the healing of men and women, he can heal only by 
acting in the worldliness of the world, in and through the vortex of death and loss. He must 
share the condition of our sickness, our damnation, so as to bring his life and fullness into 
it…God has borne all that we bear and so has made the fabric of history his own garment. 
The world has no discernible meaning or pattern, but into it there has entered the compassion 
of God. Give up the futile struggle to dominate and organize the chaos of the world in systems 
and mythologies, and realize that the empty destitution of confronting darkness is the only 
way in which love can begin. Only if we are honest about the world can we see the choices 
that confront us. Either there is only destruction and death, or there is destruction and death 
which we take into ourselves to let it burn away our self-obsession and so make room for 
active love, compassion, mutual giving, life in communion. And the only sign of this possibility 
is the ambivalent memory of a dead and betrayed man.’
2
  
 
The emphasis here on rejecting fantasy for the sake of seeing clearly is what we have 
encountered before in his lectures on the Quartets. In Williams’ opinion, following after Eliot, it is only 
by not evading fantasy, by seeing the ‘progress’ of history as it really happens – with all its tragic 
entanglements – that we are opened to genuine compassion, as we have already seen in a slightly 
different way regarding his reflections on the poet in the previous section of this chapter And it is 
through the process of ‘making out of chaos a network of compassion and of giving to others’ that 
‘there is redemption and reconciliation in the world of history.’ He goes on to say that ‘The pain will not 
go away; the horror will remain’ and yet it is shot through with ‘the hope and the possibility of 
compassion and reconciliation.’ Hope and meaning remain in this milieu of terror, but it comes – as 
one might put it (Williams does not say this) – as a phoenix from the ashes. Williams postulates 
further and says that ‘Eliot was a great preacher of the gospel because he had the integrity not to 
close his eyes to any of the real horror of the world; preaching is cheap if it fails to meet human 
beings at their darkest points. The reconciliation he writes of is utterly costly, mortally hard: our sole 
nourishment in the task is the blood of God’s costly love, the assurance that even death, loss, 
disorder are not stronger than the compassion of God.’
3
 At the end, he closes off his sermon by 
referring to a line from Little Gidding (‘We only live, only suspire / Consumed by either fire or fire’), and 
                                               
1
 Ibid. 189.  
2
 Ibid. 189-190.  
3
 Ibid. 190-191.  
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comments by saying that ‘No optimism, no activism will do that does not grow out of the vision of 
these two fires, the unbearable violence and the unbearable compassion.’
1
 
In summary of this sermon, we can see that Williams’ fundamental vision of the tragic 
disorderedness of life has not changed significantly. The relation between the historical and visionary 
consciousness are evident once again: it is only by taking time, acknowledging history, and by risking 
the apparent nihilism it implies seriously that we can glimpse a redemptive vision, inspired by the 
belief in a God who has revealed Godself in the tragic history of a crucified and risen human being. 
Quoting Ben Myers again: ‘The possibility of the world’s transformation emerges from a truthful and 
unprotected seeing of what is really there.’
2
 Additionally, we have seen that the theme of fantasy has 
come to the foreground in an explicit way. The seeds for Williams’ suspicion of fantasy were laid 
already in the Quartet lectures, but there is a clear marked quality to this theme, as found in this 
sermon, that bears further explication.
3
  
Firstly, Williams’ suspicion of fantasy is inseparable from belief regarding truthful knowledge about 
God and the self, and how they are inextricably bound together. Such an emphasis would be 
fundamentally influenced by Williams’ reading of Augustine.
4
 It is difficult to deny the fact that 
Augustine’s reflections on self-knowledge and human desire have profoundly influenced Williams 
thought as a whole.
5
 Following Augustine, Williams would argue that human desire cannot find its 
terminus in any finite object; this is because, in reality, desire always transcends finite objects towards 
something else. Williams argues that for Augustine God is the only thing that can be enjoyed for itself, 
for its own sake; all other creaturely objects of desire are ‘signs’ indicating something deeper and 
divine to the reality we inhabit. However, this does not imply that finite objects are simply passed over 
and treated as expeditious to some higher purpose, but rather that no earthly object can exhaust our 
desire, and therefore it cannot be treated as the end of our human and creaturely longing.
6
 Such a 
perspective counter-acts an ego-centred portrayal of the self because the desire for complete 
                                               
1
 Ibid. 191.  
2
 Myers, Christ the Stranger, 25.  
3
 I am indebted, in the following section, to Myers discussion of this theme in Christ the Stranger, 107-112. It should also be 
mentioned here that Williams’ larger suspicion of fantasy is tied to strong affirmation of dispossession, both in a personal 
sense, but also in relation to the larger collective of the church. For some reflections on Williams thinking regarding 
‘dispossession’, you can read his ‘Theological Integrity’, in On Christian Theology, 3-15. Regarding the church, you can see 
Rowan Williams, Mission and Christology. J.C. Jones Memorial Lecture (Brynmawr: Church Missionary Society, Welsh 
Members Council, 1994).  
4
 Williams’ interpretation of Augustine can be classed, generally speaking, under the category of recent postmodern attempts to 
rehabilitate Augustine’s understanding of the human soul in which the self-consciousness of the human is understood as 
something that is constituted by relation and difference, rather than self-constituted in the Cartesian sense. For a brief summary 
of some ‘postmodern’ theological interpreters of Augustine view of the human soul (with Rowan Williams included), see Roland 
Kany, Augustins Trinitätsdenken: Bilanz, Kritik and Weiterführung der Modernen Forschung. Studien und Texte zu Antike und 
Christentum 22 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 240-246. For some substantial arguments that strongly question Augustine as 
a precursor to the Cartesian ego, see Jean-Luc Marion, In the Self’s Place: The Approach of Saint Augustine, trans. Jeffrey L. 
Kosky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 56-100.   
5
 For more reflections on this, see The Wound of Knowledge, 71-91.  
6
 For the most detailed treatment of this theme, see Williams, ‘Language, Reality and Desire in Augustine’s De Doctrina’. 
Journal of Literature & Theology 3.2 (1989), 138-150. Williams is reflecting here on Augustine’s use of signum (sign) and res 
(the thing itself), as well Augustine’s distinction between frui (enjoyment) and uti (use). Williams seems to be influenced here  
(in some degree) by his reading of Derrida. For more on this, see Jeffrey McCurry, ‘Towards a Poetics of Theological Creativity: 
Rowan Williams Reads Augustine De Doctrina Christiana after Derrida’. Modern Theology 23.3 (2007), 415-433. For a feminist 
reading of Augustine’s reflections on desire along similar lines, see Karmen MacKendrick, Divine Enticement: Theological 
Seductions (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 1-31.  
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possession of the Other and the self (and the Other-in-the-self
1
) are infinitely deferred towards the 
Triune God, who is a perpetual and infinite movement towards otherness and desire.
2
  
Such a fundamental theological vision informs Augustine’s understanding of self-knowledge, which 
for him is ‘a practice of criticism, specifically the way the subject distorts its self-perception into fixity 
by fixation upon the meeting of needs in the determinate form in which they are mediated to us in the 
perception of the Other’.
3
 Augustine does not understand the self as some stable Cartesian entity, but 
rather articulates the belief in ‘the impossibility of stating any theory of the self as a determinate 
object’ because Augustine rejects ‘the idea that we could observe the self or mind in a neutral way: 
because what we see when we look at ourselves is desire’, and that ‘we are to know and love 
ourselves as questing, as seeking to love with something of God’s freedom (in the sense of a love not 
glued to any object of satisfaction)’.
4
 Rather than endorsing a proto-Cartesian view of the self, 
Williams writes that Augustine sought ‘to ‘demythologise’ the solitary ego by establishing the life of the 
mind firmly in relation to God’, a God understood as ‘self-gift, as movement to otherness and distance 
in self-imparting love.’
5
 
All of this is being said to provide some theological background for why Williams’ is suspicious of 
the ego’s attempt to grasp stability and security in its interactions with the world. The move towards 
possession and invulnerability is entwined with the ego’s attempt to move beyond desire towards 
completion. The problem with this is that the ego continues to fixate on a series of objects, hoping that 
                                               
1
 Regarding the themes of desire, possession, and the Other-in-the-self, as well as a much larger discussion surrounding the 
theme of self as it is formed in negotiation and narrative, see Williams, Lost Icons: Reflections on Cultural Bereavement 
(London – New York: T & T Clark, 2000), 171-214. For further reflections on the self as formed within language, negotiation, 
and construction, see Williams, ‘The Suspicion of Suspicion’, in Wrestling with Angels, 186-201; Williams, ‘Interiority and 
Epiphany: A Reading in New Testament Ethics’, in On Christian Theology, 239-264.  
2
 On this, see Williams, ‘The Deflections of Desire: Negative Theology in Trinitarian Disclosure’ in Oliver Davies and Denys 
Turner, Silence and the Word: Negative Theology and Incarnation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 115-135; 
Williams, ‘Balthasar and Difference’, in Wrestling with Angels¸ 77-85. Also, cf. ‘Macrina’s Deathbed Revisited’, 242: ‘The 
conviction of our dependence on an unchangeably loving God draws us into a state of strictly objectless attention, love without 
projection or condition, moving and expanding but not restless, and kind of erōs, yet only capable of being called ‘desire’ in a 
rather eccentric sense, because of its distance of wanting and getting, lack and satisfaction. We are challenged to imagine a 
radical lack, accepted without anxiety, hunger, fantasy.’  
3
 Williams, ‘’’Know Thyself”: What Kind of an Injunction?’ in Michael McGhee (ed.) Philosophy, Religion and the Spiritual Life 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.223-224. Williams’ language of ‘the Other’ here is inflected by Lacanian 
terminology. For Lacan, ‘the Other’ belongs to the inter-subjective realm of the Symbolic which is the realm of discourse and 
language into which we are socialized as speaking subjects: ‘Man speaks…but it is because the symbol has made him man’ (p. 
72), quoted in Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (London & New York: Routledge, 1977). For a brief 
discussion of Lacan’s concept of the Symbolic Order, see Terry Eagleton, Trouble with Strangers: A Study of Ethics (UK: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009), 83-90. 
4
 Williams, ’The Paradoxes of Self-knowledge in De Trinitate‘, in Joseph T. Lienhard, Earl C. Muller and Roland J. Teske (eds.) 
Augustine: Presbyter Factus Sum, Collectanea Augustiniana (New York: Peter Lang, 1993),131. 
5
 Williams, ’Sapientia and the Trinity: Reflections on De Trinitate’, in Bernard Bruning, Mathijs Lamberigts and J van Houtem 
(eds.) Collectanea Augustiniana: Mélanges T J van Bavel, vol. 1 (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1990), 331. It could also 
be mentioned here that Williams view of the self and personhood is not only influenced by Augustine, but also his engagement 
with Eastern Orthodoxy. This can be seen in the first published article that he wrote, which sought to expound the theme of 
humanity as persons –in-communion. On this cf. Williams, ‘The Theology of Personhood: A Study of the Thought of Christos 
Yannaras’, Sobernost: The Journal of the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius 6.6 (1972), 415-430. However, the main 
influence on Williams thought from within Orthodoxy is still Vladimir Lossky, particularly in relation to his distinction between the 
‘person’ and the ‘individual’. For Lossky (like Augustine), the mystery of personhood was grounded upon the mystery of the 
Trinity, that the imago dei reflects the imago trinitatis. For Lossky, in the Trinity there is no ‘individual will’ but rather a 
movement of kenosis whereby the persons renounce themselves for the sake of the Other: ‘the person expresses itself most 
truly in that it renounces to exist for itself’ (p. 144), in Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Crestwood, NY: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1976). That such a view of personhood is still influential on Williams today, can be seen in an 
interview Williams conducted in the mid-90’s with Todd Breyfogle. Here, summing up Lossky’s own view of personhood, 
Williams says that for Lossky ‘talking about the person is as difficult as talking about God. If you want to talk about human 
beings in the image of God, it may be in that difficulty and elusiveness that the centrally human is to be located, not in any 
quality that we and God have in common… I found that — and still find it — extremely interesting.’ He goes on to say that when 
we are, ‘talking about the human, we occupy the same edge of difficulty that we occupy when talking about God. And we face 
the same danger of falling over into rather banal generalities…I think Lossky pushes beyond that to say that the personal in us 
is not an item among others: it is the strangeness and difficulty, the irreducibility, within any relation.(pp. 307-308)’, in Todd 
Breyfogle, ‘Time and Transformation’.  
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such a completion will be accomplished. In the process however, various finite objects are used (and 
abused) to establish the ego’s security in the world. It is such a desire for security that is at its base a 
fantasy, a goal which will never be accomplished. Our desire for invulnerability and a frictionless 
environment, beyond the milieu of perpetual desire, can be projected also onto God, who is believed 
to be the Archimedean point upon which we shall establish the ultimate stability and completion.
1
 And 
it is here the figure of Freud appears.  
Our original question above was why the theme of fantasy occurs in a more pointed way in the 
sermon discussed than in comparison to what we find in his earlier texts. The answer seems to lie in 
Williams’ engagement with Freud, which became deeper sometime in the late 1970’s and the early 
1980’s. It is difficult to ascertain exactly where Freud’s influence enters most pointedly. We can see it 
surface towards the end of Williams’ essay on Barth and Trinity (1979), where he talks about robust 
Christian theology of the Trinity avoiding ‘the Freudian charge that Christianity is an inflation of 
infantile beliefs about the omnipotent father who can solve all problems and heal all wounds’.
2
 
However, the most in-depth treatment this theme is to be found in an encyclopaedia article published 
in 1983, a year before he preached the sermon discussed above.
3
 It can be seen in this article that 
Williams is generally quite critical of Freud’s approach towards the origins of religious belief. Freud 
adopts a ‘scientific’ approach towards the origins of religion, which in reality is not ‘scientific’ but rather 
a ‘mythical’ construct. He compares Freud’s approach to other modern approaches to 
psychoanalysis, in order to show how the field has changed and become more focused on self-
narration, storytelling, and existential analysis. Yet Williams does give Freud credit regarding his 
critique of religion. He writes that ‘Religion attempts to deal with the powerlessness of the human 
subject; but rather than itself being a means of empowerment, its projects unrestricted power onto an 
alien reality and fixes the self in a permanent state of impotence and alienation. Power (divine power) 
is accessible only through self-abasement and self-devaluing.’
4
 
Williams also seems to side with Freud (against figures like Erich Fromm) in relation to his tragic 
interpretation of human life. Against a kind of mysticism which would argue for a cosmic reconciliation 
between humanity and nature – another ‘alienating myth’ in Williams’ opinion – we have to wrestle 
with the problem of ‘contradiction, limit and mortality’. In his words, ‘there is no way that limitless 
power ever becomes available to humanity’. The attempt of self-deification is a futile attempt of 
humanity to extricate itself from the limitations of created existence. Within such a context, belief in a 
creating God does not necessarily imply ‘alienation and self-loss’, because as Williams says ‘[a] God 
who is both radically other and radically hidden is not a competitor for power with the finite self: to 
depend for one’s identity ultimately upon a hidden source of self-giving or self-sharing is to be free as 
one can be within the tragic limits of the world.’
5
 Williams (not doubt following Aquinas
1
 and Nicholas 
                                               
1
 Cf. Williams, ‘Adult Geometry: Dangerous Thoughts in R.S. Thomas’, 86-89 
2
 Williams, ‘Barth on the Triune God’ [1979], in Wrestling with Angels, 141.  
3
 Williams, ‘Freudian Psychology’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), The Westminster Dictionary of Christian 
Theology (Philadelphia, Westminster, 1983), 219-222.  
4
 Ibid. 220. For some reflections on Freudianism, within a more devotional context, focusing on how believers construct divine 
‘omnipotence’ and ‘love’ in ways that are at odds with a more orthodox picture of God, see Brother Emmanuel of Taizé, Love, 
Imperfectly Known: Beyond Spontaneous Representations of God, trans. Dinah Livingstone (London-New York: Continuum, 
2011). 
5
 Ibid., 221 For more on this, see the above discussion in chapter two. Williams essay ‘On Being Creatures’ is particularly 
relevant on this point.  
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of Cusa
2
) believes that a doctrine of creatio ex nihilo does not imply a competition between humanity 
and God, because such a power-competition presupposes that they are in the same category of being 
– something that orthodox theology rejects.
3
 And yet still, Williams believes that the critique of religion 
that Freud made (particularly against the Judeo–Christian tradition) provides avenues for a robust 
self-critical theology, even an apophatic theology. He says that psychoanalysis helps us by showing 
‘the ambiguous, domesticated, fantasy-ridden or self-indulgent functions of our religious language’ 
and that ‘it pushes us towards the purifications of a negative theology which is constantly suspicious 
of the religious temptation to seek for absolute knowledge’.
4
 
One place where Freud’s influence upon Williams can be clearly seen is a sermon he delivered 
entitled ‘The Dark Night’.
5
 That Freud’s influence lies in the background of this sermon can be clearly 
seen from the content.
6
 Here again, the starkness of Williams’ language is apparent: ‘The only 
defense religion ever has or ever will have against the charge of cozy fantasy is the kind of 
experience or reflection normally referred to by Christian writers…as the “night of the spirit”…It is the 
end of religious experience, the very opposite of mysticism…In the middle of all our religious 
constructs – if we have the honesty to look at it – is an emptiness. It makes nonsense of all religion, 
conservative or radical, and all piety.’
7
 He goes on to say ‘You must recognize that God is so unlike 
whatever can be thought or pictured that, when you have got beyond the stage of self-indulgent 
religiosity, there will be nothing you can securely know or feel. You face a blank and any attempt to 
avoid that or shy away from it is a return to playing comfortable religious games…The dark night is 
God’s attack on religion.
8
 
The experience of the dark night, in Williams’ estimation, is the antidote to religious fantasy, an 
answer to the claim that faith and belief are merely wish-fulfilment. Here we have an experience which 
cannot be equated self-serving religious projection, because it is precisely the self that is questioned 
by such an experience. It is not something the human self can inflict upon itself; rather it is something 
that challenges complacent egotism in a radical way. It is obvious that Williams is proposing such a 
perspective to counter the critique of religion made by Freud (as well as others like Feuerbach), in the 
                                                                                                                                                  
1
 Cf. Williams, ‘Redeeming Sorrows: Marilyn McCord Adams and the Defeat of Evil’, in Wrestling with Angels, 267-268.  
2
 Cf. Williams, ‘Logic and Spirit in Hegel’, in Wrestling with Angels, 51, n.14, Williams, ‘Balthasar and Difference’, in Wrestling 
with Angels, 79-80.  
3
 For a discussion of divine power that contributes, rather than hindering creaturely freedom, see ‘On Being Creatures’. Also, cf. 
the statement of Williams in Christ on Trial: How the Gospel Unsettles Our Judgement (Great Britain: Fount, 2000): ‘If we are 
really to have our language about the transcendence – the sheer, unimaginable differentness – of God recreated, it must be by 
the emptying out of all we thought we knew about it, the emptying out of practically all we normally mean by greatness. No 
more about the lofty distance of God, the sovereignty that involves control over all circumstances: God’s ‘I am’ can only be 
heard for what it really is when it has no trace of human power left to it; when it appears as something utterly different from 
human authority, even human liberty; when it is spoken by a captive under sentence of death. (p. 7)’  
4
 Williams, ‘Freudian Psychology’, 221.  
5
 A Ray of Darkness, 80-84. This sermon is undated, and so I am unaware of the exact date of this sermon. However, judging 
from the introduction, the latest additions to this collection were delivered in 1991, and so it seems to reason that the majority of 
the sermons were delivered before this date.  
6
 Jeffrey McCurry argued in his dissertation on Williams that Freud clearly ‘inflects’ Williams treatment of ‘the dark night’. For 
more on this, cf. ‘Traditioned Creativity’, 288-297.  
7
 A Ray of Darkness, 80-81.  
8
 Ibid. 82. For more on the theme of ‘the dark night’, see Williams, ‘The Dark Night’, in Gordon Wakefield (ed.), A Dictionary of 
Christian Spirituality (London: SCM 1983). Cf. especially his comment (p. 104) on Pseudo-Dionysius regarding paradoxical 
language: ‘‘The paradox [of light and darkness] affirms that Christian speech is incurably dialectical. No attempt to resolve it 
even by supposing that there is a communicable and incommunicable ‘part’ of God will do. The illumination is itself a revelation 
of the dimensions of inconclusiveness, challenge, and questioning in all talking about what we refer to as God.’ 
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attempt to retrieve from within the Christian tradition sources that counter-act the move towards 
religious fantasy.
1
  
It should be mentioned that in addition to Freud other figures who were (and still are) influential for 
Williams on the theme of fantasy and ego-projection include Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil. Murdoch 
once wrote that ‘Almost anything that consoles us is a fake’
2
 so that a truly ethical movement towards 
the Good has to involve a movement beyond the ego. Furthermore, Simone Weil’s concept of 
‘necessity’ and ‘attentiveness’ have thoroughly influenced Williams approach to contemplation, that 
process where the self is taken outside itself through patience and attentive waiting, not allowing the 
ego to find easy solutions to the complex and sheer otherness of the world.
3
 Space does not permit 
deeper engagement here, but enough has been said to show the influences that impinge upon 
Williams’ thinking on this matter.  
The slight divergence from the theme of tragedy and historical consciousness towards the theme 
of religious fantasy which I have attempted in this section was done with the purpose of explaining 
why in his sermon of 1984, we see an accented rejection of the fantasy-driven ego. In that sermon, 
we saw that Williams reception of Eliot after the Quartets lectures of 1974-1975 remains pretty much 
the same, except that there is a stronger emphasis on the theme of fantasy. Here, Williams was 
concerned to show that an attentive posture towards the reality of tragedy and the apparent 
meaninglessness of suffering acts as a bulwark against the view that we can construct the world any 
way we choose. In time, we are limited by the constraints of finitude and contingency; and the 
concomitant result of this is that we caught up in scenarios and dynamics that are tragic in nature – 
suffering and pain that cannot be avoided because we live as finite beings in the movements of time. 
The only way for time to be redeemed is from within time itself. And for Williams (following Eliot), it is 
the incarnation which provides the hope of time’s redemption, for its through entering into the 
vicissitudes and the stochastic fluctuations of finitude that God’s compassion is made manifest, and it 
is through partaking in that divine movement that we ourselves come to share in God’s compassion. 
To summarise: here, I aimed to further deepen the question on why Williams is suspicious of 
fantasy. I showed that Williams concern with speaking truthfully about the self and God arises from 
his deep engagement with the thought of Augustine. We further showed that in the period between 
delivering the lectures on Eliot, and his sermon on the same theme, Williams seems to have 
encountered the thought of Freud in a new way, particularly focusing on his critique of religion as the 
product of human fantasy, the displacement of human impotence onto the omnipotent Father. The 
ego desires to be placated and soothed, and so fantasy is an attempt for the ego to achieve 
‘wholeness’ against the fragmented desire it experiences. For Williams (and for Freud), this is the root 
of self-serving religiosity. However, Williams argues that there are traditions within Christianity which 
                                               
1
 To read up more on this discussion, namely the relation between contemplation and religious critique, particularly in relation 
to Freud and Feuerbach, see Michael J. Buckley, S.J., Denying and Disclosing God: The Ambiguous Progress of Modern 
Atheism (New Have-London: Yale University Press, 2004), 99-119. Buckley also points out the differences between Freud and 
Feuerbach in their respective critiques of religion, and he also charts the development and maturation of Freud’s critique. 
2
 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London-New York: Routledge, 1970), 59.   
3
 Weil, Waiting for God  (New York: G.P Putnam’s Sons, 1951). Also, cf. Simone Weil ‘Attention and Will’ in Siân Miles (ed.), 
Simone Weil: An Anthology (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1986), 211-217. This is not to say that Williams is uncritical of 
Weil’s more self-lacerating moments. For his appreciation and critique of Weil, see Williams, ‘Simone Weil and the Necessary 
Non-Existence of God’, in Wrestling with Angels, 203-227.  
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act against a conclusion that spirituality is merely human fancy; the experience of the dark night (as 
expounded by figures like John of the Cross) point towards something different.  
The connections here between the theme of fantasy and tragedy become clearer. As we saw in 
Quartets lectures (and the sermon that came later), the attempt to escape time and its tragic 
consequences, either through fantasy, or the ‘the timeless moment’ cannot be a solution to the 
problems time proposes. Tragedy forces us to acknowledge that we are always subject to curtailment 
and limitation, to non-closure in our engagements with the world. The desire of fantasy is to achieve 
an escape from time and limitation, to move beyond creaturely finitude. The move beyond continuing 
desire is essentially part of the ego’s defense mechanisms, an attempt to move into a world without 
friction, without difficulty. The sheer particularity of tragedy resists the idea that we can project any 
vision onto the world, that the world is simply a product of our perspectival fantasy.  
To conclude this chapter, it might be helpful quote from a text in which all of these themes appear 
in order to show more explicitly how the problem of fantasy and self-protection relates to Williams 
later theology. Jumping to a more recent time, while Williams was still the incumbent Archbishop of 
Canterbury, he delivered a sermon on Shakespeare Sunday in 2006, where he described the artist 
and poet in the following words:  
 
‘Something is missing in the poet, some habit of self-defence that allows most of us not to 
know a lot of what we'd rather not know, some inner adjusting mechanism that leaves words 
and images and sensations where we found them and stops us sensing the frightening weave 
and crossover of language and impression that gives the world a new shape…Authority, 
whether in religious or poetic speech, or both, arises from the acceptance of the wound, the 
resolve to live with one's own undefendedness so that certain things in the human world are 
never forgotten or reduced… [I]f poetry makes nothing happen1, what poetry makes visible is 
what does change the world… It is not the poetic ego that moves things; it is what the poetic 
lack or frailty of ego allows to emerge, what the poet knows and allows us to know. This is 
what will destroy and build; this is the strength of what imagination uncovers…of what he 
[Shakespeare] has allowed us to see that we should otherwise have ignored or shrunk from, 
he has brought into our imagination that compassion he now asks us to show him.’
2
 
 
What can be seen here is that several of the themes that are elaborated in different essays and 
sermons come together. The emphasis on contemplation, mainly in the form of the poetic openness 
to reality that lies beyond the ego, is present here. Such a poetic openness implies a kind of passivity, 
a weakness in which the poet is progressively disillusioned of his or her fantasies, and becomes open 
to the experience of compassion, whereby we are able to sympathise and imaginatively inhabit a 
perspective that cannot be reduced to the solitary ego. Furthermore, the possibilities and insights that 
are opened by such an artistic posture of attentiveness to the world open the way for protest against 
                                               
1
 Williams is referencing here Auden’s statement that ‘poetry makes nothing happen’ (to be found in the poem ‘In Memory of 
W.B. Yeats’).  
2
 Williams, ‘A Sermon for Shakespeare Sunday’ (2006). Accessed from the http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org, 
11/28/2013, n.p. I owe this reference to Ben Myers.  
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the present order of the world. Even though poetry cannot ‘do’ anything, it can supply us with new 
imaginative possibilities and perceptions which can be part of the process of change. The patience, 
passivity, and the waiting which poetic creation imply, make possible a new vision, an ability to see an 
alternative world within the world we inhabit. Williams’ reflections here in this sermon confirm what we 
have found elsewhere.  
To relate these ideas again to the theme of tragedy, a focused attention to the reality of the tragic 
provides us with a paradigmatic example of what cannot be reduced to simplistic reduction or 
included in the fantastical projections of the ego. The paramount difficulty that tragedy impinges on 
us, the lack of clear resolution that it proposes, and the reality of human suffering therein revealed 
bring to attention what is sheerly intractable in the world we inhabit. In Williams’ opinion, a 
contemplative attention to the tragic disorderedness of the world provides an opportunity to be open 
to the world as it is, in all its irreparable thereness. It is in this experience that possibilities for poetic 
creation and protest are awakened, as well as compassionate co-suffering with the world.  
In the following chapter, we will deal a little more with Williams’ reflections on the difficulty of 
tragedy and the problem of closure (in relation to Williams’ reception of MacKinnon). We shall also 
seek to expound a little more his thoughts on the topic of theodicy (particularly in his dialogue with 
Marilyn McCord Adams), as well as some texts relating to temporality, politics and Christology. 
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5. The Shattered Mosaic 
 
My concern in this chapter is to deal with some of Williams’ later texts which are related to the 
theme I have been discussing. Amongst these texts, we will include Williams’ most sustained 
engagement with the thought of his teacher Donald MacKinnon, particularly as it relates to 
MacKinnon’s reflections on the theme of tragedy. In this essay, Williams seeks to emphasize 
MacKinnon’s own plea for a resolute attention to the tragic and its insistent refusal to be reduced to 
any harmonizing or explanatory schemas. I will also engage with Williams’ essay on Marilyn McCord 
Adams, in which we he gives a thoughtful critique of her theodicy project, and also provides 
suggestive indications of his own response to the problem of evil. The essential problem with Adams’ 
theodicy – in Williams’ opinion – is that the problem of evil is again being reduced to a generalised 
theory, and that it fails to be attentive to the unique and particular existential problems that suffering 
provokes. Williams is suspicious of any sweeping resolutions to the problem of evil, and it seems that 
Williams places Adams’ own philosophically and theologically provocative attempt at a response to 
this problem as one more attempt within this general tendency among various theodicy projects. I will 
close this section in reference to Williams’ own application of this perspective in his public addresses 
regarding the 2004 Tsunami, which reflect the themes we have been dealing with. Thereafter, I will 
attempt to expound some miscellaneous texts in which the themes of contingency and temporal 
boundedness are brought in conversation with the topic of tragedy. We shall not say anything new 
here, but simply show how in some of Williams’ later texts the theme of creaturely finitude is related to 
reality of the tragic. Bringing into mind here the broad leitmotifs that have been mentioned before 
throughout this thesis, we will show that the emphasis on non-closure, compassion, contemplation, 
and contingency come to the fore in these later texts.  
Furthermore, I will also seek to briefly engage with Williams’ understanding of politics, particularly 
as this is refracted through the conflictual modes of politics suggested by Gillian Rose, and her 
reading of Hegel. Herein, the tragic theme of contingency and conflict form an important part of 
Williams’ understanding of human political engagement since for Williams (and Rose) there is no 
abstract or neutral point of engagement, but one that is already involved in the ‘negativity’ of social 
interaction. One can only seek to inhabit the ‘the broken middle’ which is not simply a mediating 
position between two opposing viewpoints, but rather a practice whereby we stake a ‘position’ within 
continued discourse that remains open for transformation and dialogue. Thereafter, I will engage very 
briefly with some of Williams’ recent reflections on theme of Christology and temporality, mainly 
focusing on his discussion of Prince Myshkin as to be found in his book on Dostoevsky.   
In the last section of the chapter, I will spend some time on Williams’ theology of the Trinity and its 
relation to tragedy. This part of the chapter will be a response to some comments made by Ben Myers 
in this regard.  
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5.1 ‘Trinity and Ontology’ (1986) 
 
Williams’ most detailed exposition of the theme of the tragic is to be found in his contribution to a 
Festschrift (1989) compiled in honour of his teacher Donald MacKinnon. The paper was originally 
read at conference in 1986, in which MacKinnon’s theology was the central theme. This essay is 
republished in Williams’ own collection of essays entitled On Christian Theology (2000), complied and 
published before he took over the see of Canterbury. Before we expound this essay, it should be said 
that not everything said in this essay would be endorsed by Williams today. The most outstanding 
difference between Williams’ exposition of this theme (between then and now) would be his 
interpretation of Hegel. In 1986, Williams’ interpretation of Hegel still fell within a consensus 
interpretation in which Hegel’s philosophy was understood at that time. The general consensus 
among many interpreters of Hegel’s thought was that Hegel exemplified, in a paramount fashion, a 
systematic vision of history, one in which all contradictions and discontinuities would be reconciled in 
the Absolute. Such an interpretation would have difficulty in accounting for any non-resolvable 
remainder that the reality of suffering and tragedy might pose, since it implies a strongly teleological 
or harmonizing resolution to history. However, sometime after 1986, when Williams was in his late 
thirties, his view on Hegel began to change, mainly through the instigation of his pupil Andrew 
Shanks, and the philosopher Gillian Rose. As a result of this influence, Williams began to see Hegel 
as a philosopher of contradiction and opposition, rather than of totality and systematic harmonization.
1
 
Such an about-face in Williams’ interpretation has created a situation in which his understanding of 
the tragic possibilities of human engagement is inflected with a distinctly Hegelian perspective.
2
 
Nonetheless, all of this is being said simply to qualify what shall be said below: while Williams’ 
perspective on tragedy and its relation to theology continues to be inflected by the work of MacKinnon 
(as presented in the essay to be discussed), not everything in this essay would be endorsed by 
Williams today. Our discussion of Williams’ more mature appropriation of Hegel is postponed until 
later in this chapter.  
Moving onto the essay itself, Williams introduces his discussion with a brief and dense of 
discussion of Mackinnon’s involvement in the realism-idealism debate. Williams is by no means 
uncritical of MacKinnon in this discussion, but he understands that MacKinnon’s insistence on realism 
is bound up with his emphasis on the reality of the tragic. MacKinnon’s ‘negative metaphysics’
3
, and 
his stalwart focus on tragic realism is interpreted my Williams to be a resolute antithesis against any 
attempt to understand the subject and human volition as ‘world-causing’
4
 and is a part of his project 
‘to demythologize a free, triumphant, endlessly resourceful, sovereign willing self.’
5
 Idealism as a 
philosophical project fails to the extent that it is unable to grasp the fact that suffering and tragedy 
cannot be understood as a construct of the mind, that there are certain things (like the tragic) which 
                                               
1
 Ben Myers has an excellent short discussion of this theme in Christ the Stranger, 51-58. For more on this, see Shortt, God’s 
Advocates, 16-17.  
2
 To see the influence of this change on Williams’ later thought, see Williams, ‘Hegel and the Gods of Postmodernity [1992]’, 
‘Between Politics and Metaphysics: Reflections in the Wake of Gillian Rose [1995], ‘Logic and Spirit in Hegel [1998]’, in 
Wrestling with Angels, 25-34, 35-52, 53-76.  
3
 Williams, ‘Trinity and Ontology’, in On Christian Theology¸ 152.  
4
 Ibid.  
5
 Ibid., 154 
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impress and ‘show’ themselves, and therefore cannot be reduced to a projection of the human will. 
Placing this debate in the background illuminates what Williams has to say further on this matter. This 
becomes apparent as we move onto the second part of the essay; he begins by stating the following: 
‘If the world is our creation, or even if the world is masterable as a system of necessities, the idea of 
irreparable and uncontrollable loss ceases to make sense: there are no tragedies’. He goes onto say 
that ‘All explanation of suffering is an attempt to forget it as suffering, and so a quest for 
untruthfulness…The resolution of the sheer resistant particularity of suffering, past and present, into 
comfortable teleological patterns is bound to blunt the edge of particularity, and so to lie; and this lying 
resolution contains that kind of failure in attention that is itself a moral deficiency, a fearful self-
protection. It is just this that fuels the fantasy that we can choose how the world and myself shall be.’
1
 
Here we can see how in a dense manner several of the themes we have been dealing with thus far 
come together. Teleology in relation to human suffering is understood to be an attempt at closure, an 
attempt which avoids the fundamental difficulty of the tragic itself. Further, we can see the theme of 
fantasy (which is linked the motif of contemplation) recurs again here and is tied explicitly with the 
moral dimension that we have spoken about before in relation to the self-sufficiency of the human 
ego: ‘The world is such – is, independently of our choice and our fabrication – that we cannot think 
away particulars into comprehensive explanatory systems; the world is such that attention to 
particularity is demanded of us.
2
 If we are to speak of God, can we do so in a way that does not 
amount to another evasion of the world.’
3
 He goes onto expound the concept of projection and fantasy 
in a rather dense paragraph:  
 
‘There is a way of talking about God that simply projects on to him what we cannot achieve–a 
systematic vision of the world as a necessarily inter-related whole. Trust in such a God is 
merely deferred confidence in an exhaustive explanation and justification; a deferred 
confidence of this sort is open to exactly the same moral and logical objection as any other 
confidence in systematic necessity of this kind in the world. A God whose essential function is 
to negate the ‘otherness’ and discontinuity of historical experience, and so to provide for us 
an ideal locus standi, a perspective transcending or reconciling discontinuity in the system, is 
clearly an idol, and an incoherent one at that: if he is the negation of the reciprocal negations 
or exclusions of worldly subjects, either he is the completion of the process of historical 
dialectic (in which case he cannot strictly provide a locus standi outside it for us now, as there 
is no alternative to living through the dialectic); or else he is simply a further object, of a rather 
unusual kind, standing in opposition to the rest of objects that there are (in which case there is 
no ultimate overcoming of discontinuity).’
4
   
 
What Williams seems to wrestling with here is the problem of divine transcendence in relation to the 
contingent realities of the world. The attempt to understand God as an ‘organizing principle’ or an 
                                               
1
 Ibid., 154-155.  
2
 The echoes here of Simone Weil’s concepts of ‘attention’ and ‘necessity’ should not be forgotten here.  
3
 ‘Trinity and Ontology’, 155.  
4
 Ibid., 155-156.  
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‘abstract postulate’ ultimately ties God’s identity to the world in a way that a classical Christian 
theology should avoid (‘…God is in no sense made to be what he is by the sum total of worldly fact’
1
). 
The problem then becomes how do we understand God’s relation to the world, particularly as it 
becomes manifest in the history of Jesus Christ. Williams goes on to discuss Christological issues, 
and particularly draws on MacKinnon’s insistence that we focus on the tragic in the narrative of Jesus, 
as well as the particularity of Jesus’ historical existence.
2
 Within this context, namely the relation of 
God to the man Jesus Christ and the substance of Christological reflection, Williams says that we 
cannot speak about this issue while bypassing ‘the context of limit – the limits of particularity, of 
bodiliness and mortality, of moral capacity, of creatureliness’.
3
 As we can see again, the problem of 
limit and contingency here comes into focus, something that we have argued is intrinsically a part of 
Williams’ construal of the tragic. In Christ, we can say that God has constituted a finite and contingent 
life that is ‘paradigmatically creaturely, distanced from God’ in which God has become a ‘sheer 
externality’ that constitutes the divine ‘identity-in-difference’, an ‘identity in distance or absence’.
4
 For 
Christ to live in time is to live within ‘temporal process’ and the ‘risk’ that temporality entails, and this 
concrete story of ‘risk and consummation’ provides us with the language to talk about God as Source 
(Father) and God as Begotten (Son), in which the Father provides a kind of ‘externality’ or ‘limit’ for 
the Son and thereby the identity-in-difference of the Trinitarian persons. In Williams’ words: ‘The self-
abnegation of Jesus in its specific form of active and transfiguring acceptance of the world’s limit is 
not at all a mere paradigm for conscienceless obedience or resignation; it is what puts to us the 
question of how God can be if this is how he is historically’.
5
 
However, it should be mentioned here that Williams clearly wants to distinguish himself here from 
a ‘Hegelian’
6
 understanding of the Trinity whereby ‘Christ’s union with the Father as enacted in history 
on to eternity (and so destroys the proper contingency and unresolved or tragic limitedness of that 
and every history)’.
7
 Furthermore, he also wants to distinguish his view (which is basically a classical 
treatment) from any doctrine of the Trinity that makes God’s identity dependent on these contingent 
events (a view which he attributes to Moltmann). For Williams, the immanent Trinity makes the story 
or Jesus ‘possible and intelligible’, since it is ‘the ground and ‘form’ of this encounter’, but this is not 
the same as saying that ‘God would not be God’ if it were not for these unique events.
8
   
                                               
1
 Ibid., 156. It should be said here that Williams has in mind here the so-called ‘monist ontologies’ of Plotinus, Hegel, and Marx. 
As already said, Williams interpretation of Hegel here (1986) would be rejected by Williams today.   
2
 On this, see MacKinnon, ‘Some Notes on the Irreversibility of Time’ in Explorations in Theology, 96-98. This reference is taken 
from Williams’ essay. Some recurrent examples that MacKinnon uses in relation to this theme are the relation between Jesus 
and the damnation of Judas, and link between the cross and the history of anti-Semitism. Williams comments (p. 157) on this 
(while speaking on Jesus’ ‘sinlessness’) by saying that ‘…sinlessness can only be a judgement passed on the entirety of a life 
in which the inevitable damage done by human beings to each other has not sealed up the possibility of compassionate and 
creative relationship (even those most deeply injured: what could one say here of the relation here between the figure of Jesus 
and post-Holocaust Judaism, as perceived by modern Jewish writers. Does this give a hint of what the content of ‘sinlessness’ 
might be?).’ 
3
 Ibid., 158. Williams is referencing here MacKinnon’s suggestion for an ‘analogy of limits’ in relation to Christological and 
Trinitarian reflection.  
4
 Ibid., 158.  
5
 Ibid., 161.  
6
 Williams’ interpretation of a ‘Hegelian’ doctrine of the Trinity would be very different today. However, Williams’ comments here 
still have force for a contemporary interpretation of his thought, as long as the focus remains on the main point of his crit ique, 
namely the separation of the story of Christ (and the doctrine of the Trinity that is entwined with it) from its contingent 
enactment.  
7
 Ibid., 160.  
8
 Ibid., 160-161.  
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In the last portion of the essay, Williams (like MacKinnon before him) seeks to bring out the ethical 
and moral dimensions of the tragic. Here again the reality of creaturely limit and contingency come to 
the fore. Williams while expounding this writes that ‘the tragic by definition deals with human limit; that 
is, with what is not to be changed. There is pain in the world that is, so to speak, non-negotiable. The 
suffering that has happened and cannot be made not to have happened (the irreversibility of time) is, 
in spite of various kinds of vacuous, insulting and brutal rhetoric, religious and political, unchangeably 
there for us’. He does say that ‘There can be a paralysing obsession with the tragic’ but goes onto 
suggest that ‘there can also be an attempt to bypass and rationalize the pain and death’.
1
 
It is attention to this tragic dimension in reality that provides a resource for moral and ethical 
armament. In Williams’ estimation, an attentive posture towards the tragic that manifests itself in 
history, and particularly the radical limitation which it reveals, provides us with a moral vision that 
leads to protest against powers and dynamics that would efface such limitation, because ‘it is one’s 
own appropriation of the limits of possibility, in protest against a polity and a culture that lure us to sink 
our truthful perceptions in a collective, mythologized identity that can shut its eyes to limits.’
2
 Williams 
goes into expound this a little further and in more detail by saying ‘No one acts without perceiving 
something. And if that is so, the disjunction between interpretation and transformation becomes less 
absolute. If interpretation is not an explanatory reduction, but the gradual formation of a ‘world’ in 
which realities can be seen and endured without illusion...interpretation does not happen because an 
individual or individuals invent a set of symbols. The possible world of truthful perception depends on 
what has been concretely made possible, however precariously and impermanently, for actual 
persons in communication with each other.’
3
 
Regarding tragedy more specifically, he writes that tragedy is ‘capable of being lived with and 
articulated because…of the particular, the narratively specific, out of which certain kinds of new 
language grow.’
4
 What Williams seems to be saying here is that an attentive attitude towards the 
reality of limitation and the particular contours that tragedy puts before us, form and create within us a 
perceptive ability to see the world without illusion and fantasy, and therefore able to speak and act in 
ways that are more truthful and open to resistant thereness of the world. And it is in confrontation with 
that which ‘shows’ itself in the world, with that which cannot be the mere result of our projectionist 
whims, that we are confronted with a reality that requires new language to make sense of it, a 
language which has the moral backbone to take account of the sheer fact of human suffering and 
misery, without resorting to reductive fantasy or evasive strategies of the ego.  
Thus far, the essay has mainly focused on Christological issues, but Williams goes a little further 
(beyond MacKinnon) to expound a theology of the Spirit in relation to this theme. Alluding to the work 
                                               
1
 Ibid., 162-163.  
2
 Ibid., 163. One can fruitfully compare Williams’ statements here to Giorgio Agamben’s short essay entitled ‘On What We Can 
Not Do’, in Agamben, Nudities, trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 43-45.   
3
 Ibid. 163-164. Williams goes on to apply this perspective to the problem of racism in Britain (p. 164): ‘To confront both the 
suffering of the victims of racism and my own de facto involvement in the responsibility for this, without fantasizing and self-
lacerating guilt, requires specific encounter and the possibility of its continuance; not reconciliation, but a kind of commitment 
without evasion. The ‘reading’ of our situation in certain terms rests on existing small-scale transformations – and also, of 
course, assists in the creation of further transformation.’ On this point, one should compare Williams to Nicholas Lash in 
relation to his understanding of ‘performance’  and ‘interpretation’ which is central to demonstrating the ‘truth’ of Christian belief. 
On this, see the essays collected in Lash, Theology on the Way to Emmaus (London: SCM Press, 1986).  
4
 Ibid., 164.  
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of John Milbank on the spirit
1
, he says that ‘The encounter of the Spirit with Christ is potentially an 
encounter with our own complicity in the cross, and so with the crosses of our own making in the 
present and the past; it should, then, if it is what it claims to be, form a central strand in Christian 
protest in transforming action’. However, he also suggests that attention to the tragic can’ hold us to 
penitence, the acknowledgement that our present possibilities are shaped by our past, that limit 
remains inescapable; and so it can save us from facile and shallow utopianism, which so readily spills 
over into authoritarian expression.’
2
 
This quotation again bears witness to some of the themes he have discussed previously
3
, 
particularly as we sought to show the connection between the work of the Spirit, attentiveness, and 
resistant protest against the disorderedness of reality. Rather than leading to passivity or a mere 
resignation to fate, a culture of attentiveness to the limits and tragic entanglements of reality cultivates 
a moral awareness which is not satisfied with the way things are, thereby leading to protest against 
the status quo, and to repentance in relation to our own contribution towards the suffering of others. 
As can be seen from this, Williams’ understanding of tragedy does not necessarily imply an ultimately 
pessimistic and resigned posture towards the flow of immanent movements, but rather an ethical 
stance of resistance towards those powers that would seek to overthrow limitations, those 
circumscribed boundaries of created life to which we are all subject.  
And so I should summarise what we have seen in this essay thus far. I have shown that Williams’ 
is resistant to any explanatory structures in relation to the indelible thereness of tragedy. While 
Williams would distance himself from any romanticizing of tragedy, he would argue that the problem 
of human suffering and the tragic present us (in a paramount fashion) with the problem of non-closure 
in the sense that no other wider structure can account for or provide a framework into which it can be 
understood or finalized but continues to present us with a resistant difficulty that has to be continually 
wrestled with.
4
 Any attempt to blunt the force of human suffering and the actuality of the tragic results 
in a failure of moral awareness and sensitivity to the sheer magnitude of the problem. Such an 
acknowledgement of this (in relation to the inherent non-resolution of tragedy) is bound up with what 
we have seen elsewhere in relation to the fundamental contemplative stance in the work of Williams. 
Contemplation is essentially an attitude of openness and attention to reality as it presents itself, not 
seeking to evade it or confine it within the constraints that the human ego provides. And in relation to 
tragedy, we are confronted with, in a paradigmatic way, with something that is phenomenologically 
resistant to all attempts to circumscribe or explain. And further, one can say that such as 
contemplative stance is bound up with the formation of a moral sensitivity to otherness (both human 
and non-human) as it presents itself within our existential milieu. Such an attention to otherness 
further entwined the nurturing of a compassionate ethic which the particularity of human suffering is 
taken seriously and given dignity. 
                                               
1
 Milbank, ‘The Second Difference: For a Trinitarianism Without Reserve’. Modern Theology 2(1986), 213-234. This essay was 
published the same year as this conference on MacKinnon took place.  
2
 ‘Trinity and Ontology’, 165.  
3
 Namely, in our discussion of Williams’ essays ‘The Spirit of the Age to Come’ and ‘Poetic and Religious Imagination’.  
4
 It is useful to remember Paul Janz (God, the Mind’s Desire, 174) in reference his discussion of the tragic in the work of 
MacKinnon, where by states that tragedy presents us in a way like no other with ‘a finality of non-resolution’ in the sense that it 
remains ‘a sheerly intractable, non-negotiable, empirically and morally indefeasible finality that ‘stumps’ every conceivable 
theodicy, rationalization or apologetic strategy.’  
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5.2. Redeeming Sorrows’ (1991) 
 
In this section, we will deal with Williams’ own perspective on the so-called theodicy project. Such 
a project (officially commenced in the Enlightenment but whose exact beginning cannot be 
measured
1
) is by no means unified or fully coherent, but is concerned centrally with the question: Si 
Deus est, unde malum? Si non est, unde bonum? Theological reflection on the problem of evil is a 
highly contentious affair, and has been subject to various formulations (and critiques, for example by 
Kant
2
) from the times of the Epicureans through Leibniz (who coined the term ‘theodicy’
3
). Such a 
discussion continues until the present day, and does not seem to be coming to a resolution any time 
soon. Because of this, I cannot attempt to even come close to a comprehensive treatment in the 
space given here.
4
 The modus operandi here – as elsewhere in this monograph – is to expound a 
particular text as it relates to our theme, and see what contributions and advancements the text-in-
question makes. As has been assumed throughout, the problem of human suffering is bound up with 
discourse about tragedy; and further: while acknowledging that we cannot assume that the questions 
and central problems of questions related to evil have remained the same throughout the history of 
Christian considerations of this theme
5
, it seems an unquestionable fact that the reality of human 
suffering has provided a problem for theological thought and existential reflection until the present 
day. And since the central problem of tragedy is concerned with vulnerability, limit, contingency and 
the reality of suffering, avoiding some kind of attention to Williams’ construal of the theodicy project 
would leave gap in our discussion, which is why I have chosen to deal with it here.  
The occasion for Williams’ reflection on theodicy and the problem of suffering was a conference 
held in Claremont Graduate University (1991). The essays delivered were published later in a 
collection of papers gathered from this conference (1996).
6
 Williams’ contribution to this conference 
constituted a response to a paper given by Marilyn McCord Adams at the same conference.  Adams 
is known for her trenchant philosophical treatments of theodicy, particularly as they relate to the 
problem of what she calls ‘horrendous evil’, namely those evils which are of such intensity and 
magnitude that they constitute a prima facie argument against someone being able to gather a 
                                               
1
 Terrence Tilley, The Evils of Theodicy (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1991), 221-255.  
2
 For an excellent and accessible discussion of Kant surrounding these issues, see Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An 
Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 57-84.  
3
 For an excellent survey and history of the ‘theodicy-project’, see Dalferth, Malum, 38-76; 160-213. Dalferth engages in a 
reappraisal of Leibniz’s project, and shows that Leibniz advocated a belief in a creative God of love and redemption, not just 
reason or power, and that it is within this context that his espousal of the present world as the ‘best possible’ world should be 
understood.  
4
 I cannot even do justice in a footnote to the amount of literature on this problem. I can only mention a few that I have found 
useful; they include: Kenneth Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Surin, The Turnings of 
Darkness and Light, 57-90; Wendy Farley, Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion: A Contemporary Theodicy (Louisville: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990); Stanley Hauerwas, Naming the Silences: God, Medicine and the Problem of Suffering 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), 39-95; Terrence Tilley, The Evils of Theodicy, 89ff.; David Bentley Hart, The Doors of the 
Sea: Where was God in the Tsunami? (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005); Karen Kilby, ‘Evil and the Limits of Theology’. 
New Blackfriars 84.938 (2007), 13-29; Charles T. Mathewes, Evil and the Augustinian Tradition, 36-43; Dalferth, Malum, 38-76, 
160-213; Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010); 
Friedrich Hermanni, ‘Hiob und das Theodizeeproblem in der Philosophie’, in Edmund Runggaldier and Benedikt Schick (eds.), 
Letztbegründungen und Gott (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 50-66; Terry Eagleton, On Evil (New Haven-London: Yale University 
Press, 2010). 
5
 Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil, 1-37, where he shows that modern theodical appropriations of Irenaeus and 
Augustine are problematic; and Tilley, The Evils of Theodicy, 83-140, where he speaks on Job and Augustine, and how these 
texts make it difficult to construct a theodicy from them.  
6
 The original collection of essays was published in D.Z. Phillips (ed.), Religion and Morality. Claremont Studies in the 
Philosophy of Religion (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 132-148. The same essay was republished in Higton, Wrestling 
with Angels, 255-274, and is entitled ‘Redeeming Sorrows: Marilyn McCord Adams and the Defeat of Evil’.   
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symbolic or ‘aesthetic’ victory over suffering. In Adams’ opinion, such evil can only be overcome by 
such an individual coming into a relation with a God whose being is characterized by infinite 
goodness.
1
 Central to Adams’ theodicy project is the problem of proportionality; in her opinion, life has 
to have some kind of balance to it if ultimate happiness is to be achieved. However, if suffering 
outweighs happiness, or suffering reaches horrific proportions such that meaning or balance cannot 
be achieved, this is where a symbolic collapse occurs, and it is this reality that theodicy has to deal 
with.  
It is precisely this ‘aesthetic’ theory of proportionality that Williams takes issue with. While Williams 
acknowledges that Adams does take account of individual appropriations in relation to the experience 
of suffering, Williams suggests that the sheer fact that people experience suffering in different ways 
points in a different direction away from ‘the pseudo-aesthetic mode in talking about such matters’.
2
 
Williams goes onto to expound this a little further by saying that ‘What makes an experience bearable 
for one person and the final and intolerable blow for another is, of course, in large measure what they 
have been made by previous experience. That is to say, we cannot take ‘experiences’ as 
psychological atoms that can be assessed on a scale of proportionateness to each other and to an 
imagined whole.’ He explains further: ‘There is, philosophically speaking, no such thing as ‘an’ 
experience, capable of being unproblematically isolated and assessed. Rather, our interaction with 
what we do not choose or control, our environment, develops and modifies what we sense and say of 
ourselves; and we do not know in advance what a new stage in this interaction will do to our linguistic 
and narrative construction of who we are.’
3
  
Williams’ concern with such an ‘aesthetic’ solution to the problem of evil, in which ‘horrendous 
evils’ are ultimately defeated by the incommensurate goodness of God, is that it too hastily assumes 
that ‘no human outcome could heal the effects of appalling injury’. Furthermore, he worries that ‘the 
notion of humanly unhealable hurts should not be used as a device to bring in the need for divine 
(unmediated?) consolation.’
4
 In other words, Williams senses that the language of proportionally 
overwhelming suffering is being used to introduce God as a solution to the problem. But Williams 
remains unconvinced that this is how people deal with suffering (even horrific suffering) in real life; the 
language of ‘proportion’ is unable to deal with the complexity and diversity of actual human 
experience. For some people, meaning can be wrested from life even when the injury and the pain 
they have received seem overwhelming. For others, something apparently minor (from an observer’s 
standpoint) can be the undoing of their symbolic universe. Williams’ suspicion is that Adams’ 
‘aesthetic’ approach ultimately privileges ‘the observer’s standpoint’ and turns ‘the question of how 
evil is to be lived’ into ‘the question of how a satisfactory object can be constructed’, which results in 
making ‘the problem more mine than the sufferer’s’.
5
  
                                               
1
 For a summary of her theodicy project, see Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithaca – New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1999).   
2
 Williams, ‘Redeeming Sorrows’, 257.  
3
 Ibid.,  
4
 Ibid., 258.  
5
 Ibid., 259. Adams’ favourite analogy for such an ‘aesthetic’ approach is the one used by Roderick Chisholm. Using the 
language of ‘balancing off’ and ‘defeat’, Adams argues that if we examine a painting (by Monet for example), we can exam ine it 
closely and see that there are ‘ugly’ bits (viewed atomistically), but that ultimately the ‘ugly’ bits have to be ‘balanced’ with more 
beautiful bits in order for the painting to achieve an aesthetic completion. If the ‘ugly’ bits outweigh the beaut iful bits, then the 
aesthetic unity of the painting is ‘defeated’ by the more unseemly sections of the painting. Williams is unconvinced by such 
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Williams goes on to discuss in a little more detail Christological issues and the question of divine 
suffering. Here, Williams objects to the speaking about God suffering in ‘exactly’ the same way as 
humans suffer. Following from what Williams has said earlier, since suffering always occurs within a 
specific context (resulting in differing interpretative acts), we cannot say that when God ‘suffers’ God 
experiences such an occurrence in the same way as humans do.
1
 God’s identification with the human 
story of Jesus in his passion and resurrection tells us that ‘God in Christ assumes not only humanity 
in general but humanity specifically in its vulnerability. Because the life of God incarnate is worked 
out, articulated, in a human biography in which acute physical and mental suffering occur, such 
suffering cannot be held to be in itself an absolute obstacle to perfect and conscious union with God; 
indeed, it may seem as part of the concrete working out of God’s will, not in the sense that God 
actively wills particular sufferings but because the way in which sufferings are endured becomes an 
aspect of the way in which the love and generosity of God are made concrete and historical.’
2
 
It is such concreteness that Williams seeks to emphasise, rather than finding a solution in some 
generalized or ‘abstract’ account of divine love, he asserts that ‘If the love of God is simply an 
overwhelming tide of ‘positive experience’ that can be guaranteed to swallow up any and all specific 
negative experiences, we are left with nothing to say about particular ways in which suffering 
damages the self and the particular needs that are to be met in healing it. The ‘indifference’ of divine 
love is in danger of becoming an abstraction that ultimately devalues particular histories, and the 
promise of a specific healing or wiping away of tears is reduced to the promise of a maximally positive 
experience for all one day.’ Williams goes on to speak more personally by saying that ‘this is also the 
ground for my unease with the idea that the resolution of earthly pains of a specifically acute kind 
must lie in an unmediated experience of divine love – as if the love of God could now be bestowed on 
an individual subject without the intervention of a ‘world’; as if we could make sense of a notion of 
experience that bypassed the world – our environment, our history and language, our essential 
interconnectedness with other subjects. Here there raises its head the familiar spectre of a 
philosophical ethos that regards the world as a regrettable barrier between the subject and truth.’
3
 
Together with this critique of a lack of particularity in Adams’ account of divine love, Williams also 
has problems with Adams’ construal of divine action. I shall not go into detail here in his relation to his 
critique of Adams on this point, but it essentially comes down to his belief that Adams’ theodicy 
presupposes a view of divine action that has a similarity to a kind of divine ‘crisis management’ in 
which God’s action is fundamentally ‘reactive’ in relation to the world, rather than being the final 
‘’cause’ or ‘context’ of the world and creaturely activity in general.
4
 Williams is following here the 
tradition of Aquinas, and particularly the tradition of Nicholas of Cusa in relation to the God as non 
                                                                                                                                                  
analogy; for him, such an atomistic perspective fails in the artistic realm, and leads him to question its application in the realm 
of human experience. However, Adams seems undeterred on this matter, and it continues to remain a central feature of her 
theodicy project. On this, see Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God, 17-31. Nonetheless, one should not equate 
Adams’ approach with Chisholm’s one since Adams seem to advance a more nuanced, post-Chisholmian approach to an 
‘aesthetic’ theodicy. For this, see Ibid., 129-151.  
1
Ibid., 260-262.  It should be pointed out here that one can see a marked development in Williams’ thought on this matter. 
When one compares what he says here with some of the statements contained in his Quartet lectures, we can see a movement 
towards a more ‘classical’ approach to this question.  
2
 Ibid., 260-261.  
3
 Ibid., 263-264.  
4
 Ibid., 266-271.  
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aliud.
1
 The imagery of God stepping into the picture with overwhelming love in response to the 
occurrence of horrendous suffering is modelled (in Williams’ opinion) on human action – except that 
God’s action occurs at a more profound scale. And this raises some rather difficult and problematic 
questions for any theodicy conceived along this line of divine action: ‘If God has continually to 
intervene when created choices become (disproportionately?) destructive on a large scale, is the 
world as originally created incapable of realising the divine purpose? And if God is capable of endless 
damage limitation apparently envisaged here, is God not capable of creating an environment where 
this sort of intervention is less necessary? And so on’.
2
 
Towards the end of his essay, Williams summarises his critique of theodicy projects in general. In 
his opinion, theodicy either seeks to minimize the magnitude of suffering (by making it seem that it is 
not as bad as it actually is, given the wider scope of God’s action in the world), or it attempts to point 
toward a perspective which we do not have access to at the moment, in the here and now, towards 
some kind of eschatological epiphany in which suffering will be healed and made sensible. However, 
Williams wonders whether such a perspective avoids dealing with the sheer quantity of human 
suffering, and with the reality that we have to live now live with many stories and events in which 
healing and consolation remain elusive (one only has to think of the many stories related to sexual 
abuse, rape, genocide, and the Shoah to exemplify this reality). In light of such realities, Williams 
wonders whether ‘Perhaps it is time for philosophers of religion to look away from theodicy – not 
appeal blandly to the mysterious purposes of God, not to appeal to any putative justification at all, but 
to put the question of how we remain faithful to human ways of seeing suffering, even and especially 
when we are thinking from a religious perspective.’ He goes on to say that, speaking of bodiliness and 
finitude that ‘Part of the task of good theology and candid religious philosophy is…to reacquaint us 
with our materiality and mortality. And part of that is the knowledge of suffering without explanation or 
compensation – and also the knowledge, of course, that there are unpredictable, unsystematisable 
integrations of suffering into a biography in the experience of some.’ Going further, he says that ‘we 
should be worrying about seeing suffering always in its historical particularity: this, here, for this 
person, at this moment, with these memories…In plain English…it is more religiously imperative to be 
worried by evil than to put it into a satisfactory theoretical context, if only because such a worry keeps 
obstinately open the perspective of the sufferer, the subject, for whom this is never a question of 
aesthetics, however imaginatively and discriminately pursued.’
3
 
As can be seen here, Williams is arguing against any perspective that would seek to provide a 
general answer to the problem of suffering, that is, any theory which bypasses the perspective of the 
one who is suffering. Here Williams’ emphasis on particularity and concreteness become apparent, as 
well as his fundamental contemplative attitude towards the reality of suffering and tragedy. Rather 
than seeking to explain or to give a metaphysical framework in which human suffering makes sense, 
Williams again emphasises an attention to particular narratives of suffering, some of which are truly 
horrifying and resist any justificatory attempts of theodicy. For Williams, in the words of Iris Murdoch, 
                                               
1
 Cf. n.1-2 on p.118 above.  
2
 Ibid. 267. 
3
 Ibid. 271-272. It should be said that Williams’ perspective on Adams’ on theodicy has not changed since he penned this 
essay. In his interview with Rupert Shortt (God’s Advocates, 9-12), he reaffirmed his position in relation to Adams’ theodicy.   
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the question is ‘How is one to connect the realism which must involve a clear-eyed contemplation of 
the misery of the world with a sense of an uncorrupted good without the latter idea becoming the 
merest consolatory dream?...It is very difficult to concentrate attention upon suffering and sin, in 
others and oneself, without falsifying the picture in some way while making it bearable.’
1
 However, as 
Murdoch also writes later in the same book: ‘There is something in the serious attempt to look 
compassionately at human things which automatically suggests ‘there is more than this’’ even if ‘Only 
the greatest art can manage it’.
2
 Therefore, for Williams (and Murdoch) contemplation and 
compassion give us a perspective to acknowledge ‘there is more than this’, while maintaining the art 
of non-evasion in relation to the difficulty that suffering poses. Attentiveness to the otherness of the 
sufferer’s perspective opens us to an ethic of compassion in which we learn to open ourselves to what 
is truly different and strange in the other. This is thoroughly implied by Williams’ plea to attend to 
human stories of sufferings. But it is also apparent in his reference to divine action when he says that 
‘if God is compassionate towards the world, this is not self-pity, but the exercise of that radical love 
which is attention to the other in its difference, not its kinship; thus in its specificity within the world 
that is not-God.’
3
 Here divine love is viewed in the model of compassion, whereby the sympathetic 
action occurs to the extent that we do not claim the other’s suffering as our own, but seek to the best 
of our ability to enter into ‘the world’
4
 of the sufferer. Such a model of divine compassion would 
(presumably) lay the foundation for human action, in which we partake through a continuing 
analogical union with God’s own action in the world.  
To concretize some of these points, we can see that Williams revealed this basic orientation in his 
public responses to the Boxing Day Tsunami in 2004.
5
 In a piece originally written for The Sunday 
Telegraph (January 2, 2005), Williams poignantly spoke about how it is precisely the particularity of 
victims that makes suffering so horrifying
6
, and furthermore that it is precisely this difficulty that makes 
giving ‘explanations’ for suffering so intractable.
7
 Seeking for resolutions to the problem of suffering, 
additionally, leads to questionable theologies regarding divine nature
8
 and cannot ultimately bring 
comfort to those who are suffering atrociously. Nonetheless, faith continues to survive such disasters 
because people find it difficult to deny that they have ‘learned to see the world and life in the world as 
                                               
1
 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 61, 73.   
2
 Ibid., 73. It should be mentioned that Iris Murdoch was also a student of Donald MacKinnon, so we should not be surprised at 
the similarities between Williams and Murdoch on this point.  
3
 ‘Redeeming Sorrows’, 272. Williams uses this analysis of compassion to argue against the idea that God has to experience 
suffering in the same way that humans experience suffering. For Williams, as he has argued earlier in this essay, suffering 
always occurs within a narrative context so that the individual’s appropriation of that suffering cannot be generalized. He uses 
this to argue against the idea that God suffers in the same manner as we do. Furthermore, by adducing divine compassion, 
Williams says that God does not need to experience suffering in the same manner in order to identify with us. 
4
 One is reminded here of the statement made by Wittgenstein that ‘The world of the happy man is a different one from that of 
the unhappy man’, in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (rev ed., London-New York: 
Routledge, 1974), 6.43.  
5
 Williams, ‘The Asian Tsunami’ (2 January 2005), available at http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/, accessed 
11/1/2014, n.p.   
6
 ‘The number of deaths horrifies us - but what most painfully reaches our feelings is the individual face of loss and terror.’ 
7
 ‘"Making sense" of a great disaster will always be a challenge simply because those who are closest to the cost are the ones 
least likely to accept some sort of intellectual explanation, however polished. Why should they? Every single random, 
accidental death is something that should upset a faith bound up with comfort and ready answers. Faced with the paralysing 
magnitude of a disaster like this, we naturally feel more deeply outraged - and also more deeply helpless. We can't see how 
this is going to be dealt with, we can't see how to make it better. We know, with a rather sick feeling, that we shall have to go on 
facing it and we can't make it go away or make ourselves feel good.’  
8
 ‘If some religious genius did come up with an explanation of exactly why all these deaths made sense, would we feel happier 
or safer or more confident in God? Wouldn't we feel something of a chill at the prospect of a God who deliberately plans a 
programme that involves a certain level of casualties?’  
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a freely given gift; they have learned to be open to a calling or invitation from outside their own 
resources, a calling to accept God's mercy for themselves and make it real for others’. And 
furthermore, for those who are left, Williams endorses compassion, or what he calls ‘passionate 
engagement’ which seeks ‘to change the situation in whatever – perhaps very small – ways that are 
open to us’ and that finally what ‘can be said with authority about these terrible matters can finally be 
said only by those closest to the cost. The rest of us need to listen; and then to work and – as best we 
can manage it – pray.’ Over and above this, Williams asserts (in another piece written in 
remembrance of the Tsunami)
1
 that ‘love can continue to grow even on the soil of the worst pain and 
the deepest doubt. When we stretch and torment our minds over the problem of evil in the world, we 
should not forget that the survival of love is just as much of a mystery.’ To say this, is to imply that 
while there is a ‘problem of evil’, there is also ‘the problem of good’ which bears witness to ‘the 
bewildering mystery of the fact that the ruined landscape can still be made into a place of human 
dignity and hope.’  
Looking at Williams’ response to this tragedy, we can see that some of the themes we have 
articulating are present namely the reality of contingency (our susceptibility to natural disasters), 
contemplation or attentive practice (our awareness of the particular faces and individuals who suffer), 
compassion (the process of listening to victims, or what he calls ‘passionate engagement’), and finally 
non-closure (refusing simple explanations or solutions to the problem of suffering). All these traits 
confirm the argument we have been making thus far, and gives some legs to Williams’ own 
application of his more ‘theoretical’ work (in relation to his engagement with Adams’ theodicy).  
 
5.3. Tragedy, Time and Augustine  
 
In this section, I will deal with some miscellaneous texts in which the theme of tragedy is brought 
explicitly in into contact with the theme of time and contingency. The purpose of this section is to 
make explicit that which has been presumed and argued throughout, namely that (for Williams) the 
possibility of the tragic is bound up with our existence as creatures living within the constraints of time 
and creaturely contingency. I shall focus mainly on two texts or more specifically certain sections of 
those texts in which the question of time and tragedy are explicitly brought into the discussion. The 
first text we shall deal with is an essay length review of the first edition of John Milbank’s Theology 
and Social Theory. The second essay is one we have already discussed previously, namely his essay 
on Augustine and evil.
2
 I earlier discussed Williams’ reflections on the Augustinian theory of privation 
boni, but left out Williams’ reflections on the tragic in this essay in order for it to be discussed later. 
The reason I did this was because I wanted to trace the specific contours of Williams’ understanding 
of tragedy as it has lead up to the present day.  
The context for Williams’ reflections on the tragic in ‘Saving Time: Thoughts, Patience and Vision’
3
, 
is his friendly critique of Milbank’s reflections on the church in Theology and Social Theory. Williams’ 
                                               
1
 Williams, ‘Tsunami 2004: A Service of Remembrance St Paul's Cathedral’ (11 May 2005), available at available at 
http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/, accessed 11/1/2014, n.p.    
2
 Cf. chapter two above.  
3
 New Blackfriars 73.861 (1992), 319-326.  
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problem with Milbank’s portrayal of the church is that – historically speaking – it tries to fuse ‘historical 
narrative with ‘essentialist’, diagrammatic accounts of ideological options.’
1
 Milbank’s sketch of the 
church as a historical entity, in relation to Greco-Roman society and Judaism, risks becoming a 
metanarrative that is in danger of becoming ‘a bald statement of timeless and ideal differences’ and ‘a 
narrative of origins’ within an ‘ahistorical framework’, a ‘battlefield of ideal types’.
2
 In relation to 
Milbank’s construal of the Christian vision as a rejection of ontological violence, and its concomitant 
commitment to the priority of non-violence, Williams again wonders whether Milbank overemphasises 
the ‘achieved’ character of the church’s identity, without paying attention to the processes in which the 
church’s identity is ‘learned, negotiated, betrayed, inched forward, discerned and risked.’
3
 It is within 
this context that the theme of tragedy enters into the discussion. He mentions Milbank’s obstinate 
refusal of ‘the haunting of ethics by the tragic, to the extent this might suggest an inevitability, a non-
contingency, about evil.’
4
 However Williams wonders whether ‘the very ideas of culture, idiom and 
ethic insist on the tragic in some form. If our salvation is cultural (historical, linguistic, etc.), it is not a 
return to primordial harmonics, purely innocent difference. We are always already, in history, shaped 
by privation, living at the expense of each other: important moral choices entail the loss of certain 
specific goods for certain specific persons, because moral determination, like any ‘cultural’ 
determination, recognizes that not all goods for all persons are contingently compatible.’ Therefore, 
he argues that ‘The peace of the church is going to be vacuous or fictive if it is not historically aware 
of how it is constructed in the events of determination which involve conflict and exclusion of some 
kind.’
5
 
He goes on to say, regarding ‘the minimalist theodicy of Augustinianism’, that ‘an authentically 
contingent world is one in which you cannot guarantee the compatibility of goods. That’s what it is to 
be created. And when that contingency becomes meshed with rational beings’ self-subverting choices 
of unreality over truth, the connectedness of human community becomes life-threatening as well as 
life-nurturing. That is what it is to be fallen.’ He goes onto say (echoing some thoughts we have seen 
elsewhere, namely in his poem ‘Twelfth Night’) that ‘Grace does not give innocence…it gives 
absolution and the Church’s peace is a healed history, not a ‘total harmony’ whose constructed (and 
thus scarred) character doesn’t show. And in our history, healing is repeatedly imperilled and broken 
by new decisions.’ In this context, he goes on to articulate that ‘The Church actually articulated its 
gospel of peace by speaking the language of repentance; failure can be ‘negotiated’ into what is 
creative. But this means that the Church as an historical community is always in construction. It does 
not promise a new and finished innocence in the order of time, but focuses the freedom of God 
constantly to draw that order back to difference that is nourishing, not ruinous.’
6
 
The question then arises here whether this understanding of the Church’s existence within time 
implies ‘a myth of necessary violence’. Williams’ response to this is, firstly, that that the word ‘violence’ 
has become a loaded word and that ‘sometimes it is being made to do duty for any voluntary limiting 
                                               
1
 Ibid., 319-320. 
2
 Ibid., 320.  
3
 Ibid., 321.  
4
 Ibid.  
5
 Ibid., 322  
6
 Ibid., 322.  
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of another’s unrestricted will’.
1
 He says that it ought to be possible to say that ‘a contingent world is 
one in which contestation is inevitable, given that not all goods are ‘compossible’, without saying that 
there can be no healing or mending eschatologically, or that conflict and exclusion have a sacred or 
necessarily liberative character.’
2
  Secondly, Williams seeks to relate the doctrine of the Trinity to the 
creatio ex nihilo. Williams argues that there is a difference within the Trinity which does not amount to 
‘collision or competition’ and this ‘difference’ is seen to be basis for ‘the positing of difference ‘outside’ 
the divine life’. However, regarding this divine creative act, such a positing is not ‘a repetition of divine 
generation’ but rather it is ‘the making of a world whose good will take time to realise, whose good is 
to emerge from uncontrolled circumstance – not by divine enactment in the direct sense, but by a kind 
of interaction of divine and contingent causality’.
3
 For Williams ‘Creation itself is not to be thought of 
as a moment of tragic rupture, a debauching of divine Wisdom, but is surely pregnant with the risk of 
tragedy, conflicting goods, if the good of what is made is necessarily bound up with taking time. The 
Fall is not necessary, logically or ontologically but…its story can be ‘retrieved’ as one outworking of 
what creation (logically) cannot but make possible if it is really other to God.’
4
 
Thereafter, Williams concludes his essay with some reflections on the socio-political implications of 
Theology and Social Theory, and the lessons that can be learn from it. Since such a discussion is not 
explicitly relevant to our discussion, I will not enter into a discussion here of those passages. Rather, I 
will move onto the next essay on Augustine which deals with similar themes.  
Towards the end of his essay on Augustine and evil, Williams seek to mount a response to the 
work of Kathleen Sands
5
 particularly as it relates to her criticisms of Augustine, namely, her rejection 
of the privation theory of evil as well as her privileging of a radically tragic view of life in which the 
Good and the True do not always find identity, and (further) that the twin options of dualism and 
rationalism are unable to deal with the fundamental contingency of life. Such an opinion rejects ‘moral 
dualism’ in the sense that (as she argues) to be involved in life means that one is often inherently 
involved in evil; furthermore, the traditional Augustinian position (according to Sands) is unable to deal 
with this radical contingency that haunts all our activity as human beings. She argues that the moral 
dualism that is pervasive in Christian ethical reflection is tied to a concept of the rationalistic will that is 
bound to a primarily androcentric mode of discourse. Taking these points into account, Williams 
partially confirms her opinion by saying that ‘there is no timeless and stable goodness in this world; 
there is no incarnation of evil. All creaturely good is realised in time…’ However, he distances himself 
from Sands by saying that ‘the perfection exists not as something that issues from a process, but as 
the eternal standard and direction of creaturely good.’
6
  
Williams wants to distinguish Augustine himself from any simplistic understanding of the Good that 
is separate from its entanglements with contingent realisation. Williams argues that it was precisely 
the Donatists and the Pelagians who argued for such an ahistorical position in relation to the Church. 
                                               
1
 One should compare this comment with Gillian Rose’s reflections on ‘violence-in-love’, in The Broken Middle: Out of Our 
Ancient Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992),147-152. 
2
 Ibid.  
3
 Ibid., 322-323.  
4
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5
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6
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If the Good is God (as Augustine argues) then such ahistorical understandings of the Church’s 
identity will not work because the Good cannot be completely present within time in a non-dialectical 
manner because God cannot be reduced to and circumscribed by any finite actualisation. However, 
such a dialectical actualisation of the Good should not be (contra Sands) taken to mean that the Good 
ultimately is radically contingent, meaning different things in different contexts without any “grammar’ 
of continuity’
1
 between these differing contexts. If there is not any such continuity then it is difficult to 
escape the kind of dualism that Sands wants to reject, and furthermore it becomes difficult to 
articulate a moral theory that argues that there are certain things that are wrong no matter what 
context we find ourselves in.  
As can be seen from this, Williams is rejecting the radical implications of Sands’ theory of tragedy, 
but this should by no means imply that Williams is rejecting a tragic perspective in general. He says 
that a true Augustinian might still say that ‘the world is tragic, in the sense that our fallen perceptions 
of the world are so flawed that we are constantly, and inevitably (since the Fall), involved in mistaken 
and conflictual of our true interests. In so far as the Good, in the fallen order, requires a measure of 
coercion if total incoherence and fragmentation are to be avoided, loss is always bound up with 
creaturely virtue, even sanctity…However, this frustration is contingent on history, not intrinsic to the 
nature of their good. What such an interlocutor could not accept would be a definition of tragic conflict 
as a necessary feature of created order.’
2
 And so, we can see that Williams is not rejecting a tragic 
perspective per se, but rather a conception of the tragic that is understood in terms of ‘necessarily 
conflictual goods’ which ultimately imply ‘very stark metaphysical implications’.
3
 Williams is at pains to 
emphasise that to be involved in time implies that we can succumb to potential tragedy, but this 
should not imply that life should be understood as ‘essentially’ tragic. Instead, we should understand 
tragedy as that which is made possible by our involvement in creaturely contingency and a reality that 
is bounded by temporal limits.  
To summarise my conclusions from examining these two later essays, I can reaffirm my basic 
contention that for Williams, tragedy is bound up with our involvement in time. In his interactions with 
Milbank and Sands, Williams is seeking to emphasise that tragedy is not part of the essential ontology 
of the world. To understand the tragic as bound up with the contingent reality of life is to clearly 
distinguish Williams understanding of tragedy from any affirmation of an ontology of violence (the 
critique of which has been expounded by people like John Milbank and David Bentley Hart). 
Understanding tragedy as a part of our existence as contingent beings is very different from affirming 
that life is fundamentally tragic, ontologically speaking. To live within time means that we are subject 
to powers and forces beyond our control, and that we are entwined with dynamics that might cause 
others to be subject to diminution and violence. We say this in an attempt to be as realistic as 
possible in relation to how the world really operates, without retreating into a world in which the reality 
of human suffering and pain are not taken with full seriousness.  
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5.4 Tragedy and the Broken Middle: After Hegel and Gillian Rose 
 
It is beyond the scope of this section to expound Williams’ entire socio-political philosophy; it will 
suffice here to say that Williams advocates a kind of ‘interactive pluralism’
1
 which tries to steer a way 
through both liberal individualism and strong versions of communitarianism. Williams’ proposal is 
influenced by many sources
2
, but the essential model underlying his politics is a theological one, 
namely the Pauline image of ‘the body’ in which each part is given its dignity and particularity, but that 
each part nonetheless contributes to the common good of the body.
3
 To use another analogy: in a 
symphonic performance each part, instrument and melody, is unique, but contributes something to 
the whole, something that is greater than the sum of its parts.
4
 He holds to a belief in the ‘social 
miracle’
5
 of charity and the collective good that can arise when the legitimate needs, desires and 
identities of different communities are recognised, and are given space to articulate together a vision 
of society that will lead to the mutual benefit of all involved in this process. From this, it follows that 
Williams’ ideal regarding the socio-political context is a more decentralized one, one that is less 
‘statist’ or centred around a programme of ‘programmatic secularism’ in which the state and the realm 
of politics is assumed to arbitrate between different groups in abstraction from their particular cultural 
and religious identities. Such a process of abstraction is an inherently violent and coercive process 
since communities and individuals are asked, for the sake of political peace and order, to be culturally 
and religiously ‘neutered’, to be silenced regarding something that makes them who they are as 
individuals and communities. Instead, Williams argues for a ‘procedural secularism’ in which the state 
gives dignity and recognition to the different claims of various constituencies, while at the same 
refusing to prefer one cultural or religious identity over another
6
, as can been seen in his controversial 
lecture on Shari’a law
7
, the content of which I will not enter into here.
8
  
The problematic relationship between identity and difference within the socio-political realm, both 
philosophically and practically conceived, is the place where Hegel’s vision becomes important for 
Williams.
9
 As we have already said earlier, Williams changed his view on Hegel somewhere in the late 
1980’s as a result of his engagement with Gillian Rose, and his student Andrew Shanks. Initially, 
Williams held to the standard criticism of Hegel, namely that he held to an understanding of all 
                                               
1
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difference being consumed in the sameness of the Absolute. Later, he changed his viewpoint and 
came to understand Hegel as a thinker of difference and negativity, rather than reconciliation and 
closure. In Williams’ own words, Hegel’s philosophy of mind is ‘not a story of return to the same’, and 
he doubts whether for Hegel ‘the Absolute Spirit was realizable as the term of any specific historical 
process’. There is a teleological pattern within history but it is not ‘representable’ fully in a specific 
‘historical consciousness’.
1
 Therefore, within the context of human negotiation and language, ‘there is 
no identity yet to be found in the endless exchanges of speech and understanding.’
2
 For Williams, in 
order to understand Hegel, one must understand that for him to think is to think within the context of 
‘an infinite relatedness’ in which there is ‘no concrete identity that is not ‘mediated’, i.e. realised and 
maintained by something other than itself alone.’
3
 This more or less summarises (in Williams’ view) 
Hegel’s understanding of ‘negativity’; such ‘negativity’ finds a supreme example for Hegel in his 
(Lutheran) understanding of the divine incarnation whereby God, who is bound up with ‘making sense’ 
of things
4
, identifies with ‘the poverty, pain and negativity of life and death’ which cannot be construed 
as ‘natural symbols of divine identity’, so that the cross can be understood in a ‘speculative’ manner in 
in which the ‘negative’ undermines sameness or simplistic identity, thereby questioning  the violence 
of human totalization.
5
 
In an article specifically dedicated to Gillian Rose
6
, Williams seeks to expound Hegel’s thought 
within a specifically socio-political context. Rose within her political appropriation of Hegel sought to 
move beyond the two options of absolute identity (as in some interpretations of Hegel) and absolute 
difference (as in the postmodern ethical theory of someone like Levinas). Both options make 
otherness literally ‘un-thinkable’. Instead Rose sought to emphasise the process of political labour and 
negotiation in which difference is ‘an occasion of work, the work by which human beings constantly 
query what they have assumed is their interest as individuals or definite groups’
7
 in which we 
acknowledge that the ‘sense I make is not under my control’
8
. However, such a process is precisely a 
political or ‘agonistic’
9
 in which ‘every moment of recognition is also a new moment is also a new 
moment of salutary error to the extent that it is the taking of a position’.
10
 Such a staking of a position 
is inherently risky since it becomes difficult to extract such a negotiating process from ‘a struggle of 
the will against the resistance of an environment, and it becomes impossible to disentangle this from 
some account of violence’.
11
 It is this context of aporia and political agon that Rose designates as ‘the 
broken middle’. Williams goes on to define Rose’s concept of ‘the broken middle’
12
 by saying that 
                                               
1
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‘Without the awareness of what constrains us, which is not only the given material environment but 
the history of negotiation with other agents that surrounds our projects before they are articulated or 
formed, we cannot act so as to initiate or change; yet the act itself that changes or introduces the 
critical, the possibility of failure, requires that we stand over against the ethical as order, recognizing 
that the action we inaugurate is not in advance specified as successful, well-formed or orderly. It is 
involved with 'violence'. But, in turn, that violence is rendered recognizable, capable of being 
criticised, by the fact that the ethical is not abolished; the act of inauguration does not establish an 
anti-order of arbitrary free-for-all.’
1
 
It is not difficult to see here that for Williams and Rose, politics is a potentially tragic affair in which 
the staking of an identity and a position is always already engaged with relatedness and limitation and 
‘negativity’, as well as failure and potential ‘violence’. Staking a position within this context entwines 
one with conflict and the limited options made available by the contingent milieu we find ourselves in. 
Such a context has been made possible by an infinite range of determinants and historical effects, 
and our staking of a position within this environment can only continue this negotiating process within 
the confines of time, which means that such an ‘ideological’ positioning can never be finalized or 
closed off since such a position has been made possible by contingent factors which limit our 
perspectives on any totalized ‘whole’. And because of this, our staking of a position always has the 
potential for failure, and can – potentially - even contribute (even unintentionally) to historical effects 
that can be deemed ‘violent’, in the sense that it creates ‘limited’ options for those who come after. As 
such, the reality of the tragic, non-closure and a continuing involvement within the process of 
negotiation remain important factors within our socio-political theorising and praxis. This does not 
mean that Williams holds tragedy to be the final word about humanity
2
, nor that the ‘social miracle’ of 
human charity is not possible within the context of such political engagement. He is simply saying that 
we cannot ever come to a final conclusion regarding the political ordering of society - we have to go 
on attempting, to ‘Try again. Fail again. Fail better’ as Samuel Beckett said.
3
 
Such a political vision applies to the context of the church and the body of Christ just as much as it 
applies to our everyday societal context. Especially when it comes to the problem of serious 
disagreement regarding moral issues, in which opinions can be so divisive, Williams suggests that as 
the body of Christ we have ‘to sacrifice a straightforward confidence in our "purity”. Being in the Body 
means that we are touched by one another's commitments and thus by one another's failures. If 
another Christian comes to a different conclusion and decides in different ways from myself, and if I 
can still recognize his or her discipline and practice as sufficiently like mine to sustain a conversation, 
this leaves my own decisions to some extent under question. I cannot have absolute certainty that this 
is the only imaginable reading of the tradition. I need to keep my reflections under critical review. 
This…is not a form of relativism. It is a recognition of the element of putting oneself at risk that is 
involved in any serious decision making or any serious exercise of discernment.’
4
 The particular moral 
                                                                                                                                                  
Consequences for the Theology of John Milbank’, in Anthony Paul Smith and Daniel Whistler (eds.), After the Postmodern and 
the Postsecular: New Essays in Continental Philosophy of Religion (UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 189-208.  
1
 Ibid., 63-64.  
2
 Cf. ‘The Spirit of the Age to Come’, 622. 
3
 Samuel Beckett, ‘Worstward Ho’, in Nohow On: Company, Ill Seen Ill Said, Worstward Ho (London, John Calder, 1989), 101.  
4
 Williams, ‘On Making Moral Decisions’. Anglican Theological Review 81.2 (1999), 304.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
140 
 
problem Williams references in the above quoted essay is the problem of nuclear armament 
(something, like his teacher MacKinnon, he stands strongly against
1
), but it could also be applied to 
the strenuous debates within the Anglican Communion surrounding woman bishops and 
homosexuality. The manifest ‘brokenness’ within the body of Christ surrounding these issues is 
something which has to be taken seriously, but the ecumenical desire for unity is something that 
cannot be sacrificed or given up without serious diminution of the witness of the Church, even though 
such a desire cannot be achieved at any cost (‘Unity at all costs is indeed not a Christian goal. Our 
unity is Christ-shaped or it is empty’).
2
 And so within our ecclesial and social context, we continue to 
inhabit ‘the broken middle’, which while frustrating and sometimes even irresolvable, is the only place 
in which dialogue can continue, and transformation of struggles can occur.  
 
5.5. Christology and Temporality: Christ and Prince Myshkin 
 
In this section I want to engage very briefly with one of Williams’ more recent texts, namely his 
book on Dostoevsky and his discussion on whether Prince Myshkin in The Idiot can really be called a 
Christ figure. Herein, Williams references the temporal aspect of salvation, and how Christology 
relates to that reality, which often involves an entanglement in tragic decisions, effects, and outcomes. 
The debate surrounding the question on how far Myshkin can really be considered a Christ figure 
continues to be debated among scholars of Dostoevsky. As Williams says, ‘discussion continues 
about how far the Prince’s failure as a protagonist should be read theologically, as a statement 
about—once again—Christ’s relation to mundane worldly truth or the effectiveness of grace in the 
actual world of human relationships or Dostoevsky’s capacity to sustain his surface Christian 
conviction in the actual process of writing.’ But Williams suggests that ‘What we are seeing in the 
novel, certainly, is not the outworking of a theological strategy but the effect that the writing itself has 
upon the original purposes of the writer.’
3
  
It is Williams’ argument that the reason it is difficult to consider Myshkin a ‘saviour’ is not because 
he is a human being subject to the fluctuations of time, but rather for precisely the opposite reason, 
namely that it is Myshkin’s ‘changelessness’
4
 that makes it difficult for him to be considered a saviour. 
Williams goes further to say that ‘if this is a Christ figure, it is one who has no “hinterland,” no God 
behind him.’
5
 He describes a scene in the novel where Myshkin has an epileptic fit; Williams takes 
note of this because ‘The ecstatic vision is of a state beyond time and so beyond choice and action’, 
and furthermore, the language used by Myshkin to describe his experience seems to speak of ‘[a] 
world of causal completeness, where we have no option but “reconciliation”’. That is, we have to learn 
to accept the way things are, accepting that ‘this world is a terrible, mechanical thing’.
6
 Myshkin 
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seems to be a ‘timeless’ figure, without a past or ‘hinterland, and because of this, such a timeless 
quality has ‘no resources of memory and critical self-awareness to make it effective in the world of 
human relations’. Williams mentions Myshkin’s relationship with one of the other female characters in 
the novel, and suggests that there is little personal investment or genuine listening to the ‘actuality’ of 
the person’s situation.
1
 He says that ‘To see the truth in someone is not only to penetrate behind 
appearances to some hidden static reality. It also has to be, if it is not to be destructive, a grasp of the 
processes and motors of concealment, a listening to the specific language of a person hiding himself. 
It is perhaps the difference between “seeing through” someone and understanding him.’
2
 Because of 
this, it is difficult to depict Myshkin as a ‘beautiful’ character since it is difficult to represent such a 
character ‘without giving him a history that will enable him to understand the changes and processes 
of growth or repression or whatever that occur in temporal beings. Myshkin’s timelessness is what 
prevents him being a savior.’
3
 The ‘humanness’ of Myshkin is put in question by this reality because 
‘what is most crucially human—growth, memory, the capacity to listen and change place’ cannot be 
done ‘if you don’t have a place to begin with.’
4
 In brief: Myshkin fails as a Christ-figure because he has 
never ‘learned how to learn’.
5
 
Thereafter, Williams goes on to discuss how ‘Myshkin’s tragedy sheds a clear light on the whole of 
Dostoevsky’s implicit Christology.’ Referencing the debate within Christian circles as to whether Christ 
in the incarnation took on fallen or unfallen nature, Williams writes that ‘If the Word takes on a fallen 
humanity, does this mean that he is born into a humanity that is—in Augustine’s language—incapable 
of not sinning? In which case, how can he restore it? But if the Word takes on unfallen humanity, in 
what sense does he undergo precisely the experience of fallen beings faced with potentially tragic 
choices? If he does not, once again, how can he restore it, healing all that he has assumed, in the 
vocabulary of the fourth-century Gregory Nazianzen?’
6
 However, with the figure of Myshkin, we see 
Dostoevsky’s experimental and nostalgic attempt at a kind of utopic Christology which tries ‘to remove 
any tragic shadow from the person of the saint or redeemer.’
7
 In contrast, referencing the biblical story 
of Christ, Williams says that Jesus is ‘not one from which tension and decision are absent, and 
furthermore, in more detail (echoing no doubt some of the sentiments of his teacher MacKinnon), he 
says for  
 
‘Jesus to be human at all, this narrative implies, is for him to be faced with choices not simply 
between good and evil but between options that might arguably be good but also bring with 
them incalculable costs. The options that confront actual historical agents are not like self-
contained items on a shelf or rack awaiting buyers; they are part of a continuum of human 
policies that may be flawed and damaging, and they will already be constrained by what has 
happened. This is the concrete meaning of embracing the consequences of fallenness. Even 
a subject whose desires are creative and altruistic has to enact those desires in a context 
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where their objects will often appear obscure and ambiguous, so that good outcomes cannot 
be tightly and causally linked to good intentions.’
1
 
 
And because of this, the story of Jesus is bound to be ‘a narrative of real risk: either a yes or a no 
could produce destructive results.’
2
 To illustrate this point (moving away from the text itself), one only 
has to think here of Donald MacKinnon’s oft-quoted reference to the cross being a tragic occurrence 
since it is simultaneously an event of salvation and damnation (for Judas Iscariot), and furthermore 
(because of its historical players, including Jews and the Romans) it is an event that has been used to 
justify centuries of Christian anti-Judaism, anti-Semitism,  pogroms, and definitely made something 
like Auschwitz a greater possibility than it would have been without it. What seems clear from this 
discussion concerning Christology, and from Williams’ more recent publications, is that even in his 
more recent theological endeavours, he still sensitive to the problems of temporality and its tragic 
possibilities. In Williams’ opinion, not even God’s redemptive act in Christ can be immunized against 
the vicissitudes that time involves. As we have already seen, in his reflections on T.S. Eliot and the 
Four Quartets, Williams believes that it is only through taking time seriously (something the 
incarnation does) that we are able to speak about genuine redemption and hope. For Williams, 
Christology and the question of salvation cannot be extricated from the problem of time, if it is 
precisely we  (as temporal and contingent beings subject to the limitations and tragedies of created 
being ) who need redemption, then the question is how are we are to be redeemed, without changing 
us into something else, or removing something that is central to our humanity, namely our material 
and temporal quality as limited, non-divine creatures.  
Bringing this part of the chapter to a close, other shorter texts could be mentioned
3
, but enough 
has been said to make the point. Thus far we have shown that, for Williams, tragedy provides an 
exemplary example of that which resists closure because it resists attempts to circumscribe and to 
explain. The particular force of tragedy is that it continues to confront us with the inherent difficulty of 
explaining the world within generalised theories because the tragic refuses to be generalised in such 
a fashion. In addition to this, we showed that Williams distances himself from theodicy projects 
precisely because they are unable to deal with the particular experiences of suffering, with the unique 
first-person perspective of the sufferer. And finally, we showed once again that, for Williams, tragedy 
is bound with our existence as contingent beings, subject to the forces of time, and it is within this 
context that we are to understand the radical contingency and conflict that afflict our political 
endeavours (as Williams has learned from Hegel and Gillian Rose). And furthermore, since our 
humanity is bound up with the time and contingency, our understanding of Christology and atonement 
will have to take account of this factuality.  
 
 
                                               
1
 Ibid., 57.  
2
 Ibid.  
3
 One could mention Williams brief reflections on tragedy in the work of Charles Dickens, which touches on some of the themes 
discussed thus far, namely in relation to the themes of self-deception, and the tragic consequences that can erupt when the 
truth is confronted. For this, see Williams, ‘Address at The Wreathlaying Ceremony to Mark the Bicentenary of the Birth of 
Charles Dickens, Westminster Abbey,7 February 2012’. Dickens Quarterly 29.2 (2012), 113-115.  
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5.6. On the Trinity and Tragedy 
 
The subject of this section will be Williams’ understanding of the Trinity and its relation to time. 
Here I would like to anticipate a possible objection to the argument that I have been making regarding 
the relationship between tragedy and time, and it seems that now (after we have engaged Williams’ 
perspective on time and tragedy in more depth) that such a section seems to be well-placed in this 
chapter, particularly since it picks on themes we have been discussing in this chapter, namely the 
Trinity (briefly discussed in relation to Williams’ discussion of MacKinnon) and the problem of 
contingency. This is an section designed to counter a potential interpretation of Williams’ 
understanding of tragedy, and its relation to his doctrine of the Trinity. More specifically, this part is a 
kind of propaedeutic against a possible misinterpretation of Williams’ understanding of the relation of 
the Trinity to the dramatic movements of time. My argument is not essentially addressed against 
specific critiques of Williams’ Trinitarian theology (there are no significant critiques of his theology of 
Trinity that I know of) but rather against a possible interpretation. Such an interpretation could run as 
follows:  if we take a look at some of Williams’ discussions of the Trinity, we could find the ontological 
basis for tragedy not within creaturely contingency but rather in the divine life itself, in which the divine 
life is itself understood as a kind of tragedy (like the divine tragedy advanced by the ‘Orthodox’ 
philosopher and mystagogue Nicholas Berdyaev, a thinker who Williams is not particularly fond of).
1
 
At face value, such an interpretation seems to be a stretch, to say the least. However, it is one 
possible interpretation of Williams’ Trinitarian reflections, particularly in relation to his reflections on 
the desire of God, a lack of ‘fulfilment’ and ‘completion’
2
, even between the Triune persons 
themselves. The reason I bring up this discussion at all is because of a statement made by Ben 
Myers, in his book on Williams. While expounding Williams’ theology regarding fantasy, he writes that 
‘Even the life of God resists gratification. The Son eternally unconsoled, eternally broken, by the love 
of the Father; the Father is eternally devastated and displaced by the gift of his being to the receptive 
Son; and a third agency, the Spirit, is the constant evacuation of fantasy, a dark night poised between 
God and God, light and light. If tragedy means a total lack of completion and consolation, then it is 
hard to avoid concluding that there is something very like a tragedy going on forever between the 
persons of the trinity [italics mine].’
3
 
Now it could be argued that if we take such a passage literally (I don’t think this is Myers’s real 
intention, as I will argue), then – theologically speaking - the door is open to placing tragedy at the 
heart of existence, and that the basis for tragedy (ontologically speaking) is found within the Godhead 
itself, rather than time and creaturely contingency. Tragedy would be seen as an expression of 
                                               
1
 In his interview with Breyfogle (‘Time and Transformation’, 308), Williams has expressed his dislike of Berdyaev: ‘I loved 
Berdyaev when I was seventeen and haven't been able to read him seriously since. He has the same effect on me as Tillich, 
I'm afraid to say. That is, it's all very exciting, but I haven't a clue what you're supposed to do about it. I suspect that with both 
Tillich and Berdyaev you're dealing with people — I have to state this carefully — who are essentially rhetoricians, so much 
involved in the process of the rhetoric that other dimensions of the discourse just seem to fade away. That is to say, the 
experience of reading them is what the text is about; I'm afraid there's an emptiness behind it. It's a pity that for many people 
Berdyaev represents the Russian Orthodox mindset, and most Russians tear their hair out at that suggestion.’  
2
 I am aware that using terms such as these are problematic since it might seem to imply a denial of divine simplicity, or a kind 
of process theology. However, it should be said that these terms are being used analogously in reference to the intra-Trinitarian 
relations, and not in relation to God’s dependency on the world. The reason I adopt such language is because speaking of 
‘desire’ between the Triune persons implies an ‘eternal dynamism’ that never comes to an end or rest. I am grateful for Sarah 
Rowland-Jones’ critical comments on an earlier draft of this section.  
3
 Myers, Christ the Stranger, 112.  
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ontology, and thereby ‘necessary’ in the stringent sense of the word. My argument thus far has been 
that Williams understands tragedy to have a foundation within created time, not divine eternity. My 
basic response to this potential interpretation will go as follows: in Williams’ theology of the Trinity (1) 
the language of divine desire implies a lack of closure or rest between the Trinitarian persons, but this 
does not imply an ‘eternal tragedy’ within the Trinity. Further, (2) we can only apply the category of 
creaturely finitude to the divine life in an analogical sense in light of God’s own eternal self-
differentiation from the Son, revealed in the incarnation, whereby ‘God constitutes in Jesus a life 
which is – so to speak – paradigmatically creaturely, distanced from God of…something approaching 
the ‘externality’ of creator and creation, yet decisively not that, but a mutually constitutive presence, 
and internal relation of terms’.
1
 And if this is the case, then (3) we can comprehend Donald 
Mackinnon’s application of the analogy of limits to the divine life, and Williams’ apparent endorsement 
of it. The language of ‘limits’ here is no doubt an exercise in analogous thinking, but it is an attempt to 
think how the ‘externality’ of Father and Son (revealed incarnationally) provides an ‘ontological’ basis 
within the divine life for creaturely finitude and, as a consequence, potential tragedy.  
In making this argument, I am not implying that Myers advocates an ‘eternal tragedy’ in the sense 
that I have been arguing against, only that it is a possible trajectory of what he has said. In what is to 
follow, I shall deal a little with Myer’s quotation within its context. I will show that Myers’ language of 
tragedy in relation to the Trinity is largely drawn from one lecture Williams delivered on the theology of 
the Russian Orthodox theologian, Sergei Bulgakov. However, even within this text, we can see that 
there are indications that we should not take such language too seriously or literally. Such a move 
would go beyond Williams’ own explicit statements to the contrary. But in order to contextually place 
this statement of Myers, I will need to embark on a discussion of William’s understanding of divine 
desire and the Trinity
2
 so that the context can be properly indicated.  
As we have already shown in our previous chapter on the problem of fantasy, Williams’ theology of 
desire remains fundamentally Augustinian in its approach to this question.
3
 The first major reflections 
on this theme (within Williams’ oeuvre) focus for the most part on the theme of human desire, but 
already in these texts we can see that Williams’ theology of desire is underpinned by a specific 
doctrine of God. A paradigmatic example can be found in his essay on Augustine, language and 
desire, penned in 1986, but published in 1989.
4
 Williams is reflecting here on Augustine’s use of 
signum (sign) and res (the thing itself), as well Augustine’s distinction between frui (enjoyment) and uti 
(use). As we have already mentioned in our previous chapter, Williams interprets Augustine’s use of 
                                               
1
 Williams, ‘Trinity and Ontology’, 158.  
2
 It should be said here that, up the present date, whenever Williams engages in longer treatments of the Trinity, he almost 
always does so by exegeting specific texts within the Christian tradition, sometimes focusing in-length on one specific text or 
writer. There are exceptions, for instance in his reflections on icons, but by and large this is his practice. As of yet, we are still 
awaiting Williams’ own book-length treatment of this theme, so the only texts (by and large) we have available for a positive 
construction of Williams’ own Trinitarian theology are the texts in which he is expounding at the length the Trinitarian theology 
of other theologians. This confirms a perennial practice of Williams when it comes to his own theological construction, namely 
that he is not particularly ‘original’  in his treatment of theological topics, but that he is rather deeply hermeneutical thinker who 
loves immersing himself in the texts of others. But it should also give us pause when it comes to identifying Williams’ own 
position completely with the opinion of the authors he is expounding. This is something we need to bear in mind as we look at 
some of his texts related to the doctrine of the Trinity. Regarding his own book length treatment of this theme, he has stated, in 
his interview with David Cunningham (‘Living the Questions’, 26), published in 2002, that he has already been ‘trying for many 
years to write a book on the Trinity’. In private conversation, Graham Ward (a close friend of Williams) has confirmed that this 
project is still in progress. 
3
 I am indebted to Ben Myers discussion of this theme in Christ the Stranger, 83-91.  
4
Williams, ‘Language, Reality and Desire in Augustine’s De Doctrina’, 138-150.  
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these words to expound of a specific theology of desire. For Augustine (according to Williams) only 
God can be truly ‘enjoyed’ for God’s own sake; all other things should be ‘used’ for the higher purpose 
of entering deeper into the life of the triune God. However, this does not imply that these things are 
merely disposable or that they can be commandeered for ideological pretensions (in the name of 
God). Instead, by saying that created things point us towards God, and therefore should not be 
enjoyed for themselves, we can affirm the hard truth that there is no end to our desire so that our 
desire cannot be exhausted by any object on the creaturely plane of reality. Such an 
acknowledgement preserves the ‘objectivity’ of the world over against the ego which would try to 
consume it in the hope of coming to an ‘end’ of desire.
1
 It is precisely this deferral of desire which is 
the basis for Williams’ reflections on the Trinity.  
Williams’ theology of desire is brought into explicit conversation with the doctrine of the Trinity in 
his celebrated (albeit highly controversial) essay on ’The Body’s Grace’, delivered in 1989.
2
 I will not 
engage in depth here on the themes dealt with in this essay since they would take us too far from our 
present purpose. It can be said that the primary thrust of this essay is to expound a theology of desire 
and sexuality that opens us to the ‘grace’ of the embodied self, the other, human and divine, rather 
than treating the other as merely an theatre onto which we can stage our fantasies. This implies an 
understanding of sexuality that affirms joy and desire, but also risk and vulnerability in our intimate 
engagements.
3
 Here Williams explicitly relates the Trinity and desire
4
 since for Williams, the story of 
redemption implies that we are taken up into the desire that makes up the life of the Trinity, the love of 
Father, Son and Spirit. Nonetheless, despite the connections made here, we will have to wait several 
years before Williams engages in a more in-depth treatment of divine desire and the Trinity. The 
underlying structure is presupposed, but it is only made explicit in more depth several years later.  
Before we analyse the rest of the texts, for the sake of orientation, one could summarise Williams’ 
theology of the Trinity by saying that he is attempting to expound an ek-static Trinitarian doctrine, 
namely, that the persons of the Trinity are be understood as a movement of other-directed love in 
which each person gives itself to the other, divests its being for the sake of the other: the Father gives 
himself to the Son and the Son to the Father. However, mere twoness risks becoming another kind of 
egoism (égoïsme à deux), so within the Trinity, the excess of love between the Father and Son is 
understood to be the Spirit. In the words of Ben Meyers: ‘The Spirit sustains the exchange of love 
                                               
1
 For more on this, see Williams, Lost Icons: Reflections on Cultural Bereavement, 171-214 
2
 Williams, ‘The Body’s Grace’ [1989], in Eugene F. Rogers, Jr. (ed.), Theology and Sexuality: Classic and Contemporary 
Readings (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 309-321.  
3
 For more reflections on the theme of sexuality, in relation to the question of ethics, see Williams, A Ray of Darkness, 138-144; 
Williams, ‘Forbidden Fruit: New Testament Sexual Ethics’, in Martyn Percy (ed.), Intimate Affairs: Spirituality and Sexuality in 
Perspective (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1997), 21-31. For a discussion of these texts, see Mike Higton, Difficult 
Gospel, 135-152. Also cf. Williams, ‘Macrina’s Deathbed Revisited’, 244: ‘Sexual desire, erōs in the usual sense, is, like other 
features of our instinctual life, capable of carrying reasonable meaning, and is analogous to that fundamental erōs for the 
endless God that the binds the polyphony of our intentionality into some sort of unity’. For a critical discussion of Williams’ 
reflection on this theme, see Andrew Cameron, ‘Desire and Grace: Rowan Williams and the Search for Bodily Wholeness’, ON 
Rowan Williams: Critical Essays, 141-162. For a  more theologically constructive and nuanced treatment, see Christopher 
Craig Brittain, ‘On the Demonisation and Fetishisation of Choice in Christian Sexual Ethics’. Studies in Christian Ethics 27.2 
(2014), 144–166.  
4
 ‘Grace, for the Christian believer, is a transformation that depends in large part on knowing yourself to be seen in a certain 
way: as significant and wanted’. He goes on: ‘The whole of creation, incarnation, and our incorporation into the fellowship of 
Christ’s body tells us that God desire us, as if we were God, as if we were that unconditional response to God’s giving that 
God’s self makes in the life of the Trinity. We are created so that we may be caught up in this, so that we may grow into the 
wholehearted love of God by the learning that God loves us as God loves God.’ For this quote, see ‘The Body’s Grace’, 311-
312. 
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between the Father and Son precisely being more than that exchange, by personifying their mutual 
excess in love.’
1
 In this context of infinite self-abnegation and love, desire can never be completed or 
terminated in the Other but rather continues to be deflected, so that we could can say that there is 
incompleteness of desire within the Godhead itself which cannot be terminated because it is deflected 
in a perennial movement and ‘excess’ of perichoretic love. To quote Williams himself: ‘A doctrine like 
that of the Trinity tells us that the very life of God is a yielding or giving-over into the life of an Other, a 
‘negation’ in the sense of refusing to settle for the idea that normative life or personal identity is to be 
conceived in self-enclosed and self-sufficient units.’
2
   
One of Williams’ earliest sustained reflections on the Trinity is his essay ‘Barth on the Triune God’ 
published in 1979, which was the product of series of intensive seminars on the Barth’s theology.
3
 It 
would be difficult to summarise everything Williams has to say in this rather dense essay but for our 
purposes, it is important to take note of the fact that already here Williams has problems with any 
doctrine of the Trinity that reduces the Godhead to a quasi-monadistic subject, God existing as ‘an 
Absolute’ apart from the Trinitarian relations of self-bestowal and perichoresis.
4
 For Williams, Barth’s 
construal of the divine ‘modes of being’ manifesting One subject (exemplified in Barth’s earlier 
volumes of the dogmatics
5
) remains in strong tension with Barth’s later reflections on Christology
6
, 
which imply a strongly ‘historicized’
7
 understanding of God’s Triune identity. Barth’s theology of 
                                               
1
 Myers, Christ the Stranger, 86. Williams seems to be influenced here by Milbank’s discussion of the Spirit in ‘The Second 
Difference’. 7 
2
 Williams, ‘Author’s Introduction’, in Wrestling with Angels, xiii. It would take us too far in a different direction to examine the 
roots of Williams emphasis on this ek-static quality of the divine persons, but we could say (in a similar manner to the theme of 
desire), Williams begins by examining the question within the creaturely sphere (from a chronological perspective in relation to 
his total oeuvre) before moving onto discussing the Trinity (which is the subject of his more mature reflections). Obviously a 
doctrine of the Trinity is presupposed in his anthropology, but it seems that he began his earlier studies with the questions of 
human sociality before eventually moving onto the Trinitarian theology in more depth (especially in his engagement with Barth 
and Balthasar which we will discuss later). This can be seen from early on his career in discussions on personhood and 
sociality within an Eastern Orthodox context (see Williams, ‘The Theology of Personhood: A Study of the Thought of Christos 
Yannaras’, (1972), 415-430. For more, cf. Todd Breyfogle, ‘Time and Transformation: A Conversation with Rowan Williams.’ 
Cross Currents 45.3 (1995), 307-308), particularly in relation to the work of Vladimir Lossky, whose anthropology of imago dei 
sought to expound humanity as imago trinitatis (Cf. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, 104 and passim). 
Like his Augustinian reflections on desire, Williams begins with reflecting on humanity before moving onto the divine life which 
presupposes such an imago dei. Human self-transcendence in the other presupposes a doctrine of God, which in turn implies 
the ek-static nature of the divine life. Such an understanding of God is the presupposition for Orthodox reflections on the 
difference between taking about ‘the individual’ and ‘the person’. Human sociality, eros and language are to be understood as 
ontologically founded in the divine life of God in which by ‘abandoning the myth of self-protected self-sufficiency, the conscious 
and intelligent agent, the finite nous, moves in the mode for which it was created, moves in alignment with the purpose of God, 
habitually echoing in finite for the infinite desire of God for God, of love for love’ (in Williams, ‘Nature, Passion and Desire: 
Maximus’ Ontology of Excess’, in Markus Vincent (ed.), Studia Patristica 68 (Leuven-Paris-Walpole: Peeters, 2013), 267). 
3
 ‘Barth on the Triune God’ [1979], in Wrestling with Angels, 106-145.  
4
 For the following reflections, I am indebted to Ben Myers discussion of this essay in  ‘Election, Trinity, and the History of 
Jesus: Reading Barth with Rowan Williams’, in Myk Habets and Phillip Tolliday (eds.), Trinitarian Theology After Barth (Eugene, 
OR: Pickwick, 2011), 121-137. It might be interesting here to compare of some of the work that has been done in German 
Barthian scholarship, particularly that brand research associated with the figures of the so-called ‘Münich school’ of Barth 
interpretation that was initiated by figures such as Trutz Rendtorff. For more on this, see Trutz Rendtorff, ‘Radikale Autonomie 
Gottes: Ein Verständnis der Theologie Karl Barths und ihrer Folge‘, in Theorie des Christentums: Historisch-Theologische 
Studien zu einer Neuzeitlichen Verfassung (Gütersloher Verlaghaus Gerd Mohn: Gütersloh, 1972), 161-181. For a discussion 
of Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity, a classic text is Eberhard Jüngel, God’s Being is in Becoming: The Trinitarian Being of God in 
the Theology of Karl Barth, trans. John Webster (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001).  
5
 On this, see Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics I.I: The Doctrine of the Word of God, trans. G.W. Bromiley (London-New York, T & 
T Clark, 1975), 348ff.  
6
 Particularly, CD 4.1ff where Barth’s mature reflections on Christology imply a revision of his theology of the Trinity.  
7
 For more on Barth’s historicized Christology, see Bruce McCormack, ‘Karl Barth’s Historicized Christology: Just How 
Chalcedonian is It?’, in Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth, 201-233. It should be said that Barth’s 
relation to the importance of ‘history’ for theology is ambiguous, since his later reflections on Christology complicate his earlier 
anti-historicist tendencies during the earlier Römerbrief period. Barth was by no means unique in this tendency, since there 
were many other Weimar theologians and scholars who exhibited similar tendencies in response the outbreak of the First World 
War, such that some (like Friedrich-Wilhelm Graf) spoke of an ‘anti-historical revolution’ in Germany. Such a revolution took on 
many forms and cannot be easily categorized, even if one can speak of a general ‘conservative revolution’ (exemplified by Carl 
Schmitt) during this period. For more on this, see Georg Pfleiderer, Karl Barths Praktische Theologie: Zu Genese und Kontext 
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revelation implied an epistemologically linear understanding whereby the movement of God’s self-
unveiling can only move in one direction, namely across the gnoseological abyss of creator towards 
creature.
1
 Such a model implies a strongly ‘monist’ understanding of the Trinity, entwined within the 
dialectic of the master-slave relationship.  In contrast, Barth’s later reflections imply a more historical, 
pluralist, and relational understanding of the Trinity, one less focused on epistemology and more on 
soteriology, an understanding that is able to take into account not merely punctiliar events of 
revelation, but also the revelational process in which we learn what our language means within the 
context of our continuing relationship with God, as well as in the movements of history.
2
 Such a 
process implies less certainty in our theological judgements about God and revelation, and instead 
proposes that we focus on becoming conformed to the pattern of Christ within a dialogical structure, 
rather than a unidirectional movement of divine self-disclosure. By doing this, however, it becomes 
clear that Williams is taking ‘Barth’ beyond Barth (in a distinctly Balthasarian direction), but 
nonetheless we can see that Williams’ theology of the Trinity already at this juncture is concerned with 
undermining a ‘monistic’ conception of the Godhead which by bypasses plurality, and merely projects 
the solitary ego onto divine being. Williams does not discuss the theme of divine desire in this essay, 
but we have seen that already here in the late 1970’s Williams is dissatisfied with any understanding 
of the Trinity which reaffirms an egocentric concept of God.   
We can see this critique against a monistic conception of Trinity return in his reflections on 
Augustine’s reflections on the self and the Trinity. In his essay ‘Sapientia and the Trinity’
3
, Williams 
attempts to deconstruct a common assumption among theologians, namely that Western 
(Augustinian) theologies of the Trinity sought to emphasise the unity of the Trinity, while Orthodox 
thinkers sought to expound the plurality of persons.
4
 For Williams, Augustine’s own reflections on this 
matter complicate such a neat division. Furthermore, he seeks to distance Augustine from any proto-
                                                                                                                                                  
eines paradigmatischen Entwurfs systematischer im 20. Jahrhunderts. Beiträge zur historischen Theologie 115 (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 29-47. It should also be mentioned that after the period of Der Römerbrief, some have even spoke of 
Barth’s ‘gnosticism’. For more on this, see Benjamin Lazier, God Interrupted: Heresy and the European Imagination Between 
the World Wars (Princeton-Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 27-36.  
1
 Here, Williams is very much influenced by the writings of the Scandinavian theologian Gustav Wingren, who critiqued Barth 
for over-emphasising epistemology, in the sense that for Barth’, revelation is mainly concerned about correct ‘knowledge’ about 
God’. It should be said here that this interpretation of Barth has been subject to criticism. On this, see John Webster, Barth’s 
Ethics of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). However, Webster is aware of Williams’ more 
nuanced critique of Barth in this essay (cf. Ibid, 25), and seems to accept (at least partially) the validity of his concerns. 
However, for more critical discussions of Barth’s theology of divine subjectivity, which argue that Barth’s theology of the Trinity 
makes it difficult to account for the real otherness and historicity of creation, see Jörg Dierken, Glaube und Lehre im modernen 
Protestantismus: Studien zum Verhältnis von religiösem Vollzug und theologischer Bestimmtheit bei Barth und Bultmann sowie 
Hegel und Schleiermacher. Beiträge zur Historischen Theologie 92 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), 49-76;  Michael Menke-
Peitzmeyer, Subjectivität und Selbsinterpretation des dreifaltigen Gottes: Eine Studie zur Genese und Explikation des 
Paradigmas >>Selbtsoffenbarung Gottes<< in der Theologie Karl Barths. Münsterische Beiträge zur Theologie 60 (Münster: 
Aschendorff Verlag, 2002), 531-547. In addition to this point, Menke-Peitzmeyer argues that Barth’s theology of divine election 
is influenced by a philosophy of ‘decisionism (Decizionismus) that struggles to show how God’s self-determination is already an 
expression of God’s essence, and furthermore that it has difficulties with articulating an orthodox notion of the relation of the 
relation between grace and nature, thereby leading to a kind of ‘positivism of revelation’ (‘Offenbarungspositivismus’). To read 
more about Barth’s relation to the philosophy of ‘decisionism’, one can read Jan Rohls, Philosophie und Theologie in Geschicte 
und Gegenwart (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 535-540. For a more general treatment of divine subjectivity in Barth, you can 
also see Ingrid Spieckermann, Gotteserkenntnis: Ein Beitrag zur Grundfrage der neuen Theologie Karl Barths (München: Chr. 
Kaiser Verlag, 1985), 72-82.  
2
 Such an understanding of revelation is advanced further in some of Williams’ other essays, namely ‘Word and Spirit’ [1980], 
and ‘Trinity and Revelation’ [1986] in On Christian Theology, 107-127, 131-147.  
3
 Williams, ’Sapientia and the Trinity: Reflections on De Trinitate’, 317-332.  
4
 This theory was first expounded by Théodore de Régnon (1831-1893). For more on this, see David Bentley Hart, The Beauty 
of the Infinite, 168-175.  
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Cartesianism in regard to the human self.
1
 The image of God in man reflects ‘a movement in our own 
createdness’, a journey towards justice and wisdom, that reflects in turn ‘our movement into God’s 
own life as turned ‘outwards’’.
2
 The ‘introspective method’ of De trinitate cannot be held responsible 
for the move towards individualism or the Cartesian emphasis on the solitary ego. Rather, Augustine 
seeks to ‘demythologise’ such an individualistic psychology by ‘establishing the life of the mind firmly 
in relation to God’.
3
 Williams later confirms this opinion of Augustine in another essay when he says 
that the image of God who not be located in ‘the mind’ per se but rather in ‘the mind of saint’, the one 
who practices justice and love.
4
  
This trajectory within Williams is carried further when we come to his reflections on Thomas 
Aquinas. Commenting on a lecture he delivered on the topic of Aquinas and the Trinity, Williams 
remarks that ‘the whole of Aquinas’ discussion of the Trinity takes off from the springboard of his 
immediately preceding discussion of whether God enjoys himself. That’s a strange way of putting it, 
but he has been discussing the bliss of God, and by establishing that to make any sense of the 
biblical God you’ve got to think of a God who is not only loving and intelligent, but who is wholly in 
love with his own loving and intelligence, because its supremely delightful and wonderful reality that 
can be conceived.’
5
 In the lecture, Williams’ purpose was to show that Aquinas’ theology of the Trinity 
does not presuppose a separation of the God of creation (the one God) from his understanding of the 
God of salvation and redemption (the Triune God). As in his discussion of Augustine, he argues that 
Aquinas’ anthropology of redeemed humanity concerns the question of how ‘the rationale of being 
human is somehow rooted in the nature of loving and joyful consciousness which is God. And to be in 
God’s image, to be God’s conscious creature means to be bound up in that bliss.’
6
 For Aquinas, as 
Williams argues in the lecture, movement towards the Other within the immanent Trinity
7
 cannot be 
understood literally as a movement ‘outwards’ or a ‘procession’ in the same sense that creation is an 
outward movement. Nonetheless, Aquinas’ way of dealing with the internal processions of the 
Godhead is to understand God as intelligent (‘that God is in some graspable way conscious’)
8
. And it 
is precisely this movement of intellection that counts as ‘a movement, a process; something of which 
we can say there is an origin and an outcome.’
9
 Yet this movement implies no physical change; all it 
implies is that the object of intellection comes to ‘inhabit’ us in some way. In reference to our own 
human processes of intellection, Williams writes that our ‘own acts of understanding involve what we 
know coming to be in us: they ‘live’ in us in the sense that their action upon our receptive sensibility 
and open mind becomes the action of the mind itself. To understand something is to have the action 
of our mind follow the contours, as you might say, of the active reality of what’s understood.’
10
 To put 
it more simply, ‘understanding something is the process of something’s appearing in language. To 
                                               
1
 For Augustine (according to Williams), there is not a solitary ego that can understand itself apart from relation with God. We 
cannot properly apprehend ourselves apart from the self-giving movement of love into which we are taken. This is ‘the only way 
of knowing ourselves truthfully’ (Sapientia and the Trinity’, 320). 
2
 Ibid., 321.  
3
 Ibid., 331.  
4
 Williams, ’The Paradoxes of Self-knowledge in De trinitate‘, 131. 
5
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6
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7
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have the means of thinking about something is to ‘speak’ about it, not necessarily in audible words, 
but to let it become a moment in the system of speech in which we are aware of ourselves.’
1
 In 
Aquinas’ parlance, divine intellection is grounded in God’s existence as verbum, the Word of God, 
generated out of God’s act of ‘speaking’. However, like we have seen in his discussion of Augustine, 
Williams shows that Aquinas’ construal of the Trinity should not be reduced to the so-called ‘Latin’ 
interpretation, namely, ‘the Trinity is a single subject reflecting itself to itself’
2
. Instead, what Aquinas 
seems to be saying is that ‘The Father generates the Son in the act of knowing that he (the Father) is 
already actively giving what he is to another, and that in knowing that primordial and eternal giving he 
also knows all the relations in which divine life can stand to anything that is not divine… what the 
Father knows is neither the divine essence as some abstraction from the actuality of divine life, nor 
‘himself‘ as a divine individual: he knows himself in generative relation to another.’
3
 
Williams invokes the analogy of the Moebius strip (an image he invokes elsewhere
4
) to illustrate 
that for Aquinas ‘it isn’t possible…to separate out a prior agent (the Father), an act of generation (the 
begetting of the Son) and the consciousness of that act (the formation of the verbum within the divine 
life).’
5
 Here we can see again Williams’ argument that we cannot be independent subjects within the 
Trinity, but rather divine persons who know themselves precisely within their relations and mutual 
dependence. Such an understanding of divine intellection and co-inherence lays the ground for his 
reflections on divine desire. He writes that ‘intellectual procession results in a sort of repetition in 
another medium of the known. But the relation of love or will does not produce an image; it produces 
an inclinatio, almost a ‘programme’ for action that is not a repetition of the act of the object, yet is no 
less a kind of living of the object in the subject, a presence of the beloved in the lover. Something 
known continues its structured activity in the knower by living in the knower as an intelligible structure. 
Something loved continues its life in the lover as a stimulus to motion away from itself, a stimulus to a 
kind of self-abandonment.’ He summarises by saying that ‘knowledge is about the continuity between 
subject and object, love is about the discontinuity. Knowing is the other coming to be in the subject, 
love is the acknowledgment that the other remains other, even in the subject.’
6
 He goes on to say, 
bringing such perspective into play with Aquinas’ pneumatology ‘God loves God, loves what is 
understood in the eternal Word, loves the always pre-existing self-giving of the Father. God is present 
to God or in God not simply as the self-image generated by knowledge, but as what exceeds that 
repetition or reproduction, as the stimulus of what a modern (not Thomas) might want to call, 
tentatively and analogically, desire.’ He explicates this suggestion further by saying that ‘God is a 
movement towards God, God’s wanting of God so that God may be fully and blissfully God, may 
enjoy the ‘natural good’ proper to divine nature. Insofar as the most fundamental thing we can give to 
each other, give in the sense of pure gratuity, is the unqualified wanting of another’s good, and insofar 
as love is the ground of such wanting, then the Spirit is as rightly called ‘gift’ as ‘love’…The natural 
good of the divine life is, it seems, something like the state of wanting another’s good. If we could 
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imagine a condition of unbroken and unqualified commitment to the good of another, we should have 
imagined something like the divine life. The Spirit is God’s life as it is shaped and directed towards the 
good of the other by the recognition, the knowledge, of divine life as self-bestowal.’
1
 Such a 
movement of inclination, intellection, and desire is never complete within the infinite life of the 
Godhead because ‘this eternal engagement is never a possessing, because it is the act (the 
knowledge) of love; what is understood prompts and grounds something other than ‘simple’ 
intellection. That something other is not just an attitude of consent or approbation, but a movement to 
which desire is analogous.’
2
  
What can be concluded from examining this essay on Aquinas is that Williams is, firstly, that the 
divine persons must be understood in within a context of fundamental co-inherence, so that we 
cannot understand the Trinity as ‘individual’ centres of consciousness, but rather a movement or 
process of knowledge-intellection, and love-desire in which ‘knowledge’ and ‘intellection’ act as a 
models for divine co-inherence and perichoresis, and in which the ‘love’ and ‘desire’ preserve the 
‘objectivity’ of the divine persons, which forms, secondly, the basis for a journey of infinite and never-
ending desire within the Godhead itself.  
Williams’ most in-depth treatment of divine desire is to be found in his essay ‘The Deflections of 
Desire’.
3
 As the subtitle of this essay implies, Williams is concerned with theme of negative theology, 
or more specifically, with the fact that we are dealing with a God who cannot be ‘reduced to a finished 
conceptual scheme, however much we may labour to remove obvious inadequacies and 
misunderstandings.’
4
 Williams is concerned to show how negative theology applies ‘the relations of 
divine life’ rather than some ‘essence’ lying behind the triune life of God.
5
 In order to do this, he 
engages in an exegesis of St. John of the Cross, specifically focusing on his Romanzas.  Williams 
summarises the Trinitarian theology of the Romazas by saying ‘Father and Son are ‘in’ each other, as 
lover and beloved, and the love uniting them is equal to them. Yet in the Trinity there is one lover and 
one beloved: all three are one lover, all three are one object of love, since the being or essence (ser) 
of the three is identical with each one. It is as if the ser of the Godhead is being identified with the 
formal pattern of indwelling itself – not with a ‘nature’ beyond or behind the three, but with the 
movement of one into another in desire’. He further explicates by saying: ‘The love specifically uniting 
Father and Son is…the love that is the ‘excess’ of what each desires in the other; it is thus constituted 
as an equal presence or agent within the pattern of divine agency. But at the same time…the love of 
the Father, the love of the Son and the excess of their mutual love which is the Spirit also constitute 
the divine life or essence, three agents of one love, one recipient of love in three modes’. This 
understanding of the Triune love implies an openness: ‘The single life of the Godhead is the going-out 
from self-identity into the other; that cannot be a closed mutuality (for then the other would be only the 
mirror of the same); the love of one for other must itself open on to a further otherness if it is not to 
return to the same; and only so is the divine life ‘as a whole’ constituted as love (rather than mutual 
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reinforcement of identity). If so, the designation of both Spirit and divine essence as love makes 
sense: it is the Spirit as excess of divine love that secures the character of God-as-such.’
1
 
Another important conversation partner in relation to Williams’ reflections on the Trinity is the 
Catholic thinker and theologian Hans Urs Von Balthasar. In relation to the Trinity, two texts stand out. 
The first is entitled ‘Balthasar and Difference’, and was published in 1998.
2
 Here, Williams sought to 
relate Hegel and Balthasar to postmodern discussions of difference, trying to show how Hegel’s 
dialectic and Balthasar’s Trinitarian reflections (along with his understanding of the analogia entis
3
) lay 
a foundation for difference that is able to take contingency and time seriously
4
, rather as opposed to 
the ‘curiously disincarnate’
5
 forms in which ‘difference’ enters into the discussion of many 
postmodernist theorists (Derrida being exemplary in this regard). Speaking of the Trinity, he confirms 
what he has said elsewhere 
 
‘The Catholic faith is that God is not a subject, nor even a plurality of subjects in intimate 
connection. God is intrinsically that life which exists only and necessarily in the act of 
‘bestowal’, in a self-alienation that makes possible the freedom and love of an other that is at 
the same time itself in otherness. The extremity of the relation between God and the God-
forsaken Jesus is our way into this claim for the life of God-as-such: the divine life is what 
sustains itself as unqualified unity across the greatest completeness or alienation that can be 
imagined; and so appears as unqualified gift or…bestowal. The gulf between Father and 
crucified Son, between Father in heaven and Son in hell, now appears as the immeasurable 
measure of the way divine love ‘leaves’ itself, travels infinitely from itself (from self-
possession, self-presence). Here there can be no identity prior to differentiation: the only 
identity in question is precisely total and eternal self-bestowal that constitutes the other. The 
generative or originary moment in the divine life, the Father, has no reality except in the act of 
generating otherness and sustaining the unity of divine life across the gulf of immeasurable 
otherness by the issuing of ‘spirit’: the life bestowed in its wholeness upon the Son is both 
                                               
1
 Ibid. 118. To illustrate this deflective movement within the Godhead, Williams make use of the famous icon of Andrei Rublev 
depicting the hospitality of Abraham. Williams reflects on this image by saying that what immediately confronts us in this image 
is ‘the central figure of the composition, the angel on the opposite side of the table; but this figure does not look back at the 
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within the divine life, a theological basis is laid for a negative theology that does not seek for some ‘God’ beyond God’s own 
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closure within the Triune relations that constitute God’s identity. 
2
 The essay originally appeared as an afterword to a collection of essays on Balthasar, but was republished in Wrestling with 
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3
 For Balthasar, as Williams argues, analogy should not be understood as a correspondence between the being of God and the 
being of creation. Rather, Williams defines Balthasar’s theory of analogy as follows (‘Balthasar and Difference, 80): [Analogy] is 
the active presence of the divine liberty, love and beauty precisely within the various and finite material/temporal reality. ‘The 
divine’ is not present in  creation in the form of ‘hints of transcendence, points in the created order where finitude and 
creatureliness appear to thin out or open up to mysterious infinity, but in creation being itself – which includes, paradigmatically, 
creation being itself in unfinishedness, time-taking, pain and death. The crucified Jesus is, in this context, the ground and 
manifestation of what analogy means’.’  
4
 Williams explains this in Balthasar and the Trinity’ (p. 83) by saying that ‘God is not be spoken of by denying 
contingency…God is not different like that: if divine difference were the negation of all finite predicates, God would be the other 
belonging to a discourse about the finite world. God’s life would be subsumed under that of the world, the antithesis of the 
world’s thesis; and out of such a discourse, no possible language for divine freedom or love could be generated.’ 
5
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returned to the Father and opened up beyond the duality of Father and Son as the Holy Spirit. 
Or, in other words, the self-alienating of divine life in the Father’s self-gift to the Son 
‘alienates’ itself, posits itself as more than a symmetry of self-sacrifice, becomes that which 
the Son gives, realizes, liberates, from the depth of his distance from the Father.’
1
 
 
While the language of desire is not so evident here, we can see the same pattern emerging. The 
language of ‘bestowal’ and ‘alienation’ in this passage has the same function as perichoresis in 
classical Trinitarian theology, divine self-knowledge and love in the work of Aquinas, and the 
deflections of desire to be found in St. John of the Cross. Here Williams speaks the divine traversal of 
‘extremity’ and ‘alienation’ through the movement of bestowal, self-differentiation and unification 
across the divide that is the historical cross of Jesus, the abyss of Godforsakenness that is already 
accounted for within the Triune relations of the deity.  
The second essay, entitled ‘Balthasar and the Trinity’, is to be found The Cambridge Companion 
to Hans Urs Von Balthasar, published in 2004, while Williams’ was Archbishop of Canterbury.
2
 
Williams confirms what he has said previously about Balthasar regarding his theology of Holy 
Saturday, particularly in relation to his understanding of divine ‘self-othering’ that lays the foundation 
for God’s creative activity in relation to the world, and his overcoming of the distance experienced 
between God and God in the cross of Christ (‘Holy Saturday leads us to the very beginning of 
creation’)
3
. Important here, and for what is to follow in this section, is that Williams makes mention of 
the fact that Balthasar references the Orthodox theologian Sergei Bulgakov, particularly in relation 
Bulgakov’s endorsement of an ‘eternal kenosis’ between the persons of the Trinity (Balthasar 
renames this as ‘divine godlessness’).
4
 In this eternal, ‘theodramatic’ movement between the persons 
‘the identity of God appears as a free and loving self-differentiating, a totality of giving so radical that  
God’s giving energy generates that which it is not and lives wholly and unreservedly in that which it is 
not.’
5
 As such, reality is fundamentally revealed to be ‘kenotic’ and ‘ek-static’.
6
 Balthasar’s Trinitarian 
theology was at pains to argue that God should be reduced to ‘a single self-consciousness’
7
.   
It is within this context of Balthasar’s theology of divine self-differentiation, Holy Saturday, and his 
reflections on the concept of analogy (the so-called major dissimilitudo implied by the analogia entis), 
that Williams ventures to say (going a little beyond Balthasar himself, but adhering to the trajectory of 
his thought), regarding the cross and the Trinity, that ‘what is taken up in ‘the saving act of Christ is 
real historical dereliction, unconsoled and unmeaningful failure or suffering’ and furthermore that ‘the 
necessary absence of any resolution within time [italics mine] of tensions and sufferings is involved in 
the identity-in-difference that is between God and creation.’
8
 What we should take note of here is that 
Williams’ reference to non-closure and meaningless suffering (a central of aspect to his understanding 
of tragedy that we have shown this far) is understood within the context of creaturely finitude, and is 
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placed within a context of the soteriologically and christologically circumscribed context of analogy 
found in Balthasar’s work.  
 It is thoroughly granted here that Williams is trying to open up Balthasar’s theology of the Trinity to 
a more tragic understanding of history, something that Balthasar’s theology sometimes resists. 
Williams has said that ‘the temporal conflicts and resistances of ‘ordinary’ interpersonal exchange, 
what might be called the sense of the tragic…are often felt as absences in Balthasar’s oeuvre, despite 
the often stunningly powerful focus on the unconsoled dereliction of the crucified’.
1
 Nonetheless, 
Balthasar’s (and Williams) adherence to the major dissimilitudo between God and creation prohibits 
any simplistic ascription of tragedy to the divine being. Williams own insistence on negative theology
2
, 
and his suspicion of ascribing ‘drama’
3
 or ‘history’
4
 to the internal life of the Trinity confirm this point. 
He has said (regarding God and created order of things) that they cannot be ‘moments in one story’
5
 
and that the life of the divine persons cannot be ‘a story like the stories of contingent agents’6. In light 
of this, we need to be careful of ascribing the language of finitude, tragedy, or drama to the Godhead, 
and the only way we could make such an ascription is through a carefully described theory of 
analogy, whether of the kind proposed by Balthasar, or the kind of analogia personarum or ‘the 
analogy of limits’ suggested by Donald MacKinnon in relation to the doctrines of the incarnation and 
the Trinity, something we shall discuss below.  
It is these considerations we need to take into account as we read the text that seems to be most 
influential on Ben Myers statement, quoted at the beginning of this section that if ‘tragedy means a 
total lack of completion and consolation, then it is hard to avoid concluding that there is something 
very like a tragedy going on forever between the persons of the trinity.’ The text that Myers seems to 
be drawing on here is from Williams’ reflections on the Trinitarian theology of Sergei Bulgakov
7
, 
drawing mainly from the Liddon Lectures delivered in 1998, while he was still bishop of Monmouth.
8
 
Concerning Bulgakov’s theology of the Trinity, Williams says that ‘The picture given of the Trinity is 
strongly and centrally kenotic: it is about self-emptying. The Father gives all that he has and is to the 
Son, gives over everything to the Son. When the Son comes forth in the Father’s begetting, nothing is 
held back.’
9
 He goes on: ‘The Spirit is that divine agent pointing to the life of mutual giving as the life 
of God. The Spirit makes the mutual giving of Father and Son a giving out, not simply a giving to and 
an exchange…the potential tragedy of mutual annihilation [italics mine] is overcome in the joy of the 
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Spirit.’
1
 Bulgakov risks a provocative phrase by describing this mutual self-empting as ‘self-
devastation’
2
, but he does not stop there; he endorses a bridging of this potential annihilation through 
the agency of the Spirit, by saying that ‘the tragedy and tension of the emptying out of the Father and 
Son into each other, the death, so to speak’ is ‘revealed as life, glory and saving presence.’
3
 However, 
Williams qualifies his statements with the following ‘If we were to take this kind of language as strictly 
descriptive of the inner life of God, we should be not only exercising massive presumption in regard to 
a mystery that is utterly inaccessible to the finite mind, but also importing into God the stories of 
tension and resolution that are typical of relations between finite persons in history.’ He goes on to 
mention that in ‘thinking of God’s eternal Trinitarian love, we must not take as our basic model any 
kind of unqualified outpouring into the Other that ends in cancelling out distinction; somehow, the self-
emptying of the love of Father and Son for each other always ‘overflows’ into another agency of 
personal mode of active love.’
4
 
This statement makes clear that Bulgakov, by using the language of tension and tragedy, is not 
concerned with ‘the domestic dramas of divine persons’.
5
 Williams even says that Bulgakov’s 
language approaches a kind of ‘mythology’ – even though it could be considered to be ‘potent 
mythology’.
6
 What can be seen from this is the fact even within this text, a text which seems to be 
source of Myers’ statement (‘there is something very like a tragedy going on forever between the 
persons of the trinity’), we can see emphatic qualifications to this statement. Williams does not seem 
to think that Bulgakov’s language of tragedy and tension can be taken as anything else than an 
experimentation with imagery, used for the purpose of expounding a specific point regarding the 
divine persons. Furthermore, we should emphasise that this is Bulgakov’s imagery, not Williams’ own 
description regarding the Trinity. Even though Williams’ defends Bulgakov against misinterpretation in 
this regard, we cannot assume that this would be Williams’ own choice of imagery and metaphor. And 
even if it was, we cannot interpret such metaphorical language as having any ‘grammatical’ function 
within Williams’ theology of the Trinity that is substantially different to what we have shown above, 
regarding the imagery of divine desire, self-differentiation, bestowal, knowledge, love, and kenosis.  
On this point, I do not think Myers takes such language too seriously either. One could argue that 
he is engaging in a rather loose poetic description of Trinity. The very fact that he says ‘there is 
something very like a tragedy’ going on within the triune relations points to the fact he is engaging in a 
tentative and thoroughly metaphorical description. Furthermore, it seems that Myers’ own definition of 
‘tragedy’ does not have particularly strict contours either. For example, if one surveys Myers excellent 
book on Rowan Williams, you can find the language of ‘tragedy’ and ‘the tragic’ being used in different 
ways. In the passage we have quoted, we can see that Myers’ invocation of tragedy within the Trinity 
is an attempt to give imagery to the infinite non-closure and deflection that occurs within the Triune 
persons. This is one way to interpret the meaning of tragedy, as we have shown in the first chapter 
and throughout this monograph, namely that tragedy presents us in an exemplary manner with the 
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problem of non-closure, with the resistant objectivity of the world that continues to create difficulty with 
tidy or finished description. Since Myers describes such an activity (divine desire and its non-closure) 
as occurring among the persons of the Trinity, such a lack of ending or consolation cannot be reduced 
to the limitations of creaturely existence, the result of some ontological or moral deficiency, but is 
inherent to reality itself.  
Nonetheless, one finds a slightly different usage of ‘the tragic’ elsewhere in this book. While 
speaking about Williams’ particular eschatological vision, he says that (unlike some other 
eschatological projects) it ‘refuses any final gratification of human desire. Insofar as it withholds 
ultimate consolation, it is a tragic vision.’ So far so good; however, we goes on to say something 
surprising: ‘But it is tragic, I suppose, only from the perspective of unredeemed desire [italics mine]. 
To the warped neediness of selfish desire, even God’s triune love seems tragic rather than the 
highest bliss.’
1
 How one reconciles what he says here with what he says elsewhere is not quite 
straightforward. Certainly there is a point of contact regarding the reality of non-closure and a lack of 
consolation; however, in the one instance tragedy is seen as bound up with divine desire (and 
therefore something good and not the result of some kind of moral failure) while the other is bound up 
with unredeemed desire (and therefore bound up with finitude and its concomitant sinfulness). 
Clearly, we have two distinct usages of the imagery of tragedy, which performatively (whether 
intended or unintended) makes Myers’ usage of ‘tragedy’ a little bit slippery. In other words: we should 
not take Myer’s language here too literally.  
The question remains however: can we talk about contingency or time in relation to the Trinity? It 
is here that we bring Donald MacKinnon back into the discussion, particularly regarding his 
suggestion that it might be appropriate to make use of ‘analogy of limits’ in similar manner to the 
analogia personarum. In his essay on MacKinnon, Williams seems to endorse MacKinnon’s 
suggestion in this regard.
2
 MacKinnon expounds this idea, in his own essay on the incarnation and 
the trinity by saying ‘If we suppose that in the theology of the Trinity an analogia personarum can be 
complemented by an analogy of limits…it may go some way towards grounding within the eternal, the 
essentially human element of temporality, the sense of inescapable limitation. For this element of 
temporality…belongs to Jesus’ comings and goings. What is was for him to be human was to be 
subject to the sort of fragmentation of effort, curtailment of design, interruption of purpose, distraction 
of resolve that belongs to temporal experience. To leave one place for another is leave work undone; 
to give attention to one suppliant is to ignore another; to expend energy today is to leave less for 
tomorrow.’ MacKinnon goes onto say (rather densely) that ‘We have to ask ourselves how far this 
very conformity to the complex discipline of temporality, this acceptance of the often tragic 
consequences that spring from its obstinate, ineluctable truncation of human effort, belongs to the 
very substance of Jesus’ defeat. Jesus’ acceptance of this part of his burden can arguably be 
interpreted as a painfully realized transcription into the conditions of our existence, of the receptivity, 
the defined, even if frontierless, receptivity that constitutes his person.’ Explicitly relating this to 
Trinitarian theology, he says ‘It is indeed as that which makes such transcription possible that we 
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must first see the divine relation to the temporal. It is a relation we will misunderstand except we see 
the God so related as triune.’
1
 What MacKinnon seems to be suggesting here is that the possibility for 
creaturely temporality, finitude and tragedy should be found within the self-differentiation of the Triune 
persons, what Williams calls the ‘sheer externality’ of the Father and Son that lays the foundation for 
Jesus’ own life that is ‘paradigmatically, creaturely, distanced from God’.
2
  
Williams goes on to say that (in a density that echoes MacKinnon’s formulation): ‘If we are to 
speak of God in terms of Jesus, we must say that in God there is that which makes possible identity-
in-difference – indeed, identity in distance or in absence – of Jesus and who or what he calls Father: 
something approaching the ‘externality’ of creator and creation, yet decisively not that, but a mutually 
constitutive presence, and internal relation of terms…Creation in its ‘externality’ to God and its 
‘externality’ within itself can be so because the life of the creator is what it unchangingly is in a relation 
we only perceive as something teasingly and disturbingly like self-negation; but not that.’
3
 Williams’ 
rather recondite formulation is simply an exposition of a classical Christian theme: that the difference 
of the Father and the Son is ontological basis for the difference that is the material world of creation. 
His appropriation of MacKinnon’s ‘the analogy of limits’ is simply a teasing out of this idea. The Father 
and Son cannot be completed ‘absorbed’ into one another, since this would undermine the difference 
between the persons of the Trinity. They are in some sense ‘negative’ poles in relation to one another, 
constituting a kind of mutual ‘limitation’ and ‘externality’ that is inherent in any concept relation of love 
that maintains the ‘objectivity’ of the beloved, and does not reduce it to sameness. And it is precisely 
this ‘limitation’, this openness towards the Other, which is the personal agency of the Spirit, that is the 
foundation for creaturely finitude -  and the potential tragedy it involves. In this light, we can only apply 
the language of finitude to the life of God only in an analogical sense, based upon the mutual 
limitation of the Father and Son that is the ground of our own contingency, and narrated history of 
Jesus Christ. It is the divine life of the Trinity that makes the incarnation of God possible, and enables 
to account for God’s self-disclosure in the contingent – and tragic - occurrence of Jesus’ crucifixion 
and ultimate resurrection. It is though reflecting on the narrative of God-with-us, and its involvement in 
‘the complex discipline of temporality’, the ‘tragic consequences’ and the ‘ineluctable truncation of 
human effort’ (MacKinnon) found therein, that we are able to see God’s involvement with our tragic 
finitude and the inherent limitations we are subject to.  
In bringing this section and this chapter to a close, it would be good to summarise what we have 
shown. In this chapter, we have been concerned with the reality of non-closure, whether it was talking 
about the particularity of human suffering that cannot be explained away, or our reflections on the 
Trinity which advocated an openness or ‘unfinishedness’ of desire within the Godhead itself. We have 
also shown that contingency is foundational for Williams’ belief in our creaturely involvement in the 
aleatory fluctuations of tragedy. Furthermore, we have shown that Williams’ theology of the Trinity 
does not imply an ontologization of the tragic, thereby opening his tragic theology to the criticism that 
it implies an ultimate violence or a cosmic, mythological conflict within the heart of being. Rather, we 
                                               
1
 D. M. MacKinnon, ‘The Relation of the Doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity’, in (ed.) Richard W. A. McKinney, Christ, 
Creation and Culture: Essays in Honour of T.F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1976), 104. 
2
 ‘Trinity and Ontology’, 158.  
3
 Ibid. 158-159.  
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have seen that all of Williams’ various metaphors for the Trinity (self-differentiation, self-alienation, 
self-emptying, desire, knowledge, love, deflection, bestowal) confirm that he is seeking to expound an 
orthodox theology of the Trinity that is able to resist closure and cheap consolation
1
, thereby opening 
towards an infinite journey and movement of desiring that is without end. Further, while such an 
understanding of the Trinity confirms one motif of his tragic theology (the problem of non-closure), we 
cannot apply the other central motifs (the reality of contingency, finitude or tragedy) in any 
uncomplicated way. This is because God is not implicated in history in the same way we are, and 
therefore we cannot apply ‘dramatic’ stories to the immanent life of God. The only way we can apply 
the motif of finitude to the life of the Trinity (in Williams’ and MacKinnon’s estimation) is through a 
reflection of the difference and mutual ‘limitation’ or ‘externality’ of the Triune persons that is the basis 
for creaturely time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 By using the term ‘cheap consolation’, I am obviously referencing Williams’ general debt to Iris Murdoch, and obviously T.S. 
Eliot as well. I am not saying that God does not provide comfort, healing or hope generally. What Williams is criticizing here is, 
as we have iterated before, the tendency for the ego to be satisfied in its own self-reference. However, as we shall see in the 
final chapter, one could potentially criticize Williams for overemphasizing this element of self-critical faith.  
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6. Conclusion: The White Line 
 
Rowan Williams has written that ‘Wisdom is more than explanatory skill on the one hand and 
intuitive penetration on the other; wisdom is knowing the scope of tragedy.’
1
 Advancing through this 
study, it could be said that we have been arguing implicitly that Williams is a thinker of the irresolvable 
tensions we find within human life, those aporias which resist easy resolution and final explication, 
namely our position between contingency and freedom, hope and realism, meaning and uncertainty. 
Gillian Rose has written that ‘Philosophy, ancient and modern, is born out of [the] condition of 
sadness’ in which ‘Earthly, human sadness is the divine comedy – the ineluctable discrepancy 
between our worthy intentions and the ever surprising outcomes of our actions.’
2
 Such a disposition of 
‘sadness’ is expressed in the lines to be found in Williams’ poem on King Lear (quoted in the epigraph 
to this thesis): ‘the white line in the tickling / membrane of freedom’.
3
 The imagery is of a line of 
tension, something that is held in suspenseful abeyance between wholeness and integrity (on the one 
hand), and being ripped apart at the seams - potentially at any moment (on the other). Whether it will 
break, or maintain its shape cannot be certain. As we have stated throughout this thesis, history 
provides the space in which freedom can be articulated, but history is also a realm of ‘necessity’, in 
the sense we have been advocating that term. Within time, our vision is dimmed, myopic and angular 
so that resolution to the tensions of life cannot be easily found. Nonetheless, we can glimpse the 
possibilities for greater freedom that can be wrenched from the temporal matrix. To paraphrase 
Auden in this regard: we can never ask what history is up to, and therefore cannot act as if we knew. 
Nonetheless, the challenge remains: how are we to assume that freedom which the powers of history 
deny, thereby being able to pass through freely?
4
 It could be said that it is precisely this ‘sadness, this 
‘tension’ between ‘freedom’ and ‘necessity’ that Williams as a theologian and a philosopher aims to 
wrestle with: how do we aim to act in hope, believing that things do not have to stay as they are, while 
at the same acknowledging ‘the long revolution’ (Raymond Williams) in which ‘The Christian claim…is 
bound always to be something evolving and acquiring definition in the conversations of history’, and 
further that ‘it offers a direction for historical construction of meaning, but does not offer to end 
history.’
5
 In our experience of history, how do we follow and take seriously Wittgenstein’s dictum 
(practically and philosophically speaking) that ‘What’s ragged should be left ragged’?
6
 How do we 
learn to stop ourselves and recognise that the solution to our problems probably lies in dwelling upon 
an answer that seems preliminary to a solution (something that Wittgenstein echoes elsewhere).
7
 
What does this difficulty teach us about our language in general, which is the only place our freedom 
can be articulated? Williams tries to take this difficulty as seriously as possible, since it is here that we 
                                               
1
 Williams, Ray of Darkness, 202. 
2
 Rose, Love’s Work, 115-116.  
3
 Williams, ‘King Lear’, in Headwaters, 60.  
4
 I am referring to Auden’s poem entitled ‘The Old Man’s Road’, in W.H. Auden, Collected Shorter Poems 1927-1957 (London: 
Faber & Faber, 1966), 304-305.  
5
 Williams, ‘The Judgement of the World’, in On Christian Theology, 36.  
6
 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, trans. Peter Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), 45. 
7
 Wittgenstein, Zettel, trans. G.E.M. Ambscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), § 314-5. I owe this reference to Martha Nussbaum.  
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can easily be lead into ‘the world of speculation’ in which our fantasies and world-imaging fail to take 
account of reality as it presents itself, in all its intractable complexity.  
It could be said that sometimes, however, Williams does seem to emphasise this sadness, this 
tragic realism, this rejection of fantasy a bit too stringently. The starkness of Williams’ theology on this 
matter is summarised by Ben Myers when he says that ‘The cost of Williams’ achievement is a sort of 
pervasive ontological sadness; to see all things coloured by a tragedy older than the world. It is no 
momentary sorrow, but a deep conviction that life must always remain unconsoled, that the best we 
can hope for is to be stripped bare, exposed, and forgiven under the stark relentless light of reality.’
1
 
Myers goes on to write later that ‘Williams’ deep preoccupation with the problem of fantasy’ is ‘in 
danger of becoming myopic’
2
 since Williams tends to find such a vision everywhere he looks (whether 
it be Augustine or Karl Barth). Mike Higton has also written that Williams’ ‘writing is too unrelentingly 
agonized -  too aware of the possibilities of self-deceit, too aware of the dangers of cheap consolation, 
ever to relax in the Sabbath rest of God’s love, feasting at the table of the Son, despite all the dangers 
that attend such relaxation’.
3
 In a personal conversation I had with Rowan William’s friend Graham 
Ward
4, he mentioned to me (in a similar way to Myers and Higton) that Williams’ thought in this area 
risks the undesirable implication of what he called an perpetual ‘haemorrhaging’ (referring to the 
Jean-Luc Nancy’s theory of ‘the body’ as a ‘wound’)
5
, in which pain and self-laceration are 
emphasised to such a degree that a genuine joy and hopefulness is occluded or disguised.   
Now it will be admitted that this may be the case. Williams might have a tendency towards a ‘pan-
tragic’ interpretation of writers both ancient and modern; however, what we need to assert here, 
regarding Myers’ reference to Williams’ ‘pervasive ontological sadness’, is that such ‘sadness’ should 
not be understood apart from the context in which Williams believes such ‘sadness’ is situated. For 
the Christian church, such ‘sadness’ cannot be removed from the environs of the concrete story of the 
crucified and resurrected Jesus, and therefore from the liturgical praxis of praise, lament and 
Eucharist, in which ‘the tragic’ is given a contextualized anamnesis and setting. Helpful here, would 
be the distinction Gillian Rose
6
 makes (in another context) between the abstract melancholia, in which 
the outworking of ‘spirit’ is understood in complete extraction from ‘law’ (namely, the socio-political 
process involving negotiation, recognition, and misrecognition) and the process of an inaugurated 
mourning in which such ‘sadness’ can find its Sitz in Leben in the concrete exchanges of culture and 
human meaning-making. For Rose, the melancholic and ‘neurotic’ fixation on loss needs to be 
transformed into the work of mourning whereby the infinite deferral of sadness is ‘politicized’ and 
sutured (as best as possible) so that real transformation may occur, and real pain may be 
incorporated into the process of healing.   
Regarding the remnant overtones of Ward’s critique, I hope I have shown throughout this thesis 
that Williams’ is no pessimist, and that his sensitivity to the relation between the body, matter and 
                                               
1
 Myers, Christ the Stranger, 116.  
2
 Ibid., 124.  
3
 Higton, Difficult Gospel, 36.  
4
 The conversation occurred after I had delivered a paper a theological colloquium held at Stellenbosch, September 2013. I 
again thank John De Gruchy for making it possible for me to attend this event.  
5
 Cf. Nancy, The Birth to Presence, 189-207.  
6
 Rose, Mourning Becomes Law, 63-76. On this, see also Gillian Rose’s essay on Walter Benjamin in Judaism and Modernity: 
Philosophical Essays (Oxford; Blackwell, 1993), 175-210.  
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time-taking fully affirms that fundamental ‘depth’ and beauty to the world as it unfolds itself within the 
context of poetic activity. Such a world entails that our bodies and matter are ‘intelligent’, already 
entwined within the context of language and complexities of representation
1
, and that furthermore 
such an ‘intelligibility’ is grounded ontologically in the intra-relations of the Triune God, in whom 
relational dynamics of language are founded, so that there is no state in which ‘matter’ is not entwined 
with Logos, that is, meaningful communication
2
. This sits very uneasily with Nancy contention that the 
body (especially the ‘naked’ body) communicates nothing but itself. If this is the case, then pure 
ipseity will not work within Williams’ theological schema. Meaning and unity cannot be merely 
‘imposed’ upon bodies; for Williams, meaningfulness is something always already entwined with 
matter itself, being the product of the world’s fundamental rationality, goodness, and human socio-
linguistic construction.   
Another critique that could be made is from the perspective of feminist theology. Feminists could 
accuse Williams’ of preferring a strongly Augustinian theology of sin in which humility and the denial 
of fantasy takes a central place to counter-act the hubris that is sin’s most defining feature. A feminist 
might object to this line of thought by saying it is a particularly androcentric or phallocratic mode of 
thinking in which a solution to masculine pathologies is subtly used to suppress the voice of women. 
Such a critique, however, would be too hasty since Williams is fully aware of this potential objection. 
He has clearly written that the language of humility and dispossession can be used as ‘ideological 
commendations of passivity in an intolerable situation’, and therefore he proposes that ‘any rhetoric of 
humility and dispossession should be subjected to suspicion’. Nonetheless, he still asserts that the 
self-critical style of Augustinian self-knowledge ‘assumes that the most pervasive false construction of 
the self is an ego around whose specific satisfactions the world is to be structured.’
3
 The main 
emphasis Williams seeks to make in regard to his Augustinian understanding of self-knowledge is that 
we can never seek to understand our selves apart from the movement of desire, because, in Williams’ 
estimation, Augustine rejects ‘the idea that we could observe the self or mind in a neutral way: 
because what we see when we look at ourselves is desire’, and that ‘we are to know and love 
ourselves as questing, as seeking to love with something of God’s freedom (in the sense of a love not 
glued to any object of satisfaction)’.
4
 Such an acknowledgement of desire as central to the 
understanding of the self actually hereby coheres with the feminist critique of androcentricism since 
the acknowledgement of the infinite desire for God works itself out in practices of unmastery, rather 
than seeking to have a finalized picture of the world, as Sarah Coakley has argued.
5
 
The final possible criticism we shall mention is the one given by John Milbank. For Milbank, as we 
might postulate in light of some of his remarks in Being Reconciled, while the past cannot be undone 
(including instances of suffering and tragedy), nonetheless, like a musical note that is heard differently 
in light of what comes after it, we cannot view tragedy in a such a resolute fashion that we do not pay 
                                               
1
 This is something emphasised by his recent Gifford Lectures. For more on this, see ‘Material Words; Language as Physicality 
(available from http://www.ed.ac.uk/about/video/lecture-series/gifford-lectures, accessed 25/4/2014).  
2
 For more on this, see Williams, ‘Nature, Passion and Desire: Maximus’ Ontology of Excess’, 267-272.  
3
 Williams, ‘Know Thyself’, in 224.  
4
 ’The Paradoxes of Self-knowledge in De Trinitate‘, 131.  
5
 Coakley, ‘Is there a Future for Gender and Theology? On Gender, Contemplation, and the Systematic Task’. Criterion 47.1 
(2009), 2-11; and Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self: An Essay ‘On the Trinity’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), 33-65. 
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attention to the possibility of it being seen differently in light of continuing history.
1
 Furthermore, 
Milbank rejects ‘the unsurpassibility of the tragic’ because such an assertion will ultimately leave ‘no 
possibility for the ethical’. Speaking of King Lear, Milbank says that ‘Since this play discloses a 
universal tragic sway (we cannot redeem our losses and misdeeds, there is no forgiveness), one 
cannot either mitigate this circumstance nor come to terms with it; that is to say accept it, even though 
it is true. It is so bad, that it should be turned away from, and yet it cannot be. It must be turned away 
from…’
2
 Milbank seems to be saying that we cannot allow tragedy to stop us from going on, from 
living in and imagining a world in accordance with ‘the counter-reality of resurrection, and the 
possibility that this world already mysteriously participates in that reality’
3
 where the potential for 
reciprocity, gift-receiving and gift-giving is not excluded, but continues to be a possibility, in spite of 
horrendous evil. For Milbank, ‘The greatest atrocity requires all the more an access of hope, the 
greatest evil calls out all the more for an impossible forgiveness and reconciliation, else, quite simply, 
such evil remains in force’. Milbank argues (following from his belief in the privatio boni) that 
something as terrible as the Shoah belongs to ‘the contingency of perversity’ rather than any historical 
necessity or an ontology of ‘radical evil’.
4
  
It should be said that Williams would find little to disagree with here; in his recent Gifford Lectures, 
Williams made specific (and approving) reference to similar statements made by Milbank.
5
 In light of 
this positive reference, it could be argued that he acknowledges the fact that we cannot exclude a 
priori potential resolutions to seemingly irresolvable tensions, including tragic conflict. Every tragedy is 
open to the healing powers of God, and is not shielded from the process of human meaning-making. 
Nonetheless (though Williams did not mention this in the lecture itself), in light of what we have seen 
from Williams’ comments elsewhere, I suspect that Williams would have difficulty in saying that all 
tragedy, contradiction and loss can find such resolution, even eschatologically. Unless one holds to a 
maximalist doctrine of apokatastasis panton
6
 (something that Williams does not expound) where 
everything is redeemed, and all loses are recompensed, where all the limitations of time are 
overcome, then there remains the problem of how one is to understand the beatific vision and 
eschatological judgement as giving dignity to our existence precisely as historical and limited beings 
(as someone like Nicholas Lash emphasised, along with others)
7
, one in which the history of our 
bodily engagements and identity are not apocalyptically ‘suspended’ in any simplistic way. This is also 
the vision we see suggested in his lectures on Four Quartets. The remaining question that Williams 
might propose to Milbank is to whether he believes all losses or tragedy will simply be returned or 
                                               
1
 Being Reconciled, 52.  
2
 Ibid., 149. It should be said here that Milbank has MacKinnon in mind here, but such criticisms could also be directed at 
Williams himself.  
3
 Ibid., 153. 
4
 Ibid., 55.  
5
 See ‘Extreme Language: Discovery under Pressure’ (available at http://www.ed.ac.uk/about/video/lecture-series/gifford-
lectures, accessed 24/4/2014), where we affirms Milbank’s suggestion that the experience of irresolvable tension calls, 
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fiction and stories constructed in light of the conflicts we experience.  
6
 For an admirable reflection on the apokatastasis panton, see J. Christine Janowski, ‘Eschatologischer Dualismus? 
Erwägungen zum »doppelten Ausgang« des Jüngsten Gerichts‘. Jahrbuch für Biblischen Theologie 9 (1994) 175-218. 
Janowski discusses the history of the term, but also seeks to disentagle its possible future usage from its Origenist baggage. At 
the same time, she seeks to articulate an eschatology that is not ‘geschichtsnihilistisch’, or that promotes an ‘eschatologische 
Dualismus’,  an ‘ungeheuerlich Ontologie’ that underlies the exclusionary tendencies we find articulated in experiences of the 
‘Logik des Wahsinns’ and ‘Logik des Schreckens’.   
7
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transformed eschatologically. If the world telos is comedy, simplistically speaking, then does not such 
a position imply a theology of universal reconciliation which (while finding support among early church 
fathers), is nonetheless a controversial doctrine within orthodox theology. Even if one were to hold a 
chastened, hopeful theory of apokatastasis panton (like Karl Barth and Balthasar did), one should not 
turn such a vision into a ‘historical metaphysic’ (to reference Barth)
1
 or use it as a theory to overcome 
the messiness and cultural thickness of our human interactions within the confines of the temporal 
order of things.
2
 In other words, we should not use eschatological theories in an uncomplicated 
manner to suture the wounds of history, as if the resurrection can surgically remove completely each 
and every scarring and harrowing experience humanity has gone through (cf. John 20.26-29, Rev. 
5.1-14), as if eschatology could encompass or undo each and every experience of loss.  
One must take seriously Milbank’s critique of ‘the cult of tragedy’
3
 in which ‘the tragic’ achieves a 
kind of ‘speculatively idealist’ quality, extracted from the continuing movement history and politics. 
Milbank argues that we have to ultimately look away from ‘tragedy’ precisely because – especially in 
the case of truly extreme kinds of tragedy – gazing at it will get us nowhere, it will only paralyze us; 
ethically we are hamstrung. One also suspects that that – following Badiou
4
 – Milbank believes that 
focusing on tragedy in all its resilient particularity, its ‘otherness’, freezes us into inactivity because 
being so enamoured with particularity and ‘difference’ we are unable to engage in real, material 
social-political change. This obviously raises questions in relation to one of the motifs I have 
advanced in relation to Williams’ theology of the tragic, namely the motif of contemplation, which 
could carry overtones of ‘the cult of tragedy’. However, I have already mentioned earlier (in chapter 
one), that Williams attempt to take seriously tragedy should not amount to a pedagogy of pain, or that 
‘tragedy’ is given some kind of ‘sacred’ status of awe and terror, in the aboriginal and ambiguous 
meaning of that term.
5
 Rather, I have simply argued that for Williams tragedy provides a paradigmatic 
example of the world’s ‘objectivity’, of that which resists our attempts to formulate a complete and 
finalized picture of the world, that it resists our assertions of ‘the end of history’, or that our socio-
political knots or tensions will ever be completely resolved. By responding to tragedy contemplatively, 
or with a resolute attentiveness, Williams is essentially advocating that we develop a poetic and 
attentive praxis of discernment in relation to the ‘the tragic’ or ‘tragedy’, a praxis which in itself does 
‘nothing’, like poetry (as Auden said), but that nonetheless creates a sensitivity towards what is 
irrepressibly there, and is able to instil within us (when suffering is involved) the seeds from which 
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 Barth, Church Dogmatics II.2: The Doctrine of God, trans. G.W. Bromiley et al (London-New York: T & T Clark, 1957), 417. 
For Williams ‘ own reflections on this theme, see Williams, ‘Heaven and Hell: A Modern Embarrassment?’ Epworth Review 21.2 
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3
 Being Reconciled, 149.  
4
 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. Peter Hallward (London-New York: Verso, 2001), 18-29. 
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Press, 2003).  
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 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 75-80. For more on this semantic and etymological ambiguity of sacer and sanctus, see Emile 
Benveniste, Indo-European Language and Society. Miami Linguistic Series No. 12, trans. Elizabeth Palmer (Coral Gables, 
Florida: University of Miami Press, 1973), 452-456.  
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compassion can grow. Turning away from tragedy is certainly sometimes the only response that can 
be given, especially initially when the pain is raw and trauma still burgeoning. However (following 
Gillian Rose) we need to allow the work of mourning to take its course, if we do not want melancholia 
to reign. This involves taking the trauma and tragedy seriously, not turning away too quickly, which 
opens the door potentially to repression, and the eventual return of the repressed. To reference 
biblical imagery here, like the story of the Bronze Snake in the Wilderness (Num. 21.4-9, John 3.14), 
seeing truly is part of any genuine healing process
1
; denial is a recipe for stagnation and neurotic 
fixation. The source of our affliction needs to be seen for what it is if we are to begin to find solace and 
consolation. Admittedly, recalling tragedy and pain is a risky process since (as Paul Ricoeur has 
argued), all history and memory is a potentially pharmakon (a potential poison or cure
2
), but 
nonetheless we cannot simply turn away or forget tragedy without some kind of undesirable 
consequences occurring. I am obviously not suggesting that Milbank holds such an opinion, only that 
his comments need to be balanced a little more in this direction.
3
 It should be clarified further that 
Williams is opposed to a ‘political melancholy’ which assumes that ‘history is essentially tragic or 
catastrophic, that the enemies of human welfare of always already victorious’ and therefore is 
suspicious of certain ‘Messianic’ interpretations of history in which social change can only occur 
magically and violently.
4
 However (apropos Milbank’s comments on forgiveness), Williams is also 
aware of ‘the risk and powerlessness of remorse’ in the sense that ‘no one can guarantee 
forgiveness’ will occur.
5
 Generally speaking, in this regard, one also wonders whether Williams would 
not have some similar comments to make regarding Milbank’s concept of divine forgiveness (as we 
saw in his comments on Marilyn Adams’ theodicy), in the sense that Milbank seeks to magnify the 
problem of forgiveness to such an extent that the possibility of any real forgiveness being enacted on 
the interpersonal plane of being between human agents becomes problematic; Milbank essentially 
creates an such expansive problem that only a divine being could provide a solution. And one 
wonders whether this (as with Adams’ reflections on God providing a solution to ‘horrendous’ evil), we 
have a kind of deus ex machina operating here, to the extent that Milbank would need to explicate 
further how real experiences of forgiveness could occur between human beings, even when 
‘horrendous’ evils were concerned, without simply bringing in ‘God’ to solve the problem.  
As we bring this study to a close, I think it would be beneficial to bring what we have been 
speaking about into the South African context. From my perspective, it seems to be the case that as 
we look at the history of South Africa over the past century, the category of tragedy seems to be an 
enlightening heuristic for interpreting where we find ourselves now. As I write this, South Africa is 
celebrating twenty years of democracy, and at the same time is entering into a fourth term of ANC 
rule. However, it is also the first free elections we have experienced without the moral lodestar that 
was Nelson Mandela, who died on 5 December 2013. Presently, there is also a growing discontent 
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 I owe this insight to a sermon delivered by Robert Steiner at Rondebosch United Church.  
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 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 
2004), 141-145.  
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with the ruling party, with reports of corruption, cronyism, mismanagement, and irresponsibility 
becoming commonplaces of the South African socio-political milieu. While this is occurring, millions of 
South Africans are experiencing the ravages of poverty and unemployment, as well as HIV/AIDS. 
Within this context, two factors need to be taken into account, both which bespeak of real, historical 
tragedy.  
On the one hand, many of the inequalities we are experiencing now are simply the historical 
effects and fruits of apartheid and racially-prejudiced policies like the Group Areas Act (amidst others) 
which effectively deprived many South Africans of their inheritances and their homes, creating a 
reality of systematic impoverishment. That we are still living within this effective history (the results of 
which cannot be simplistically reversed) is a fact of South African life. Obviously, I am not denying the 
fact that small restitutions can be made here and there for specific individuals and on a systematic 
level. However, as we reflect on darker aspects of our history, the horrors of torture, rape, murder, 
and kidnapping which were not uncommon practices of the de facto nationalist security forces during 
apartheid (never mind the history of segregation and white paternalism that preceded it), have left 
scars and memories which can never be fully healed or recounted, despite the magnanimous (albeit 
ambiguous) gesture that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was. There are stories which were 
not told, and some risk oblivion in the land of forgetfulness; and we cannot underestimate the history 
of such brutal violence being a part of our present reality, which still remains a pretty violent one by 
world standards. We cannot assume that the TRC has resolved the narratives of suffering which our 
history bears witness (though I am not suggesting it attempted to do this).
1
  
On the other hand, the ruling party itself (the ANC) since it has come to power seems to be 
manifesting some rather troubling tendencies (corruption and the policy of seizure and maintenance 
of power being some), proclivities which were already present in the period before it came power 
(even while it was a banned, being an effectively illegal political entity). Here the ‘tragic flaw’, the 
ἁμαρτία (in the Aristotelian sense) has become manifestly apparent.
2
 With such factors in play, and 
without a significant political upheaval on the horizon, political pessimism seems to be an attractive, 
and a seemingly reasonable option. I am not saying that I endorse such a perspective; I simply giving 
expression to a major stream of contemporary political pathos.  
Into such a context, what might Rowan Williams have to say? It should be said that Williams did 
travel to South African during the 1980’s, and penned a reflection on the topic of violence for New 
Blackfriars.
3
 He also has written about the problem of political remorse and reconciliation within the 
South African context more recently.
4
 In 1984, he spoke about the difficult position the church found 
                                               
1
 For a brief reflection on these issues, see Theo De Wit, ‘The Adornment of Evil: Narrativity, Evil and Reconciliation’. 
Nederduits Gereformeerde Teologiese Tydskrif 51.3-4 (2010), 231-237. For a response, see Gerrit Brand, ‘Facing Evil: 
Theological Reflections’. Nederduits Gereformeerde Teologiese Tydskrif 52.1-2 (2011), 289-296. For a more detailed 
discussion, see Dirk J. Smit, ‘Shared Stories for the Future? Theological Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in South 
Africa’, in Ernst M Conradie (ed.), Essays in Public Theology: Collected Essays 1. Study Guides in Religion and Theology 12 
(Stellenbosch: Sun Press, 2007), 325-341.  
2
 On this issues generally, see Alex Borraine, What’s Gone Wrong?: On the Brink of a Failed State (Johannesburg & Cape 
Town: Jonathan Bal Publishers, 2014). However, already in the late 80’s and early 90’s, there were some who questioned the 
nascent authoritarianism of the ANC (e.g. Hermann Giliomee, Johann Degenaar). For some of these reflections, see Johann 
Degenaar, The Myth of a South African Nation. Occasional Papers, no. 40 (IDASA, 1992).  
3
 Williams, ‘Violence and the Gospel in South Africa’. New Blackfriars 65.775 (1984), 505-513. He has also written essays on 
the topic of racism. For a sample of this, Williams, ‘’Nobody Knows Who I am Till Judgement Morning’, in On Christian 
Theology, 276-289.  
4
 Lost Icons, 144-150.  
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itself in, a place where neutrality was impossible: you either in your actions and attitudes supported 
the apartheid regime, or you resisted in whatever manner possible, suffering the consequences of 
such rebellion. He even references the fact that church’s denunciation of ‘terrorism’ could be heard as 
a justification of the status quo.
1
 He advocated that the church engage in ‘small-scale direct actions’ 
where possible, and also ‘the exploration of appropriate ‘gestures’ in defiance of the status quo’.
2
 
More recently, Williams has spoken about a ‘deeply felt myth of innocence’
3
 within the South African 
community (especially amongst white Afrikaners, though not exclusively
4
). He acknowledges that a 
significant political transition occurred in 1994, but he also comments on the economic situation by 
saying that ‘The maintenance of white privilege by ‘freezing’ the great majority of the total population 
within the constraints of a low-wage, labour intensive economy becomes harder and harder in a 
market-orientated international situation’. He also makes reference to the possibility that ‘self-
perceptions don’t necessarily change when economic and political constraints do…If a significant 
proportion of the white population remains privately wedded to the self-perceptions that reinforced 
apartheid, even when the structures have begun to shift, what real conversation, what ‘charity’ can 
emerge between former masters and former slaves’.
5
 Regarding history, he has said that ‘refusals to 
confront the past deny the passage of time and the reality of vulnerability.’
6
 And further: ‘South Africa 
should remind us that the corporate selves of the dominant and oppressed groups in a society do not 
simply lose their histories by the fact of structural change; they thus remain vulnerable, tense and 
mistrustful constructions to the extent that these histories are not thought and imagined afresh’.
7
 
Williams is aware of the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and commends its work, 
but he does wonder (amidst some others concerns), whether ‘The good intentions of the Commission 
have appeared at times as having the effect of cheapening the very language of truth and 
reconciliation’.
8
 Nonetheless, he says (echoing again Rose’s work) that ‘The mourning that arises in 
[a] relational particularity enables me to endure as a ‘witness’ to other possibilities in the face of 
catastrophe; even to remain open to the ironic and the humorous; it also, because it recognises that 
the recognition between persons happens, allows the possibility and intelligibility of forgiveness’.
9
 This 
is part-and-parcel of Williams’ belief in the social ‘miracle’ of charity which can occur amongst people 
and communities.
10
 However (again referencing Rose), he recognises that ‘the central tragedy of 
modern consciousness’ relates to the question of modern politics in which ‘the militarisation and 
mystification of the state as an impersonal mechanism’
11
 results in ‘a schism between my moral 
                                               
1
 ‘Violence and the Gospel in South Africa’, 511.  
2
 Ibid., 512.  
3
 Lost Icons, 145.  
4
 Williams does complicate this image by mentioning some of the stories that came out of the TRC regarding the activities of 
Winnie Mandela, which no doubt complicate any theory of ‘pure’ victimhood on the part of black South Africans. In this regard, 
some of the stories mentioned by Alex Borraine in relation  to the ANC’s  (and Umkonto we Siswe’s) practices when it operated 
beyond in the borders (especially in relation to suspected cases of espionage within the ANC) were sometimes far from 
innocent.    
5
 Ibid., 146.  
6
 Ibid, 146-147.  
7
 Ibid., 149-150.  
8
 Ibid., 148.  
9
 Ibid., 157.  
10
 Ibid., 65-115.  
11
 Historically speaking, the church should admit its own responsibility for this occurrence since the ‘mystification’ of the state or 
the ‘nation’ is something which can be traced to Medieval developments regarding beliefs regarding the corpus mysticum, the 
‘secularisation’ of Christological concepts, as well as the reception of the idea of economia within theological reflection. For a 
genealogical study of these terms, see Ernst H. Kantorowicz, 'Pro Patria Mori in Medieval Political Thought’, and ‘Mysteries of 
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awareness, my scrutiny of myself as (more or less) self-determining, self-forming, agent and the 
political location as a subject involved in processes beyond my control, processes for which I can 
disclaim responsibility.’
1
 For Williams, movements for political change and forgiveness have to be 
cognizant of history, those unique narrative details which form us as individuals and communities, as 
well as rethinking the political order of things, especially the modern, secular notion of the state, and 
our relation to it.
2
 Taking into account the limitations of history, the particularity of the South African 
story, as well as reimagining our institutions and interpersonal relations (across the borders of race, 
class, gender, age) is the only way real change can occur. Without such a procedure, the continuing 
possibility remains that under the requisite pressure and tension, old prejudices and myths will flare 
up again (as the xenophobic violence which erupted a view years ago displayed).  
In light of these realities, for us as South Africans, our confession should be that redemption and 
reconciliation, both politically and soteriologically, cannot occur without memoria
3
 (‘Liberation is 
achieved through, not apart from, the awareness of the past’
4
) since, as Eliot wrote, ‘A people without 
history / Is not redeemed from time’.
5
  Taking this into account, Williams might suggest that we as 
Christians cannot be blind or escape into a world of fantastical wish-fulfillment (forgetful of history and 
limitation, nor of political constraints) but must seek in concrete ways to embody within our 
communities practices of hope and imagination
6 as well as cultural resistance7 to hegemonic forces 
where necessary (e.g. secularist, technologized, putatively ‘non-religious’ politics), thereby seeing a 
world within the visible one, one that is scarred and tattered with the remnants of history’s apparent 
disaster, one in which the ‘miracle’ of charity and mutual recognition are continually possible despite 
limitations. It could be said that Williams’ theology of tragic hope is an attempt to see such a world, a 
world that can only be glimpsed for those who have eyes to see. In a strenuous manner, Williams 
tries to articulate what it means for us to construct meaning and hope precisely within the recalcitrant 
contexts we find ourselves in, a hope beyond the world of speculation or self-protecting fantasy. Such 
a hope is possible because Williams believes in the fundamental goodness of the world, and in a God 
who is able to dwell within a world of contingency and its tragic consequences, in cross, creation, 
                                                                                                                                                  
State. An Absolute Concept and Its Late Medieval Origins’, in Selected Studies (Locust Valley, New York: J.J Augustin 
Publishers, 1965), 308-324, 381-398; Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy 
and Government, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).   
1
 Ibid., 152-153.  
2
 The essays to be found in Faith in the Public Square, are largely an attempt to rethink theologically and philosophically what 
we mean by the state. Williams has (since the late 70’s at least) preferred the ‘pluralist’ model of the state suggsted by J.N. 
Figgis (and others like Lord Acton and Harold Laski) in which the state acts as a ‘community of communities’ rather than an 
entity that politically, culturally and religiously ‘neuters’ its constituents. For a brief discussion of Figgis, see Williams, ‘Liberation 
Theology and the Anglican Tradition’, in Rowan Williams and David Nichols, Politics and Theological Identity: Two Anglican 
Essays (London: Jubilee, 1984), 20-24.  
3
 For some reflections on history and memory within a South African context, see Robert Vosloo, ‘Memory, History, and Justice: 
In Search of Conceptual Clarity’. Nederduits Gereformeerde Teologiese Tydskrif 53.3 (2012), 215-227.  
4
 Williams, ‘Mankind, Nation, State’, in This Land and This People, 122.  
5
 Eliot, Little Gidding  V, in Collected Poems: 1909-1962, 208.  
6
 For some reflections on hope that are inspired by Augustine, see Charles Mathewes, The Republic of Grace: Augustinian 
Thoughts for Dark Times (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 218-243. For some  general reflections on hope that are more 
pertinent to the South African context, see Selina Palm and Clint Le Bruyns, ‘Transforming Hope? A Theological-Ethical Vision, 
Virtue and Practice for the Common Good’. Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 146 (July 2013), 104-121. One is also 
reminded here of Cornel West’s articulation of a ‘blues’ sensibility, one that articulates a ‘tragicomic hope’ that draws on the rich 
and painful experience of African-Americans. For this, see Cornel West, Democracy Matters: Winning the Fight Against 
Imperialism (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 19-23.  
7
 Rowan Williams and John Milbank, for example, have spoken quite a bit about this (in different ways); in the South African 
context, however, Gerrit Brand also expressed similar sentiments in the last years of his life. For his views, see Gerrit Brand, 
‘Faith in the Face of Secularism? Unmasking a Sacred Ideology’, and ‘Culture, Power, Religion’, in Godverlanger: ‘n 
Huldingsbundel vir Gerrit Brand – met ‘n keur uit sy skrywes, (eds.) Willem De Vries and Robert Vosloo (Stellenbosch: SUN 
Press, 2014), 352-368; 397-416.  
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ecclesia and Eucharist, in the Christ who ‘plays in ten thousand places’.
1
 And whether he is 
successful or not remains open for debate since the conversation on this difficult topic is potentially 
endless. Such a continuing discussion is bound up with the reality of tragedy itself, which encourages 
us to hold onto the question rather than being satisfied with final answers.
2
 It is within the context of 
such a question that we find ourselves, and it is within this place that we have to articulate the liberty 
given to us. ‘The white line in the tickling / membrane of freedom’ remains in force, along with its 
uncertain, but hopeful agnosticism regarding the exact and definitive ‘shape’ of the future. We 
continue to hope, and to make whatever differences we can, knowing that ‘We are only undefeated / 
Because we have gone on trying’
3
. We continue to hope for transformation, that God may 
metamorphosize the crucifixes of history into instruments of salvation, that the wreckage of the past – 
the ‘heap of broken images’
4
 – may become tessellated into some kind of cosmic mosaic, even 
though the dark ornamentation of the tragic may linger on. History is not simply (as Schopenhauer or 
Stephen Dadaelus might have it
5
) a nightmare in which the only hope is our awakening, or (if the 
musical metaphor may be permitted) a perpetual Danse Macabre, Ligetian Requiem, Stockhausian 
Kontake, or ‘Todesfuge’ (‘Schwarze milch…wir trinken und trinken’
6
) but rather – it may be suggested 
– an eschatological Quatuor pour la fin du temps, or a transposing fugue of such contrapuntal density 
that it allows the haunting music of history to ramify and echo. For such, we may hope and desire; the 
Angel of History moves on.  
Furthermore, holding onto this question (within the South African context) might also involve 
provoking the church to reflect theologically on the problem of evil and tragedy, in light of South 
Africa’s own unique history, either through robust constructive theological work
7
, or through more 
informal reflections on particular narratives in light of Christian symbols and themes.
8
 While some 
work on this problem has been done, I suggest that there is room for more development in this area. 
In addition to this, and more broadly, I think reflections on the theme of tragic limitedness and the 
complexity of reality provide a fruitful avenue for reflections on the nature of education and the 
university itself. Within a technologized and efficiency-driven context such as ours (intellectually 
                                               
1
 Gerard Manley Hopkins, ‘As kingfishers catch fire’, Selected Poetry (ed.) Catherine Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), 115.  
2
 I owe this phrase to Brother Alois of Taizé who mentioned it to me in a private conversation. Williams himself has said that we 
continue to use metaphorical and paradoxical language so that we may keep questions alive.  For this, see A Ray of Darkness, 
100.  
3
 Eliot, The Dry Salvages V, in Collected Poems: 1909-1962, 200.  
4
 The reference is to Eliot’s ‘The Burial of the Dead’, from the The Wasteland, in Collected Poems: 1909-1962, 53.  
5
 Julian Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy: From Plato to Žižek, 152-168; James Joyce, Ulysses, (eds.) Hans Walter Gabler, 
Wolfhard Steppe, and Claus Melchior (London: The Bodley Head, 1986), 28 (line 377).  
6
 Paul Celan, ‘Todesfuge’, in Die Gedichte: Kommentierte Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005), 40-41.  
7
 There are some examples of South African theologians reflecting on the problem of evil generally, within the context of 
theodicy and the so-called debates surrounding the free-will defense. On this, see Vincent Brümmer, Brümmer on Meaning and 
the Christian Faith: Collected Writings of Vincent Brümmer (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 211ff.; Gerrit Brand, ‘Om God in goed 
en kwaad to sien. Oor twee vorme van Teodisee’. Nederduits Gereformeerde Teologiese Tydskrif 53.3 (2012), 1-12. It  should 
be mentioned here that that this last mentioned article was one of the last Gerrit published before his death in March 2013, and 
his last contribution to the NGTT. The article was written in honour of Brümmer for his eightieth birthday, who was his 
Doktervater at Utrecht. On a more personal note, in one of the last conversations I had with Gerrit, he told me he was preparing 
this article. He asked me to provide him with some references for Ingolf Dalferth’s Becoming Present, which I did. So in this 
regard, I like to think, in some small way, I made his final contribution as the editor of the NGTT a bit easier.  
8
 An example of a such a genre can be found in John De Gruchy, Led into Mystery: Faith Seeking Answers in Life and Death 
(London: SCM Press, 2013). While this is a more personal (and theological) reflection on the death of his son Steve (also a 
well-known theological figure in South Africa), and is not directly related to suffering caused by the effects of apartheid policies, 
it nonetheless provides us with a fruitful model for future reflections on narratives of suffering, within a South African context. A 
more pertinent example however (from an American context) which seeks to bring historical suffering (namely, the experience 
African Americans), as well as personal and theological reflections on tragedy and hope into conversation, is James H. Cone’s 
The Cross and the Lynching Tree (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2011).  
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stemming from Descartes
1
, but similar tendencies are also in Plato
2
), we can lose sight of the 
questions regarding the procedures that pertain to the advancement of a truly humane culture, in 
which learning and education can serve as a contributing factor towards an expansive notion of ‘the 
human’, that educational systems should be conscious of their place and purpose in society, while at 
the same time adhering to their properly critical, Socratic function. The density and connectedness of 
the contingent reality we find ourselves in serves as a reminder that we are never complete in 
evaluations, and that our judgements and speech are placed before the possibility of revision. The 
commonly-presupposed idea of education, either in its technologized or career-driven forms, often 
fails to account for this reality. But it also fails to take into account limitedness and the tragic, the 
finitude of human creativity, in the sense that the world in all its rhizomed complexity
3
 resists final 
control or the ultimate triumph of universal technē.
4
  
A final thought: Rosenzweig once said that tragedy aims to be a representation of silence
5
, namely 
the speechlessness of the central agents of the tragic story. While it will be admitted that certain forms 
of silence can be oppressive, silence, when it is rightly contextualized, can open up spaces of 
meaning where words fail us, much like the emptiness and ellipses one finds in a poetic stanza, or in 
a piano sonata
6
. Silence has its own ‘aesthetic’ contours.
7
 Taking into account these qualifications, 
holding onto the question, rather than being content with final answers, maybe involves learning to 
shepherd that silence, allowing it to do its work on our language, and awakening us to that silence 
hidden within our speech, helping us to navigate around – where possible – language’s own potential 
‘fatality’.
8
 As Walter Benjamin said: ‘Silence is...born from the conversation’.
9
  
 
I conclude with Hopkins: ‘Not out of his bliss / Springs the stress / Nor first from heaven (and few 
know this) / Swings the stroke dealt – / Stroke and stress that stars and storms deliver, / That guilt is 
hushed by, hearts are flushed by and melt – / But it rides time like riding a river / (And here the faithful 
waver, the faithless fable and miss.)
10
 
                                               
1
 John Milbank argues that Descartes sought to motivate a ‘Counter-Renaissance’ in the sense that he wanted ‘to extirpate the 
role of immanent vital forces and of human innovative creativity, both being seen as dangerously paganizing in character’. It is 
for this reason that Descartes’ concept of divinely given ‘innate ideas’ leads to – in Milbank’s opinion –‘the reduction of 
Renaissance poesis (both artistic and natural-magical) to the modern classical techne: the measurable, mechanical world being 
revealed only to our clear, solitary grasp’ which can ‘become the object of endless manipulation according to prescribed and 
absolutely fixed mental standards’. Milbank goes on to say that ‘Modern Prometheanism…is paradoxically linked to the loss of 
spontaneous mental activity and does not lie in straightforwardly in continuity with the celebration of divinely human creativity 
by Nicholas of Cusa, Pico della Mirandola and others in the Renaissance period’. For this, see John Milbank, Beyond Secular 
Order: The Representation of Being and the Representation of the People, 82.  
2
 Sean Kirkland, The Ontology of Socratic Questioning in Plato’s Early Dialogues, 59-91; Julian Young, The Philosophy of 
Tragedy: From Plato to to Žižek, 3-20 in relation to Plato’s preference for technē over poesis.  
3
 Paul Cilliers, ‘Imagining Better Futures: Complexity and Creativity’, in John De Gruchy (ed.), The Humanist Imperative in 
South Africa (Stellenbosch: SUN Press, 2011), 31-40.  
4
 For some reflections on this, see Williams, ‘Faith in the University’, 24-35. Also, cf. Williams, ‘Has Secularism Failed?’ in Faith 
in the Public Square, 11-22.  
5
 Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, trans. William Wallo (Great Britain: Routledge and Kegan, 1971), 77.  For a 
commentary on this, see Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death: The Place of Negativity, trans. Karen E. Pinkus and Michael 
Hardt (Minneapolis-Oxford: University of Minneapolis Press, 2006), 84-98.  
6
 For more on this, see Williams, ‘Can the Truth Be Spoken?’ (available at http://www.ed.ac.uk/about/video/lecture-
series/gifford-lectures, accessed on 5/9/2014).  
7
 See Susan Sontag, ‘The Aesthetics of Silence’, in Styles of Radical Will (United States: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1969), 3-
34.  
8
 For this phrase, in a slightly different context, see Jorge Luis Borges, ‘An Investigation of the Word’, in Selected Non-Fictions, 
(ed.) Eliot Weinberger, trans. Esther Allen, Suzanne Jill Levine, and Eliot Weinberger (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 38. 
9
 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Metaphysics of Youth’, in Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (eds.), Selected Writings 1: 1913-
1926 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1996),  
10
 Hopkins, ‘The Wreck of the  Deutschland’, in Selected Poetry, 99.  
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